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Abstract
Following the case study research strategy, this thesis has investigated the 
implementation of corporate environmental policies in subsidiaries of transnational 
corporations in Brazil. More specifically, it investigated six subsidiaries from three 
countries of origin - the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany - operating in 
the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors.
This comparative study has resulted in a theoretical framework to explain 
transnational corporations’ environmental practices. This framework follows an 
interdisciplinary approach, consisting of four levels. First, at the international level, an 
overview of the constraints regarding transnational corporations and environmental 
issues is addressed. The second level is represented by the environmental regulatory 
policies in the home and host countries. The third level accessed the influences from the 
industry’s structure (in both international and Brazilian contexts). Finally, the fourth 
level is centred on the companies, which specifically discusses the home-host dilemma 
in the management of transnational corporations.
The most important conclusion is that the main source of pressure over 
subsidiaries’ practices is the environmental regulation of the host country. Nevertheless, 
there are cases of non-compliance and cases of overcompliance regarding Brazilian 
environmental legislation. However, these contradictory results are explained by the 
headquarters-subsidiary relationship. That is, poor environmental performance was 
explained by lack of control from the headquarters. Otherwise, good performance was 
explained by tight control from headquarters over subsidiaries’ practices in Brazil.
Additionally, there is indication that regulation is the main driving force in the 
home countries. However, attempts at self-regulation are in progress in the chemical 
industry in order to balance these external pressures for environmental improvements. 
Finally, there is evidence that the nationality of the selected companies is a relevant 
aspect of their environmental policies and practices. This is mainly because the legal 
requirements and management approach of the home countries are incorporated into 
their environmental management.
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Chapter I - Introduction
1.1 - Objective of the study
The aim of this thesis is to investigate, with the aid of an interdisciplinary 
perspective, why and how transnational corporations1 adopt and implement 
environmental policies2 in their subsidiaries in a developing country. In addition, the 
question concerning the main factors determining subsidiaries behaviour is addressed.
The unit of analysis is ‘corporate environmental policy and practices’, because 
the focus of analysis is the process of implementation of a ‘corporate policy’ through 
formalised ‘practices’. Consequently, this unit of analysis is of an embedded type. That 
is, the subsidiary is the main unit of analysis because the empirical investigation is 
centred on transnational corporations’ (TNCs) practices in a host country. However, the 
headquarters usually define the corporate environmental policy; therefore the 
headquarters is the subunit of analysis (Rappaport and Flaherty, 1992; Brown et al., 
1993; and UNEP, 1994).
More specifically, corporate environmental policies are understood as broad 
guidelines declaring companies’ strategic decisions regarding the management of their 
environmental impacts. The UNTCMD (1993, p. 14) states that environmental policy 
statements “consist primarily of corporate principles that express in fairly general terms 
the fundamental attitudes and activities of the corporation with regard to the 
environment”. Likewise, Rappaport and Flaherty (1992, p. 27) affirm that corporate 
policy statements are an effective means for communicating the company’s intentions 
for environmental, health and safety (EH&S) issues. As well as this, the most common 
feature of these written policies is the explicit statement of compliance with existing
1 The choice of the concept of ‘transnational’ instead of ‘multinational companies’ follows UNCTC (1983) 
and Strange (1994, p. 76). The latter states that TNC is more accurate because as a corporation it is neither 
in character nor in control, multi-national. In fact the majority of them are national corporations operating 
transnationally. Despite this choice some studies that will be addressed here assume the term 
‘multinational’, therefore such cases shall be restricted to authors’ citations.
2 For prescriptive definitions of corporate environmental policy see CBI (1992; 1995b), UNEP (1994) and 
Bennett et al. (1993). Descriptive examples of this concept are in Brown et al. (1993), Buzzelli (1991) and 
van Bergeijk (1991). Moreover, empirical evidence of these policies may be found in corporate 
environmental reports. Finally, Smart (1992), Willums and Goluke (1992) and Schmidheiny (1992) have 
compiled some of the ‘most successful’ cases of corporate environmental policies and practices.
1
regulations and laws as well as a certain standard that the corporation seeks to meet 
(UNTCMD, 1993, p. 16).
Gladwin (in Pearson, 1987, pp. 13-19) indicates prototypical patterns of 
environmental management associated with pollution-intensive multinational 
corporations (MNCs). The author enumerates five areas (performance objective and 
measurements, organization staffing, project and product planning, technology transfer, 
occupational health and safety), in which environmental performance was investigated 
inside the broad set of MNCs’ activities. Although he states that the information 
available leaves much to be desired, his study must be mentioned as a relevant data 
source on environmental policies and practices of TNCs.
Gladwin’s findings (from surveys completed in the 70s) suggest that MNCs had 
developed formal written statements of objectives and policies concerning pollution 
control that appeared to be in a continual state of evolution and were intended mainly for 
home-country operations. Consequently, MNCs had no system of pollution-control for 
worldwide operations; therefore, affiliate reports to headquarters tended to be informal 
or irregular. According to Gladwin, a large number of MNCs “have corporate-level, top 
management environmental committees that are charged with policy formulation and 
progress review”. However, their dominant orientation “has tended to be toward home- 
country operations, and they are typically composed only of home-country executives” 
(in Pearson, 1987, p. 14). Nevertheless, this emphasis on the home country’s operations 
has not yet been fully explored by the literature.
The UNTCMD (1993) goes one step further in the investigation of TNCs’ 
environmental management3. The most interesting conclusions from this survey are: (1) 
there is a close relationship between the environmental issues that have received much 
regulatory attention in recent years and the issues that have high priority on the corporate 
agenda. Most corporate environmental activities can be related to local or national 
regulatory initiatives, but international regulation (e.g., the Montreal Protocol banning 
the use of chlorofluorocarbons) also seems to influence the TNCs’ activities; (2) 
corporate conduct in specific areas (such as logging and oil industries) is also influenced
3 The ‘Benchmark Corporate Environmental Survey’ includes data from 210 TNCs (of the 794 firms 
targeted by the survey). Among the respondents 169 filled out the questionnaire (including four companies 
investigated by this thesis - BASF, Hoechst, Eli Lilly and Glaxo Wellcome), whereas 41 TNCs preferred to 
send solely informative material (UNTCMD, 1993).
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by international public opinion (UNTCMD, 1993, pp. 161-162); (3) international 
guidelines4 were rarely observed, even though most corporations found international 
harmonization of environmental standards important; (4) only a few TNCs had specific 
accounts of their responsibilities in developing countries, such as policies pledging to 
employ the same EH&S standards globally or special training programmes for 
employees; (5) management practices vary significantly among corporations due to 
factors such as leadership and involvement from the board of directors, corporate line of 
business (i.e., industry sector), size of the company (roughly defined by annual sales), 
and finally home country (Ibid., pp. 91-93).
Two of these factors determining corporate EH&S management are of particular 
interest. First, the suggestion that corporate environmental practices vary significantly 
among countries. Moreover, “it was found that EH&S practices in developing nations 
depend on the home region of the corporation”. These variances may “indicate that 
particular cultural factors affect the way in which corporations organize EH&S 
management”. More specifically, it is stated that “the nature of the regulatory 
environment in the home country of the corporation” (Ibid., p. 93) explains those 
variations.
Second, the indication that industry sector is an important factor. It is suggested 
that companies from the extractive-based sector (including chemical and oil industries) 
have more advanced environmental policies and programmes probably as a consequence 
of extremely costly accidents. On the contrary, companies in the computer and 
pharmaceutical industries have been more innovative than those in other industries. This 
is mainly because “new and more dynamic industries often will have the resources to 
invest in long-term environmental programmes” (Ibid., p. 92). Overall, the UNTCMD’s 
(1993) survey, characterized essentially as an exploratory study, has identified key 
factors that are supposed to influence TNCs’ environmental management. Consequently, 
the survey’s findings will be included in the discussion aiming to build the framework of 
analysis (in chapter two).
Additionally, Gladwin affirms that MNCs’ subsidiaries, “unlike their domestic 
rivals, tend to be more vulnerable to demands and pressure emanating from home and 
host countries with respect to social responsibility” (in Pearson, 1987, p. 7), which
4 From organizations such as International Chamber of Commerce, International Standard Organization, 
International Labour Organization and United Nations for Environmental Protection.
3
includes EH&S concern. But Levy (1995, p. 45) states that “large companies, which are 
the most progressive in terms of environmental policies and procedures, are found to 
have poorer environmental performances in terms of reduction in hazardous emissions” 
Thus, Gladwin’s (in Pearson, 1987) and UNTCMD’s (1993) suggestions that TNCs are 
more advanced in EH&S management have been refuted by Levy’s (1995) results, and 
the merely rhetorical character of TNCs’ environmental policies is given evidence 
(Greenpeace, 1992).
Following an international business perspective, Levy (1995, p. 46) concludes 
that regulatory and organizational factors influence corporate environmental practice 
(defined as policies and procedures) and performance (in terms of toxic emissions); 
however, “there is surprisingly little relationship between practice and performance”. In 
this regard, Gleckman (1995) indicates how TNCs have been addressing environmental 
issues aiming to answer the pressures they face for sustainable development. More 
specifically, TNCs have been acting collectively (through organization such as the ICC) 
in the attempt to avoid responsibility for their environmental impacts5 and to influence 
the definition of sustainable development by international institutions (a similar 
argument is made by Eden, 1994).
In conclusion, these authors stated above have touched upon some aspects of 
interest to this thesis. However, none of them have clearly answered the causal relations 
in the implementation of corporate environmental policies in developing countries. It 
could be explicitly recognized that the lack of explanatory studies (in epistemological 
terms) is in contrast to the abundance of descriptive and prescriptive studies (mainly 
from the field of business management and the business community itself). This lack 
makes clear that the task is not complete; and this is precisely what motivated and 
justified the purpose of this thesis. Taking into account the literature review, this thesis 
will focus on TNCs’ environmental policies and practices in a selected host country.
5 The definition of environmental impact followed throughout the thesis is quite broad, based on what 
Roberts (1995, p. 22) calls environmental problems. According to the author, the business and 
environment relationship includes the likelihood “that the activities of an individual company will have 
both a direct impact upon the local environment through its everyday operations - such as the disposal of 
solid waste materials to landfill - and an indirect impact on regional, national or global environments 
through its consumption of resources such as energy and raw materials”.
4
Due to the fact that a case study was selected as the research strategy to be 
followed, the case findings have produced an analytic generalization6 of the theoretical 
framework developed. Such a framework (presented in chapter two) is based on a set of 
selected variables, which are organised in four levels of analysis7. First, at the 
international level, an overview of main constraints regarding TNCs and environmental 
issues is addressed. At the second level is the home and host countries contexts 
represented by their environmental regulatory policies. The third level accesses the 
influences from the industry’s structure (at both the international and Brazilian 
contexts). Finally, the fourth level is centred on the companies (including headquarters’ 
strategic decisions and subsidiaries’ management), which specifically discusses the 
home-host dilemma in TNCs’ management.
Briefly, this thesis is organized in six chapters. Chapter one introduces the 
research design and the importance of the study. Chapter two discusses the literature in 
order to build the framework of analysis. The empirical results are distributed in the 
subsequent chapters. More specifically, chapter three provides the description and 
analysis of the contextual conditions in the host country. Chapters four and five address 
the selected industrial sectors aiming to describe and analyse the economic and 
regulatory aspects that have affected the implementation of corporate environmental 
policies in the subsidiaries. Finally, chapter six complements the theoretical 
explanations from the previous chapters by addressing the influences of the home 
countries and corporate management on the subsidiaries’ practices.
6 The present research is a case-oriented study with a causal-analytic purpose, that is, to produce limited 
generalizations concerning the causes of theoretically defined categories of empirical phenomena common 
to a set of cases (Ragin, 1989, p.35).
7 In broad terms these levels are strictly related to the concept of international and national contexts, as the 
selected variables are elements of them. National context represents the nation-state and involves not only 
the idea of a distinct governmental jurisdiction, but also that of a distinct sense of nationality, which is 
closely related to ethnic and cultural factors. Accordingly, international context is a concept from the 
political science field, and results from the concept of national political boundaries that divide the world 
into theoretically sovereign and independent nation-states (Apter and Goodman, 1976).
5
1.2 - Empirical focus
Brazil (as a developing country8) was selected as the host country in order to 
analyse the implementation of corporate environmental policies. The first point to justify 
such selection is the reasonable number of TNCs (from the selected countries of origin) 
operating in manufacturing industries (which are pollution-intensive). This aspect has 
allowed a margin of manoeuvre in the selection of the companies. Additionally, the 
focus on TNCs’ subsidiaries and not on domestic firms is based on the literature 
specifically related to Brazil. There is indication that domestic firms are either reactive 
towards legislation or lack environmental management. Besides this, it is strongly 
suggested that TNCs will lead the incorporation of environmental management into the 
Brazilian context (Maimon, 1992b; Neder, 1992; Zulauf, 1994; Gutberlet, 1996).
The second point concerns the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) which occurred in Brazil in 1992. Despite the view that it has 
not achieved any practical results (Thomas, 1993), or that it has been captured by the 
TNCs (Sklair, 1995; Bruno, 1992); this event is considered a turning point in matters 
related to environmental issues. In the Brazilian context (Leis, 1996; Viola, in Ferreira 
and Viola, 1996; Zulauf, 1994; and Hurrell, in Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992), this 
Conference has been able to change the perception of the society regarding 
environmental issues. According to Keck (1995, p. 418), the preparatory process for the 
1992 UNCED “was also an important space for exchange between environmental 
organizations and other kinds of social movements in Brazil”.
Finally, the selection of Brazil is also justified, according to Oyen, “by the fact 
that the researcher had easy access to data and familiarity” with this country. It derives 
from the fact that “familiarity with a country provides additional information, increasing 
the value of the explanatory statements” (1992, p.l 1).
The criteria followed to select the TNCs’ countries of origin may be 
summarised, as follows: (a) to be among the major countries with foreign direct 
investment in Brazil (see table 1.1 below); and (b) to have “western patterns” of social-
8 Some authors (e.g., OECD, 1992a) may classify Brazil as one of the ‘newly industrialized countries’. The 
choice of developing country is specifically to maintain coherence with the literature on TNCs and 
environmental issues (such as Miller, 1995 and UNTCMD, 1993).
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political and economic organization, since some similarity is preferred in order to cope 
with one of the pitfalls of doing comparative studies, that is, equivalence of concepts. At 
this point, one comment shall be made, concerning the fact that countries are neither the 
object of the study nor its units of analysis (Oyen, 1992, p.6). On the contrary, countries 
are considered as contexts which may have distinct influence on the implementation of 
corporate environmental policies and practices.
Initially the US and the UK were selected as the TNCs’ home countries. Later, 
during the fieldwork activities in Brazil, Germany was included as the third country of 
origin. There are specifically two reasons for this decision: (a) former work by the 
researcher with American and German companies in Brazil (Guedes, 1993) had 
produced some directions for further research; and (b) German FDI is representative in 
the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors; the same sectors in which access to American 
and British companies was secured. In sum, the inclusion of German TNCs could 
reinforce even further the cross-country scope of this thesis, at the same time that it 
added more differentiation among the already selected countries which share the same 
language and historical background.
Considering that most countries are too different to be compared fruitfully, 
Teune suggests “that selecting of countries ... should be theoretically justified” (in Oyen, 
1992, p. 44). This aspect has been looked at more deeply in chapter two (section 2.3 of 
this thesis). However, the US is the single major foreign investor in Brazil (illustrated in 
table 1.1). Thus, the behaviour of American TNCs’ subsidiaries represents a source of 
leadership and attention (positive or negative) for society, government and competitors 
(BNDES, 1988). Nevertheless, Germany and Britain are respectively in second and third 
position in the ranking of FDI in Brazil per country of origin.
Table 1.1 - Brazil - foreign direct investment stock -1995* (US$ million)
Country of origin Total** Investments Reinvestments
United States 18,983 (32.7) 15,996 2,987
Germany 7,054 (12.1) 4,779 2,275
United Kingdom 5,216 (9.0) 4,371 845
Japan 4,475 (7.7) 3,581 894
Switzerland 3,637 (6.3) 2,265 1,373
Total*** 58,083 45,504 12,579
Source: Banco Central do Brasil, Boletim, ‘Investimentos e Reinvestimentos Estrangeiros no Brasil’, April 
1996. Notes: * position on 30 June 1995, figures in current-cost basis; ** numbers in parentheses indicate 
percentage o f total FDI stock in Brazil; *** total includes all countries with foreign investments in Brazil.
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Finally, the contextual variances among the UK, the US and Germany, which 
point out significant differences in behaviour (as suggested by Hampden-Tumer and 
Trompenaars, 1993) are useful in testing the theoretical framework. These countries are 
three contexts or examples of empirical data in which to examine the research 
propositions. In addition to this, Stopford et al. (1991, p. 232) state that the nationality of 
the firm is an important question for further research in the realm of international 
relations (rather than in international business). Moreover, the authors affirm that 
“however great the global reach of their operations, the national firm does, 
psychologically and sociologically, ‘belong’ to its home base” (Ibid., p. 233).
The selection of the industrial sectors was initially constrained by the existence 
of TNC subsidiaries with origin in the US and the UK, as well as by the existence of 
German subsidiaries later on. Consequently, the choice of the chemical sector was 
immediately justified by the existence of subsidiaries from the fifteen largest TNCs (in 
the world chemical industry) in Brazil. These TNCs represent a main source of 
technology transfer to domestic companies because of their lack of capital to finance the 
development of technologies (BNDES, 1988).
Another interesting point regarding the chemical sector is the existence of 
environmental guidelines managed by the industry association. Willums and Goluke 
(1992) state that the chemical sector has shown itself to be proactive in the adoption of 
guidelines for environmental improvements (EC, 1997; Smart, 1992). Nevertheless, it 
must be clear that the chemical sector makes products and employs processes that have 
major environmental impacts; furthermore some of these impacts have global 
consequences.
Additionally, there is the chemical industry’s dependence on a non-renewable 
resource (petroleum), although there is no consensus about the limits of the world 
reserve. Nevertheless, it is also recognized that a more rational use of such resources 
(aiming to reduce consumption and emission of pollutants) has been adopted by TNCs 
since the early 70s (EC, 1997; Willums and Goluke, 1992). The structural characteristics 
and environmental implications of the chemical sector will be further analysed in 
chapter four.
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The selection of the pharmaceutical sector was much more the result of efforts to 
secure access to TNCs’ subsidiaries than a decision taken at random. However it 
deserves some justification. First, TNCs dominate the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector9 
(Evans, 1974). Consequently, all major world producers have subsidiaries in Brazil 
(CRQ, 1996). Secondly, this is a sector with potential to cause accidents with 
environmental consequences (Yves, 1985), mainly due to its involvement with chemical 
manufacturing and the existence of final consumers. The structure and environmental 
implications of the pharmaceutical industry will be addressed in chapter five.
It may be argued that the selection of other industrial sectors (e.g., extractive- 
based industries) could produce more interesting comparisons. As far as any eventual 
criticism is concerned, it must be noted that the lack of companies (from the selected 
countries of origin) in the automobile, pulp and paper, mining and petrochemicals 
sectors in Brazil excluded them. The priority in the selection of case studies was initially 
placed on countries of origin, secondly on industrial sectors, and finally on companies 
themselves. It is therefore not feasible to expect this thesis to compare the ‘ideal set’ of 
companies. The stratified sample is constituted by a reasonable set of companies, 
operating in two interesting industrial sectors, but representing the countries of origin 
responsible for the largest amount of FDI in Brazil.
Nevertheless, the selection of companies (in both industrial sectors) was guided 
by the following set of conditions: (a) companies producing similar products, that is, 
operating in the same market segment; (b) companies with production for both domestic 
and export markets; and (c) companies located in the same Brazilian state. The last 
condition means that companies are subject to the same state environmental regulation. 
Consequently, the Sao Paulo state was selected because it has the strongest 
environmental agency (Gutberlet, 1996; Zulauf, 1994), and the largest number of private 
companies in Brazil (table 1.2 illustrates this geographical concentration).
9 In 1996, foreign companies achieved a participation of 73% in the total sales (based on the 20 biggest 
companies) of the pharmaceutical sector (Exame, ‘Melhores e Maiores’, July 1997, p. 11).
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Table 1.2 - The location of the private-owned enterprises* in Brazil
(%)
Brazilian states 1973 1995 1996
Sao Paulo 63.4 52.6 51.2
Rio de Janeiro 20.2 11.8 12.6
Rio Grande do Sul 4.4 7.8 7.8
Minas Gerais 3.2 6.4 7.4
Parana 2.6 3.8 4.2
Santa Catarina 1.6 4.0 3.8
Bahia 1.6 4.6 3.6
Espfrito Santo 0.2 2.2 3.0
Amazonas 0.4 2.6 2.2
Ceara 0.1 0.8 0.8
Other 2.3 3.4 3.4
Source: Exame, ‘Melhores e Maiores’, July 1997, p. 25.
Note: * sample of the 500 biggest companies, including domestic and foreign.
Apart from concern in selecting the companies, nothing could change the 
constraints in the empirical reality. Therefore, the final stratified sample differs in some 
aspects from the criteria previously defined. First, the production from the selected 
companies is basically destined for the domestic market. Thus, exports from Brazilian 
subsidiaries (in both industrial sectors) are only a low percentage (less than 10 percent) 
of total production. Consequently, the assumption10 that export-oriented companies 
(mainly domestic) have been facing environmental pressures in industrialized countries 
will not be investigated regarding TNC subsidiaries. Secondly, the British company (in 
the pharmaceutical sector) is located in the Rio de Janeiro state. This aspect brought 
some complexity to the comparison of pharmaceutical cases, due to some specific 
requirements and characteristics of the state environmental agency.
Additionally, two other conditions were included as stratified sampling 
procedures (Miles and Huberman, 1994, pp. 27-28). First, is the fact that the selected 
companies in the chemical sector must be participants of the Responsible Care 
programme11. Secondly, the selected companies (from both industrial sectors) must have
10 Regarding the Brazilian context, Warhurst (1994) indicates pressures from machinery suppliers in the 
mining industry; Gutberlet (1996) reports pressures for environmental improvement of the manufacturing 
process and substitution of chlorine in the paper industry, and for environmental certification (the German 
Okotex) in the textile industry.
11 The Brazilian chemical industry association (ABIQUIM) adopted this international initiative in 1992 
with the name of ‘Atua?ao Responsavel’ (which is presented in section 4.3.1.3).
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a formal statement (similar to a corporate environmental policy) showing their 
commitment towards environmental issues. This is a practice not widespread among 
Brazilian (including foreign and domestic) companies (Neder, 1992; Zulauf, 1994 and 
Gutberlet, 1996). The table below shows all companies that have secured access to their 
Brazilian subsidiaries (see Appendices - section A.2.1 - for a list of companies that have 
been contacted).
Table 1.3 - Stratified sample
Industry sectors Home country - 
United Kingdom
Home country - 
United States
Home country - 
Germany
Tobacco
Chemical
Pharmaceutical
Household & 
Toiletry
B.A.T./Souza Cruz 
Zeneca 
Glaxo Wellcome
Reckitt & Colman
(negative answer*) 
DuPont 
Eli Lilly
(negative answer**)
(not available***)
BASF
Hoechst Marion 
Roussel
(not available***)
Notes: * Philip Morris was contacted but refused to participate; ** Colgate-Palmolive and Johnson & 
Johnson have been contacted but refused to participate; *** there was no German company to be contacted 
in this industrial sector.
1.3 - Importance of the study - a review of the literature on corporate 
environmental policies and practices
The importance of the study owes much to the fact that TNCs are considered a 
fundamental actor in the international relations field when the focus is on environmental 
issues. This position arises from a variety of factors12 including: (a) their pollution­
intensive activities as a consequence of their size and predominance on pollution­
intensive industries (UN, 4992a, b; UNCTC, 1985), (b) their economic power in the
12 Similarly, Andersson (in Folke and Kaberger, 1991, p.239) states that there are at least three arguments 
for paying special attention to multinationals with regard to pollution in developing countries. They are: (1) 
“the broad scope of these firms’ activities in pollution-intensive industries results in an impact on the 
environment”, (2) “their dominance in technology influences industrial processes, including environmental 
impacts”, and (3) “multinational enterprises function across the boundaries of nation states and are in a 
position to bargain with individual countries, on issues such as pollution, to an extent which domestic firms 
are not”.
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world economy (Ghoshal and Westney13, 1993; Keohane and Nye, 1981); (c) the 
political power they represent in the international system (Keohane and Nye, 1981, 
1989; Boddewyn, 1988); (d) the potential contribution in solving environmental 
problems through their capability (on account of high expenditure in R&D) to develop 
and establish the main technological patterns (WCED, 1987; Caldwell, 1990; Choucri, 
1993); and finally (e) their “global reach” (i.e., transnational nature) since TNCs are 
expected to differ from purely national firms, subject to regulations and practices that 
vary across countries and because they are forced to make choices between worldwide 
standardization or national adaptation. Moreover, TNCs are subject to international 
conventions but are more powerful and less subject to control by national governments 
and agencies than national firms (Ives, 1985; Levy, 1995).
The investigation of TNCs from industrialized countries in a developing country 
can be even more interesting because of the often widespread criticisms against their 
practices in such countries. This is particularly the case in those countries where, 
according to international NGOs (Greenpeace, 1992; Friends of the Earth, 1992) the 
TNCs’ activities are defined by exploitation of resources and pollution, and, according 
to Haas et al. (1993), the local authorities are typically characterized by a low pattern of 
control and regulation. For example, Sklair (in Main and Williams, 1994, p. 97) stresses 
that some American manufacturers have established maquilas (which are responsible for 
environmental impacts along the Mexican-US border) in order to escape strict 
environmental regulations (including toxic-wastes regulations) in the US.
The importance of this study may be highlighted by pointing to the lack of 
studies within the literature concerning the relationship between TNCs and 
environmental issues as indicated by the authors below. These authors especially 
advocate the necessity of conducting research to fulfill such gaps in developing 
countries, in order to assess: (a) the so-called “double-standards”, that is, dissimilar 
practices for environmental protection among home and host countries’ production units 
within the same TNC. A relevant point is that sometimes the ‘double-standard’ means 
‘low-standard’, not only equitably distinct ones (Pearson, 1985; Ives, 1985; Gladwin, in
13 Ghoshal and Westney (1993, p. 21) point out that collectively “multinational corporations account for 
over 40% of the world’s manufacturing output and almost a quarter of world trade. About 85% of the 
world’s vehicles, 70% of computers, 35% of toothpaste and 65% of soft drinks are produced and marketed 
by multinational corporations. A major source of research and development resources, they are an 
important vehicle worldwide for technological innovation and its diffusion”.
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Pearson 1987; Castleman, in Pearson 1987; Rappaport and Flaherty, 1992); (b) how 
local regulations have been evolving and/or how TNCs have responded to them 
(UNCTC, 1985, 1990); (c) the TNCs’ environmental policies and performance (Levy, 
1995; Pearson, 1987; UNCTC, 1985), and also; (d) the effectiveness of different forms 
of international co-operation, that is, the way TNCs respond to codes of conduct, 
conventions, general guidelines and social campaigns (Gleckman, 1995; Eden, 1994; 
Frederick et al., 1992; Pearson, 1985; UNCTC, 1985).
Other points on the discussion on TNCs and environment have also been 
addressed (showing great variance in perspectives). Among the literature closely related 
to the subject of this thesis is a study such as Pearson’s (1985). The author stresses the 
relevance of environmental degradation in developing countries, and how TNCs can 
play an important role (positive or negative) through the standards and practices they 
follow in such countries. The regulatory polices that have been established in host 
countries, and how they are enforced was also investigated. In summary, Pearson 
submits a broad picture, where corporations, host governments and international 
organizations have all taken modest steps to address this question. He argues that some 
modest advantages could emerge from the adoption of environmental codes at the 
international level.
In a later study, Pearson (1987) provides case studies that address environmental 
issues related to TNCs in developing countries. More specifically, Gladwin (in Pearson, 
1987, pp. 3-31) has suggested issues that should be considered worthy of further 
research, as follows: (a) the necessity to investigate TNCs’ investments in forestry and 
agriculture or industries producing polluting products (e.g., motor vehicles, tobacco, 
pharmaceutical, food, etc.); and (b) the necessity to investigate whether TNCs are truly 
taking into account environmental concerns when formulating their strategies, projects 
and products.
In practical terms, the most radical criticism on environmental impacts generated 
by TNCs are usually from NGOs. Friends of the Earth (1992) examines the lack of 
TNCs’ environmental disclosure and the public right-to-know, mainly comparing the 
TNCs behaviour in the US and Europe. Greenpeace (1992) stresses the rhetorical 
character of corporate environmental policies when contrasted with their practices. 
Nevertheless, there is plenty of literature which strongly criticizes TNCs for their
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negligence towards the environment, community and employees. A radical criticism on 
the “greening” of business comes from Plant and Plant’s (1991) work claiming the need 
for a deeper change in the behaviour of society. Likewise, Sklair (1995, p. 83) states that 
UNCED (held in Rio in 1992) was captured by TNCs14 which “successfully blocked any 
threat to the interests of global capitalism” (an argument originally made by Bruno, 
1992). The central point was to avoid any challenge to the assumption that the 
capitalism system “will ensure unlimited replacement or substitution of resources” 
(which are considered virtually infinite based on scientific and technological solutions) 
as they are consumed (Sklair, 1995, p. 82). Accordingly, evidence of their success is that 
since then waste management has been one of the fasting growing industries.
In broad terms,^International ^Qfganizations (including their agencies) have 
looked at the issue of industrial pollution quite differently. First, UNCTC (1985) is 
focused on the effects of TNCs’ activities on the environment in host countries (mainly 
developing countries), though it is based predominantly on the literature and sources 
from the US (that is, Gladwin, 1977 and Gladwin and Walter, 1980b). Later, WCED 
(1987) did undertake a relevant study of the relation between environment and 
development including multiple-actors’ roles, which result in the concept of sustainable 
development (disseminated worldwide and claimed to be followed by business 
associations in industrialized countries).
The UN (1994b, pp. 313-314) report has stressed that the liberalization of 
policies regarding FDI has given enterprises more freedom, which also means more 
responsibility, including social responsibility. More specifically, this concept implies 
responsibilities that go beyond meeting minimum legal requirements. However, CEPAL
(1991) affirms that the solution for industrial environmental impact implies the 
transformation of industrial efficiency and changes in the governmental agencies 
responsible for industrial regulatory policy.
PNUMA (1991) provides an overview of industrial environmental impacts and 
explains the role of UNEP and its special area of work on industry and environment. 
Additionally, UNEP (1994) published a technical report15 on ‘company environmental
14 A group of TNCs was represented by the Business Council o f Sustainable Development, which was 
created in 1990 in Geneva to provide business inputs to this conference.
15 This is a series from UNEP’s industry and environment office which provides information on the issues 
and methods of environmental management relevant to various industrial sectors.
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reporting’ to encourage companies to release their environmental records annually (as 
recommended by the Chapter 30, Agenda 21; that is, the UNCED plan of action on 
sustainable development). Among the cases reported, three companies (BASF, DuPont 
and Hoechst) investigated in this thesis are considered pioneers in environmental 
disclosure.
Additionally, of special interest for this thesis is the discussion that has emerged 
from institutions representing the international business community, such as the BCSD 
(Schmidheiny, 1992)16. In this study a free trade and self-regulation prescription to 
environmental issues is addressed, providing a long-term strategy to senior corporate 
executives on how to incorporate environmental issues into business. ICC (Willums and 
Goluke, 1992) shows case studies of ‘good practices’ from a variety of industrial sectors 
to illustrate the implementation of principles of the ‘Business Charter for Sustainable 
Development’17. More recently, DeSimone and Popoff (1997) develop further (in
1 ftcollaboration with the World Business Council for Sustainable Development ) the 
concept of ‘eco-efficiency’, which has been previously introduced by Schmidheiny
(1992). Such a term aims to describe ‘business activities that create economic value 
while continuously reducing ecological impact and the use of resources’.
Sklair (1995, p. 83) goes one step further accusing Schmidheiny of being a 
‘critical optimist’ for his assumption that it is possible to keep ‘ever-improving 
standards of living’ if some effort is put into it. Another group is called ‘cynical 
optimists’ for their view that sustainable development represents business opportunities. 
This latter argument is called a ‘win-win approach’ in the business literature which has 
been criticized by Walley and Whitehead (1994).
16 Walley and Whitehead (1994, pp. 49-50) criticized this work precisely because of the lack of 
prescription for managers, as it has not answered how environmental protection will be incorporated into 
everyday business decisions.
17 This Charter was prepared by the ICC and launched at the Second World Industry Conference on 
Environmental Management in April 1991. It provides a basic framework of reference for action by 
individual corporations and business organizations throughout the world (ICC, 1995).
18 The WBCSD resulted from a merger between the Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(created by the Swiss industrialist Stephan Schmidheiny to represent business interest in the UNCED) and 
the World Industry Council for the Environment (a post-UNCED initiative from the ICC, based in Paris, to 
motivate business towards the implementation of the principles from the Agenda 21). The WBCSD has 
over 120 individual members and aims to develop closer cooperation between business, government and 
other organizations concerned with the environment and sustainable development. Besides, it encourages 
business in the achievement of high environmental management standards (DeSimone and Popoff, 1997, 
pp. xxii-xxiii).
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In reality, the business field has contributed with a profuse variety of studies. It 
basically started with Gladwin’s (1977) investigation about how MNCs incorporate 
environmental protection into their project planning. Later, Gladwin and Walter (1980b) 
focused on conflicts related to MNCs and how they respond to external demands from 
environmental regulation and trends in environmental policy. More recently, Brown et 
al. (1993, pp. 7-8) have provided a very useful overview of earlier studies regarding 
hazardous manufacturing facilities in developing countries. This study is focused on 
three American multinationals establishing industrial facilities in India and Thailand in 
the 80s.
Additionally, Schot and Fischer (1993) recognize four distinct sets of pressures 
upon industrial firms. In brief, the authors state that: (1) regulations are becoming more 
stringent; (2) actions taken by companies have not produced adequate results, thus the 
public expects improvements in environmental performance; (3) consumers are willing 
to buy environmentally sound products, and industrial consumers are pressurizing 
suppliers to enforce environmental requirements; and (4) investors and insurance 
companies are closely monitoring environmental risk and reputation. It is worth 
mentioning that this pattern of consumers’ behaviour is not widespread. Wong et al. 
(1995) refuted such an assumption through the investigation of four environmentally 
sound products in the British market.
In general terms, the business management literature has addressed every single 
aspect of the “greening” of companies’ activities (e.g., Ottman, 1992; Winsemius and 
Goluke, 1992 and Davis, 1991). Besides, business practitioners (such as CEOs, 
consultants and EH&S corporate managers) have been sharing their experience on 
environmental issues (e.g., Monsanto’s case, by Stroup, 1988; Union Carbide’s case, by 
Smith, 1990; Dow Chemical’s case, by Buzzelli, 1991 and Shell’s case, by van 
Engelshoven, 1991).
Taking an industry perspective, Leonard (1988) explains how and why 
environmental regulation would alter the prevailing allocation of comparative advantage 
in the US industrial production, thus investigating the “industrial-flight and pollution- 
haven” hypotheses to conclude that there is no clear evidence of industrial relocation (an 
earlier study was made on this subject, that is Castleman, in Pearson, 1987). However, 
Leonard (1988) is criticized by Eskeland and Harrison (1997) for the lack of effort “to
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assess statistically the relationship between the distribution of US foreign investment 
and pollution intensity”. Briefly, Eskeland and Harrison (1997, p. 29) “have found 
almost no evidence of pollution havens”. Otherwise, the authors found that “foreign 
firms are less polluting than their peers in developing countries”. Finally, Sorsa (1994) 
investigates environmental expenditures and industrial comparative advantages, 
concluding that such expenditures will not cause changes in comparative advantages.
In a more technological vein, Choucri (1991, 1993) discusses the environmental 
implications of TNCs’ activities, mainly focusing on environmental investments (in oil, 
chemical and construction industries). The driving forces for environmentally 
responsible behaviour of companies were identified by Choucri as: (1) the increased 
acceptance of the “pollution pays principle” in international forums; (2) marketing 
challenge - including a broader set of companies’ activities (not limited to product, but 
also dealing with public relations due to hostile public, positive image, etc.); and (3) 
emergence of new opportunities to firms, through the creation of new markets for 
environmentally sensitive products, technology and services.
Likewise, Caimcross (1995), whose section on the role of industry is illustrative 
of some driving forces for environmental change, places too much expectation on 
technological solutions. This assumption leaves companies with more power to define 
their own sustainable behaviour, and almost no expectation to change behaviour (that 
could be the counter force to industry power, in economic and technological terms, as 
suggested by Smith, 1993). According to Commoner (1990, p. 35) the “market is a 
useful means of facilitating the flow of goods from producer to consumer; but it 
becomes a social evil when allowed to govern the technology of productions”.
Nevertheless, Caimcross (1995) recognizes that some firms can cope alone, 
without intervention, as they ‘genuinely’ want to pursue sound environmental policies. 
Her study is also relevant because of the discussion whether environmental regulations 
are needed. A counter argument on this issue was made by Porter (1991) and, Porter and 
van der Linde (1995). Briefly, Porter (1991) has indicated that the core discussion must 
be concentrated on the kind of environmental regulation not in its existence, suggesting 
that environmental expenditures can result in higher competitiveness.
Taking into account that Brazil is the selected developing country under 
investigation, it must be mentioned that few studies have been done there which
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explicitly relate to the subject of this research (Pimenta, in Pearson, 1987; Rappaport 
and Flaherty, 1992; Maimon, 1992b; Neder 1992; Guedes, 1993; Donaire, 1994 and 
Gutberlet, 1996).
Briefly, Pimenta (in Pearson, 1987) is particularly focused on the evolution of 
pollution control and legal compliance in the Sao Paulo state in Brazil (addressed in 
section 2.4.1 of this thesis). More recent and closely related to this thesis is the study by 
Rappaport and Flaherty (1992). The authors analyse corporate policies and management 
systems for implementing EH&S issues in the international facilities of American 
companies19. They provide an overview of Brazilian regulations and the findings for a 
subsidiary (oil and gas industry) located in Cubatao, Sao Paulo state (addressed later in 
section 2.6).
Maimon (1992b) suggests that a case study is the best research strategy to 
investigate companies’ environmental policies in Brazil. This is because the rhetorical 
character of these policies would be better investigated by in-depth methods, in which 
the whole process of definition, implementation and evaluation could be checked. In 
such a case, she suggests investigating TNCs’ policies and practices by reason of their 
insertion in the international system (or transnational mobility according to Levy, 1995), 
which will result in best environmental protection performance (mainly if compared 
with domestic firms).
Following some of these assumptions, a study (Guedes, 1993) was made in 
Brazil20. Briefly, its findings suggested that the implementation of environmental 
programmes in TNCs’ subsidiaries are basically accomplished in the long-term, because 
of the compliance with the Brazilian environmental legislation and the scarcity of 
financial resources. Additionally, there was no evidence of similar programmes among
19 According to Rappaport and Flaherty (1992, p.17), “five in-depth case studies of US-based multinational 
corporations were conducted to understand the complex forces both inside and outside the corporation that 
help shape the EH&S programmes in different locations around the world”. Additionally, a survey of 98 
American companies was conducted to gain supplementary information on EH&S practices (see Flaherty 
and Rappaport, 1991, for details of this survey).
20 This exploratory study, with American and German subsidiaries operating in the chemical sector, has 
confirmed the existence of environmental policies and practices in early stages of implementation in Brazil. 
One American company showed evidence of proactive environmental programmes, though its products 
were commercialized in the Brazilian domestic market (where environmental awareness was not high, see 
Carvalho et al., 1995, for details of this case). The German company had more realistic goals, suggesting 
that environmental improvements will come in the long-term. Finally, another American case assumed a 
quite reactive posture towards Brazilian regulation. However its products were exported without facing 
environmental pressures, which can be superficially explained by the fact that this company produces 
intermediary products (basic chemicals) for other industries (Guedes, 1993).
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the subsidiaries. This latter finding led to the argument that the incorporation of 
environmental issues by these TNCs’ subsidiaries was related to: (a) environmental 
concern (that is, regulatory and public pressures) in the country of origin; (b) 
environmental awareness in the Brazilian context (that is, regulatory and media 
pressures); and (c) strategic decisions of individual TNCs when facing new demands 
from society. It is specifically on these items above that this thesis is investigating causal 
relationships.
Furthermore, Donaire (1994) investigates the links between environmental 
concern and social responsibility21 in the Brazilian context. Similar to the findings of 
Neder (1992) and Guedes (1993) the author concludes that the incorporation of 
environmental issues is a consequence of external influences (basically legislation and 
public pressure). Additionally, he suggests that the line of business (i.e., industrial 
sector) will influence the degree of environmental commitment.
In many cases, as Maimon (1992a) states, environmental protection is linked to 
health and safety practices in industries with dangerous processes or inputs (e.g., oil and 
chemical sectors). Such an assumption was confirmed by Guedes (1993) but has been 
refuted by Neder (1992). According to Neder (1992) there are few cases22 (that is, 13 
cases among 48 foreign and domestic firms) with EH&S management in Brazil. The 
common characteristic among these firms is the existence (and attempts towards 
implementation) of environmental policies in which pollution control integrates the 
hygiene and safety practices.
Additionally, Neder states that industrial pollution control is due to requirements 
from the Brazilian legislation (in 58.24 percent of cases from a total of 48 companies). 
Consequently, it will not produce any improvement in the quality and safety of the work 
place (that is, environmental control has not improved hygiene and safety aspects in 
72.91 percent of cases). In conclusion, Neder (1992) reinforces that federal and state 
legislation is the main factor prompting pollution control in companies (the secondary
21 In six case studies, which include three foreign and three domestic firms, operating in chemical, mining, 
paper, automobile, petrochemical, and food sectors (Donaire, 1994).
22 Based on an exploratory survey aiming to identify if corporate environmental policies among Brazilian 
companies were improving workers health and safety. Briefly, the data came from interviews with 
managers responsible for pollution control in a selected group of forty eight manufacturing companies, 
operating in nine different industrial sectors (that is, automobiles, spare parts and transport material; 
petrochemical, chemical, pharmaceutical and hygiene; metal industry and industrial equipment; food and 
drinks; steel; textile; glass; cellulose and paper; sugar and alcohol).
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factors are managerial and technological improvements, pressures from employees, 
community and headquarters). However, the author has neither explored the potential 
explanations related to country of origin (in the case of foreign firms), nor those related 
to industrial sectors.
Similarly, Zulauf (1994, p. 76) says that there are distinct patterns of behaviour 
among the economic agents in Brazil. First, there are companies with an ‘old culture’ of 
exploitation in which environmental concern is an exotic element. In this category the 
author includes some foreign, domestic and state companies. However, the assumption 
that MNCs are more environmentally responsible (as a consequence of headquarters’ 
audits) than domestic firms is once again assumed (as it was by Maimon, 1992b).
Second, there are companies with a ‘modem culture’ which have been 
incorporating environmental management and the concepts of sustainable development. 
They usually negotiate with governmental authorities deadlines and technological 
adaptation or changes in the process. Third, there are companies located in the urban 
areas with behaviour similar to the ‘old culture’ category. These companies usually 
claim that they were initially not installed in urban areas, as a counter argument to 
complaints from the nearby communities. Lack of space is their major problem, which 
makes the installation of effluent treatment systems impossible. The environmental 
agencies’ requirements are constantly attenuated by the threat of closure and 
unemployment. In sum, the solution for these cases has been relocation to industrial 
areas financed by the high value of their estates in urban areas (Zulauf, 1994, p. 77).
More recently, Gutberlet (1996) has made a comprehensive investigation23 into 
industrial production and environmental regulatory policy in Brazil. This study provides 
an interesting overview to the current situation in the selected states, including the legal 
requirements and instruments available to enforce them. Additionally, it emphasizes 
voluntary schemes, environmental certification and the instruments available for 
environmental management at industry and company levels. The author concluded that 
the industrial centres in Sao Paulo are constituted by companies with serious
23 This study is focused on the states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais and based on primary data from trade 
unions. Its initial aim was partially fulfilled, therefore eight case studies were added to the data on 
environmental management (including mining, steel, paper and pulp, chemical companies). Finally, 
Hoechst and Carbono-Oxypar - a Brazilian-American joint venture - represented the chemical sector.
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environmental impacts. Moreover, there are only a few large domestic and foreign firms 
incorporating environmental management in their production lines.
In conclusion, there are common aspects among these studies regarding 
environmental management in Brazil. First, the differentiation between domestic and 
foreign firms is based on the argument that the latter have more advanced practices due 
to their links with the headquarters. There is generally no empirical evidence of what 
‘more advanced’ represents in operational terms; moreover, the repercussion of such 
connection with the headquarters is never discussed.
Second, there is a complete lack of explanation grounded in the institutional 
context of the country of origin when dealing with TNCs’ subsidiaries. However, the 
international context is constantly mentioned as responsible for the “greening” of 
business. This is mainly because the competitiveness of Brazilian export products is 
threatened by environmental certification (and consumer pressures) in Europe and the 
US. In reality, such ‘eco-protectionism’ is constraining specific export-oriented sectors 
(e.g., textiles, footwear, and paper). Additionally, the extractive-based sectors are subject 
to international pressures from NGOs; particularly mining and logging in the Amazon 
region. In sum, the assumption of international pressure does not identify the sources of 
pressure or the industrial sectors most subject to these constraints.
Third, the studies rely extensively on secondary data from industrialized 
countries (basically Western Europe and the US). However, they usually fail to question 
the applicability of imported concepts regarding environmental management. As well as 
this, there is some indication that much of the corporate rhetoric launched during the 
UNCED was incorporated into local business language.
Altogether, the importance of investigating the implementation of corporate 
environmental policies can be justified by the need to examine the environmental 
performance of TNCs’ subsidiaries24. That is, how environmental commitment is turned 
into environmental practices, which may result in social (e.g., community participation 
in accident prevention, Frederick et al., 1992) and economic benefits (e.g., rational use 
of resources, Smart, 1992).
24 Levy (1995, p. 45) states “despite the evidence that some TNCs are becoming more responsive to 
environmental issues, there are few systematic data on improved environmental performance” (measured in 
terms of toxic emissions).
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Because it assumes that potential explanations for the adoption and 
implementation of corporate environmental policies are not only grounded in the 
economic context (at firm and industry sector levels), but also at the social, cultural and 
political contexts of home and host countries, this thesis goes further in the development 
of this subject-area. In the broad sense its scope is very complex, including opposite 
forces and multiple levels of analysis (Giddens, 1984).
1.4 - The need for interdisciplinarity
The complexity of such discussion is based on the fact that environmental issues 
are strictly related to local conditions (including ecological, social, political and 
economic) at the same time that they can generate broader implications (at national, 
international or global levels). These questions are not easy to investigate (mainly if the 
purpose is to ‘think theoretically’ about the causal relations among them, Rosenau and 
Durfee, 1995). Consequently, the use of multiple levels of analysis (as an analytical tool) 
is justified by the fact that single level investigation may result in dysfunctional 
explanations and policy implications. This approach is an adaptation from Strauss and 
Gorbin’s (1990, p. 163) conditional matrix, which means “a complex web of interrelated 
conditions, action/interaction, and consequences that pertains to given phenomenon” 
(Ibid., p. 161).
As far as the literature is concerned, it is vital to mention that early studies (such 
as Gladwin, 1977 and Pearson, 1987) assumed multiple levels of analysis. 
Consequently, the concern with the external context, when investigating the 
implementation of corporate environmental policies, implies that environmentally sound 
behavior on the part of TNCs seems to result largely from external pressures (at the 
international and national levels). More specifically, environmental practices result from ' 
governmental (from home and host countries) coercion rather than from voluntary action 
(at industry and company levels).
In other words, Gladwin (in Pearson, 1987, p. 22) re-affirms that 
“environmentally oriented behaviour, is often motivated by external (that is, public 
policy) rather than internal pressures”. Thus, he implicitly recognizes two points: (a) the
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limits of unilateral action by TNCs, and (b) the TNCs’ responsible behaviour in one 
regulatory context does not guarantee the same pattern in another. Although Gladwin 
explicitly included international and national driving forces to analyze TNCs’ 
environmental practices, this point was not extrapolated to explain causal relations in a 
country specific context.
The research design assumes that both cross-national and cross-industrial 
stratification is necessary in order to explore the influence of different contextual 
conditions, as suggested by Gladwin (1977), on the implementation of corporate 
environmental policies. This thesis has postulated previously that external influences 
should be considered in the implementation of corporate environmental policy. 
Therefore, no specific organizational internal variables (apart from the environmental 
policy itself, and the potential influence from headquarters’ strategic decisions) related 
to TNCs’ operations will be under investigation.
More specifically, Rappaport and Flaherty (1992, pp. 131-137) stress that some 
beliefs and commonsense related to effective EH&S in TNCs are not confirmed by their 
findings. Among the most obvious are company size and profitability. Internal variables 
will be investigated in an exploratory and ad hoc way in this thesis. If a particular 
variable seems to explain the phenomenon it will be further developed. The justification 
is that such a focus on external pressures was to a certain extent dictated by the current 
literature.
The literature previously reviewed is evidence of the diversity of approaches 
towards TNCs and environmental issues. However, only a few of them have been 
particularly helpful in order to define (and refine) the research question. Altogether, the 
literature review was a wide-ranging representation of distinct fields (such as 
international relations, international business, business management and industrial 
organization to name the most relevant), which rarely share their understanding of either 
TNCs or environmental issues.
The decision to undertake an investigation with multiple levels of analysis leads 
to the need for an interdisciplinary approach. The limits of disciplines impose a strong 
constraint on studies following an interdisciplinary approach. One approach is too 
narrow to include all variables under investigation, another is broader but not 
sufficiently developed to include all the explanations for specific cases. Therefore, it is a
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difficult task, since the boundaries separating disciplines have been kept for so many 
different reasons (Kuhn, 1970; Redclift, 1987, p. 7-11) out of the scope of this thesis.
In reality the need for an interdisciplinary approach to investigate TNCs is part 
of the current debate in international business. Due to the complexity of such 
organizations, it is difficult to keep the boundaries of discussion within a few 
perspectives (Sundaram and Black, 1992; Grosse and Behram, 1992). However, the 
main issue under investigation among the variety of questions related to TNCs’ 
operations - that is, environmental policies and practices - has also justified an 
interdisciplinary approach. For example, Hurrell and Kingsbury (1992, p. 3) stress that 
“it is not longer possible to treat ecology and international political economy as separate 
spheres”. And Redclift (1987, p. 3) argues “that political economy and 
environmentalism each stood to gain from sharing an analytical perspective”. This is 
mainly because the environmental crisis is intrinsically an outcome of an economic 
crisis.
More specifically, Choucri (in Choucri, 1993, p. 215) states that theoretical 
perspectives investigating MNCs “can be viewed roughly through three disciplinary 
lenses ...: (1) international relations analyses in political science, (2) market analyses in 
economics, and (3) organizational theory in business and management”25. But all of 
them “reflect inherent biases, and none effectively address environment-investment 
linkages” (the main issues discussed by Choucri, 1993). Additionally, Smith (1993, pp. 
4-5) recognizes that the complexity and multidisciplinary nature of environmental 
problems have conspired for this subject to be neglected by the academics from the 
business field. In his opinion, environmental concern, like the issue of corporate 
responsibility, run counter to the dominant business (financial-based) paradigm.
Finally, Rowlands (1995, p. 265) suggests that issues of global environmental 
politics challenge traditional academic divisions, which seem to require a 
“multidisciplinary approach”. He also argues about the complexity and unexpected 
results that the adoption of multidisciplinary approach might imply, “even within 
international relations - a subject that would seem to be a natural home to 
interdisciplinary efforts”. In accordance with this, the elaboration of the framework
25 Gladwin (in Fischer and Schot, 1993) made a relevant contribution to the explanation of environmental 
behaviour in industrial firms grounded in organizational theory.
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(throughout chapter two) to analyse corporate environmental policies and practices will 
clarify the need for interdisciplinarity.
1.5 - Limitations of the method
This thesis has no aim to test any pre-existent model because this subject-area 
has not been developed enough (in terms of explanatory theory-building). Apart from 
any criticism about the building of general theories from case studies (as suggested by 
Vaughan, in Ragin and Becker, 1992, p. 175), the propositions of this thesis are related 
to specific cases, and their limitations must be carefully addressed. As a general result 
the conclusions will provide some direction for further research, including some 
assumptions to be tested through the use of other research methods. Consequently, a 
major contribution of this thesis is that, by attempting to build a theoretical framework 
to investigate the selected case studies, it will advance the literature concerned with 
TNCs and environmental issues.
Although case study - as a research strategy - has a set of positive aspects that 
justifies its use, this strategy is not without critics. According to Yin (1994, p. 1) great 
care must be exercised “in designing and doing case studies to overcome the traditional 
criticisms of the method”. More specifically the usual criticisms about this method are, 
as follows: (a) the researcher “has allowed equivocal evidence or biased views to 
influence the direction of the findings and conclusions”; (b) case studies “provide little 
basis for scientific generalization”; and (c) case studies “take too long, and they result in 
massive, unreadable documents” (1994, pp. 9-10).
In Yin’s (1994) opinion, these concerns can be overcome if a whole set of 
techniques are taken into account. For example, the criticism in item (a) - related to the 
subjective judgments of data analysis - was avoided by concern with the construction of 
validity. In other words, by the use of multiple sources of evidence as a way to test the
9 f \quality of empirical data during the data collection process . Miles and Huberman 
(1994, p. 266) explicitly name it “triangulation”. This method is basically used “to
26 See Appendices (sections A. 1.1 and A. 1.2) for further explanation on the construction of validity; 
additionally, see section A.2.2 for a summary of the data sources used.
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support a finding by showing that independent measures of it agree with it or, at least, do 
not contradict it”.
Additionally, the patterns of analysis chosen by this thesis are indicated 
respectively in the data analysis chapters. This point is especially important for 
explanatory case studies, because of the broader problem of making inferences. That is, 
the researcher infers that “a particular event resulted from some earlier occurrence, 
based on interview and documentary evidence collected as part of the case study” (Yin, 
1994, p. 35).
However, the more frequent criticism against case studies is directed to this 
aspect, which is the problem of generalization (as stated in item (b) above) from a 
study’s finding beyond the single case study. The simplest way to solve this is through 
the use of multiple-case studies because of the “replication logic” (which was adopted 
by this thesis as part of the research design). In other words, case studies rely on analytic 
generalization; consequently, it is possible to generalise a particular set of results to 
some broader theoretical debate, which is not the same as ‘generalise’ in other case 
studies (Yin, 1994, p. 36).
The criticism in item (c) can be avoided during the data interpretation, according 
to Strauss (1990). The author states that all those classical requirements for case study 
reports (such as, the actors’ viewpoint, credence to the author’s theoretical argument and 
reader comprehension) can be achieved by the use of illustrative data, but there should 
be a careful selection of data. In Strauss’s words, the construction of the cases “is 
relatively simple, since it consists mainly of highly selected descriptive detail put 
together as a more or less coherent whole, to illustrate one or more theoretical points” 
(1990, pp. 216-219).
It is relevant to stress that prior knowledge is a relevant aspect in this kind of 
research design. For some authors this knowledge is required in the data analysis phase 
(Strauss, 1990, p. 219). For others, it is useful in the selection of suitable cases, and in 
searching for other sources of evidence through specialised interviews (Hakim, 1992, 
pp. 64-73). Moreover, Yin states that this prior knowledge is important in defining the 
components of a research design, in developing the theoretical framework, and for 
organising the data collection (1994, p. 28).
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Another relevant point, in terms of the limits of the study, is the time boundaries 
that define the beginning and end of the cases. This question was considered because it 
assists in the definition of the unit of analysis, and in determining the limits of the data 
collection and analysis (Yin, 1994, pp. 24-25). In this thesis, the data obtained through 
interviews and direct observations were originated during fieldwork in Brazil (from 
August to December 1996). Secondary data collection has included documents 
(published in late 80s and 90s) from the selected companies. Altogether, these data were 
interpreted as evidence of corporate environmental policies and practices, which is a 
contemporary phenomenon.
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Chapter II - An interdisciplinary framework for the study of corporate 
environmental policies and practices
In brief, this thesis is clearly under the scope of the pluralist perspective1 (Hollis 
and Smith, 1991, pp. 38-39) by way of its focus on TNCs and environmental issues (as 
both are examples of the transnational relations in world politics, Keohane and Nye, 
1981). According to Hollis and Smith, TNCs “are among the rival candidates which 
seem to be growing in importance and which have no place in the rarefied dispute 
between systems and states” (1991, p. 199). Besides, corporations are usually treated as 
units (“black boxes”) and their internal organization is not taken into account (an 
approach that is shared with economic theories).
However, this thesis assumes that the state remains a significant actor despite its 
vulnerabilities in the face of specific issues and/or non-state actors. This is another claim 
made by the pluralists (according to Little and Smith, 1991, pp. 6-8); a perspective 
which rests on a positivist epistemological and methodological foundation (Little, in 
Smith et al., 1996, p. 83).
In other words, Rosenau (1990) argues that it is necessary to accept that 
contemporary world politics is bifurcated into the familiar state-centric world described 
by realists and the less familiar multi-centric world exposed by pluralists. This thesis is 
following the latter paradigm assuming that is the most useful in the light of what it aims 
to accomplish. However, one specific issue calls for an inter-paradigm approach as no 
single perspective has satisfactory addressed it, that is the ‘nationality of the firm’ 
(Stopford et al., 1991, p. 232). Besides, it is argued that any consideration of TNCs’ 
environmental practices in a developing country may benefit from a critical theory2
1 Little and Smith (1991, p. 11) have identified three perspectives by imposing a structure on the diverse 
and conflicting literature on international relations. First, politics of power and security focused on states 
action and responses in an anarchical international system. Second, politics of interdependence and 
transnational relations disaggregating both states and foreign policy to reveal interests and coalition within 
and across states boundaries. And third, politics of dominance and dependence stressing global inequality 
in face of an international system structured by centre (constituted of rich countries) and the periphery 
(poor countries).
2 Brown (in Groom and Light, 1994, p. 58) emphasizes that the “aim of critical theory is the restructuring 
of social and political theory which involves both challenging positivist approaches to social science and 
proposing alternatives”.
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approach, because it represents the North-South interdependence . Altogether, an mter- 
paradigm perspective is a consequence of the alliance of theory, method and data.
This chapter presents the building of an interdisciplinary framework to 
investigate corporate environmental policies and practices in Brazil. As mentioned in 
chapter one, the decision for multiple level analysis justifies the interdisciplinary 
approach. Accordingly, the first section introduces the theoretical framework to be used 
in the empirical phase. This framework is further developed in the subsequent five 
sections, which represent respectively the international, home and host countries, 
industry and company contexts.
2.1 - Theoretical framework
2.1.1 - Research question and propositions
The research question is:
“Why and how TNCs adopt and implement environmental policies in their 
subsidiaries in a developing country? In doing so, which are the main factors 
determining their behaviour?”
The main assumption of this thesis is that the implementation of corporate 
environmental policies in TNCs’ subsidiaries located in a developing country is mainly 
explained by external variables (UNTCMD, 1993; Rappaport and Flaherty, 1992; and 
Gladwin, 1977). However, a better understanding of the main assumption may be 
achieved by the following secondary assumptions:
(1) The implementation of corporate environmental policies in a developing country 
is expected to be a result of regulation and self-regulation combined. However, the
major driving force will have a regulatory nature, in which TNCs’ subsidiaries from
..
home countries with strict environmental regulatory policy will have stronger 
environmental policies. For this reason the TNCs’ nationality is regarded as a relevant
3 Hurrell (1992, p. 136) stresses that environmental issues are important to Latin American countries for a 
set of reasons. The most important aspect for this thesis, is the question that “global environment is the one 
area where North-South interdependence is based on solid reality rather than empty rhetoric”.
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aspect to be investigated. Additionally, the regulatory context of the host country will 
constrain, in a complementary way, the subsidiaries’ practices.
(2) The attempts at self-regulation by TNCs is highly dependent on their affiliation 
to industrial associations. Such voluntary initiatives are also a result of the industry’s 
characteristics, that is, they depend strongly on whether the TNC is in an 
environmentally sensitive sector or not. Environmental commitment from industry 
associations is expected to be stronger in sensitive sectors.
(3) In order to better explain strong corporate environmental policies it may be 
necessary to add an element of discretion, through headquarters’ strategic decisions 
towards environmental issues. This variable helps to explain why companies may have 
strong environmental policies, though they are not generating major environmental 
impacts. In such a case they are neither subject to strict environmental regulatory policy 
nor industrial attempts at self-regulation on environmental issues. Finally, such 
discretion will also provide explanations for subsidiaries which present examples of 
overcompliance towards the host country regulatory policy.
Altogether, the final explanations of the causality in the adoption and 
implementation of corporate environmental policies in TNCs’ subsidiaries are expected 
to be based on a set of driving forces from the home and host countries, industry and 
company contexts. This overall purpose will be tentatively accomplished by the 
articulation of some propositions4 presented below:
(Pi) The home country’s environmental regulatory policy is the main source o f  
pressure fo r the implementation o f  corporate environmental policies in TNCs’ 
subsidiaries.
(P2) The implementation o f TNCs’ environmental policies includes compliance 
with the host country’s environmental regulatory policy as a minimum requirement.
(P3) I f  industry associations have environmental guidelines, TNCs’ subsidiaries | 
have stricter implementation o f corporate environmental policies.
4 The propositions (which are applied to all case studies) are the equivalent of the hypothesis in the survey 
research. They represent plausible explanations for the research question and they direct the attention to 
elements which should be studied and analysed within the scope of this thesis.
30
(P4) The corporate environmental policies o f TNCs’ subsidiaries is defined by the 
headquarters, following a strategy o f  centralization.
2.1.2 - Overview of the analytical framework
This chapter encompasses the main theoretical explanations for the adoption and 
implementation of corporate environmental policies in TNCs’ subsidiaries. The 
framework is based on selected variables, that will be analysed in different contextual 
conditions by the use of cross-country and cross-industry stratification. Moreover, it is 
postulated that the assumptions based on industrial sector and country of origin may 
result in complementary explanations for corporate environmental policies.
According to the literature available, the selected variables are able to explain 
the implementation of corporate environmental policies. However, such selection has 
not included all variables that may potentially explain corporate environmental policies. '
The focus of this thesis is basically on variables that represent the regulatory and self- 
regulatory aspects of TNCs’ environmental policies and practices.
The framework comprises four levels of analysis: international, home and host 
countries, industry and company-specific explanations. The first level is represented by 
the pressures from the international context over corporate environmental policies. More 
specifically, it is represented by pressures from international organizations, 
environmental NGOs and international business associations (such as the ICC and 
BCSD). Overall, this is the recognition of the influence that international forces have on 
the implementation of corporate environmental policies in the host country (though it 
has not resulted in a formal proposition to be verified in the empirical phase).
The second level is concentrated on the influence that may be exerted by the 
national context of the home and host countries. The research design, including TNCs’ 
subsidiaries from distinct origin is suggestive that the nationality of the firm is part of 
the explanation. Such an assumption is basically grounded on the fact that TNCs’ 
headquarters are home-based, which makes them susceptible to influences and pressures 
from the contexts of the countries of origin. It is therefore expected that environmental
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regulatory policy will be the major source of pressure on TNCs’ practices. In addition to 
this, TNCs’ subsidiaries are faced with similar pressures in the host country context, 
where the implementation of corporate environmental policies takes place. For that 
reason, compliance with the environmental regulation is a key aspect under 
investigation.
The industry sector represents the third level of analysis, which has two contexts 
- the international and the Brazilian. At this stage the most relevant aspects to be 
investigated have an economic nature. That is, this study considers whether the 
structural characteristics of each industrial sector shape the corporate environmental 
policies. Furthermore, attempts at self-regulation by industry association (such as in the 
chemical industry) may represent a strong source of influence on TNCs’ practices.
Finally, the fourth level of analysis is concerned with the discretion that TNCs 
(at both headquarters and subsidiary levels) may exercise by the adoption and 
implementation of corporate environmental policies. This analysis investigates whether 
headquarters and subsidiaries have room for manoeuvre in choosing which 
environmental management approach to be incorporated, or if they are mostly 
constrained by external pressures (which are represented by the previous levels of 
analysis).
2.2 - International context
The present section will concentrate on two main perspectives within 
international relations theory. First it will address issues from international politics of the 
environment aiming to demonstrate increasing concern about environmental issues in 
the last decades and its effects on TNCs’ activities. Secondly, it will discuss the 
relationship between states and firms grounded in international political economy. From 
such a perspective the collective action from TNCs as well as the lack of environmental 
concern in the literature will become clear.
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2.2.1 - International politics of the environment
This item will address the emergence of the environment in the international 
agenda, including a summary of major perspectives which are related to the main issues 
under investigation (i.e., corporate environmental policies and practices in a developing 
country). By way of conclusion, it will provide an overview of the increased public 
concern with environmental issues in the international context and its consequences on 
TNCs’ policies and practices.
The development of international environmental politics has taken place under 
the auspices of the United Nations (UN) in the postwar period (Miller, 1995, p. 5). Until 
the 1960s the focus was on nature protection and to a lesser extent on the conservation 
of natural resources. Environmentalism5 first caught the public imagination in the 1960s 
and early 70s. According to Miller (1995, p. 6) the “environment moved from being the 
concern of a few scientists, administrators, and conservation groups to being the focus of 
a mass movement that affected much of the industrialized world”. Since then it has been 
investigated as both a ‘new’ social movement (Yearley, in Redclift and Benton, 1994) 
and as a political ideology (Dryzek, 1997).
It is at this stage that “the public began to pressure governments to address issues 
of pollution and resource mismanagement” (Miller, 1995, p. 6). At the international 
level the main event was the United Nations Conference on Human Environment (or 
Stockholm Conference) in 1972, as a result of efforts to place the protection of the 
biosphere on the international agenda (based on increased scientific knowledge on 
human impacts on the environment).
It is relevant to note the absence of the international business community and 
NGOs among the participants of the Stockholm Conference. However, at this event 
developing countries began to play a role in determining the international environmental 
agenda by pushing for changes in the conference focus (from environmental problems 
that characterize the affluence of developed countries to issues of interest to developing 
countries, Miller, 1995, p. 8).
In the 80s, a number of accidents (such as Bhopal in India, the Chernobyl 
explosion and the Exxon Valdez oil spill) generated a strong response in terms of
5 See McCormick, 1989, for an interesting account of the history of the environmental movement from its 
emergence until late 80s.
environmental concern. Miller (1995, p. 37) says that “criticism of the environmental 
consequences of the corporate culture grew during the 1970s and the 1980s” until TNCs 
could no longer deny their connection to environmental degradation. Accordingly, TNCs 
“launched a public relations campaign that adopted the language of the environmental 
movement”. However most striking was that they claimed to be helping developing 
countries to achieve sustainable development. Miller (1995, pp. 35-36) stresses that 
TNCs are major environmental actors; therefore, they may influence the adoption and 
enforcement of environmental regulation in developing countries as a result of 
negotiations to attract more foreign investments.
Over the same period, more scientific evidence supported the existence of global 
environmental issues (such as ozone depletion and climate change). In this regard the 
report from the Brudtland commission (WCED, 1987) is considered a turning point for 
its analysis and conclusions linking environment and development. Moreover, it stressed 
the necessity of economic growth in the developing world in order to solve the 
degradation generated by poverty. Hurrell and Kingsbury (1992, p.3) state that 
sustainable development6 “has become a global issue both because of the high levels of 
economic interdependence that exist within many parts of the global economy and 
because it raises fundamental questions concerning the distribution of wealth, power, 
and resources between North and South”.
In this context, the UNCED was held in Brazil in 1992; however the different 
agendas for industrialized (e.g., focused on ozone depletion, global warming, acid rain 
and deforestation) and developing countries (stressing the links between environmental 
protection and economic development) persisted. What was new was the presence of 
large number of representatives from NGOs, a number of world business 
representatives7 and full media coverage (Miller, 1995, p. 9). However, the conference 
resulted in new international treaties on climate and biodiversity, a statement on forests 
(Rio Declaration) and an action plan on sustainable development (Agenda 21).
It is possible to identify the involvement of multiple actors (e.g., international 
institutions, nation-states, NGOs, and TNCs) in international environmental politics in 
the late 90s. However, the importance of multidimensional economic, social and
6 See Redclift (1987) for a critical analysis on the concept of sustainable development.
7 See Bruno (1992) for a critical view on the role played by business association (such as ICC and BCSD) 
in the UNCED.
34
ecological interdependence was stressed by Keohane and Nye (1989, p. 4) in the mid- 
1970s. These authors also argued for international policy coordination on ecological 
issues, but suggested that cooperation on such issues would be difficult (Ibid., pp. 33- 
35). One of the conditions of complex interdependence stated by Keohane and Nye 
(1989) is the multiple channels of contact among societies; in such a group the TNCs are 
significant both as independent actors and as instruments manipulated by governments.
Hurrell and Kingsbury point out that global environmental management 
demands high levels of cooperation and policy-coordination among states. Therefore, it 
poses a politically sensitive challenge “because it involves the creation of rules and 
institutions that embody notions of shared responsibilities and shared duties” (1992, p. 
6). As well as this, it has implications at both domestic and individual levels. The 
solution, in the authors’ opinion, is based on both international negotiations and 
agreements, and reform at the domestic level.
However, states are not alone, as companies play a relevant role “in determining 
how environmental problems are defined and dealt with by governments” (Ibid., p. 10). 
Additionally, it is stressed that the diffusion of “green thinking” through the global 
media, which is informed by environmental NGOs, is an aspect of environmental 
politics insufficiently studied. Nevertheless, the inter-state agreements remain the 
‘centrepiece’ of international efforts to deal with global environmental issues (the table 
below illustrates some of these international agreements).
Table 2.1 - Selected multilateral agreements
Year Agreement US Germany UK
1985 Vienna Convention - Protection of the ozone 
layer
R R R
1987 Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete 
the ozone layer*
R R R
1989 Basel Convention - Control of 
transboundary movements of 
hazardous wastes and their disposal
S R S
1992 Rio de 
Janeiro
Convention - Biological diversity S R R
1992 New York Framework convention on climate 
change
R R R
1997 Kyoto Convention - Climate change S S S
Source: Adapted from OECD, 1996, pp. 258-261. Notes: S = signed and R = ratified; * this protocol was 
amended in 1990 and 1992.
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Consequently, there are many studies which concentrate on international 
environmental regimes (e.g., Young, 1989 and Young and Osherenko, 1993). Other 
approaches to global environmental politics have also focused on the formation and 
evolution of environmental regimes (Porter and Brown, 1996; Haas et al., 1993; and 
Rowlands, 1995). However some have included other aspects of the discussion, such as 
Miller (1995) who investigates the role of the ‘Third World’ in environmental politics 
and how these countries have attempted to modify environmental regimes8.
Additionally, a recurrent issue in the discussion of international politics of the 
environment is the weakness of states to cope with international agreements that aim to 
solve global issues. Nye (1990) identifies this state weakness as one of the most 
important barriers to find solutions to such so-called new security issues such as drugs or 
the environment. Additionally, Hurrell (1991, p. 205) suggests that the capacity of the 
state will remain as one of the most important aspects of environmental management 
(specifically making reference to the Brazilian case). Accordingly, “there is at least an 
argument that better environmental policy means more rather than less state 
involvement” (Ibid., p. 214).
Haas et al. (1993) have analysed the effectiveness of international environmental 
institutions9. Their findings are relevant due to their recognition that multiple-actors’ 
involvement in environmental problems is essential when searching for solutions. The 
authors explicitly state that nation-states are part of any solution, as well as 
environmental NGOs and private corporations. In principle, they seem to be optimistic 
about the results achieved through cooperation among states. At the end they recognized 
failure in the cases10 of pesticides, population, and fisheries. It is relevant to emphasize 
that the failure on pesticides and population have major implications for developing 
countries.
8 According to Miller (1995, p. 10) the realist paradigm (based on conflict and competition among states, 
when pursuing their self-interests and power) assumes that industrialized countries hold the preponderance 
of power, and consequently developing countries have little or no influence on the formation of 
environmental regimes.
9 See Hurrell and Kingsbury (1992) for an analysis of the role of major international institutions (e.g., UN, 
World Bank and European Community) in the management of environmental issues.
10 The seven issues covered by Haas et al. (1993, p. 6) are: oil pollution from tankers, acid rain, 
stratospheric ozone depletion, pollution of the Baltic and North seas, mismanagement of fisheries, 
overpopulation, and misuse of agrochemicals.
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More specifically, Haas et al. (1993, p. 7) affirm that environmental actions in 
developing countries are guided by international institutional pressures. However, the 
effectiveness of international environmental institutions is based not only on the 
traditional abilities of governments to make and enforce law and regulations, but “also 
on the ability of actors in the civil society to play an effective role in policy making and 
implementation” (Ibid., p. 20).
It is exactly these aspects that explain the lack of effectiveness in environmental 
protection in developing countries. According to Haas et al. (1993) this happens because 
“governments have often been unable either to understand or to regulate the impact of 
their citizens and industrial enterprises on the natural environment”. Besides this, civil 
society in these countries is not organised by groups that could generate information and 
criticism on environmental degradation.
Contrary to Haas et al.’s (1993) assumption above, Miller (1995) has indicated 
that though the majority of environmental NGOs were based in industrialized countries, 
the number of such NGOs based in developing countries has been growing. Despite the 
fact that these NGOs have not acquired the international influence of industrialized 
countries-based NGOs, they have been able to influence domestic policies and their 
governments’ decisions on international environmental politics. Likewise, Princen and 
Finger’s (1994) study is illustrative of how NGOs have been spreading in developing 
countries since the early 1980s, including a broad set of interests from environmental to 
human and women’s rights.
The Amazon deforestation is a good example (as well as the case of rubber 
tappers in the Acre state in Brazil, Keck, 1995, p. 411) of the relevant role played by 
transnational groups of ecologists and campaigners in the international pressure exerted 
on the Brazilian government. It is recognized that deforestation became an international 
political issue only because of the campaigning from these groups. However, it must be 
said that systematic study on environmental NGOs and their influence in Latin America 
is rare (Hurrell, 1991, p. 211).
Miller (1995, p.38) has identified that the influence of environmental pressure 
groups comes from their ability to call upon a strong core of public support, as they 
attempt to affect national and global environmental politics. Although their strategies 
vary from traditional lobbying to confrontational tactics, two other factors contribute to
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the strength of pressure groups: (a) their constitution in network forums for data 
gathering and dissemination, and (b) the fact that they act independently of nation-states, 
which enhances their credibility.
Additionally, Miller (1995, p. 11) says that due to increasing economic and 
ecological interdependence (the former acts as a constraint on developing countries’ 
influence on international environmental politics, but the latter can provide room for 
manoeuvre in some contexts), IGOs and NGOs have been crucial in integrating the 
developing countries into the world system. Nevertheless, the interests of IGOs and 
NGOs are likely to be more consistent with those of the industrialized countries than 
they are with those of the developing countries (Ibid., p. 47). Regarding environmental 
NGOs, Princen and Finger (1994) state that their activities are usually focused on 
specific environmental problems (e.g., based on selective environmental issues - the use 
of pesticides, ecosystems - tropical forests, or geographic areas - the Antarctic and North 
Sea), which has kept their activities within feasible limits.
2.2.2 - Nation-states and transnational corporations - from individual to collective 
actions
This section will discuss the relationship between states and TNCs from the 
perspective of international political economy (IPE). It aims to address the collective 
action engineered by firms in order to face pressures from national governments. The 
IPE perspective seems to be appropriate to address TNCs practices, as it is impossible to 
separate political issues from economic issues, or to consider only the relationship 
between nation-states11. Strange (1994, p. 80) states that the “nature of the global 
production structure has become increasingly dominated by international business”, 
which is the “combined result of state policies and of market trends, of management 
strategies and changing technology”.
Additionally, Hurrell and Kingsbury (1992, pp. 3-4) state that environmental 
politics must be incorporated into the IPE discussion, because the “institutions that 
matter most are not specifically ‘environmental’, but rather are the core institutions that
11 See Stubbs and Underhill (1994, pp. 18-38) for a overview of the central questions and premises of the 
discipline of international political economy and its distinct theoretical perspectives - realism, liberal, neo- 
realism and Marxist.
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govern (or at least seek to govern) the workings of the world economy” (such as the 
World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, and to some extent the OECD).
In this regard, Redclift (1987, p.78) examines the dimensions of the global 
environmental crisis from the perspective of IPE, arguing that the process of 
development cannot be divorced from the historical evolution of the international 
economic system. The author argues that the structure of the international economy is 
partly responsible for the worsening condition of local environments in many parts of 
the South. The pressure to achieve more economic growth, orientated to external 
demands in a period of indebtedness, had served to deepen the crisis afflicting the local 
economy in many areas (see Newfarmer, 1983).
Moreover, Glover (in Stubbs and Underhill, 1994, p. 285) stressed that “the 
difficulties encountered in introducing environmental concerns into international forums 
highlight the lack of congruence between existing institutions and the problems with 
which they must deal”. Nevertheless, such attempts12 reflects “a growing awareness of 
ecological interdependence and the global ramifications of national environmental 
practices”.
Overall, there are some limitations to applying IPE to investigate environmental 
issues. First, there is precisely the lack of explanations for environmental issues. Second, 
the core focus of IPE on market-related issues has meant that sociological implications 
of states-firms relationships are not often included. However, Stubbs and Underhill 
(1994) have made progress on the political, social and environmental aspects of IPE. So 
far, Strange (1994, p. 18) has defined IPE as “it concerns the social, political and 
economic arrangements affecting the global system of production, exchange and 
distribution, and the mix of values reflect therein”.
In sum, it is argued here that corporate environmental polices and practices are 
not fully explained by economic and political arguments (which are certainly state- 
centric). Sally (1994, p. 163) is quite clear on this aspect arguing that “political economy 
continues to be ‘state-centric’, overwhelmingly concentrating on the role of 
‘government’ in both domestic nation-state and international economic affairs”.
12 Mainly on a rhetorical level, as the Final Act of the GATT accord of December 1993, creating the WTO, 
made reference to the objective of sustainable development; the International Tropical Timber 
Organization has a mandate to promote sustainable production methods; and finally the BCSD, which 
‘proved to be a useful forum’ during UNCED, should have a role to play (Glover in Stubbs and Underhill, 
1994, p. 286).
39
Consequently, “one of the fundamental defects of contemporary political economy is the 
neglect of the individual enterprise in national and international affairs”.
Additionally, this thesis assumes some discretion from the host country’s 
government and TNCs’ subsidiaries in developing countries, which requires the 
structural approach to be supplemented. Besides, most IPE approaches (with the 
exception of Stopford et al., 1991) consider corporations as “black boxes” (Sally, 1994, 
p. 164), excluded from the investigation of organizational related variables. 
Consequently, research aiming to explain relationships that take place within country 
and organization levels will necessarily require additional perspectives. Finally, IPE 
lacks investigation on either the nationality of the firm (as suggested by Stopford et al., 
1991, p. 232) or social and cultural issues that could explain the behaviour of states and 
TNCs in the ‘transnational market economy’.
Stopford et al. (1991, p. 211) states that TNCs, though indispensable allies for 
governments, are “competing for world market shares as a means to wealth and 
survival” (which may result in both cooperation and conflict). The theoretical 
framework (based on the so-called ‘triangular diplomacy’) elaborated by Stopford et al. 
(1991) is useful for this thesis by way of its focus on the interdependence between states 
and firms, emphasizing that states have to negotiate with foreign firms, firms with firms, 
and more traditionally states with states. Such an approach is quite interesting and 
unusual through its combination of IPE and international business literature. 
Furthermore, it recognizes the importance of TNCs in host countries, especially 
developing countries (Ibid., p. 204).
Regarding TNCs in developing countries other contributions were made on what 
is called the political economy of North-South13 relations. Miljan (1987) stresses that the 
“TNCs’ command over economic resources and their enviable possession of managerial 
skills and technology provide them with a unique opportunity not only to influence the 
process of socio-economic development in host-countries, but also to imprint patterns of 
international relationships on host economies” (Ibid., p. 252).
13 Marchand (in Stubbs and Underhill, 1994, p. 296) has addressed the North-South relation providing an 
historical account and questioning the future usage of this concept.
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Although Stopford et al. (1991) did not focus on environmental issues14, two 
references are made which may produce some insights for future explanations of 
corporate environmental policies. The first reference is focused on the environmental 
impact of new projects and how both firms and governments measure the benefits from 
projects. In the authors’ opinion, “the firm makes calculations in terms of the global 
return; the government looks only at the local effects” (Ibid., p. 151). In the end, the 
firms’ environmentally concerned decisions15 are not considered as “philanthropy, but 
good commercial sense”. However, neither the meaning of commercial sense, nor other 
factors (such as pressures from environmental groups) that could explain firms’ 
decisions are clear.
Stopford et al. (1991) illustrate state’s decisions with the Brazilian case. Brazil is 
mentioned as a country that has accepted “less than the best international standards for 
pollution control” due to the rush to industrialize16 (in reference to the petrochemical 
complex of Cubatao17, Sao Paulo state). The authors conclude that “good practice can 
only be established in partnership between firms, governments and international 
regulatory bodies ... Both firms and governments thus have a strong incentive to work 
together to find solutions” (Ibid., p. 154).
The issues that demand such partnership vary in content and context, and also 
seem to be dependent on other variables (outside firm’s and government’s scope of 
actions). Consequently, what Stopford et al. (1991, p. 154) called “firms’ responses to 
pressure” could justify an investigation on corporate environmental policies that is
14 A more radical criticism is made by Choucri (in Choucri, 1993, p. 220), when she states that “to date all 
theories of the MNCs ignore the impacts of corporate activities on the natural environment and on 
ecological balances. Indeed, the term ‘natural environment’ is never cited in the indexes of volumes on the 
multinational corporations or international political economy”.
15 Two interesting examples are provided, as follows: (a) Shell’s experience in developing an oil field in 
partnership with the Gabonese government assuming an environmental impact study, and (b) B.A.T’s 
Kenyan subsidiary supports to tobacco suppliers that maintain the reforestation process to produce the 
timber to cure the tobacco (Stopford et al., 1991, p. 153).
16 A valid discussion on development styles and an alternative development model for Latin America is 
made by Redclift (1987, pp. 96-102), in which two main trends have been identified. First, is the 
promotion of industrialization for the internal market, and second, the attempt to achieve development 
through the export of primary goods, resulting in the depletion of natural resources and maintenance of the 
dependence on the world system.
17 In early 1980s the Brazilian federal government intervened with an emergency plan that obligated all 
companies in this area to adopt pollution control activities; since then the local authorities have been using 
their power and resources to reduce pollution. According to the Financial Times (6 June 1996, p. 5) 
Cubatao (which concentrates 16 percent of Brazilian heavy industry) accomplished a clean up programme 
backed by US$ 400 million on loans from the Inter-American Development Bank and the Brazilian 
Development Bank.
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focused on ‘external pressures’, and not only on ‘firms’ commercial sense’. Moreover, 
this thesis works on the assumption that companies are not incorporating environmental 
protection voluntarily (Gladwin, 1977; Neder, 1992; Gladwin, in Pearson, 1987; 
UNTCMD, 1993).
The second reference to environmental issues comes from the discussion that 
governments, as a group, have lost bargaining power to TNCs as a consequence of the 
intense competition for wealth among states. More specifically, TNCs, as a group, can 
exercise considerable influence over government choices, and their collective action 
may produce or influence some international standards. Stopford et al. (1991, p. 216) 
state that “through such representative bodies as the ICC, firms also play a central role in 
shaping international standards on a wide range of issues, from bilateral tax treaties to 
environmental standards”. In the specific case of ICC (which has observer status at the 
UN, where it lobbies on behalf of international business18) the issue of whether the 
principles for sustainable development established in 1992 with the support of major 
TNCs have been implemented and/or evaluated deserves investigation.
Gleckman (1995) argues that TNCs had never acted as a group on environmental 
and development issues before the UNCED in 1992. They have no institutional history, 
no established leadership or methods to reach consensus. Gleckman states, calling 
attention to business associations (such as BCSD, ICC and trade associations), that since 
UNCED, some principles were defined to incorporate environmental concerns into 
companies’ activities. In contrast there is no organization that is the legitimate 
representative of TNCs on any subject. In other words, business associations cannot 
make agreements on behalf of TNCs, but they can try to influence governments and 
international forums. In the author’s opinion, TNCs play two conflicting roles: at the 
same time as publicizing their “global reach”, they deny that their collective action could 
have negative consequences or power to influence events.
In conclusion, Gleckman (1995) stressed that national governments are crucial 
for the control of environmental activities of TNCs. Accordingly, environmental laws
18 Eden (1994) has stressed the manipulation by ICC on the definition of the concept of sustainable 
development. It is clear, by the author’s statement, that ICC’s debate on sustainable development 
emphasizes growth with shallow environmental concern (based on technical and market-responses). Thus, 
there is no tension with the dominant business paradigm (finance-based). Eden calls attention to the power 
of business lobbying internationally, and consequences of this lobby at United Nations Commission for 
Sustainable Development. It somewhat answers the question set up by Gleckman (1995) about who will 
define the sustainable behaviour of TNCs.
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and regulations in the home country are the single motivating factor for the 
establishment of a global environmental policy by TNCs. While on the contrary, in the 
international arena, the battle for the definition of an acceptable international corporate 
behaviour (including standards for environmental disclosure) has not finished (though 
the attempts to establish codes of conduct for TNCs by the OECD and the UN19 have 
failed according to UNCTC, 1985, p. 82).
2.3 - Home country context and its implications
2.3.1 - Nationality of the firm
Considering everything that has been discussed in the previous section, it is 
appropriate to stress two points: (a) the notion that TNCs have a political element 
(Boddewyn, 1988) that may be dichotomized into collective (through business 
associations without legitimacy to take decisions for them) and individual actions; and 
(b) the TNCs’ embeddedness in their external context in relations with other actors 
(Sally, 1995). According to Sally (1995, p. 206) “it is precisely this area of interaction 
between multinational enterprises and other actors, which affect both the competitive 
advantage of the firms, the competitiveness of the economies in which they do business, 
and variables of relative power and policy choice”.
Following such a pattern of analysis on government-firm relationships, another 
important question arises: how does such interaction take place for environmental 
issues? It is usually through a regulatory policy that governments define the standards 
for industrial pollution control. In fact, one of the assumptions of this research is that 
governments (even in developing countries) have the capabilities (power, interests, and 
other resources) to intervene into other actors’ activities. At the same time, these actors 
will try to influence governments’ decisions.
19 Miljan (1987, p. 252) states that the apprehension on the part of Asian, African and Latin American 
members of the UN on the capacity of TNCs “to influence political decisions, pattern of consumption, 
changes in culture, the direction of production and trade” resulted in the establishment of the United 
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations. This centre was maintained from 1975 to 1992 and became 
the Transnational Corporations Management Division of the UN Department of Social Development (from 
1992 to 1993). Now it is the Programme on TNCs at the UNCTAD. Finally, a critical discussion of the 
political, social and cultural impacts of TNCs in developing countries is made by Sklair (1995).
43
The UNTCMD (1993) has indicated that “the nature of the regulatory 
environment in the home country of the corporation explains variations between regions 
[in this case among Europe, North-America and Asia] in the nature of environmental, 
health and safety management practices”. However, it must be clear that the regulatory 
policy has a national sphere of influence. This means that environmental regulatory 
policies from the home countries are not expected to have any kind of coercive effect in 
the host country context. Gladwin (in Pearson, 1987, p. 23) states that the likelihood of 
any attempt by TNCs’ home countries to extend their environmental regulations 
extraterritorially is rather low in view of diplomatic matters. On the other hand, criticism 
has been made regarding the mimicked behaviour of developing countries20, which 
formulate their environmental regulatory policy21 based on industrialized countries’ 
experiences.
Nevertheless, the regulatory policies of TNCs’ home countries may be indirectly 
present in host countries. The UNTCMD’s (1993, p. 93) survey has found that the 
EH&S practices of TNCs in developing nations reflect the home region of the 
corporation. Birdsall and Wheeler (1993, p. 137) state that the combination of trade 
liberalization and increased foreign investment in Latin America have not been 
associated with pollution-intensive industrial development. However, the 
extraterritoriality of standards will take place, because for multinationals the cheapest 
way to meet the threat of future regulation is to adopt the standards prevailing in their 
home countries (Ibid., p. 142).
According to Stopford et al. (1991, p. 233-234) it is exactly over “the relation of 
national identity and corporate identity that conflict has arisen in international relations 
concerning the management of international trade and investment”. Besides this, relation 
is closer in some states than in others, which affects the competition between states for 
market shares (at home and abroad).
20 For example, Monosowski (1989) criticizes the Brazilian environmental policy for the lack of prior 
studies to assess the characteristic of the local ecosystems, and the importation of American standards (for 
emissions of industrial pollutants) which were adopted in late 70s.
21 The UNCTC report (1985, p. 23) affirms that few studies have gone much beyond the conceptual level 
in trying to define international differences in assimilative capabilities of the local environment. Therefore, 
the assumption that developing countries may enjoy a greater supply of assimilative capacity of pollution is 
controversial. Nevertheless, it is suggested that environmental quality levels, and corresponding policies to 
achieve them in any nation, will be a joint function of environmental assimilative capabilities and 
preferences of environmental quality expressed. Finally, the higher environmental awareness in 
industrialized countries, translated into environmental regulatory policies, was found to be correlated very 
strongly with per capita income.
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More specifically, Buckley and Casson (1991, p. 101) have found evidence to 
support the hypothesis that the ‘nationality of the firm’ is a very significant influence on 
the behaviour of MNEs. In addition, Sally (1994, p. 170) indicates that the MNE is an 
institution embedded in an array of different institutional environments. Such a 
perspective implicitly recognizes that nations have “different models of institutional 
expression and capitalist operation”.
The evidence to support the differences on the political culture of environmental 
politics22, comes from O’Riordan’s (1981) study. The author states that it will “vary 
with the traditions, customs, institutions, and other cultural attributes of a political 
community” (Ibid., p. 230). For example, there are differences in terms of the political 
culture of environmental politics between the UK and the US, notably in relation to 
political participation, administrative and/or authority’s behaviour, decision making 
processes, and the role of environmental law. Likewise, Vogel (1986, p.21) says that 
apart from “common roots of their political and legal systems”, American and British 
approaches to environmental regulation differ from each other (see tables 2.2 and 2.3 for 
selected legislation in the US and the UK).
Table 2.2 - Selected environmental legislation - United States
Year Act
1947 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
1966 Freedom of Information
1969 National Environmental Policy
1970 Clear Air (amended in 1977 and 1990)
1972 Clean Water (amended in 1977 and 1981)
1975 Hazardous Materials Transportation (amended in 1976)
1976 Toxic Substances Control
1976 Resource Conservation and Recovery
1977 Soil and Water Resources Conservation
1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
(“Superfund” - amended in 1986)
1986 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know (Title El of 1986 
Superfund amendments)
1990 Clear Air Act Amendments
1990 Pollution Prevention
1990 National Environmental Education
Source: OECD, 1996b, pp. 32-34.
22 See Vogel (1986) for further details on the national styles of environmental regulation in the UK and the 
US.
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Table 2.3 - Selected environmental legislation - United Kingdom
Year Act
1956 Clean Air (consolidated in 1968 and 1993)
1974 Control of Pollution
1974 Health and Safety at Work
1985 Food and Environment Protection
1989 Water
1990 Environmental Protection
1991 Water Industry
1991 Water Resources
1992 The Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) Regulations
Source: OECD, 1994, p. 27.
Additionally, Vogel (1986, p. 27) states that the American style of regulation 
represents a model to which environmentalists, consumer and trade union activists from 
industrialized countries would like their nations to follow. For example, the politics of 
pollution control and conservation in Germany are similar to the US (in the late 60s and 
early 70s). Moreover, the German government has enacted standards that are now the 
strictest in Europe (see table 2.4 below).
Table 2.4 - Selected environmental legislation - Germany
Year Act and Ordinances
1957 Water Management Act
1972 Waste Disposal Act
1972 DDT Act
1974 Environmental Statistics Act
1976 Wastes Water Charges Act
1976 Energy Saving Act
1980 Chemical Act
1980 Hazardous Incidents Ordinance
1982 Sewage Sludge Ordinance
1986 Hazardous Substances Ordinance
1986 Waste Avoidance and Management Act
1987 Origin of Waste Water Ordinance
1990 Environmental Impact Assessment Act
1990 Environmental Liability Act
1991 Prohibition of CFCs Ordinance
1991 Packaging Waste Ordinance
Source: OECD, 1993b, p. 25.
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In short, the US is considered to be a particularly advanced society in terms of 
environmental awareness. It is said to have created a complex environmental regulatory 
policy against industrial pollution (DiMento, 1986), and has encouraged widespread 
public participation through NGOs (Princen and Finger, 1994). O’Riordan’s affirms that 
grass roots activism is part of the American political scene. Therefore the politicization 
of environmental activism is considered a normal outcome of American culture. The 
environmental pressure groups were numerous, and to be effective they usually had to 
adopt the politically successful tactics of the resource development agency (1981, p. 
231).
The UK is said to have loose active participation, if compared with the US. 
Nevertheless, it is recognized as a country with high standard of environmental 
regulatory policy, consumer and public environmental concern. More specifically, Vogel 
(1986, p. 19) stresses the long history of British concerns for the quality of the physical 
environment and with air pollution. O’Riordan has indicated that amenity organizations 
have been present on the Britain scene since the last century. However, those 
organizations “are so embedded in the political fabric (and because many of them are 
patronized by leading public figures) that activism in the sense of grass roots 
participation is less common” (1981, p. 231).
The institutionalization of environmentalism within the state apparatus started 
in early 1970s, when the Department of the Environment (in the UK) and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (in the US) were created as bodies responsible for the 
formulation and implementation of policy on environmental issues. Dryzek (1997, p. 
138) recognized that in the 70s “most of the environmental policy innovations were 
made in the developed English-speaking countries, especially in the US, and then copied 
elsewhere”.
Despite the pressure from public opinion and environmentalists to such 
institutionalization, the business community was quite responsive to the notion of 
national regulation. According to McGrew (in Smith, 1993, p. 15) “industrialists 
recognized that environmental policy could not be formulated without their expertise 
and that a uniform set of national regulations would provide a ‘level playing field’ for all 
businesses as opposed to a proliferation of local controls”.
23 See McCormick (1989) for an overview of the emergence and institutionalization of environmental 
policies in the industrialized countries.
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Over the same period, in Germany a governmental environmental programme 
was organized; however the responses during the 70s were regarded as poor, which 
motivated the emergence of a new Green Party (Die Grunen in 1979), which elected 
representatives to the Bundestag in 1983 (Ibid., p. 16). Dryzek (1997, p. 137) states that 
Germany has turned in the most successful environmental policy performance in the 
1980s and 1990s (the other best cases are Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden). 
In Germany, the adoption of the precautionary principle (which became law in the 80s) 
for guiding the policy “specifies that scientific uncertainty is no excuse for inaction on 
an environmental problem”.
The Green Party has played a key role in German policy development, “mostly 
by forcing other parties to adopt green positions and policies for fear of losing votes” 
(Ibid., p. 140). However, the uniqueness of the German context (when compared to the 
UK and the US) “is a political-economic system where consensual relationships among 
key actors prevail” (Ibid., p. 141). Nevertheless, it has taken some time for 
environmentalists to convince the corporatist state of the incorporation of environmental 
values and the promotion of ecological modernization.
Another crucial difference, between the US and Britain, is related to public 
access to information from the authorities. In Britain this is not an automatic right, 
where the regulatory policy making is executed by a selective consultation with 
particular interests. On the contrary, in the US information has been available to the 
public since 1966. The American model of “environmental decision making is based on 
bargaining and concession trading among political lobbies” (O’Riordan, 1991, pp. 233- 
235). Similarly, Friends of the Earth (1992) acknowledges that the public “right-to-know 
principle” is not part of environmental policies in Europe. This report goes one step 
further in suggesting that European companies follow such practice in their subsidiaries 
in the US (where disclosure is a legal requirement) but not in Europe.
The UNEP (1994, p. 24) states that geographical coverage of TNCs’ 
environmental reports has been limited to their home country. This survey has found two 
distinct approaches of corporate environmental reporting (so-called Anglo-Saxon and 
Rhine styles). The Anglo-Saxon model, followed by most North-American and British 
companies, “has at its core a statement of environmental policy, description of 
management practices and an inventory of emissions”. On the contrary, the Rhine
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model, used by many Scandinavian and German companies, “is based on an eco-balance 
of environmental inputs and outputs across the life-cycle” of the company’s operations 
(Ibid., p. 28).
The plausibility of future convergence of approaches is, nevertheless, 
constrained by management styles that reflect social-political and cultural aspects. The 
American case is very illustrative because “the introduction of statutory disclosure 
requirements” (such as the Toxic Release Inventory and those of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission), “has formed the context within which companies have 
developed their own voluntary environmental reporting programmes” (Ibid., p. 62). 
Likewise, the European Community has adopted (in 1993) a regulation on 
environmental management and auditing systems, “designed to encourage companies to 
voluntarily audit their operations on a site-by-site basis, and to release a summary report 
to the public” (Ibid.).
According to the UNCTC (1985, p. 23), variations in environmental policies 
may be a result of inter-country differences in levels of industrialization and living 
standards. Other differences in policies exist mainly because of variations in political 
and social philosophies. The British and American approaches to air and water pollution 
are taken to illustrate these aspects. The British “approach to environmental problems is 
consensual, specific, gradual and flexible, while the American approach tends to be 
control-oriented, general, and rigidly judicial”. Both approaches seem to work 
sufficiently well within their national boundaries, but could not produce the same result 
in another country24. This is because, they reflect distinct traditions of business- 
govemment relations, philosophies of collective intervention and patterns of industry 
competition. The same argument applies for Germany, where environmental concern 
was incorporated in the corporatist state, though the precautionary principle has diffused 
beyond the German borders (Dryzek, 1997, p. 139).
Considering that cultural diversity is intrinsically related to the existence of 
nation-states, Hofstede (1994, pp. 43-45) explains that ‘culture’ at the national and 
organizational levels are two very different phenomena. The author claims that the 
understanding of such difference is the secret of the existence of MNCs that have 
employees with extremely distinct national cultural values. Thus, it is the corporate
24 Milton (1996) has made some advances by linking cultural and environmental issues (grounded in 
anthropology).
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culture based on common practices that keeps employees together (a similar argument is 
made by Hymer, in Little and Smith, 1991).
Although it is unusual, within the IPE perspective, to include sociological or 
cultural explanations for analysis of state-firm relations; it is impossible to ignore the 
fact that managers grew up in a particular society in a particular period . For that 
reason, managers’ ideas cannot but reflect the constraints of the environment they know 
(Hofstede, 1994, p. 28).
Strange (in Stubbs and Underhill, 1994, p. 112) indicates that the nationality of 
firms deserves much closer attention in the state-firm relationship. Apart from the 
evidence that US-based firms rarely recruit non-Americans as their top managers, the 
author adds that “the behaviour of firms and their vital interests cannot always be 
predicted from the country where they are registered and have their headquarters”. As 
mentioned before, UNTCMD (1993) recognizes the home country influence on TNCs’ 
environmental management, but Strange (in Stubbs and Underhill, 1994) suggests that 
this is not always the rule.
Overall, in effect it seems that the issue of ‘nationality of firms’ is quite 
contradictory suggesting that it should be taken into consideration when investigating 
corporate environmental policies. This thesis assumes that TNCs’ headquarters are 
constrained by the regulatory policy when defining their corporate environmental 
policies. Thus, some elements of such legislation will be incorporated into formal 
statements, and will later be disseminated throughout the corporation. Such 
dissemination will happen simply because TNCs have to spread their strategic choice 
and assets (such as technology and environmental services) to maintain their 
competitiveness. In other words, the following proposition will be investigated:
The home country’s environmental regulatory policy is the main source o f  
pressure fo r  the implementation o f corporate environmental policies in 
TNCs’ subsidiaries.
25 Hickson (1997) organized a very impressive overview of distinctive managerial approaches which 
characterize different societies.
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2.4 - Host country context and its implications
This section follows a bargaining approach (Grosse and Behrman, 1992; 
Nygaard and Dahlstrom, 1992; Kline, 1992 and Gladwin and Walter, 1980b), which is 
understood as an international business perspective including political science concepts 
to analyse the relationships between TNCs and governments. As previously mentioned 
(in section 2.2.2), IPE has neglected the investigation of individual firms in their relation \ ) 
with government and other actors at the national level. On the contrary, international 
business has been prone to abstract the firm from its national and international political 
economy contexts. Consequently, Sally (1994, pp. 162-166) has made an interesting 
account on these gaps in both approaches suggesting that an interdisciplinary fusion is 
required.
In short, the next chapter provides an overview of environmental politics as well 
as the evolution of environmentalism in Brazil. Such discussion is not made in the 
present section because the contextual analysis of the host country already includes 
empirical evidence from Brazil.
2.4.1 - Environmental regulatory policy
Grosse and Behrman (1992, p. 100) recognized the “triangular diplomacy 
model” (elaborated by Stopford et al., 1991, and already mentioned in section 2.2.2) as a 
useful framework to discuss the government-firm relationship. However, other social 
and political interactions in the host context justify the analysis of the relationships 
between host government and TNCs’ subsidiaries through the bargaining approach. In 
other words, if the organization’s survival is really explained by its ability to deal with 
external contingencies, then strategic relationships between TNCs and their host 
countries must be added into the core discussion of TNCs (Grosse and Behram, 1992; 
Nygaard and Dahlstrom, 1992).
It is exactly at the interface between organization and its external environment 
that the bargaining process starts. Grosse and Behrman (1992, p. 98) recognize 
international business as a distinct field of study, without a widely accepted explanatory 
theory on which to base its uniqueness. Consequently, they suggest the use of the
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bargaining theory as a framework for constructing such a theory. The main justification 
for this selection is that governments are central to international business practice and 
analysis.
However, the current bargaining theory has not been extended to explain 
governmental interventions in TNCs’ activities vis-a-vis TNCs’ responses towards 
government, which are explained by the differences between their objectives. In Grosse 
and Behrman’s opinion such constraints demonstrate that governments and TNCs “face 
pressure not only from each other, but also from other participants” (e.g., local firms, 
municipalities and state governments) “as well as other foreign firms and foreign 
governments” (1992, p. 100).
Environmental regulation is therefore justified because this issue has not been 
among TNCs’ objectives . Consequently, TNCs have increased their concern towards 
the environment due to external pressure (e.g., from the media and environmentalists) 
and governmental intervention. It has been recognized that TNCs have not voluntarily 
(i.e., in the absence of external pressure) incorporated environmental issues (UNTCMD, 
1993). However, it is possible to suggest that by doing so they may legitimate their 
interests (Boddewyn, 1994; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In other words, TNCs may use 
environmental concern either to improve their image or to exploit market opportunities 
in the new environmental management business.
Gladwin and Walter (1980b, p. 428) recognize that “the translation of existing or 
expected environmental problems into corrective or preventive environmental policy 
depends heavily on social and political factors”. More specifically, social preferences are 
crucial in defining how an environmental problem is perceived, interpreted and given 
priority. The same social choices apply to environmental quality, as societies may differ 
on their views of what is an “acceptable level of environmental quality”. The authors 
(1980b) state that regarding environmental issues, the main opponents of TNCs’ 
practices are interest groups and regulatory actors.
Furthermore, the structures constraining TNCs are usually legal mechanisms 
(e.g., complaints and prosecution), administrative instruments (e.g., bans and regulatory 
probes) and communication (e.g., public speeches, publications, and advertisements). 
Gladwin and Walter (1980b) conclude that TNCs have been inadequately prepared for
26 Among the TNCs’ objectives are access to markets and inputs, reduction of risks, freedom of decision­
making and operations (Grosse and Behrman, 1992, p. 100).
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handling conflicts, particularly those associated with major crises and disasters, showing 
poor internal and external communications that have intensified and perpetuated 
conflicts.
In the case of industrial pollution the pressures come specifically from local 
interest groups (such as, workers’ unions, consumers and NGOs). These groups will be 
the driving forces to compel government (which has the power to intervene in firms’ 
activities) to formulate laws and regulations preserving the environment. Likewise, 
Grosse and Behrman (1992, p. 109) state that the rules for business operations are 
established by governments, which means “that firms whose operations cross national 
boundaries must necessarily assess and manage differences in legal, regulatory and 
institutional environments in each country” (similar to arguments from Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978 and Ghoshal and Westney, 1993, grounded in organization theory).
Nygaard and Dahlstrom (1992) have analysed the strategic alternatives (based on 
patterns of behaviour) of both TNC and host country. This study clearly considers 
corporate strategy as a function of contextual factors (which is consistent with the 
resource dependency perspective, Peffer and Salancik, 1978). The authors state that 
“governmental regulation and market policy are viewed as antecedent to TNC strategy”. 
Indeed ‘TNC strategy and host country policy are co-determinants”, because the “party 
with the power advantage is likely to exert influence that dictates the partner’s 
behaviour” (1992, p. 9). In sum, the host country can assume an offensive or defensive 
policy that will influence the TNC’s response. In the case of an offensive policy the 
TNC has a power disadvantage and is likely to adopt a cooperative strategy. On the 
contrary, in the case of a defensive policy the TNC has a power advantage and exerts 
influence over government regulation (Nygaard and Dahlstrom, 1992, p. 5).
The authors emphasize that “the globalization of industry sectors will accelerate 
the process of deregulation and change the strategic relationship between MNC and host 
countries” (Ibid., p. 12). In such a case, TNCs will have to develop global strategies 
resulting in less impetus to promote exchange with each country, but TNCs will 
continue to compare the investment advantages for alternative countries. For example, in 
the case of a TNC that follows a global market strategy, each plant will be specialized in 
a set of operations, and the final product will depend on a different national context. In 
the beginning, the bargaining power of the host country will decrease. However, what
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the TNCs gain in terms of competitiveness using the distinct comparative advantages in 
different countries, they lose in control after the relocation has been accomplished. 
Following a traditional strategy of production, with local production for domestic or 
export market in branch-plants, the bargain balance between government and TNCs will 
be the same. The instability in their relationships will happen in a traditional way, that is, 
in terms of intensive resources for TNCs and FDI and technological access for the host 
country. In conclusion, Nygaard and Dahlstrom (1992) stress that the changes in TNCs’ 
operations and host country deregulation are inevitable; thus cooperation should be 
promoted among TNCs, domestic firms and governmental officials.
Kline (1992) calls attention to recent changes in political systems in developing 
countries, which are often reflected in TNCs-host countries’ relations. The author has 
also indicated changes in the traditional strategic issues that have been demanded by 
host countries. The issues that are gaining in strategic importance are: technology, export 
market, capital mobilization, and TNCs’ organizational structures (1992, p. 275). For 
example, technology is important not because of the location of research and 
development (which was the most usual request from host countries), but because it 
aims to improve: (a) standards of quality control; (b) managerial skills to develop and 
coordinate complex business activities; (c) technological processes to enhance plant 
safety and environmental protection, and (d) advanced computer and communication 
services.
However, the relationship between developing countries and foreign firms is 
more complex, including technical issues (such as taxes, regulation to export and 
import, etc.) on which firms based their decision to invest in developing countries 
(Kline, 1992). In general, some of those technical issues will increase and others will 
lessen the attractiveness of a developing country to receive FDI. At the same time, some 
issues are more important ante- rather than post-investment.
A similar argument was made by Nygaard and Dahlstram (1992). Nevertheless, 
this framework has limitations on its applicability in some host countries. For example, 
a developing country may not be able to fulfill the requirements to have offensive 
regulatory and market policies. However, the search for environmental solutions 
regarding TNCs in developing countries seems to be more probably obtained through
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non traditional channels, such as public opinion, NGOs and consumer pressures27. 
Another relevant point is the locus where negotiation between government and TNCs 
takes place. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the idiosyncrasies of the governmental 
structure (e.g., centralized or decentralized), regarding environmental regulatory policy.
Additionally, the weakness of environmental agencies in developing countries, 
in relation to other local ministries dealing with foreign investors, is recognized by 
Pearson (1985). The explanation for such weakness is based on the fact that 
environmental agencies are often inadequately staffed and lack political power. There 
are also difficulties in translating law into regulation and to enforce it later. It is at this 
latter stage that problems with corruption will emerge (Pearson, 1985, p. 78). Overall, 
Brown et al. (1993a, p. 206) state that TNCs’ facilities in developing countries “are 
likely to under perform in relation to the parent country counterparts, owing to the lax 
regulatory climate of such countries”. Finally, Pimenta’s (in Pearson, 1987, p. 220) 
findings illustrate the relationship between multinationals and the government in Brazil. 
Most interesting is that the author offers a comparative analysis of domestic- versus 
multinational-owned facilities, regarding industrial pollution control in the state of Sao 
Paulo.
Briefly, Pimenta concludes that: (a) there is no discrimination between foreign 
and domestic ownership from either legislation nor government; (b) multinationals tend 
to respond faster when asked to solve environmental problems, due to concern with 
public opinion (mainly from politicians and journalists); (c) MNCs’ favourable 
responses are a consequence of corporate policies, environmentally concerned managers, 
technical capabilities, and financial resources; (d) since new pollution-control regulation 
was established in Sao Paulo, many domestic and foreign plants have been classified as 
“non-complying” with emission standards set by the state agency; (e) multinationals 
have a ‘positive demonstration effect’, because of constant comparison made by 
domestic firms when dealing with Brazilian state officials; (f) the officials complained 
about the newly arrived MNCs, as these firms have little knowledge of the country
27 Gladwin and Walter’s (1980) study illustrates the most usual social and political conflicts that MNCs 
face in their host countries. It shows the bargaining between government and MNCs: paths of change in 
negotiations and modes of conflict in management (depending on the emphasis placed on two factors: 
assertiveness and cooperativeness). Besides this, the authors recognize that both market and non-market 
forces produce tensions and contradictions for the MNCs. Another interesting study on the tensions 
between MNCs and host countries was made by Doz et al. (1981).
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(specifically its legislation, control procedures and habits); (g) it is easier to discuss or 
negotiate with MNCs than with domestic firms, where managers are not so receptive 
and there is not a permanent environmental department; and (h) examples of 
community involvement in environmental protection have not been identified (among 
MNCs and domestic firms) in the state of Sao Paulo (in Pearson, 1987, pp. 216-219).
Overall, it is assumed here that the host country’s regulation to control industrial 
pollution constrains the practices of TNCs’ subsidiaries for two reasons. First, TNCs 
need to keep their operations running (and the environmental agency has the power to 
temporarily close the facilities that are sub-standard. Secondly, they aim to maintain 
their image intact (inasmuch as some pressure may emerge from journalists, politicians, 
NGOs and consumers).
Consequently, the implementation of corporate environmental policies will 
depend on external pressures, which may be regulatory and/or non-regulatory. 
Nevertheless, the major external constraint on corporate environmental policies will be 
posed by the host country’s environmental regulatory policy, which has motivated the 
following proposition:
The implementation o f  TNCs* environmental policies includes 
compliance with the host country’s environmental regulatory policy as a 
minimum requirement.
2.5 - Industry’s structure versus environmental challenges
A complementary assumption of this thesis is that some explanations for 
corporate environmental policies derive from the industry’s characteristics (as suggested 
by UNTCMD, 1993, p. 92). This is the recognition that each industrial sector (due to its 
structural character) is a key element in explaining the implementation of corporate 
environmental policies. Consequently, in this section industry competitiveness, structure 
and environmental commitment are discussed from an economic perspective (Porter and 
van der Linde, 1995a, b; Caimcross, 1995; Sorsa, 1994; Wally and Whitehead, 1994; 
Porter, 1991, 1990, 1980; Leonard, 1988). It should be noted that the selection of the 
industrial sectors was previously addressed (in section 1.2); the characteristics of the
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industrial sectors (that is, chemical and pharmaceutical) will be introduced respectively 
in chapters four and five.
The discussion of some key concepts (regarding the industry structure) is 
justified by the fact that theoretical explanations grounded in differences across 
industries (and not only differences across firms) are considered more substantial. 
However, Nelson (1991, p. 61) stresses that economists should recognize firm 
differences explicitly. On the contrary, the argument in economics is that the differences 
are not discretionary28, “but rather reflect differences in the contexts in which firms 
operate”.
Additionally, Rumelt’s (1991) findings “imply that the most important sources 
of economic rents are business-specific; industry membership is a much less important 
source and corporate parentage is quite unimportant”. In sum, the author questioned the 
validity of industry-level analysis. Consequently, it is assumed here that while industry 
differences matter when investigating environmental issues, they are not all that matters. 
Thus, the company-level of analysis will be addressed in the next section.
More recently, McGahan and Porter (1997, p. 16) have investigated the 
influence of industry on the profitability of American companies, concluding that 
“industry proves to have a powerful direct and indirect influence on profitability”. 
Overall, the results “do not support the assertion that rapid change in the economy has 
diminished the influence of industry”. Therefore, influences from the industry 
organization and competitive contexts remain as valid.
Based on industrial organization perspectives, the industry structure “is a central 
determinant of firm performance, and firm differences are considered against an 
industry” (McGahan and Porter, 1997, p. 15). As such Porter (1980) defines global 
industries as “one in which the strategic positions of competitors in major geographic or 
national markets are fundamentally affected by their overall global positions”. Thus, 
firms in global industries have “to compete on a worldwide, coordinated basis or face 
strategic disadvantages” (1980, p. 275).
Porter (1980, p. 277) has indicated that an industry becomes global because 
firms competing in a coordinated way in many national markets result in economic 
advantages. The author makes one further point by identifying the sources of global
28 That is, a certain looseness of constraints without meaning that firms are under the tight control of then- 
top decision makers (Nelson, 1991).
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competitive advantage (such as economies of scale, product differentiation, mobility of 
production), as well as the impediments to global competition (dividing them in 
economic, managerial and institutional categories).
As far as competitiveness and environmental standards are concerned, Sorsa’s 
(1994) findings can clarify the current assertion that industry could not cope with 
environmental protection. The author has investigated the determinants of trade flows in 
environmentally sensitive products. In brief, Sorsa concludes that environmental 
spending: (a) has been a small share of total spending and it is unlikely to have caused 
shifts in comparative advantage in most industries; (b) seems to have minor variances 
among industrialized countries; (c) has been concentrated in a few basic industries under 
heavy pressure to adapt structurally in the international division of labour, and (d) is 
closely linked to energy use. Finally, he states that positive adjustment and increased 
comparative advantages in environmentally sensitive goods were more pronounced in 
countries where environmental regulatory policies have encouraged investment rather 
than current spending (1994, p. 29-30).
Two further points from Sorsa’s study deserve to be mentioned, which are 
similar to Porter and van der Linde’s (1995a) arguments29. First, the achievement of 
higher environmental standards is not a “zero-sum game”. More specifically, investment 
in environmental protection technology can maintain or even create comparative 
advantage in environmentally sensitive industries. Second, it is suggested that 
“industries stmggling with environmental expenditures should lobby for better 
environmental policies”. Considering that poor performance is likely to be caused by 
other factors, “demands for protection due to different environmental expenditures are 
likely to be counter productive and retard adjustment to a new source of structured 
change” (1994, p. 30).
Altogether, these statements have several implications. First is the idea that 
performance could be better explained by other elements, probably in economic and
29 In Porter and van der Linde’s (1995a, p. 96) opinion, the myth of conflict between environmental 
protection and economic competitiveness is challenged by cases such as Germany. This country “has had 
the world’s tightest regulation in stationary air-pollution, and German companies appear to hold a wide 
lead in patenting - and exporting - air-pollution and other environmental technologies”. On the contrary, 
“as its environmental standards have lagged, Britain’s ratio of exports to imports in environmental 
technology has fallen from 8:1 to 1:1 over the past decade”. Finally, the US leadership in environmental 
technology is in “areas in which its regulations have been the strictest, such as pesticides and remediation 
of environmental damage”.
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managerial terms. Secondly, ‘better environmental policies’ will obligate competitors 
and suppliers to have the equivalent expenditures. In such a case, the companies that 
have been spending in environmental protection will not be punished in competitive 
terms.
Leonard (1988) makes one further point in the discussion of industrial 
competitiveness, by investigating how and why environmental regulations would alter 
the prevailing allocation of comparative advantage in industrial production. The author’s i 
analysis explores the hypotheses of “industrial-flight and pollution-havens”. Both 
hypotheses are concerned with the impacts that differences in national pollution-control ‘ 
regulations would have on the distribution of international comparative advantage. The 
empirical work was focused on the transfer of industries from industrialized country (in 
such a case the US) to rapidly industrializing countries (specifically Spain, Mexico, 
Ireland and Romania) owing to environmental regulations.
Taking into account that capital-intensive industries are more flexible concerning 
location but more dependent on government decision, Leonard argues that “these 
industries - which produce goods ranging from automobiles to chemicals and electrical 
equipment - are not technically footloose: they need infrastructure, appropriately skilled 
labor, linkages with other industries, and numerous other specific provisions” (1988, p.
27). These industries depend more on the amenities offered by governments at various 
locations and less on natural resources. Despite the fact that capital-intensive industries 
“may be flexible in selecting a new location”, they “cannot easily move existing 
production facilities”. A similar argument was made by Pearson (1985, p. 35), who 
observes that “a substantial amount of foreign investment is not ‘footloose’ and able to 
shop around for unregulated locations”.
According to Leonard, physical capital (represented by large plant) is generally 
immobile for a decade or more and will remain “in operation even though the rationale 
for the location is no longer compelling. Industrial inertia, as this phenomenon has been 
labeled, introduces significant short-term rigidity into the long-term context of flexibility 
for many capital-intensive industries” (1988, p. 27). In conclusion, Leonard states that 
“the costs and logistics of complying with environmental regulations are not the decisive 
factor in most industrial decisions about desirable plant locations” (1988, p. 231). In 
reality, the “industrial-flight and pollution-havens” hypotheses are not significant
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phenomena to cause either a decrease in the comparative advantage of industrial 
countries or a complementary comparative advantage for countries with permissive 
environmental regulations.
Nevertheless, Birdsall and Wheeler (1993, p. 147) have found evidence 
“consistent with the possibility of displacement: pollution intensity grew more rapidly in 
Latin America as a whole after rather than before 1970 - as OECD environmental 
regulation became stricter”. This displacement is not, however, associated with trade 
openness but with protected economies. Trade liberalization will result in competitive 
pressure that will consequently increase investment in the latest technology. However, if 
the cost of such technology is high the effectiveness of the ‘economic rationality’ will 
depend on regulatory pressure or penalties. The authors assume that new technologies 
tend to be cleaner because they are imported from countries with higher pollution 
standards (Ibid., p. 140).
In short, these studies are extremely important for this thesis, because they may 
elucidate the assumption of massive shift of pollution intensive industries to developing 
countries. Leonard (1988. p. 232) has indicated that there is still some possibility of such 
shifts in the case of backward integration for mineral-processing industries and 
worldwide sourcing of chemical intermediates (which seems to be the case for new plant 
investment for organochlorides ).
At this point, Walley and Whitehead (1994, p. 46) deserve to be cited because 
they maintain that the incorporation of environmental concerns will not produce 
unlimited profitable results for firms. Following a prescriptive approach, the authors 
emphasize that business must be aware of the cost associated with environmental 
challenges. More specifically, their criticism was directed to Porter (1991) and Gore 
(1992), who argue that strong environmental regulation may improve national 
competitiveness. However, Walley and Whitehead’s assumption that high 
environmental expenditures have caused changes in the comparative advantage of 
industries was refuted by Sorsa (1994).
The fact that an environmental regulatory policy could result in a cleaner 
environment and more competitive economy (Porter, 1991) is subject to controversy. 
Caimcross (1995, p. 192) re-affirms such debate when suggesting that environmental
30 According to Finaldi (1993), Greenpeace has identified fifty new chlorine-related facilities (in Brazil, 
India, Indonesia and Thailand) with startup dates ranging from 1993 to 1996.  ^ '
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regulation may benefit companies as a form of protectionism (creating new markets, 
reducing cost of inputs, driving companies out of the market or protecting from foreign 
competition). In reference to the Montreal Protocol (which banned the use of CFCs in 
1987) and the major manufacturers of chlorofluorcarbon (e.g., DuPont and ICI), 
Caimcross concluded that environmental regulation may grant to “company or industry 
a lead over its rivals” (1995, p. 194).
Instead, Porter and van der Linde’s (1995a) study is focused on how regulation 
should motivate companies to innovate. In brief, their main concern is not on the
- i  i
existence of regulation, but on the kind of regulation that has been used to turn 
business into environmentally friendly activities. Thus, the case of companies that have 
been protected by environmental regulation, is neither related to Porter and van der 
Linde’s (1995a, b) nor to Porter’s (1991) arguments. Nevertheless, this is a polemical 
point, where traditional arguments (that companies cannot cope with more regulation) 
are contrasted with unusual arguments (environmental regulation would encourage 
companies to make profitable innovations). However, environmental regulation may 
produce protectionism and/or be used by companies or industrial lobbies to achieve their 
own interests. In addition, it seems that companies have been routinely missing 
profitable opportunities32 because natural resources were cheap and abundant (Pearce 
and Turner, 1990, p. 13), at the same time that industrial pollution was regarded as an 
externality.
Moreover, if technological improvements cannot be forced (Caimcross, 1995, p. 
198), then the assumption that technology will solve environmental problems faster is 
dubious. According to Smith (1993, p. 10) “the problem of environmental damage by 
business is a complex and multi-faced issue which requires more than a technological 
fix” to be solved. It requires also a long-term cultural change in industrial strategic 
approach and behaviour (confirming the argument made by Fischer and Schot, 1993).
31 Soderbaum (1994, p. 47) suggests a broad concept of environmental policy which includes other agents 
such as companies and public interest groups. This perspective aims to provide an alternative to 
Neoclassical textbooks which emphasize the “government as the main agent in environmental policy and 
classify policy instruments as either belonging to the command-and-control or the economic incentives 
category”.
32 For example, the amount of wastes, emissions and contamination, generated by manufacturing and 
extractive industries is reasonable proof of inefficient use of resources, which has even motivated the 
introduction of the concept of “eco-efficiency” by DeSimone and Popoff (1997).
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Additionally, Porter (1980) suggests that industry’s structure creates slack. More 
specifically, industries that are more concentrated (defined as a high percentage of 
market under the control of a firm and/or small number of firms) earn excess rents by 
the lack of competition. According to Beliveau et al. (1994) these rents will be 
redistributed to society as environmental protection practices.
Beliveau et al. (1994, p. 732), for instance, states that what becomes legitimate 
in one industry is not legitimate in another industry. Accordingly, the behaviour of 
“surviving firms” is mimicked by new entrants. This process results in a dominant and 
legitimate pattern of behaviour in the industry, that is, it becomes the industry standard. 
In such a case, environmental concern within the industry (most likely from the industry 
association and/or large companies) is considered relevant, as it may be a driving force 
for other companies.
The incorporation of environmental protection is constrained by the industry 
structure33, as it poses some restrictions in terms of: (a) technological pattern (that is, 
pollution-intensiveness and/or development of new technology); (b) kind of product 
(e.g., hazardous, inflammable, etc.); (c) market demand (e.g., environmentally friendly 
products), and (d) cost of production and price of the output. This thesis will take into 
consideration market, product, costs and technology (though the latter is investigated in 
broad terms because of industrial secrecy regarding technology), when investigating the 
implementation of corporate environmental policies.
Furthermore, Pearson (1985, p.75) has stressed the importance of corporate 
relations with host government regulators, community and environmental groups. Such 
relations can be best managed by using industry association and other business 
organization, through the development of codes and guidelines for better practices (Ibid., 
p. 96). In fact, Gleckman (1995) confirms that some industrial sectors have launched 
their own programmes, though he argues that this trend among trade associations does 
not necessarily have practical results.
This latter aspect turned out to be a reasonable justification for the selection of 
the chemical sector (one of the industries at the forefront of green pressures) considering 
that trends within this industry may be relevant for other sectors. Moreover, it is
33 Tombs (in Smith, 1993) in particular addresses the reasons why the chemical industry has received so 
much criticism. See also Choucri (in Choucri, 1993) for environmental and technological implications in 
the oil, chemical and construction industries.
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assumed that in an industry sector where environmental protection is a norm, firms will 
exhibit strong corporate environmental policies. Altogether, the resulting proposition is: 
I f  industry associations have environmental guidelines, TNCs’ subsidiaries 
have stricter implementation o f corporate environmental policies.
2.6 - Corporate strategic decisions and subsidiaries’ environmental management
This section focuses on the company level of analysis, grounded on international 
business, organizational theory and business management literature. First, corporate 
strategic decisions have been selected to represent the discretionary character of TNCs, 
when dealing with environmental issues. Second, some aspects of the subsidiaries’ 
environmental management are addressed.
Sundaram and Black (1992) have emphasized the need for a multidisciplinary 
approach to study MNEs; however, this task is not easy for two reasons. First, 
economists and political scientists “tend to use perspectives that focus on the 
environment of the MNE”, assuming that the organization is not important or treating it 
as a “black box”. Second, “organizational theories tend to use perspectives that focus on 
the internal workings of the MNE and pay less attention to the environment in which it 
operates” (Sundaram and Black, 1992, p. 730).
Despite the fact that this thesis focuses on ‘external pressures over corporate 
environmental policies’, the investigation of headquarters’ strategic decision is justified 
by its critical role in defining subsidiaries’ practices. As well as this, it is from the 
relationship with headquarters that subsidiaries can act as conduits, introducing changes 
(mainly through managerial practices) into the host country’s context (Rosenzweig and 
Singh, 1991).
Influence from the headquarters is supported by the assumption that TNCs’ 
subsidiaries face an environment that includes other subunits within the organization, 
which make them dependent on centralized strategic decisions (Rosenzweig and Singh, 
1991). Moreover, national contexts are increasingly linked, and they affect each other 
though a variety of mechanisms. In this case, TNCs may be either agents of change
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(linking different national contexts) or one mechanism by which distinct national 
contexts may come to affect each other.
The plurality in current debate in the field of strategic management (including 
differing and conflicting approaches) makes it necessary to clarify some concepts that 
will be used hereafter. The work of De Witt and Meyer (1994) offers a broader view of 
essential aspects of strategic management. According to the authors (Ibid., p. 47) the 
way managers are influenced by the organization’s external and internal contexts will 
result in strategic factors, which will be evaluated by top managers when determining 
the corporate mission. The first step in the formulation of strategy, a statement of 
mission, leads to the determination of corporate objectives, strategies and policies. These 
strategies and policies are implemented through programmes, budgets, and procedures 
(this process is illustrated in the figure below).
Figure 2.1 - Strategy management model
External environment + 
(societal and task)
Internal environment 
(structure, culture and resources)
Strategy formulation 
MISSION
OBJECTIVES
STRATEGIES
POLICIES
Strategy implementation
PROGRAMMES  ------
^  BUDGETS
PROCEDURES
Evaluation and control 
PERFORMANCE
Feedback
Source: Adapted from Wheelen & Hunger, in De Witt and Meyer (1994, p. 46).
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Additionally, the premise of “strategy context” indicates that strategies are 
developed to suit varying organizational and external contexts; this explicitly recognizes 
that each company has its own characteristics and operates in its own unique 
environment. Furthermore, De Witt and Meyer (1994) state that strategy process and 
content are heavily influenced by the context in which companies are situated, which 
applies to both national and international contexts. In contrast, some common 
characteristics (of the company and its context) are shared with other companies, and 
therefore could be grouped into categories (such as the industry).
Accordingly, the discussion on whether or not external contexts have impacts on 
strategy definition is illustrated by contrasting perspectives - so-called “free choice” and 
“compliance”. The first, as the name indicates, considers that firms are completely free 
to select any strategy without any external constraint34. The second, based on 
“population ecology”, accepts a deterministic view of strategy in which firms are 
completely constrained by the external environment35.
Taking into account that corporate environmental policy is the dependent 
variable under investigation, the strategic approach based on “free choice” is not the 
most suitable. On the contrary, external constraints from both the societal and industrial 
contexts on firms’ strategic choice are expected, at the same time that firms may have 
discretion. Consequently, an intermediate approach between these opposite perspectives 
seems to be more adequate.
For example, Porter (in De Witt and Meyer, 1994, p. 365) explains how the 
industry context has a very strong impact on the survival and profitability of firms. 
However, it assumes “that companies can also adapt to changes in the industry’s 
structure”, by understanding the drivers of change. As a result it is expected that the 
company has a certain degree of strategic freedom (or choice) “to determine its own 
fate”, but the industry structure is still “crucially important” (Ibid., p. 366). This 
perspective has been developed by Porter (1990), in which external influences matter 
greatly but firms have a considerable range of freedom .
34 See Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1992) for further details.
35 See Hannah and Freeman, in De Witt and Meyer (1994) for further details.
36 Nelson (1991, p. 64) says that Porter has failed to provide an answer to the question of “why do firms 
differ and how does it matter?”.
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Additionally, Porter (in De Witt and Meyer, 1994, pp. 480-481) suggests that 
both - home country and industry context - are important in the definition of the firm’s 
competitive advantage. As such, the significance of a company’s home base37 derives 
from the differences that exist between countries regarding infrastructure and industrial 
organization. Concurrently, a global strategy supplements and solidifies the competitive 
advantage created at the home base (Porter, 1986).
National boundaries are therefore an important force in defining organizational 
environment, at the same time that they are of varying importance for different elements 
of organizational structure and process. For example, technology and economic 
competition may be affected by global factors, but other elements are affected by distinct 
features of the nation.
Ghoshal and Westney affirm that the MNC consists of a number of national 
subsidiaries, which “might share some characteristics with other national environments 
because of interdependencies” on different aspects of organization-environment 
relations (1993, p. 12). More specifically, Westney (in Ghoshal and Westney, 1993, p. 
54) argues that key issues of the management of MNCs can be illuminated by the 
institutionalization paradigm, which views the MNC as an organization whose subunits 
are subject to two potentially contradictory sets of “isomorphic pulls”: those from the 
headquarters and those from the host country. In a diagrammatic form this could be 
stated as follows:
Figure 2.2 - Subsidiary’s interfaces
Host country :<-----------► subsidiary «-------► Headquarters and other subsidiaries:
pressure for local adaptation ask for consistency within the
external to the firm internal structure of the firm
Source: Adapted from Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991, p. 353.
Ghoshal and Westney (1993, p. 21) stress the lack of studies (outside 
international management field) that explicitly analyse the effect of multinationality on 
organizational behaviour. At this point, the sociological embeddedness of the MNC 
could be better explained by Kogut (in Ghoshal and Westney, 1993), as it is necessary to
37 Chandler (1990) describes how the different economic conditions, institutions and cultures of the US, 
Britain and Germany, molded the nature of the modem manufacturing firms that grew up in these countries 
in the first decade of this century.
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go back to the stage before their internationalization, when firms develop out the “socio­
economic conditions of their home environment and, even as they internationalize, they 
remain imprinted by their early development in their domestic markets”. Kogut has also 
questioned “the extent to which growing intercountry linkages and the growing 
internationalization of firms will erode country differences in organization and 
management”.
Doz (1986) has recognized the needs of MNCs with regard of strategic issues 
(which are simplified into integration versus national responsiveness). Based on this 
perspective is possible to understand how contradictory forces must be managed 
together, that is, international integration due to international competition, and national 
responsiveness in face of demands from host countries. More recently, Sally (1994, p. 
165) states that the transnational phenomenon necessitates “highly complex 
combinations of centralization and decentralization within the MNE management 
organization” (which is found basically on technology-intensive industries characterized 
by oligopolistic competition).
First, the strategy of integration, adopted by TNCs aiming to reduce their 
manufacturing costs (that is, lower costs and better efficiencies to fend off global 
competition), results in uniformization among subsidiaries (Doz, 1986). Such a strategy 
produces standardization of procedures (including for environmental issues). On the 
contrary, if TNCs adopt a strategy of national responsiveness, meaning that some 
autonomy and local adaptation are allowed in subsidiaries, it results in differentiated 
policies and procedures. In this case, the incorporation of environmental issues will be 
based on local standards. However, it is important to note that no ideal strategy type is to 
be found in reality; firms always follow a combination of both or adaptations of these 
types (Doz, 1986).
Nevertheless, environmental issues became a strategic aspect of TNCs’ activities 
(Smith, 1993; Fischer and Schot, 1993). Their impact on companies is high enough 
either to put core elements of the business at risk or to fundamentally alter a company’s 
cost structure. Additionally, managers have considerable discretion about how to 
respond to environmental challenges. UNTCMD (1993, p. 168) has identified at least 
four different management approaches that are being utilized by TNCs (such as
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compliance-oriented, preventive, environmental and sustainable development 
management).
Indeed, Gleckman (1995) states that there is some recent recognition from TNCs 
of their environmental impacts. Nevertheless, environmental awareness on the part of 
TNCs is not yet matched by actions, or by the full integration of “green issues” into 
business strategy. In other words, higher environmental awareness (through rhetorical 
statement or even the establishment of corporate environmental policies) is not followed 
by actions (or change of behaviour by implementing companies’ policies). In 
conclusion, this discussion on TNCs’ strategic decisions has lead to the following 
proposition:
The corporate environmental policies o f  TNCs’ subsidiaries is defined by
the headquarters, following a strategy o f  centralization.
In addition to this, UNTCMD (1993, p. 60) has found that only 45 percent of the 
firms investigated “had formal arrangements between headquarters and overseas 
affiliates and subsidiaries for coordinating EH&S efforts”. Moreover, this survey shows 
there was still a large concentration of formalization of EH&S in home countries in early 
90s. Consequently, the importance of this thesis is enhanced by its focus on subsidiaries 
in a developing country. Gladwin (in Fischer and Schot, 1993, p. 55) states that the 
focus of the vast majority of research on “industrial greening” is on rich nations. 
However, environmental management in such nations “may not be enough to ensure an 
environmentally and socially secure world” (Ibid., p.56). There is the need to “shift 
economic opportunity, technology, capital, and primary social-service provision” 
towards the poor countries. Therefore, TNCs’ subsidiaries become a ‘potential agent of 
change’ by their global reach.
However, Rosenzweig and Singh (1991, p. 357) recognize the interaction of 
MNEs and national environments as somewhat dynamic. And this poses an important 
question, as MNEs “may be able to resist pressures for isomorphism with institutional 
environments”, just as, national environments “vary in their acceptance of or resistance 
to newly introduced structures and processes”. Therefore, practices introduced by 
MNEs’ subsidiaries will vary in extension of adoption, the speed of adoption and the 
degree to which they are modified in the new country. These practices, in turn, are
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influenced by competitive pressure, cultural distance, and the relative importance of the 
subsidiary. Besides, it seems impossible for the parent firm to force all subsidiaries to 
implement centrally made decisions that run counter to pressures in the host country 
(Sundaram and Black, 1992, p. 743).
Rappaport and Flaherty (1992, p. 34) suggest that there is a “real tension in 
corporate management between headquarters and facilities”. However, it “generally is at 
headquarters where the overall strategy for the corporation is developed”. Additionally, 
solutions to environmental problems may prove particularly challenging to the 
traditional headquarters-subsidiary relationship. Because pollution-control activities 
require extensive process-specific knowledge to be effectively applied. In sum, 
decentralization is better for environmental issues because solutions are site-specific, 
that is, they require the facility personnel’s intimate knowledge of the production 
process.
At the organization level the most relevant determinants of environmental 
practices and performance (according to Levy, 1995) are managerial commitment and 
motivation. This entails including environmental issues in strategic planning, personal 
incentives and formal allocation of environmental responsibilities to affiliates. Finally, 
Flaherty and Rappaport (1991, p. 13) have indicated the factors preventing better EH&S 
in US-based companies, as follows: (a) focus on short-term profitability; (b) 
management structure; (c) lack of staff, and (d) lack of incentives. Surprisingly, the 
findings suggest that institutional and managerial barriers are greater than technological 
barriers.
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Chapter III - Business and environmental issues in Brazil
Considering that the main focus of this thesis is on corporate environmental 
practices in Brazil, it is appropriate to offer a summary of the regulatory and non- 
regulatory contexts in which TNCs’ subsidiaries are operating. More specifically, there 
is a focus on the states - Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro - where the selected subsidiaries 
are located within Brazil. Additionally, this outline of the Brazilian context will assist 
in the data analysis of the case studies. It will do so by defining the main contingencies 
influencing the implementation of corporate environmental policies.
This chapter is mainly grounded in primary and secondary data from the 
empirical work1 accomplished in Brazil. The first section is focused on main issues 
regarding FDI in Brazil, such as the origin of capital and its concentration throughout 
industrial sectors. The second section provides an overview of international pressures 
and environmental concerns in the Brazilian context. The third section aims to 
introduce the regulatory context faced by companies regarding environmental issues. 
The last section aims to address the major non-regulatory initiatives launched by the 
government and business community in order to motivate the incorporation of 
environmental concern into economic activity.
3.1 - Overview of foreign direct investment2
In 1995, Brazil was the target of direct investment totalling approximately US$ 
325 billions, which represented an increase of 50 percent over 1994 (UNCTAD, 
1996). In 1996, FDI reached the sum of US$ 7,5 billion (an increase of 100 percent 
over 1995, as shown in table 3.1 below). The main factor that lures such investments is 
the economic plan (‘Real Plan’3 launched in 1995), which has stabilized the economy 
and increased the consumer market by ten million people. In such a context, TNCs 
have been following a business strategy of acquiring Brazilian companies (via
1 The fieldwork in Brazil was carried out between August and December 1996.
2 FDI is defined by the Brazilian Central Bank as ownership of shares in the stock of private and/or 
public companies located in the country, with participation of non-residents in at least 10 percent of 
voting share or participation which amounts to 20 percent or more of the nominal capital (Banco Central 
do Brasil, ‘Censo de Capitais Estrangeiros 1996’, 1996, pp. 3-5).
3 Estado de S.Paulo, 18 August 1996, p. B l.
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privatization or not) in order to gain immediate return on investment. The industrial 
sectors that have been receiving FDI (as reinvestment) are food, beverages, 
automobile, chemical and banking. The sectors receiving new FDI are specifically 
automobile, electronics, and communications.
Table 3.1 - Participation of Brazil as recipient of FDI worldwide
Year (%)
1994 1.15
1995 1.06
1996 2.5
Source: UNCTAD (1996).
More specifically, the table below reflects the decrease in foreign investments 
during the 80s, which was called the ‘lost decade’. The Brazilian economy faced a 
period of recession as a result of the oil crisis, external debt crisis and insufficiency of 
new international loans. The amount of FDI corresponded to 1.16 percent of the GNP 
as recently as 1996, however, it is still below the percentages reached in the 70s.
Table 3.2 - Brazil - FDI stock as percentage of GNP (1970-1996)*
Year (%) Year (%) Year (%)
1970 0.97 1980 0.95 1990 0.27
1971 1.00 1981 1.19 1991 (0.25)
1972 0.95 1982 1.25 1992 0.36
1973 1.59 1983 0.70 1993 0.30
1974 1.40 1984 0.63 1994 0.46
1975 1.24 1985 0.53 1995 0.65
1976 1.18 1986 (0.35) 1996 1.16
1977 1.35 1987 0.42 - -
1978 1.48 1988 0.66 - -
1979 1.54 1989 0.43 - -
Source: Estado de S.Paulo, 18 August 1996, p. B l. 
Note: * Data from ‘Banco Central do Brasil and IBGE’.
According to Baer (1995, p. 237) multinationals represent only 10 percent of 
total investments in Brazil, but their importance is much greater due to their 
dominance in some of the most dynamic sectors. However, there is no indication that 
this relationship has been favorable to TNCs’ world strategy but harmful to Brazilian 
interests. In fact, TNCs “have collaborated with the government’s policies of export
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diversification”. Moreover, “the recession in industrialized countries has not led 
multinationals to decrease their Brazilian operations”, though “multinationals continue 
to shy away from basic R & D in Brazil”.
Evans (1979, p. 113) has listed the Brazilian industrial sectors according to a 
combination of FDI and domestic ownership. Foreign capital was dominant in 
transportation equipment, rubber products, pharmaceuticals and tobacco industries. 
The industries in which FDI was predominant but local capital play a significant role 
were chemicals, machinery and electrical machinery. The industries where local 
capital held the predominant position were leather products, printing and publishing, 
apparel and footwear, wood products, paper products and non-metallic metals. Finally, 
the industries where local capital accounted for the majority of sales and assets among 
the largest firms, but where FDI played a major role, were food and beverages, textiles 
and metal fabrication.
Apart from the recent privatization of state-owned companies in the 90s, the 
predominance of FDI in some sectors (pharmaceuticals, automotive, household, 
information technology, plastic and rubber, food and tobacco, respectively) has 
remained the same (see table 3.3 below for an updated overview).
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Table 3.3 - Participation of state, foreign and domestic owned enterprises per
industrial sector* in Brazil
Industrial sectors Domestic % Foreign % State %
Domestic predominance 
Building construction 
Transport services 
Clothing 
Mining
Paper and cellulose
1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996
100
75
92
34
88
81
100
96
86
85
84
2
8
7
12
16
4
8
15
16
23
59
3
-
_
7
-
-
Wholesale 75 79 25 21 - -
Retailing 82 77 18 23 - -
Building materials 69 71 31 29 - -
Steel & metallurgical 75 70 21 26 4 4
Electrical & electronics 55 60 45 40 - -
Metal processing 56 55 44 45 - -
Beverage & tobacco 51 52 49 48 - -
Foreign predominance
Automotive & spare parts 7 2 93 98 - -
Household & toiletry 11 13 89 87 - -
Information technology 20 22 78 76 2 2
Pharmaceutical 37 27 63 73 - -
Food 50 44 50 56 - -
Plastics & rubber 51 49 49 51 - -
State predominance
Public services - - - 5 - 95
Petrochemical & 14 16 22 17 64 67
chemical**
Source: Exame, ‘Melhores e Maiores’, July 1997, p. 11. Notes: * share based on total sales o f the 20 
biggest companies in each industrial sector; ** oil exploration is a state monopoly.
In conclusion, this thesis focuses on sectors where foreign capital is 
traditionally predominant (that is, chemicals) or dominant (that is, pharmaceutical). 
Although, state companies (manufacturing fertilizers, petrochemicals, synthetic rubber 
and estirene) were sold to major domestic groups, FDI is still predominant in the 
chemical sector; mainly in the diversified and technologically intensive segments of 
the industry (Baer, 1995, p. 266). Nevertheless, it is important to note that there was an 
increase in the economic power and income of private groups in the sector of basic 
chemicals as well as in other industrial sectors (such as the steel industry).
Baer concludes that “there is some evidence that Brazil’s authorities have 
learned how to police multinationals more effectively than in the past without scaring
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them away” (Ibid.). More specifically, the sophistication of Brazilian officials “in 
dealing more effectively with multinationals is also helped by the fact that there is a 
greater geographical diversification in their origin, which adds some leverage to their 
bargaining position” (the table below shows the origin of FDI in Brazil).
Table 3.4 - Origin of foreign capital in Brazil - selected years (%)
Country of origin 1951 1980 1986 1991
United States 43.9 30 30 30
Canada 30.3 4 5 6
United Kingdom 12.1 6 6 7
France 3.3 4 4 5
Uruguay 3.1 0.1 - 1
Panama 2.3 3 4 2
Germany - 13 15 14
Switzerland - 10 8 8
Sweden - 2 2 2
Netherlands - 2 2 2
Japan - 10 9 10
Italy - 3 4 3
Luxembourg - 2 2 2
Other 5.0 10.9 9 8
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Adapted from Baer (1995, p. 222) with data from ‘Banco Central do Brasil’.
Based on the table above it is evident that the US represents the largest foreign 
investor in Brazil. Most relevant is its dominant position over the decades, which 
reflects its influence on managerial and technological trends within the Brazilian 
economy. Nevertheless, the following tables show that the relative position of Brazil, 
as recipient of FDI from the selected countries of origin, is only representative for 
Germany (see tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 below).
In other words, Brazil receives the largest amount of German investment 
(approximately 65 percent) relative to total German investment in the Latin America- 
Caribbean area (though it represents only 3.5 percent of total German investment 
abroad). The same figures for the US are 19.5 percent of the total to the Latin 
America-Caribbean area and 3.03 percent of total direct investment abroad; for the UK 
the figures are respectively 13.6 percent and 1.15 percent. Finally, what is also evident
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is the decrease of British investment (illustrated in table 3.4) in Brazil from the 50s, 
though it levels off in subsequent decades4.
Table 3.5 - United States - direct investment5 abroad* (US$ million)
Year Latin America- 
Caribbean
of which Brazil Total
1985 23,210 8,893 230,287
1986 32,262 9,268 259,834
1987 42,667 10,591 314,336
1988 47,816 12,609 335,915
1989 53,898 14,025 381,781
1990 61,100 14,384 430,521
1991 65,176 14,997 467,844
1992 77,577 16,313 502,063
1993 85,261 16,772 564,283
1994 96,512 18,798 621,044
Source: OECD (1996, p. 285). Note: * stock data, position at year-end by country.
Table 3.6 - Germany - direct investment6 abroad* (DM million)
Year Latin America- 
Caribbean
of which Brazil Total
1985 13,455 8,201 146,124
1986 12,377 8,424 149,996
1987 12,423 8,531 154,944
1988 13,599 8,993 183,041
1989 13,043 9,670 205,214
1990 10,965 6,638 224,002
1991 12,894 7,734 262,671
1992 14,751 9,217 287,863
1993 14,614 8,269 308,399
1994 17,657 11,439 329,757
Source: OECD (1996, p. 115). Note: * stock data, position at year-end by country, including primary 
and secondary direct investment abroad.
4 Reasons for the decreasing interest from the UK in Latin America is found in Miller (1993).
5 The definition of direct investment implies that “a person in one country has a lasting interest in, and a 
degree of influence over, the management of a business enterprise in another country”. In the US the 
International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act sets “ownership or control o f 10 percent or 
more of an enterprise’s voting securities as a considered evidence of a lasting interest in or a degree of 
influence over management” (OECD, 1996b, p. 341).
6 In Germany, direct investment, provided that it amounts more than 20 percent o f the nominal capital, is 
defined “when an enterprise (parent company) or an investor or a group of associated enterprises or 
investors can exert a marked influence on the business policies of another enterprise (subsidiary)” 
(OECD, 1996b, p. 307).
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Table 3.7 - United Kingdom - direct investment7 abroad* (£ million)
Year Latin America- 
Caribbean
of which Brazil Total
1985 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1986 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1987 6,416 1,202 81,544
1988 7,084 1,289 102,215
1989 8,753 1,452 120,947
1990 10,225 1,250 118,941
1991 10,892 1,345 124,093
1992 12,910 1,880 146,613
1993 11,964 1,963 165,832
1994 14,897 2,023 176,342
Source: OECD (1996, p. 270). Notes: * stock data, position at year-end by country, n.a. = not available.
The import-substitution policy adopted by the Brazilian government from the 
60s gave various incentives to attract FDI. Later, this policy was complemented by an 
export promotion policy. However, foreign companies did not contribute with these 
governmental policies (when left to the market forces). This happens because foreign 
companies have been installed in Brazil basically to assemble or manufacture products 
that were formerly imported (Carvalho, 1982, pp. 5-6). Therefore, their basic interest 
was to guarantee a market in which they already had control through exports (this 
interest reflects the maintenance of economic advantages and profits from their 
oligopolistic position). Additionally, some foreign firms have also benefited from 
cheap labour and natural resources (in less capital and technological-intensive sectors).
Consequently, the Brazilian government “has taken many actions to control 
their behaviour and influence”. Baer (1995, pp. 236-237) states that the countervailing 
governmental measures are: (a) control of remittances: the Central Bank and other 
governmental agencies have become increasingly sophisticated in monitoring profit 
remittances and payments for technology. However, this does not mean that transfer 
pricing practices are totally under control; (b) credit system at the BNDES: foreign 
firms were excluded from this system, because it was used to expand the domestic 
industry in the 70s. The requirement that firms should be over 50 percent owned by 
domestic capital to have access to governmental credit was used as a bargaining tool to
7 In Britain, the minimum qualifying as direct investment is fixed at 20 percent of the capital. It “refers 
to investment that adds to, deducts from or acquires a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an 
economy other than that of the investor”. The investor aims to have an effective voice in the 
management of the enterprise (OECD, 1996b, p. 337-338).
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set up joint ventures with MNCs; (c) state companies: in key sectors (such as steel, 
mining and petrochemicals) acted as a countervailing measure. However, this is no 
longer the case with the privatization of most of them and the impending termination 
of the monopoly on petroleum exploration; and (d) market control: the use of a 
protected market policy gave an incentive to local firms to enter new technologically 
advanced fields. For example, the restriction of the minicomputers market to domestic 
firms resulted in a joint venture between American-based IBM and a local firm.
According to Baer (1995, pp. 268-269) since the 1930s “it became obvious in 
Brazil’s mixed economy that access to government institutions for special favors (e.g., 
special credits) by the private sector was not evenly distributed”; because the 
“regulatory powers were used as instruments of macroeconomics policies”. In the 90s 
the Brazilian state became less of a player in the economy, where market forces were 
allowed to determine the allocation of resources to a greater extent than before.
According to the Ecologist (1992, p. 160) there is a historical link between FDI 
and environmental degradation in Brazil, encouraged by the military regime (in power 
from 1964 to 1985) which opened the door to foreign industry, initiating the 
‘Operation Amazon’. This was a plan to ‘occupy and develop’ Brazil’s interior. All 
sorts of incentives, including support from the World Bank were offered to big 
companies. In sum, “from 1973, car, steel and food-packaging magnates were 
encouraged, by means of credit and tax holidays, to diversify and invest, especially in 
cattle ranching”.
In broad terms, Evans (1979, p. 9) states that “international capital is an 
integral part of the domestic Brazilian economy, and the representatives of 
international capital are integral parts of the Brazilian political and social order”. In 
other words, the foreign capital shares with local capital, both private and state- 
controlled, an interest in the further development of local industry. There are conflicts 
of interests amongst them, but not on the issue of industrialization. On this latter issue 
there is consensus among the “triple alliance” that they will benefit from the 
accumulation of industrial capital in Brazil. Finally, Sklair (in Redcliff and Benton, 
1994) emphasizes that transnational capitalism, TNCs, and consumerism colluded 
with the elite in developing countries in bringing about environmental degradation.
At present, there is no evidence in Brazil of special restrictions on FDI due to 
environmental issues8. The installation of news plants must follow the legal 
requirements of project and licensing submissions to the state and local authorities. 
The only current evidence of conflict between FDI and the Brazilian authorities was 
related to the timber industry operating in the Amazon area. In 1996, Brazil received 
approximately US$ 500 million of investments from Malaysian timber industries, but 
environmentalists were concerned that they might produce the same condition of 
unsustainable exploitation left in the southeast of Asia. Therefore, the Minister of the 
Environment emphasized through the media that FDI was welcome but only in 
compliance with the norms defined for the timber industry in that area9.
More specifically, the BNDES’s official10 has provided evidence of the 
environmental performance of TNCs’ subsidiaries in Brazil. For example, White 
Martins (subsidiary of American Praxair - ex-Union Carbide) is said to be a good 
example of TNCs’ environmental management. Likewise, Ciba-Geigy (Swiss 
pharmaceutical company) and Hoechst (German chemical and pharmaceutical 
company) were both mentioned as cases of positive environmental management in 
Brazil.
In contrast to this, Rhodia (French chemical company) is said to be an 
interesting case of an environmental liability (for its site contamination in Cubatao). 
Despite the long dispute between company and environmental agency - CETESB - 
over the site closure11, the judicial decision (after legal action against Rhodia) is quite 
interesting. CETESB is receiving the payment of the overdue fines in new equipment. 
The BNDES’s official adds that it is harder to control what is done by environmental 
agencies with such cash payment of fines (mainly wasted in administrative dysfunction 
and corruption). Therefore, this was a creative and more effective way of law 
enforcement. Finally, Bayer (German chemical company) was mentioned as an
8 See Muchlinski (1995) for laws, bills and regulations that MNCs are subject to in Brazil. In May 1996 
the Brazilian government approved a patent bill according to recommendations from the WTO 
(Economist, 18 May 1996), under the assumption that it would attract more FDI. Another relevant 
source on constraints faced by FDI in Brazil is Braga (in Baer and Due, 1987).
9 Folha de S.Paulo, 4 December 1996, p. 4.
10 Interview with official in the Environmental Department of BNDES (on 29/08/96).
11 Rhodia’s case reverberates among public agencies and TNCs’ subsidiaries in Brazil, as it is often used 
as an example o f misconduct of both company and environmental agency. Zulauf (1994, p. 78) stresses 
that Rhodia is removing and treating the contaminated wastes that were left by the former owner of the 
site. The company has spent US$ 75 million and more US$ 30 million was planned to achieve the clean 
up. However, this specific site has a revenue ranging from US$ 4 to 6 million per year.
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example of poor management. Because the environmental practices in the Belford 
Roxo site (Rio de Janeiro state) were not in accordance with the headquarters 
rhetoric12.
In general, TNCs are more advanced than domestic firms in environmental 
management as a consequence of headquarters guidelines, which includes 
environmental audits, access to resources and technological structure. Moreover, there 
are cases in which environmental practices developed locally have been incorporated 
by the corporation, such as in Alcoa (aluminum industry located in Sao Luis, 
Maranhao). Some years ago, this subsidiary was pressurized to change and has already 
achieved half of the targets stipulated in the eleven year programme it signed.
Finally, the most interesting example among Brazilian companies is Aracruz13 
(paper and pulp company), which contracted a consultancy firm to investigate the 
international standards for air emissions and effluents in order to improve its 
performance. Surprisingly, it was found that the standards defined unilaterally by the 
state government were stricter than those in Finland and Sweden (the countries of 
origin of major world competitors). More specifically, the strict regulatory control over 
Aracruz was a consequence of its high visibility locally (i.e., in a state with few 
industries). Consequently, it is a major polluter facing pressure from society and 
government, though Aracruz is a major source of tax and employment (which did not 
result in lax regulation).
3.2 - Environmental politics
This section will briefly discuss the major aspects of Brazilian environmental 
politics. Consequently it comprises the pressures faced by the Brazilian government in 
the international arena, and the evolution of environmental awareness in Brazilian 
society.
12 It confirms the statement from the GTZ’s (German agency for technical cooperation) consultant at 
FEEMA about double-standards at subsidiaries of German chemical companies in Brazil (Informativo 
do CRQIII, December/January, 1996, p. 5).
13 Aracruz Celulose is a company member of the Business Council Sustainable Development and the 
first Brazilian company to subscribe to the ICC’s Business Charter for Sustainable Development 
(Schmidheiny, 1992; Willums and Goluke, 1992).
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3.2.1 - International environmental pressures
Brazil has been mentioned in the literature in connection with serious 
environmental and occupational problems. Although none of them have been 
completely solved, the situation seems to have improved since the 80s. However, the 
most fundamental problems (such as a lack of clean water and sanitation) which have 
both environmental and human repercussions on those most vulnerable remain 
unsolved.
For example, Ives said that Cubatao, in Brazil is “one of Latin America’s 
largest petrochemical centers and one of the most polluted communities on earth”, 
which is “intersected by four lifeless rivers and under a venomous mist polluted by 
1,000 tons of toxic gases daily” (in Ives, 1985, p. 173). Additionally, Castleman (in 
Ives, 1985, p. 76) stated that “the careless and uninformed use of pesticides” accounts 
for a large number of death and disease in developing countries. In the Sao Paulo state 
in Brazil “an estimated 2,000 people die each year from pesticide poisoning”. 
Likewise, Margulis (1988) concludes that economic pressures for greater agricultural 
output are in principle antagonistic to strict environmental policies to control pesticide 
pollution in Brazil.
Michaels et al. (in Ives, 1985, p. 96) states that “much of Latin America’s 
industrial growth has occurred in industries in which workers are exposed to 
significant health hazards”. More specifically, Latin American countries “have 
developed their own ‘heavy’ industrial concentrations, producing steel, automobiles, 
tyres, chemicals and other durable goods”. In the Brazilian case, the Sao Paulo state 
accounts for approximately 40 percent of the Brazilian GNP, incorporating one of the 
largest cities in the world - the city of Sao Paulo14.
Rappaport and Flaherty (1992, p. 114) have provided a short but very critical 
overview of environmental degradation in Brazil (such as deforestation in the north, 
urban degradation in the south, lack of water and sewage treatment in major cities and 
food poisoning by agrochemical). Nevertheless, a more recent study (Lemos, 1995) 
has indicated that some good results were achieved in terms of pollution control in 
Cubatao. This study stresses the role played by a temporary alliance formed between
14 UNEP, Industry and Environment, July-September, 1996, p. 60.
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state technocrats and popular movements to pressure the local pollution-intensive 
industry to comply with state environmental legislation. In conclusion, it demonstrates 
that state and society can work together in Brazil, avoiding both co-optation and 
confrontation.
Hurrell (in Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992, p. 419) has made a very interesting 
connection between the feeling of marginalization at Latin America during the 80s and 
the extent to which the international environmental pressures15 were disturbing other 
pivotal issues on the local agenda. Moreover, Hurrell states that “the combination of 
deforestation and the country’s actual and potential industrial development make 
Brazil a major actor in the international politics of the environment” (Ibid., p. 401).
However, the Amazon deforestation (there is a vast literature on this subject, 
such as Hall, 1989; Bunker, 1985; Mahar, 1989; Goodman and Hall, 1990; Hurrell, 
1991) has diminished the importance of other environmental issues in Brazil. This is 
exactly the case for industrial pollution. Therefore, this thesis emphasizes the 
seriousness of industrial pollution and the fact that it represents a ‘problem of a 
predominantly urban and industrial society’16.
Additionally, the UNCED (in 1992) played an important role by increasing the 
awareness of Brazilian society towards environmental issues. Despite former 
international pressures on deforestation and demarcation of Indians’ land in the 
Amazon region, the conference materialized these pressures for a larger segment of the 
Brazilian society. At the same time it has intensified local pressure on the business 
community and local authorities.
To summarize, Brazil has been criticized internationally for the environmental 
degradation that resulted from its development policies. According to Viola (in 
Ferreira and Viola, 1996, p. 41), Brazilian diplomacy remained (during the 70s and 
80s) close to the nationalistic position presented at the Stockholm Conference, in
15 During the America Summit on Sustainable Development (held in Bolivia in December 1996) the 
Brazilian president stated that ‘Brazil rejects the role of environmental villain’. He stressed that 
international pressures are jeopardizing national policies which aim to reduce the social inequalities 
(Gazeta Mercantil, 9 December 1996, p. A - ll) .
16 Hurrell (1992, p. 122) has stressed that regionalism (as a result of structural change in the world 
economy) is a relevant trend in Latin America, which has practical consequences within the business 
community (mainly amongst multinationals). For example, since Mercosur was launched in 1991 many 
companies have been restructuring their business among the four country members. Mercosur, from the 
Spanish ‘Mercado Comun del Sur’, is a process of economic integration ratified by the Treaty of 
Asuncion in March 1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, which resulted in a 
common market in 1995.
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which the notion of incompatibility between development and environmental 
protection was a key principle (a perspective shared by the Brazilian Army). However, 
in early 90s the Brazilian government assumed an environmental commitment as part 
of its foreign policy17.
More specifically, Brazil has recently been more cooperative towards 
environmental issues in the international arena. The country takes part in relevant 
international initiatives (at the multilateral and regional levels) aiming to protect the 
global ecosystem18. As well as this, the government claims to be integrating 
environmental considerations into development programmes19.
Another major international influence on Brazilian environmental politics 
comes through NGOs. Based on the data from the Central Bank, the Brazilian NGOs 
received approximately US$ 400 million in 1994 from abroad. Nevertheless, donations 
sent by mail are not included in this amount, and the government lacks legal control 
over NGOs’ funds thereby making an accurate estimate impossible.
In the opinion of a Brazilian environmentalist20, legislation is an obstacle to 
making local NGOs more professional. Indeed, the major impediment for NGOs to 
obtain resources is lack of specific and transparent regulations. In reality, it has 
burdened the ability of NGOs to maintain membership as a major financing source. 
Consequently, they have become financially dependent on aid from international 
NGOs. It is said that up to eighty percent of the budget of the main Brazilian 
environmental groups comes through donations (such as project associations, 
campaigning for global issues, and aid to local projects) from international NGOs. In
17 A document from the Foreign Relations Ministry states that protecting the natural resources, “while 
successfully achieving economic growth, is one of the most important challenges that Brazil currently 
faces”. Consequently, “a series of policies have been put into place over the last ten years that ensure 
maximum protection for the country’s environmental resources” (Brazilian Embassy, ‘Brazil and the 
Environment’. Washington: 1993).
18 Brazil is a ‘state party’ in the following agreements: (a) the 1975 Convention on the International 
Trade of Endangered Species, (b) the 1978 Amazon Cooperation Treaty, and its 1989 Special 
Commission on the Environment, (c) the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (d) the 
1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, (e) the 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Depletes the Ozone layer, and its 1990 London Amendments (PNUMA, 1989b), and (f) 
the 1988 Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movements of Toxic and Dangerous Wastes 
(PNUMA, 1989a). Accordingly, Brazil is a signatory in the following agreements: (a) the 1991 
Environmental Protocol to the 1961 Antarctic Treaty, (b) the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, and (c) the 1992 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity 
(Ibid.).
19 Ibid.
20 Mary Alegretti - consultant of the Inter-American Development Bank and president of the Institute for 
Amazon Studies (Estado de S. Paulo, 20 November 1994, p. A-30).
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sum, this results in a situation which is misconceived and politically dangerous. The 
big international NGOs are locating offices in Brazil not only to cooperate in projects 
defined by national institutions, but to establish their space and to influence the public 
policy’s discussion in the country21. A similar argument was made by Miller (1995). 
That is, the NGOs from industrialized countries influence the public policy of 
developing countries according to their interests, which are closer to the interests of 
their government and society and lack consideration for local interests, experiences 
and culture. The virtual lack of environmental NGOs22 (international and local) with 
interests in industrial pollution in Brazil may be evidence of such phenomenon. The 
majority of local NGOs are focused on the same issues of international NGOs23.
3.2.2 - National environmental awareness
Hurrell (1992, pp. 411-412) states that the “Brazilian environmental movement 
has grown steadily since the early 1970s and has gradually helped to increase national 
awareness of environmental issues”. However, the political weakness of the 
environment movement has prevented it from becoming a major domestic political 
issue.
Grass-root organizations have been growing in Brazil since the 70s, focusing 
on the poverty and inequality that resulted from the development policies. They are 
located in urban areas and have links with the Church and community associations. 
Most importantly, they are not concerned with ecology but their demands are strictly 
related to environmental degradation in urban areas. Apart from this, environmental 
groups emerged from a distinct social background. They are formed by middle-class 
members and concentrated in the most developed regions of the country (that is, the 
south and southeast).
21 Ibid.
22 The exceptions are ‘SOS Mata Atlantica’ (Sao Paulo state) and AMDA (Minas Gerais state), in which 
only the latter is exclusively devoted to industrial pollution within the state. The former has interfaces 
with industrial pollution (mainly air and water) by its projects to recover the coastal forest and the Tiete 
river. This is the only Brazilian NGO to publicly accept donations from companies (interviewed on 
26/09/96).
23 The Brazilian office of WWF and Greenpeace confirmed that their agenda did not include industrial 
pollution (so-called brown issues). WWF is concerned with protection of the natural environment and 
Indians (interviewed on 22/08/96), and Greenpeace is focuses on Amazon deforestation and nuclear 
energy (interviewed on 27/09/96).
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Viola (in Goldenberg, 1992) has indicated two distinct phases in the Brazilian 
environmental movement24. The first phase (from 1971 to 1986) is characterized by 
much denunciation of social and environmental problems, raising a public 
consciousness. The second phase (from 1987 to 1991) is characterized by the existence 
of ‘multiple actors’, institutionalization of environmental groups and the integration of 
environmental protection with development.
The emergence of environmentalism in the south and southeast of Brazil25 in 
the early 80s has similarities with the equivalent process in Europe, North America, 
Australia and Japan (that is, the emergence of post-materialist values among the most 
affluent members of the society). However, the scope and timing of this process are 
different in the Brazilian case. In other words, the size of the affluent group is smaller 
and it emerged at least one decade later than in industrialized countries (Ibid., pp. 57- 
58).
Most relevant is the recognition that two issues are crucial for the development 
of environmentalism in developing countries, that is social justice and economic 
development (Ibid., p. 60). Consequently, in the mid-80s a bond was forged between 
Brazilian environmentalists and less privileged people facing the consequences of 
environmental degradation in industrial centers (such as Cubatao).
In the late 80s some environmental groups became professional institutions 
expanding their scope of activities26 (from the former concentration in the south and 
southeast) to the national and regional level into the west midlands, north and 
northeast of the country (Ibid., p. 61). Another relevant change in this period was made 
by professional groups27 that changed their approach from condemnation to the 
proposal of feasible alternatives for conservation or recovery of the environment. 
Moreover, these groups influenced other social movements, ranging from the victims 
of hydra-electrical projects, the mbber tappers and Indians in the Amazon region to 
rural workers and consumers (Ibid., p. 63).
24 See Padua (in Leis, 1991) for a historical perspective of environmental politics in Brazil.
25 The number of environmental groups grew from 40 to 400 in the period 1980 to 1985, though on 
average their activities lasted only one year (Viola, in Goldenberg, 1992).
26 The number of environmental groups increased from 400 in 1985 to 700 in 1989 (Ibid.).
27 Examples of this type of NGOs are: SOS Mata Atlantica, Funatura, Ecotropica, Instituto de Estudos 
Amazonicos, Funda?ao Mata Virgem, Amigos da Terra, Fundagao Biodiversitas and Greenpeace Brasil 
(Ibid.).
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Finally, from 1988 Brazilian environmentalism started to consider sustainable 
development more seriously. Viola (Ibid., p. 66) stresses the economic crisis affecting 
public resources, international influences (such as from the Brundtland report in 1987 
and international NGOs) and pressures (caused by deforestation and Chico Mendes - a 
rubber tapper - murdered in the Amazon region, Keck, 1995) as the reasons for such 
radical change towards sustainable development.
More specifically, Guimaraes (1992, p. 77) states that the idiosyncrasies of 
Brazilian natural resources enhanced the traditional problem Brazil faces as a 
developing country. The abundance of natural resources in a large territory turned 
Brazilian environmental problems into global issues, which pressurized the country 
into participating in multilateral efforts.
Later in 1989, Brazil became the host for the UNCED, stimulating 
environmental activities and the interest for the concept of sustainable development. 
Consequently, for the first time environmental issues were officially recognized (at 
least at a rhetorical level from 1990 onwards) as relevant within Brazilian society. At 
this point, two other sectors of Brazilian society - apart from professional NGOs and 
socio-environmental institutions - became active participants in the environmental 
movement. More specifically, scientists and institutions devoted to research on 
environmental issues, and a small number of representatives from the business 
community started to evaluate the production process and investments by 
sustainability criteria (Viola, in Goldenberg, 1992).
The business community was particularly interested in the opportunities that 
resulted from increased environmental concern. These opportunities were specifically: 
waste management and end-of-the-pipe technology, renewable energy, basic 
sanitation, organic products, and recycling of industrial material. Furthermore, some 
industrial sectors with exports to industrialized countries were facing strict norms on 
product and process quality. Additionally, the inclusion of business representatives in 
the environmental movement generated donations to environmental projects by 
professional NGOs, and the creation in 1991 of the Brazilian Society for Sustainable 
Development28 by companies that pledge to follow this concept.
28 This institution develops projects and research on environmental preservation and motivates business 
to incorporate environmental management. It comprises twenty - large domestic and foreign companies, 
but the founders are: Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, Caemi, Varig, Mannesmam, Papel Simao, Ripasa, 
Aracruz, Acesita, Suzano and Shell (Souza, 1993, p. 50).
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More specifically, the US Department of Commerce29 estimated that the 
Brazilian market for environmental technology services has a potential of US$ 1 
billion (including the privatization of sewage services, acquisition of end-of-the-pipe 
equipment and waste treatment). Therefore, the US aims to enhance its commercial 
relationship with Brazil in order to introduce their technology (Gutberlet, 1996, p. 
107). A similar interest has been expressed by the German government , which 
emphasises not only the sale of equipment but also joint ventures with medium and 
small companies. More recently, German companies specializing in environmental 
technology, explicitly stated their interest in the Brazilian market, because it represents 
a potential market estimated at US$ 30 billion per year. However, German companies 
will have a substantial share as they are the world leaders in technology for waste 
treatment31.
To summarize, the key question for Brazilian environmentalism since the early 
90s centres on the type of sustainable development that should be followed, given the 
conflicting positions of all those actors involved. Nevertheless, there is still a gap 
between discourse and practice within Brazilian society. For example, the lack of 
environmental concern from consumers in Brazilian and other South American 
markets delays environmental improvements in industrial operations32.
Nevertheless, signs of a progressive perspective towards sustainability from 
political, social and economics aspects of Brazilian society in the 90s are recognized 
by Viola (in Ferreira and Viola, 1996, p. 49). For example, the first democratically 
elected president (Fernando Collor, 1990-1992) incorporated environmental concern 
into the public administration mainly as a result of international pressure over the 
Amazon region and as part of preparation for the UNCED. A second aspect is that 
energy sources are based on renewable resources (i.e., hydra-electricity and biomass). 
Therefore, Brazil is at the vanguard of sustainable energy matrices. Finally, the
29 Based on a statement from American official at the Trade and the Environmental Seminar, held in Sao 
Paulo in October 1996. This event was sponsored by the Secretary of State for the Environment and 
Ernest & Young consultancy.
30 For example, a German technology fair was organized in Sao Paulo in 1995 ( ‘Quimica and 
Derivados’, October, 1995, pp. 30-34).
31 Folha de S. Paulo, 1 June 1997, C-2, p. 4.
32 Despite rare governmental initiatives (such as the SMA programme on the consumer and the 
environment) to motivate industry and consumers environmental consciousness, the reality is that 
Brazilian consumers are not prepared to exercise pressure based on their buying power (Folha de 
S.Paulo, 29 October 1995, p. 3).
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growing awareness of society towards environmental issues and its connection with 
development constitutes another contributory factor.
This last aspect changed dramatically after the UNCED. According to Viola (in 
Ferreira and Viola, 1996, p. 52) interest from public opinion on environmental issues 
has decreased since the Conference. Furthermore, the creation of the Ministry of the 
Environment did not increase the importance of this issue for the government, because 
of resistance to restructure the governmental agencies.
The international pressure from NGOs and more particularly from the 
American government over the Amazon area have persisted after UNCED. Despite 
such pressures, the presidential elections of 1994 had no implications on 
environmental issues, as candidates did not address related issues. Consequently, the 
elected president (Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 1995-1998) kept the low profile of the 
former government. The lack of media interest also contributed to major impacts on 
the Brazilian environmental movement. For example, environmental groups 
experienced a phase of stagnation as a consequence of financial problems from 1993 
to 1995. Nevertheless, the discussion of environmental issues among governmental, 
business and academic communities remained at a constant pace throughout the 90s 
(Ibid., pp. 53-55).
More recently, the Ministry of the Environment judged that five years after 
UNCED the most concrete achievement was increased public awareness about 
environmental issues33. Therefore, there was plenty of evidence during the ‘Rio + 5’ 
meeting of the gap between discourse and reality in the Brazilian context. Later on, at 
the special UN summit (held in New York in June 1997), the Brazilian government 
was criticized for its public relations approach34 during the UNCED. Accordingly, 
Brazilian environmentalists35 criticized the speech from the Brazilian President at the 
summit because the current government had neglected environmental issues.
33 The ‘Rio + 5 ’ was a preparatory meeting (held in Brazil in March 1997) for the UN special summit in 
1997; it evaluated the adoption of environmental protection measures defined by UNCED in 1992 
(Estado de S.Paulo, 13 March 1997, p. A24).
34 This criticism came specifically from the Environmental Defense Fund (American NGO) in reference 
to the Amazon deforestation (Estado de S. Paulo, 22 June 1997, p. A29).
35 More specifically the representatives of the ‘Instituto SociambientaT and the Brazilian office of WWF 
(Estado de S.Paulo, 25 June 1997, p. A16).
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3.3 - Environmental regulatory policy
This section focuses on regulatory aspects, that is, the Brazilian environmental 
regulatory policy at federal and state levels. In essence, it will introduce the structure 
and scope of the regulation that affects industrial activities in Brazil.
3.3.1 - Federal level
Brazilian society experienced an increased concern with environmental issues 
throughout the 1980’s. This process actually began in the early 70s, as a result of the 
Stockholm Conference36 in 1972. And in 1973, it was institutionalized with the 
expansion of environmental legislation and through the creation of the federal 
Secretary of the Environment (SEMA). It was endowed with the basic task of 
elaborating rules and regulations for environmental conservation and monitoring their 
enforcement (directly or in coordination with other governmental agencies).
Later, another turning-point in environmental issues came in 1981. The Law 
6938 (from 31/08/81) established the objectives and basic instruments37 for a national 
environmental policy. For the first time, internal legislation stressed the necessity of 
integrating development and environmental considerations. In addition, the first step in 
implementing the ‘community-right-to-know principle’ was launched through the 
requirement of government licensing for activities which might harm or destabilize the 
ecosystems in which they are performed.
The same legislation had an important institutional component, by creating the 
National Council for the Environment (CONAMA). This is a consultative organ 
integrated by federal, state and municipality agencies, and by non-governmental 
organizations active in the environmental and economical fields. The CONAMA is 
responsible for proposing environmental policies and drafting criteria for the 
preparation of the environmental impact assessment (ELA), and the respective report 
(RIMA), which became critical tools for guiding domestic environmental policy.
36 An account of the radical position assumed by developing countries (including Brazil) may be seen in 
Castro (1972).
37 According to Motta (1996, p. 79) the instruments of command-and-control in use in Brazil are 
classified by the National Environmental Programme, as follows: (a) environmental standards (of 
quality and emission); (b) control of land use (based on zoning and conservation units); (c) licensing 
(including ELA); and (d) penalties (such as fines and compensations).
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Accordingly, environmental agencies have been created in the majority of the 
Brazilian states since 1982. These agencies, the SEMA and the CONAMA, form the 
‘Brazilian Association of Environmental Agencies’.
Additionally, legislation was approved, allowing civil suits for damages caused 
to the environment, as well as aiming to preserve sites of landscape, aesthetic or 
historic value. Besides this, NGOs won the right to plead lawsuits in court (Law 7347 
from 1985). Finally, in 1986 a strict regulation concerning location of industrial units 
and an obligatory ELA for new sites was created (CONAMA Resolution 001).
Additional improvements happened in the national context with constitutional 
changes in 1988. The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 contains an entire chapter on the 
environment, based on the right of the population to a sound environment as a 
precondition for a healthy quality of life. More specifically, the Constitution 
established the overarching principle that both property rights and the economic order 
must be consistent with - and will not be prejudicial to - environmental protection. It 
also reinforced the citizen’s right to participate in environmental management through 
the introduction of a new type of ‘environmental popular lawsuit’. Lastly, the states 
and municipalities were granted greater legislative autonomy on environmental 
matters.
At the beginning of 1989, the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and 
Renewable Resources (IBAMA) was created under the Interior Ministry, through the 
fusion of the SEMA and three other federal agencies (i.e., Forest, Rubber and Fishery). 
Later, in March 1990, a new SEMA was established at Cabinet level, responsible for 
planning, coordinating, monitoring and controlling all activities with a potential 
impact on the environment. IBAMA, which kept its pre-existing institutional structure, 
was transformed into the executive agency for the National Environmental 
Programme. In October 1992, SEMA and IBAMA were amalgamated into the newly 
created Ministry of the Environment38.
The National Environment Programme, developed by IBAMA and partially 
financed by the World Bank, is an initiative with three main goals: (a) to strengthen 
environmental agencies both at the federal and state level, improving their 
coordination strategies and investing in staff-training programs; (b) to improve the
38 Brazilian Embassy, ‘Brazil and the Environment’. Washington: 1993, pp. 2-3.
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management of the federal conservation units, severely compromised by the lack of 
budgetary resources; and, (c) to invest in the conservation and protection of ‘special 
ecosystems’, that is, those classified as ‘National Heritage’ by the 1988 Constitution, 
namely the Amazon, the ‘Pantanal’, the Atlantic Forest and Coastal Ecosystems39.
The IBAMA has been severely criticized for not accomplishing any of these 
goals40. However, obstacles to enforcement of the law come, to some extent, from the 
government’s administrative structure41, because environmental issues are still 
dispersed within the public administration42. Another major difficulty faced by 
IBAMA is the lack of resources (as illustrated in the table below). Margulis (1992, p. 
94) criticizes the use of command-and-control in developing countries because the 
environmental agencies lack the financial, human and infrastructure to enforce the law.
Table 3.8 - Brazil - budget of the federal environmental agency
(US$ million) 1989* 1990* 1991* 1997**
IBAMA 257.7 269.4 106.5 80
Source: Adapted from Maimon, 1992, p. 114, and Financial Times, 2 December 1997, p. 9.
Notes: * current spending, ** estimated.
Brazil has three levels of public administration: federal, state, and municipal. 
The federal government formulates an overreaching policy, leaving the more specific 
law and enforcement options to state and municipality. The complex nature of this 
constitutional approach has led to conflicting decisions and priorities, which have 
often had detrimental effects on the environment (as suggested by Motta, 1996, p. 80, 
the governmental structure lacks integration). A further bureaucratic layer, created 
through federal legislation, was the formation of ‘metropolitan areas’ (such as Sao
39 Ibid., p. 5.
40 For example, IBAMA estimates that unpaid fines for environmental offenses total more than US$ 400 
millions, experts assess this backlog as a major challenge to simultaneously enforce the law and punish 
offenders. In this particular case the agency contracted lawyers to take legal action against the offenders 
(Financial Times, 6 June 1996, p. 5).
41 The official responsible for the IBAMA’s Financial Department said that a campaign was launched 
(so-called ‘penalty operation’) aiming to collect unpaid fines. The countervailing mechanism used by 
IBAMA was to include the offenders in governmental records ( ‘Cadastro de Inadimplentes’), which 
prohibited them from applying for loans from governmental organizations. Finally, it was stated that the 
revenue from legal actions had been invested in new projects financed by IBAMA (interviewed on 
21/08/96).
42 Estado de S.Paulo, 19 March 1995, C-B, p. 6.
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Paulo and Rio de Janeiro). These areas do not constitute an autonomous level of 
government, they are only an administrative concept implemented by the states.
In other words, the state and municipal government are empowered to exercise 
regulatory authority43. The most influential of these powers is the ability to approve or 
reject operating licenses of new projects that may have a significant environmental 
impact. State and local levels can also impose fines, within the limits set by federal 
law (Rappaport and Flaherty, 1992, p. 115).
Furthermore, a scholar44 has called attention to the ‘network of power, pressure 
and influence’ in the Brazilian context, which includes political parties, communities, 
social movements and workers unions. This aspect is relevant in a country like Brazil 
as a consequence of its continental size, and the existence of several layers of 
governmental power. Similarly, Hurrell (1991, p. 209) states that “it is important to 
keep the actual political impact of such new social movements in perspective and not 
to allow their novelty to overshadow study of the traditional sources of political 
power”.
In conclusion, the National Environmental Programme has introduced 
important alterations to the approach to environmental issues, particularly by moving 
the regulatory focus from pollution toward prevention and protection. Motta (1996, p. 
80) states that the results achieved since this programme was established in 1981, are 
‘satisfactory vis-a-vis the short period for its implementation’. However, the 
environmental agencies face problems in making full use of the command-and-control 
instruments45.
Considering that the UNCED has enhanced society’s perception towards 
environmental issues, changes of concept, approaches and practices regarding the 
legislation for industrial pollution control46 have been discussed. Apart from these
43 The municipality started to exert its constitutional rights in the mid-90s. Consequently, municipal 
authorities may duplicate legal requirements of the state environmental agency (which were created in 
the late 70s). For example, the municipal authority in Paulmia (petrochemical complex in the Sao Paulo 
state) aims to impose further licensing requirements. Therefore, a group of companies’ representatives 
was created to negotiate these requirements, which has support from FIESP (interview at FIESP’s 
Environmental Department, on 29/09/96).
44 Interview with a Professor from the International Relations Department in the University of Brasilia 
(on 19/08/96).
45 The absence of governmental programmes to curb industrial pollution (or so-called ‘brown issues’) 
was stressed at the Environmental Department of the Foreign Relations Ministry, and also at the WWF 
office in Brasilia (interviews made respectively on 21/08/96 and 22/08/96).
46 For example, Coca-Cola (American company) has been involved in a Programme of Energy 
Conservation after an voluntary agreement with Eletrobras (federal agency of electricity) in May 1996.
91
political and institutional changes, there are also economic changes taking place in the 
Brazilian context. In brief, these economic changes are, as follows: (a) privatization of 
state-owned companies in the petrochemical sector; (b) relocation of industrial sites 
away from the metropolitan area (mainly in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro); (c) 
reduction of hierarchical levels in the companies’ organizational structure, leading to 
closer integration between sites and support functions; and (d) a major diffusion of 
total quality control, which includes rationalization of raw materials, energy and 
wastes reduction in the manufacturing process.
In general, the current debate concerning industrial pollution control is 
increasingly concentrated on the interaction between environmental authorities and 
industry. In this context, the industrial capabilities, policies and practices of pollution 
control have been taken into account to reformulate the regulatory structure, which 
begins to rely on other instruments (such as environmental self-assessment and 
taxation of water usage, according to Motta, 1996, p. 79) and encouragement of the 
incorporation of voluntary schemes such as environmental certification.
3.3.2 - State level
3.3.2.1 - Sao Paulo state
The state government uses the Secretary of State for the Environment (SMA) 
as the core institution (created by State Decree 24933 in 1986) responsible for 
coordinating environmental issues. There is evidence that the current mandate is 
responsible for changes in the command-and-control approach47, which has 
consequences for industrial activities in the state of Sao Paulo. For example, SMA 
published a ‘resolution on information access’48 emphasizing the public right-to-know
This agreement has been developed under the auspices of the National Programme of Conservation of 
Electric Energy - PROCEL (Jomal do Meio Ambiente, August 1996, p. 9 ) .
47 The difficulty of obtaining data on the compliance of selected companies was highlighted by 
Secretary Fabio Feldmann (1995-1998) during a meeting, which includes other participants, as follows: 
the president of CETESB, the Director of Pollution Control, the Executive Assistant of the Director of 
Pollution Control, the Secretary’s advisor, two representatives from the Juridical Department. 
Consequently, the request for information was taken by the director of pollution control and answered a 
few days later (interview at SMA, on 03/12/96).
48 Resolution SMA 66 from 17/12/96 (Governo do Estado de Sao Paulo, Secretaria de Estado do Meio 
Ambiente, “Acesso a Informa^ao Ambiental”, December 1996, p. 5).
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49. This resolution states that “the norms regarding information access must serve to 
promote the transparency and broad announcement of information maintained by the 
bodies with public responsibilities”. Additionally, SMA states that “the juridical model 
of simple punishment has been partially inefficient to protect the environment ... The 
challenge is to rethink this model and to search for alternative ways to enforce the 
environmental legislation”50.
Accordingly, SMA proposes a significant evolution in the modus operandi of 
public administration, though the creation of the juridical figure; the so-called 
‘Compromise of Conduct Adjustment Term’51. Consequently, SMA has provided the 
public administration with effective instruments to make the enforcement of the 
constitutional principles of environmental preservation, conservation and recovery 
possible.
Adhering to this ‘Compromise Term’ the offender is obligated to promote the 
recuperation of the degraded environment. Furthermore, such an agreement is similar 
to an ‘extrajudicial execution title’. That is, if the offender does not fulfill the 
obligation assumed by the agreement, the immediate judicial execution of the 
obligation agreed (which includes the overdue administrative penalties) can be 
imposed.
In total, these attempts to improve the environmental management at the state 
level result in more transparency and efficiency; moreover, they aim to motivate 
compliance without making exclusive use of control and punishment. Additionally, 
there are other relevant examples from the current SMA’s administration, such as: (a) 
integrated environmental licensing, which is an exclusive counter service aggregating 
the issuing of all licenses52 from SMA and CETESB for activities located in the 
metropolitan area of Sao Paulo. This is an innovative solution to improve the standard 
of enforcement by the simplification of the former bureaucratic licensing procedures;
49 A scholar confirmed the difficulties in gathering data from Brazilian bureaucracy, emphasizing the 
lack of transparency at CETESB (interview with Associate Professor of the Production Department in 
the ‘Funda?ao Getulio Vargas - Sao Paulo’, on 27/11/96).
50 These rhetorical changes were constantly confirmed during interviews at the SMA, respectively by the 
coordinators of the NGOs (on 11/10/96) and consumers (on 20/09/96) programmes.
51 The resolution SMA 5 (from 07/01/97) regulates this legal instrument (Govemo do Estado de Sao 
Paulo. Secretaria de Estado do Meio Ambiente, “Compromisso de Ajustamento de Conduta Ambiental”, 
January 1997, p. 3).
52 More specifically, the operations from SMA’s coordination of environmental licensing and natural 
resources protection (which includes land use, ELA and natural resources protection) and CETESB’s 
pollution control Division are aggregated together.
93
and (b) the project of law (to be enacted at the state Assembly) for forest preservation, 
aiming to achieve the recovery of forest areas in the state (including new modalities of 
punishment53).
Further to this, SMA’s activism in environmental management54 is illustrated 
by the inclusion of consumer’s environmental awareness among its programmes. The 
focus of SMA’s programme is on eco-labelling products, methodology for life-cycle 
assessment and the lack of environmental concern among Brazilian consumers55. 
There is a clear connection between this programme and the launch of environmental 
certification (by the ISO). This is based on the assumption that TNCs’ subsidiaries and 
Brazilian export-oriented companies will immediately incorporate this new 
environmental scheme56.
The existence of market-related demands is the main argument supporting self­
regulation, which may be true for export companies operating in sensitive sectors 
(such as paper, timber, mining, textile, and footwear). However, such an assumption is 
ambiguous for other manufacturing sectors with products for the domestic market 
(where environmental awareness is not a driving-force). Nevertheless, SMA has been 
supporting the discussion on ISO certification as a strategy towards motivating 
companies to be more proactive on environmental issues. As such it should be 
understood that more than this is necessary to change companies’ behaviour.
The state environmental agency - CETESB - was the pioneer in the Brazilian
c *7
context by establishing strict and comprehensive legislation in 1976 that dealt with
53 Governo do Estado de Sao Paulo, Secretaria de Estado do Meio Ambiente, “Anteprojeto de Lei 
Florestal do Estado de Sao Paulo”, October 1996.
54 Folha de S.Paulo, 29 October 1995, p. 1-3, and interview with the coordinator of SMA’s consumer 
programme (on 20/09/96).
55 Reckitt & Colman’s subsidiary (British household company) has produced evidence of the lack of 
environmental concern in the Brazilian market by withdrawing its range of green products. Moreover, 
the production line was adapted to produce its traditional (and cheaper) products when domestic 
demand increased after inflation was controlled. However, the launch of this range of green products 
was influenced by the UNCED (interview at the Marketing Department of Reckitt & Colman’s 
subsidiary, on 24/10/96). Hurrell (in Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992, p. 413) mentioned how quickly the 
Brazilian media and advertising industries incorporated the green appeal, that is the ‘commercial 
advantages of environmentalism’.
56 Gazeta Mercantil, 22 October 1996, p. C-6.
57 The most relevant legislation regarding pollution control in Sao Paulo state are: (a) Law 118 
(29/06/73) that created CETESB, (b) Law 997 (31/05/76) and Decree 8468 (08/9/76) that defined the 
prevention and control of pollution, (c) Decree 14806 (04/03/80) that defined a Programme for 
Industrial Pollution Control ( ‘PROCOP’), (d) Decree 21880 (11/01/84) changed the PROCOP, 
hereinafter called Programme of Pollution Control (CETESB, 1992). This latter programme is partly 
financed by the World Bank and it has been evaluated as such by Freitas and Soares (1994). More
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two phases of pollution control on both the preventive and corrective levels. CETESB 
was chartered as a state-owned company in 1973, mainly to allow for a larger degree 
of administrative flexibility, especially with regard to personnel management 
(Rappaport and Flaherty, 1992, p. 115).
As far as the pollution control approach followed in Sao Paulo state was 
concerned, CETESB58 has been working with control of process and/or end-of-the- 
pipe solutions based on ‘best available technology’. It was illustrated that the US 
emphasizes end-of-the-pipe solutions and the Scandinavian countries are concerned 
with industrial process and technology, CETESB therefore combines both59. The 
peculiarity of pollution control in Brazil comes from the definition of types of 
pollution (i.e., air, water and soil pollution), grounded in the federal Constitution of 
1988 (Chapter VI - Article 225). Additionally, the amount of pollutants that companies 
are allowed to generate is defined by state regulations.
The discourse from CETESB is in tune with the official statement60 from 
SMA. Accordingly, self-regulation (through schemes such as eco-labelling, BS 7750 
and ISO 14000) is a powerful instrument for promoting cleaner industrial processes. 
The voicing of support from CETESB for environmental certification is crucial since a 
clear message that self-regulation is endorsed by all bodies within SMA’s structure is 
required. Nevertheless, there is no similar support at the technical level, that is, among 
CETESB’s staff (which are concerned with work conditions and wages). Thus, 
considering the lack of experience with industry self-assessment in Brazil, the 
potential results of such an approach by governmental agencies remains in doubt.
However, CETESB has achieved good results through unconventional 
approaches in the past. In one instance, the agency had to control air emissions via the 
burning of diesel. The objective was the reduction of sulphur emissions from diesel
specifically, it has two components: (a) allocation of resources to finance improvement in industrial 
activities, and (b) technical assistance to improve the operational capacity of CETESB.
58 Interview with the director of the Pollution Control Division at CETESB (on 24/10/96).
59 CETESB is a reference agency for the WHO in Brazil and Latin America. The agency has agreements 
on technical cooperation at national (major universities) and international level (British Council and 
Overseas Development Agency, EPA, GTZ and GKSS among others). For example, GTZ is helping 
decontaminate polluted site and dispose of toxic wastes in Sao Paulo (Consolidating Development 
Opportunities, by Deutsche GTZ, n.d., p. 39). Additionally, Zulauf (1994, p. 40) states that CETESB’s 
international cooperation includes agreements with WWF, Portugal’s Secretary of the Environment, and 
the Japanese International Cooperation Agency.
60 More specifically, SMA has sponsored workshops and seminars on environmental issues with the 
participation of environmentalists, business representatives and members of the academic community.
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burned by a large number of companies in the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo. 
However, the agency decided to reduce the amount of sulphur (from 5 to 2.5 percent) 
in the fuel from just one producer - Petrobras (state-owned petrochemical).
Moreover, it was confirmed by a CETESB’s official61 that the weight of the 
fines (which are defined by law and had lost value as a resulted of high inflation) has 
been increased, now representing a significant sum to offenders, thereby improving 
law enforcement. Additionally, the programme of incentives to locate sites in the 
interior of the state illustrates the long term commitment of CETESB to industrial 
pollution. In the last ten years, the programme has encouraged industries either to 
relocate current sites or to locate new sites in the interior of the state (Law 5597 from 
1987). However, the legislation is stricter in the capital because of the high urban 
concentration (Law 4963 from 1986); CETESB therefore created regional offices to 
avoid potential double-standards in pollution control within the state.
Nevertheless, the major problem affecting CETESB’s performance is lack of 
financial resources (mainly from the state government) . This lack of resources has 
resulted in changes to the ‘philosophical approach’ followed by the agency. An 
official63 from the National Development Bank (BNDES) affirms that CETESB was 
created to have a highly technical focus; it consequently follows a reductionist 
approach towards environmental issues. At present, CETESB is in a process of 
transformation, but it has already lost many qualified staff. Therefore, one of the 
founders of the agency has been reappointed as President to promote the much needed 
changes.
The first change is grounded in the legislation defining criminal responsibility 
(that is, the “pollution pays” principles) of the polluter. Second, is the proposal of 
obligatory self-assessment for industrial sites (based on the experience in the Rio de 
Janeiro state). Consequently, the companies will be responsible for data collection at 
critical points of the industrial process and the agency will evaluate the results. Besides 
this, the implementation of self-assessment will rationalize the agency’s resources so 
that qualified technicians can be devoted to more relevant tasks than inspections at 
industrial sites. Third, the Brazilian economic liberalization and privatization have
61 Interview with the official responsible for the Interior Division at CETESB’s Pollution Control 
Division (on 24/10/96). On the same occasion the station of air quality control was visited.
62 Ibid.
63 Interview with the official of the Environmental Department at BNDES (on 29/08/96).
96
also demanded changes in CETESB’s activities. As a result, it is expected that market 
forces will demand environmental concern from economic agents; environmental 
issues will became a market differential in terms of quality of product and process.
Regarding TNCs’ double-standards, CETESB’s director said that there is no 
evidence for criticizing the technological stage of Brazilian sites. The director alluded 
to the fact that foreign and export-oriented domestic companies64 would lead the 
dissemination of environmental management in Brazil. This is mainly because these 
companies are able to secure access to cleaner technology without requiring assistance 
from CETESB.
Another CETESB’s official65 said that overcompliance is unusual even among 
TNCs’ subsidiaries. One example of overcompliance is Honda’s (Japanese company) 
new site, which has presented a project above the regulatory requirements and will be 
implemented as such. Besides this, there are other few examples of overcompliance in 
the environmental management of TNCs’ subsidiaries, which are usually related to 
waste management.
3.3.2.2 - Rio de Janeiro state
The most recent legal requirement in the state of Rio de Janeiro is the 
enforcement of environmental audits66. The state environmental agency (FEEMA) 
started to implement the law in 1996 after many legal and technical difficulties67. 
More specifically, at the end of 1995, the state commission on environmental control 
from the Secretary of State of the Environment approved the guidelines68 establishing 
the scope, responsibilities, procedures and technical criteria for environmental audits. 
This self-assessment defined by state legislation is part of the licensing system of 
pollution-intensive activities69. At the first stage of enforcement only selected 
companies comply according to a timetable set by the environmental agency. In brief,
64 It was certainly a reference to companies from the paper and pulp sector, because CETESB’s director 
of pollution control previously worked for a paper and pulp company (interviewed on 24/10/96).
65 Interview with the official at CETESB’s regional office in Campinas, Sao Paulo state (on 14/10/96).
66 The Law 1898 (from 25/10/91) establishes an obligatory annual environmental audit. This legal 
requirement was introduced by a green politician and activist - Carlos Mine - in 1991.
67 Interview with the official of the Pollution Control Division at FEEMA (on 01/10/96).
68 Deliberation CECA/CN 3,427 dated 14/11/95.
69 The ‘Sistema de Licenciamento de Atividade Poluidoras’ was defined by the Decree 134, 18/06/96.
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there is comprehensive regulation detailing the enforcement of environmental audits, 
which includes FEEMA’s responsibilities, the public right-to-know and companies’ 
environmental disclosure. However, as the implementation of legislation started in 
1996, there was no evaluation of the results achieved.
Nevertheless, criticism of the enforcement of environmental audits came from 
the environmental department of BNDES70. It was said that the compulsory nature of 
environmental audit is meaningless considering that it originated as a voluntary 
industrial choice. For example, TNCs’ subsidiaries located in Rio have been doing 
voluntary environmental audits for a long time. Therefore, it was not necessary to 
impose environmental audits as a legal requirement. However, why there is no 
voluntary environmental disclosure from TNCs’ subsidiaries in Brazil is not 
questioned.
According to the BNDES’s official71 the environmental agency was created as 
a foundation without profit interests. Besides this, it was supposed to follow a holistic 
vision towards environmental problems based on the understanding that the Rio de 
Janeiro has a ‘natural vocation’ for tourism, banking industry, and other (non 
pollution-intensive) industries. FEEMA has been a good example of this type of 
institution, however it is now chaotic in a process of self-destruction.
The enforcement of obligatory audits is a turning-point in Brazilian 
environmental regulatory policy. For this reason, some criticism72 is expected because 
self-assessment was introduced at the same time that the environmental agency’s 
operations were deteriorating. In other words, FEEMA73 is the agency responsible for 
enforcing both regulation and environmental assessment, but it lacks the technical, 
human and financial resources.
The major environmental issue in the metropolitan area of Rio is the water 
pollution at Guanabara Bay. It is said that the state-owned petrochemical company
70 Interview with the official of the Environmental Department at BNDES (on 29/08/96).
71 Ibid.
72 The annual frequency of the obligatory audit has generated criticism from industrialists (La Rovere 
and d’Avignon, 1995, p. 13).
73 According to Zulauf (1994, p. 40) FEEMA has international cooperation agreements with the 
Japanese International Cooperation Agency and other similar institutions from Belgium and England. 
Additionally, GTZ (German agency) states that it is supporting FEEMA in Rio de Janeiro “in various 
fields of industrial environmental protection, including water control, toxic industrial waste, storage and 
transport of hazardous products” (Consolidating Development Opportunities, by Deutsche GTZ, n.d., p. 
39).
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(Petrobras) is responsible for most of the pollutants discharged at Guanabara Bay, 
without having faced any punishment from the authorities74. Besides this, Petrobras 
caused another oil spill75 in the bay in 1997. This argument confirms Neder’s (1994) 
statement that state-owned companies have been neglecting legal requirements 
towards pollution control. Another source76 states that ‘fifty five companies (including 
foreign and domestic) are responsible for 80 percent of the industrial pollution 
discharge in the bay’s water’. More specifically, these are the companies taking part in 
a programme launched by the state environmental agency demanding the installation 
of effluent treatment systems prior to discharge. Additionally, these fifty five 
companies77 were selected as the first to present the report of environmental self- 
assessment to FEEMA.
As far as Guanabara Bay is concerned, in 1995 a special loan line 
(approximately US$ 150 million) was launched by the federal government through the 
BNDES78. It provides for major polluters in the area willing to participate in the 
Recovery Programme for Guanabara Bay, by financing projects of pollution control. 
Surprisingly there were no applicants (from June 1995 to August 1996) for such loans. 
Consequently, governmental incentives to industrial pollution control did not produce 
any change in the slow recovery of the bay. Finally, the most obvious excuses from 
companies were: (a) economic recession, (b) lax behaviour from the state-owned 
petrochemical company, and (c) the chaotic situation in the environmental agency. 
However, a similar pattern of behaviour - that is reactive to the legislation - is also 
present in other areas of Rio de Janeiro. For example, the media stated that 
approximately 1,500 companies were penalized in 1996 because of environmental 
damage (the transport sector received the highest amount of fines)79.
74 Interview with a Professor from the Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro (on 30/08/96), who is 
also a founder member of the Ecological Economics Society in Brazil.
75 The spill of 600 thousand litres of oil was caused by a faulty pipe and the company cleared up the oil 
to contain further degradation in the Bay area (Estado de S.Paulo, 14 March 1997, p. A14).
76 Data supplied by the Division of Industrial Control from FEEMA, which is the same data sent to the 
Inter-American Development Bank - one of the sponsors of the recovery programme for Guanabara Bay 
(Jomal do Meio Ambiente, August 1996, p. 7).
77 The TNCs’ subsidiaries (located in the Bay) that have installed effluent treatment are: Ciba-Geigy, 
Bayer, White Martins, Westinghouse, General Electric and Beecham Laboratory. Elsewhere, Sandoz is 
said to be implementing the effluent treatment system (Ibid.).
78 Ibid.
79 Jornal O Globo, 19 July 1996.
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It may be helpful at this point to present an overview of environmental 
awareness in the state of Rio de Janeiro. More recently, public participation was 
enhanced as a result of environmentalists’ campaigning. A Committee for the 
Environment was created by the municipality. This Committee was drafted by state 
law as responsible for defining the priorities of environmental policy for the city of 
Rio de Janeiro. Accordingly, the first group of local NGOs (‘Defensores da Terra, 
Aquariana and GAE’) to take part has a two year mandate in the Committee80.
Following this, representatives of environmental NGOs81 recognized the efforts 
made by the federal agency (IBAMA) in the Rio de Janeiro state. Despite the 
IBAMA’s lack of resources and weak structure, its activities have been fundamental 
for environmental protection. Besides this, IBAMA has provided a room at its regional 
office for NGOs82, as a proof of the federal government commitment towards public 
participation and transparency in IBAMA’s administration. IBAMA’s official said that 
NGOs will be able to recommend, participate and inspect environmental projects 
sponsored by the agency.
Nevertheless, there are still plenty of environmental problems in the Rio de 
Janeiro state. For example, the NGOs state that the commercialization of 
agrochemicals is completely out of control. Indeed, agrochemicals are sold without 
prescription and the packaging is re-used to store food; rural workers have 
consequently been contaminated. Finally, there is a total lack of information available 
to the general public on the amount of agrochemicals in the food chain. Therefore, 
environmental NGOs demand emergency action from the state Committee for 
Agrochemical Control.
80 Jomal do Meio Ambiente, August 1996, p. 5.
81 Ibid., p. 7.
82 Ibid., p. 8.
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3.4 - Non-regulatory environmental initiatives
This section will briefly introduce the most relevant non-regulatory initiatives 
regarding environmental issues in the Brazilian context. To maintain a degree of 
coherence throughout the chapter’s organization, the industry-related attempts at self­
regulation will be addressed in the subsequent chapters. Of particular interest in this 
section are the governmental initiatives for motivating the incorporation of 
environmental concerns into industry and the responses from the business community 
to this new challenge.
3.4.1 - Governmental environmental initiatives
Since the early 90s the Brazilian government has been constantly reinforcing 
the idea that environmental concern should be incorporated into a broad range of 
economic activities (from manufacturing to tourism). Such concern is best illustrated 
by the governmental policy of financing changes83 in pollution-intensive technology 
throughout industry, which is managed by the Environmental Department of the 
National Development Bank (BNDES). This bank lent US$ 1.58 billions for 
environmental projects from 1991 to 1996. More specifically, the biggest demand 
came from privatized steel and petrochemical companies, which had accumulated 
significant environmental liabilities under state ownership84.
Considering that there is competition for scarce capital, Brazilian companies 
were pressurized into incorporating environmental concern into their investment 
planning by BNDES. This is virtually the only source of long-term financing in Brazil, 
and has turned EIA into a basic requirement in evaluating investment projects. Overall,
83 Gutberlet (1996, p. 59) has described other lines of credit for pollution control, as follows: (a) the 
PROCOP (current budget of approximately US$ 152 millions) is managed by CETESB with resources 
from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (represented by BNDES in Brazil) 
and the Sao Paulo state bank. This loan line has operated since 1980 with a high concentration of 
projects in the Cubatao area during the 80s, and in the interior of the state in the 90s, and (b) ‘FINEP 
verde’ (governmental research agency) provides financial support to companies improving their 
environmental performance by the use of preventive measures (consultancy, training, information 
system, etc.) with resources from the federal government and the Inter-American Development Bank.
84 Financial Times, Survey, 6 June 1996, p. V.
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BNDES85 aims to finance and promote development in Brazil (through loans and 
incentives). In the case of loans it operates by taking into consideration the 
environmental behaviour of applicants; those deemed to have violated environmental 
regulations are rejected.
Moreover, BNDES and other state-owned regional development banks, which 
together lend approximately US$ 21 billion a year, signed in 1995 a ‘Green Protocol’ 
giving priority to environmentally sustainable industrial and agricultural projects. 
These banks also committed themselves to withholding finance from companies which 
are environmental offenders according to the Brazilian environmental authorities86.
Additionally, the Minister of the Environment and the president of BNDES 
have been trying to convince private banks to join the governmental efforts to
517incorporate environmental protection into their decision making . The pioneer 
experience at BNDES is used as an example that other banks should follow based on 
the Green Protocol’s principles. More specifically, the protocol has obligated official 
banks to require environmental evaluation prior to the concession of loans. This 
protocol was inspired in the ‘Declaration of Banks to the Environment’ prepared by 
UNEP, which eighty banks worldwide plead to follow (including two Brazilian banks 
- BNDES and Banespa - the Sao Paulo state bank).
Another relevant point in BNDES’s environmental approach is the refusal to 
finance industrial sectors that are environmentally unsustainable (e.g., iron mining and 
timber sectors). Therefore, according to BNDES’s environmental official88, the most 
criticized sectors (e.g., chemical, petrochemical, mining and steel manufacturing) have 
been changing their behaviour in Brazil. Besides this, the privatized steel companies 
(such as ‘Cosipa, Companhia Siderurgica Nacional, Companhia Siderurgica de 
Tubarao and Usinimas’) have their projects scrutinized to finance the clean up of past 
environmental damage. This represents a total investment of approximately US$ 400 
million. In total, at the beginning of 1996, fifty projects were submitted to 
environmental risk analysis.
85 Interview with the official of the Environmental Department at BNDES (on 29/08/96).
86 This protocol was personally launched by the Brazilian president, with support from the federal 
environmental agency (IBAMA). Therefore, this reference to environmental authorities is specifically 
focused on IBAMA’s problems with unpaid fines (interview with official responsible for the Green 
Protocol at IBAMA, on 21/08/96).
87 Gazeta Mercantil, 29 January 1996, p. A -12.
88 Ibid.
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BNDES was created in the late 50s without any environmental concern 
because it was not a relevant aspect. As it became a relevant question the bank adopted 
a new approach89 including a line of incentives to assist Brazilian companies to 
minimize their environmental liabilities. Here one interesting point emerges, that is, 
foreign companies90 had no access to these incentives. BNDES’s official claimed that 
MNCs have access to financial and technological resources91 from their headquarters. 
Baer (1995, p. 236) provides an overview of BNDES’s credit system and confirms the 
exclusion of access to foreign firms. However, in 1994 the review of the Constitution 
abolished the distinction between domestic and foreign capital, the practical 
consequence of which was that foreign firms may apply for public funds to implement 
pollution control.
3.4.2 - Business environmental initiatives
As regards the initiatives from the business community in Brazil, it must be 
mentioned that they were highly influenced by environmental standards from 
industrialized countries. This is a consequence of both the openness of the Brazilian 
economy in the 90s and the existence of environmental barriers in export markets.
Nevertheless, since environmental improvements represent costs, the majority 
of companies are in a stage of non-compliance with Brazilian legislation. Therefore, it 
is largely at a rhetorical level that the environmental concern is increasing within the 
business community (Gutberlet, 1996). Additionally, there is growing interest in 
environmental certification. However, there are only isolated cases of certified 
companies92. Such concern is illustrated by the table below, which summarizes the 
most significant schemes.
89 The BNDES’s official states that since 1973 the bank has been engaged in environmental projects. 
Later in the 80s the bank created a special loan line for environmental protection (inclusive by pressure 
from the World Bank) and institutionalized an Environmental Division, which in early 90s became the 
Environmental Department (Freitas and Soares, 1994, p. 115).
90 Interview with the official of FIESP (on 27/09/96), and Folha de S.Paulo, 27 September 1993, pp. 1- 
7.
91 On the specific issue of self-regulation from industry association, BNDES’s official said that 
ABIQUIM will not assume that TNCs’ subsidiaries are framing the rules for environmental protection in 
the chemical sector; however, in the official’s opinion this is the reality (interviewed on 29/08/96).
92 For example, the Brazilian companies Cetrel - waste management in the Carnahan complex in Bahia -, 
and Copesul - petrochemical in the Triunfo complex in Rio Grande do Sul - are certified by the ISO 
14001.
Table 3.9 - Selected business environmental initiatives in Brazil
Industrial sector Institution Main objectives
Mining Brazilian Mining Institute 
(IBRAM)
Orientation on EIA and recovery of 
degraded areas, cooperation with 
IBAMA
Chemical and 
petrochemical
Brazilian Chemical 
Industry Association 
(ABIQUIM)
Dissemination of clean technology 
and process, coordination of waste 
recuperation and Responsible Care
Paper and pulp National Association of 
Paper and Pulp Producers
Dissemination of self-assessment, 
technology and reforestation
Steel Brazilian Institute of Steel Dissemination of solutions and 
financial sources for pollution 
control
Glass Brazilian Association of 
Glass Industries (Abividro)
Sponsorship of recycling 
programmes
Mining, timber, 
agriculture, cattle and 
electronics
Amazon Business 
Association
Lobbying for industrial activities in 
the Amazon area, partnership with 
trade assn. state and local 
government, and research institutes
Mining, aviation, 
paper and pulp, 
petrochemical and 
steel
Brazilian Foundation for 
Sustainable Development
Dissemination and implementation 
of the concept of sustainable 
development through research and 
projects
Beverages, food, 
tobacco, packaging, 
cleaning and 
household, chemical 
fibers, and engineering
Business Commitment for 
Recycling (Cempre)
Promotion of integrated 
management of solid wastes, 
recycling of wastes and 
consumption of recycled products
Source: Adapted from Gutberlet, 1996, pp. 84-86.
As mentioned before, the UNCED was a turning-point for the business 
community’s perception of environmental issues. Therefore, the most influential 
environmental initiatives were launched by the business community in the 90s. 
Considering the scope of this thesis on corporate environmental policies, it is 
imperative to further explain two of them. First, the federation of industries of Sao 
Paulo - FIESP - launched an environmental award in 1995, which selects one company 
per year that has best implemented environmental practices. FIESP also has an 
Environmental Department aiming to offer juridical and technical support to industrial 
companies93. Additionally, it works as a representative of the business community in 
the federal, state and municipal environmental committees. Finally, the incorporation 
of environmental issues by FIESP is relevant because this powerful organization
93 Saneamento Ambiental, April/May 1996, pp. 27-30.
104
represents business interests (in an individual and/or collective basis) in Brazil. As 
such, it has the capacity to force all sorts of companies towards better environmental 
performance.
Another voluntary scheme is the ‘Recycling Commitment’ (Cempre) created 
by a group of large companies94. This group aims to promote and modernise recycling 
as part of an integrated waste management, including proper landfilling, composting 
and incineration. More specifically, the Cempre’s institutional framework is based on 
the European Recovery and Recycling Association, and it has an annual budget of US$ 
5 million donated by the members. Accordingly, as one would expect, the major 
environmental impact caused by company members was the proper disposal of product 
packaging95. More recently, Cempre was selected by the Ministry of the Environment 
as one of Brazil’s best examples of promoting sustainable development96 since the 
UNCED in 1992.
3.5 - Conclusions
Overall, the access to information from environmental authorities in Brazil is 
still a critical issue. The lack of disclosure is very obvious at CETESB (despite the 
recent regulation on public access to information) and FEEMA. These institutions, 
though following distinct approaches towards environmental protection, are 
considered the best institutions among the Brazilian state agencies. However, they did 
not escape without operational deterioration from the governmental crises during the 
80s, and the subsequent restructuring during the 90s. It is evident that a new approach 
is urgently needed at the regulatory level. At the same time, it must be recognized that 
the current structure is still able to constrain companies’ practices regarding industrial
94 Cempre has clear influence from TNCs’ subsidiaries, consequently among its members are the 
following foreign companies: Bombril (cleaning products), Coca-Cola (soft drinks), Gessy-Lever (food, 
cleaning products), Nestle (food products), Pepsi-Cola (soft drinks), Procter & Gamble (personal 
hygiene, cleaning products), Rhodia-ster (polyester resin and fibers), Souza Cruz (tobacco) and Tetra 
Pak (aseptic drink packaging), and the Brazilian companies: Brahma (brewing, soft drinks) and Enterpa 
(waste hauling and engineering). Based on UNEP, Industry and Environment, April-June, 1994, p. 14- 
17, and Warner Bulletin, Journal of the World Resource Foundation, November 1996, p. 10.
95 Coca-Cola (American company) was the founder of this scheme, bringing some recycling experiences 
from its home country (interview with the environmental manager of Coca-Cola’s subsidiary, on 
02/10/96).
96 CEMPRE News, Number 34, June 1997.
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pollution. This is particularly true for the most visible companies within the Brazilian 
context (such TNCs’ subsidiaries, large domestic groups and former state-owned 
firms).
Accordingly, the Brazilian legislation obligates industries to have a permanent 
group (so-called CIPA) with representatives from both the workers’ union and the 
company, aiming to prevent accidents and ensure workplace safety. Besides this, 
companies have to renew the operational licenses which requires a set of practices to 
fulfill the legal requirements. Additionally some Brazilian states have special requests. 
For example, in the Rio de Janeiro state there is a programme of self-assessment 
controlled by FEEMA. Another legal requirement is related to the installation of new 
sites. It is necessary to perform an EIA prior to the installation and/or substantial 
modification of the operational processes, which must be made by a third party hired 
by the company. The EIA final report (so-called RIMA) is incorporated at the 
licencing process by the environmental agencies.
The state environmental agencies follow a case-by-case approach when issuing 
licences (including those for projects, installations and renewals) for industrial 
activities, which is a consequence of the volume of environmental legislation to be 
enforced. Usually the pollution standards are site-specific following negotiations 
between company and environmental agency. Consequently, there are no uniform 
standards for pollution control in Brazil despite the parameters established by the state 
legislation on maximum allowances. This approach reduces, according to ABIQUIM’s 
official97, the power of industry association in influencing the regulatory policy for 
industrial pollution control in Brazil.
The action of interest groups98 in the definition of legislation is neither active 
nor apparent for environmental issues in Brazil. For example, the project (of law 
3160) to turn environmental auditing into a legal obligation has been under discussion 
in the Federal Congress since 1992, without clear indication if the delay is the result of 
lack of concern or lobbying from those against the project99. Moreover, environmental
97 Interview with the official of ABIQUIM (on 04/09/97).
98 In general terms there are identifiable interest groups in the Brazilian Federal Congress, such as 
representatives of the catholic church, automotive industry, workers unions, state companies, public 
servants, large farmers and major industry associations.
99 This project follows the ‘pollution-pays principle’ and incorporates environmental disclosure as a 
legal requirement. Therefore, it is claimed to be a very strict regulation by industry associations, such as 
FIESP, CNI and ABIQUIM (Gutberlet, 1996, p. 57).
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pressure groups usually make better use of the media than Congress members. Finally, 
there are few politicians (at all governmental levels) who are publicly committed to 
environmental issues in Brazil100.
The literature (Vernon, 1993 and Vogel, 1986) stresses the existence of 
different national approaches to environmental issues, without suggesting that one 
approach is better than the other. Brazilian authorities have been supporting the 
transition from the command-and-control system to more creative ways of enforcing 
the law, which include for example, incentives to voluntary environmental initiatives 
from the business community. In the opinion of CETESB’s inspector101 the voluntary 
schemes will force companies to go further than the legal compliance, as a 
consequence of powerful marketing and/or image concerns. However, it was also 
claimed that environmental improvements entailing high investments will only be 
made when obligated by the authorities.
In general, the environmental agencies (that is, FEEMA and CETESB) lack the 
agility and creativity to respond to new demands. In other words, it is easy to impose 
new legal requirements but burdensome to implement them. However, it is interesting 
to note that some attempts were made, for example the environmental authority used 
the media to disclosure the major polluters of the Tiete river (in Sao Paulo) to coincide 
with the recovery programme launch in 1992102. A similar approach was followed by 
FEEMA (in Rio de Janeiro) regarding the major polluters of the Guanabara Bay. At 
present, the most innovative approach comes from the Secretary of State of the 
Environment103 in Sao Paulo, and its attempts to change the regulatory policy (from 
command-and-control towards environmental responsibility) and to disseminate the 
contents of the Agenda 21 (plan of action from the UNCED). In the Rio de Janeiro 
state, FEEMA has shown some strength by pioneering the implementation of self- 
assessment as an instrument of pollution control, despite its structural deficiencies (La 
Rovere and d’Avignon, 1995, p. 13).
100 Zulauf (1994, pp. 60-61) states that the inclusion of the ‘Chapter on Environment’ in the Brazilian 
Constitution o f 1988 was an exceptional occasion, when 50 politicians forged the special commission on 
the environment chaired by Congressman Fabio Feldmann.
101 Interview with an inspector in the regional office of CETESB in Campinas (on 24/10/96).
102 Veja, 8 March 1995, pp. 70-84.
103 Data from interviews with SMA’s Secretary (on 03/12/96), SMA’s coordinator of the NGOs 
programme (on 11/10/96), and with CETESB’s official in the Division of Technological Cooperation 
(on 11/10/96).
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In such a context, self-assessment is the new instrument for improving 
environmental performance. Considering that environmental agencies lack the 
resources to inspect and enforce regulation, companies will evaluate and report their 
operations. Hence, the agency will be freed from the inspection activities, and the 
frequency of site inspection will be reduced104. It is expected that this approach will 
emphasize companies’ responsibilities, since CETESB lacks the human resources to 
keep a tight schedule of inspections. Besides this, it is well-known that companies 
used to control emissions and discharges during each batch production since the 
inspector is not constantly present. In the future it is presumed that the relationship 
will be based on ‘trust’105. Nevertheless, failure to achieve reasonable results will 
subject companies to punishment and/or the return to the former inspection system.
CETESB’s official106 has suggested a pattern of behaviour amongst companies 
(including domestic and foreign) in Brazil, as follows: (a) companies that will enforce 
the law after being punished, and (b) companies that will be punished several times 
prior to complying with legal requirements. Overall, there are no cases of voluntary 
action and/or overcompliance among companies in Brazil. According to Amado and 
Brazil (1991, p. 40) the “Brazilian organizations are predominantly worried about 
immediate results, achievement, and short-term performance, which are particularly 
stressed by managers with an engineering background. Consequently, these actions 
“impair the purposes and goals of productivity, cost reduction, and quality, as well as 
organizational efficiency”.
As specifically regards TNCs’ subsidiaries, the general rule is that they will be 
warned once or twice, but will accomplish the legal requirements prior to being 
punished. Besides this, these companies maintain a process of negotiation with the 
environmental agency. CETESB’s inspector107 suggested that TNCs’ environmental 
management is more complex because of corporate influence and control through 
audits. Usually, the subsidiaries’ minimum requirement is the legislation of the 
country of operation and ‘there is no evidence of headquarters suggesting subsidiaries
104 According to CETESB’s official (interviewed on 14/10/96) the frequency of inspection will be based 
on the risk of the operation.
105 Interview with CETESB’s director of the Pollution Control Division (on 24/10/96).
106 Interview with the head of CETESB’s regional office in Campinas (on 14/10/96).
107 Ibid.
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to ignore legal requirements’. On the other hand, the headquarters have no real control 
over subsidiaries’ practices.
The argument that by following corporate guidelines the subsidiary’s practices 
will be beyond the local legislation is a recurrent fallacy. However, this is a common 
argument among TNCs’ subsidiaries, which is contradictory because their practices 
have not incorporated these corporate guidelines. Moreover, Brazilian standards are 
claimed to be a copy of American standards (as suggested by Neder, 1994 and 
Monosowski, 1989). However, the criteria of ‘technical-economic viability’ is the 
basis of the decision-making process at TNCs’ subsidiaries in order to solve the 
dilemma between local versus corporate requirements. In reality Brazil has a very 
modem environmental regulatory policy since the changes in the federal Constitution 
were made in 1988. Nevertheless, the evidence confirms the argument (such as in 
Haas et al., 1993) that developing countries lack the institutional resources to enforce 
environmental regulations (generated at national or international level).
Finally, it is also relevant to point out the existence of a ‘public attorney’, who 
may at any moment initiate a legal action against environmental degradation. This is a 
new instrument of public control regarding environmental issues in the Brazilian 
context, but it is unevenly distributed throughout the country. Consequently, some 
local communities may close down industries due to pollution problems, but others 
lack a similar mechanism. Some of the aspects discussed throughout this chapter on 
the host country context will be repeated in subsequent chapters which address the 
findings from selected cases in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors.
NChapter IV - Case studies analysis - chemical sector
In this chapter industry-related explanations for the implementation of 
corporate environmental policies in TNCs’ subsidiaries will be discussed. The chapter 
focuses on the chemical industry (its selection was justified in section 1.2, of this 
thesis). More specifically, it presents the findings from three cases - Zeneca, DuPont 
and BASF, which were investigated in order to evaluate the proposition (introduced 
previously in section 2.5) regarding industry’s influence on environmental practices. 
Briefly, the chapter’s main sections are: a profile of the chemical industry (in the world 
and in Brazil), a profile of the selected TNCs (including their Brazilian subsidiaries), 
and finally industry-related explanations based on data from the case studies. This 
latter section includes regulatory and economic aspects faced by TNCs’ subsidiaries in 
Brazil (thus it confirms aspects already discussed in the previous chapter). 
Consequently, other explanations (that is, those regarding home and company-specific 
variables) will be addressed in chapter six.
The main argument developed in this chapter is based on the following 
question: why and how does industry structure affect the implementation of corporate 
environmental policy in Brazilian subsidiaries? It is worthwhile indicating that some 
authors go deeper than others into the question of how important industry-related 
explanations are (such as Rumelt, 1991). They usually start their argument by asking 
what really configures an industry and its boundaries (Easton et al., 1993). Ballance 
(1987, p. 23) said that “in describing an economist’s view of the industry life cycle, a 
difficult task is to specify what is meant by the term ‘industry’. In fact, no one 
definition is possible. ... the availability of data may impose a definition upon the user 
which does not necessarily suit conceptual requirements”.
The attempt to assign firms to a particular industry may be based on the 
researcher’s judgment of the comparability of the cases. It happens mainly “when 
products supplied by a cluster of firms are differentiated”, in this case, “a precise 
delimitation of the industry can not be found. Actually, industries consist of shifting 
groups of competitors which are clustered around particular products or processes” 
(Ballance, 1987, pp. 23-24). Additionally, Porter (1980) suggests that the definition of 
the industry is dependent on the actor’s perception of such an industry. Moreover, the
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selection and consequent justification of industry may be specifically based on some 
(and not all) the characteristics of a set of firms (what brings them together rather than 
what separates them).
Such a discussion is not commonly made in the literature on TNCs and 
environmental issues (despite efforts in IPE to bring together distinct levels of 
analysis, including the firm-level as in Sally, 1995). Besides this, it is important to 
note that this thesis investigates other aspects (to be introduced in chapter six) apart 
from the industry context. In such a case, the industry is a kind of control variable, 
setting limits to the analysis of a phenomenon, and as such assisting the further 
development of knowledge. This decision is consequently grounded in the current IPE 
paradigm which emphasizes regulatory and economic aspects of TNCs’ practices.
One vital component of the approach followed in this research is multi-level 
analysis. Such an approach is present in the industry-related discussion on the 
assumption that there are distinct industrial contexts within any industry. More 
specifically, multi-level analysis is represented by the division of the chemical industry 
structure into two distinct contexts, that is, international and national. However, some 
aspects of the world chemical industry are reflected in the Brazilian chemical industry, 
mainly due to the presence of large TNCs, others are not. This finding leads to the 
discussion in chapter six of ontological stratification by variance of context, that is, the 
relevance of the country of origin in the explanation of TNCs’ environmental 
practices.
4.1 - Profile of the industry
This section will briefly introduce the main characteristics of the chemical 
industry from a worldwide viewpoint. Additionally, it will provide an overview of the 
Brazilian chemical industry. Overall this section will assist in the data analysis of three 
case studies, specifically those industry-related aspects explaining environmental 
practices in Brazilian subsidiaries (such as technology, cost, competition and market 
addressed in section 2.5). Finally, it is relevant to mention that the selected 
subsidiaries are not operating in all business areas as the corporations; therefore, there
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is specific emphasis on agrochemicals and specialties throughout this chapter as these 
are the most important segments of activities in the Brazilian subsidiaries.
4.1.1 - World chemical industry
4.1.1.1 - Overview and trends
The life-cycle perspective has been the main framework used by different 
authors for analysing industrial sectors. According to Ballance (1987, p. 26) the 
chemical industry provides a telling example of a mature industry. Until the 1920s, 
“producers were mainly suppliers of intermediate inputs used by other industries. 
While this function still persists, the emergence of petrochemicals led to all sorts of 
new product lines based on synthetics (e.g., tyres, textiles, paint, and clothing). 
Chemical firms outgrew their ‘supplier role’ and entered a second ‘product’ phase 
dominated by items intended mainly for the final consumer rather than other 
industries”. More recently, Ballance adds that they have faced the effects of market 
saturation, over-capacity, rising energy costs and environmental concerns. In the 
author’s opinion, these problems “have converted chemicals into a mature industry 
with a service-oriented mode of operation”, a perspective shared by Porter (1980). Just 
like firms in other maturing industries where firms have their margins squeezed, 
“chemical producers have become increasingly willing to sell their know-how”. In 
short, the current features of the chemical industry contrast with the mass production 
approach which marked earlier phases in its development (Ballance, 1987, p. 26).
The pressure on the world production of industrial chemicals can be attributed 
to the creation of new capacity, both in the developing and industrialized countries. 
This coincided with the petroleum crisis (during the 70s) that triggered changes in the 
industry’s standards of efficiency and productivity. After 1972, the shares of world 
production claimed by European, Japanese and American chemical firms declined. In 
some segments, such as the production of synthetic fibres, the Triad producers lost 
shares to India, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand. It is also recognized that “new 
environmental regulations, for example, have limited the industry’s growth of 
production in Western countries. Firms operating plants designed in the early 1970s 
have also suffered because of their high energy costs” (Ibid., p. 104).
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However, impacts on the industry have showed variances because the chemical 
sector is an industrial branch of a very heterogeneous character. Its “main activities 
consist of chemically transforming materials into diverse substances, giving them new 
physical and chemical properties. For these activities, the chemical industry employs 
raw materials from the petroleum, mining and extractive industries such as oil, 
minerals, metals and certain agricultural products”1 (EC, 1997, p. 7-1).
The importance of energy costs became critical because the chemical industry 
is an intensive energy user, mainly in the upstream basic chemicals subsector. It 
“consumes coal, oil products, natural gas and electricity, using them both as raw 
materials (feedstocks) and as fuels”. In the case of some basic chemicals, “the energy 
content can account for more than 60% of the production cost” (Ibid., p. 7-5).
The chemical industry dependence on those raw materials will influence the 
location of main plants (Kogut, 1985), affecting the balance between comparative and 
competitive advantages. Ballance (1987, p. 161) argues that “problems of shipping or 
handling can also deter local manufacture of intermediate chemicals (e.g. ethylene and 
sulphuric acid) from their raw materials”. Despite the decline of transport costs over 
the last decades, it is still a significant element in determining the location of 
processing facilities. On the other hand, the production of basic chemicals (e.g., salts, 
sulphur and hydrocarbons) may benefit from locating near user industries. Moreover, 
location near consumer markets is preferred as a consequence of the variety of end- 
uses for chemical products. Finally, most of the chemical operations are subject to 
considerable economies of scale (Ibid., p. 166).
Briefly, there are three main products segments: (1) basic chemicals, which 
include basic organic and inorganic chemicals, fertilizers, plastics in primary form and 
synthetic rubber, (2) pharmaceutical products, and (3) speciality chemicals, which 
include pesticides and other agrochemical products, paints, varnishes, soaps and 
detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations, perfumes, toilet preparations, and 
man-made fibres (EC, 1997, p. 51).
It is also possible to categorise chemical products by nature of their consumers. 
In this case there are two groups: (a) end-products, which includes a diverse set of 
products consumed by households: such as paints, varnishes, drugs, soaps, polishes,
1 The main raw materials from the mineral oil industry are naphtha, gas, oil, heavy and gaseous mineral 
oil fractions and natural gas (EC, 1997, p. 7-5).
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film and explosives, and (b) industrial products, i.e., products to be incorporated in the 
manufacturing process of other products and/or industries: such as basic chemicals, 
polymers (synthetic resins, plastics and man-made fibres), fertilizers, pesticides and 
industrial intermediates (acids and solvents) (Ballance, 1987, p. 146).
Most chemical firms are extremely large and supply a variety of products 
which include not only basic chemicals but also intermediate and end-products (the so- 
called ‘integrated’ and/or ‘diversified’ companies). Some chemical firms have moved 
downstream to produce a score of products in other industries. The opposite is also 
true, since heavy chemicals users, in industries such as textiles, steel, food and oil, 
now produce their own chemicals. At the same time, the production technologies in 
use offer many alternatives for different routes from raw materials to end-products. 
Ballance (1987, p. 146) concludes that “for all these reasons the boundaries of each 
industry are extremely blurred and make any quantitative assessment a tentative one”.
The last decade has witnessed the formation of larger groups, argued as 
necessary for the internationalisation of operations and for the implementation of 
global strategies in a worldwide basis, from a competitive perspective. More 
specifically, the major objective has been “benefit of large scale production and of the 
international division of labour in order to secure the comparative advantages in terms 
of market skills and production costs offered by the different regions of the world” 
(EC, 1997, p. 7-6).
Alongside pressures for reduction of costs, one important aspect of the 
chemical industry has been its ability to re-invent itself. The industry is said to be at 
the forefront of modem technology. It is constantly developing new and improved 
products and processes, creating and serving completely new markets. It will also 
enable other industries to become efficient and productive by the use of more effective 
substitute materials and products (Ibid., p. 7-5).
According to Grosse (1989, p. 212) this has become an important factor in the 
differentiation of firms because “not only is the industry multifaceted in terms of 
products groups, but it also is quite varied in terms of technology intensity. Some of 
the base chemicals are considered very low-tech, requiring little R&D and competing 
primarily on price and availability grounds”. The chemical industry received, indeed, 
by the OECD (1992, p. 111) the classification of medium-technology industry (such as
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motor vehicles, non-electrical machinery, and mbber & plastics). This category of 
R&D intensity (i.e., the ratio of R&D expenditures to gross output) includes industries 
that “tend to be large, traditional sectors whose output is frequently mass produced and 
is increasingly subject to international trade”.
A large share of R&D expenditures consists of basic research. However, such 
research is only the very beginning of the innovation process, because many risks are 
faced in terms of contingency and lack of internal control (Nelson, 1991). Besides this, 
there is intense competition posed by other firms, thus “commercial success or failure 
in this industry, ... , is largely a matter of what happens after a laboratory discovery” 
(Landau and Rosenberg, in Rosenberg, 1994, p. 190).
In the past, chemical companies have competed on price and on the most cost 
effective manufacturing plants, which resulted in lower prices and encouraged 
customers to see products as interchangeable. Later, technological dissemination 
contributed in turning expensive and innovative speciality products into another 
commodity. In sum, the chemical industry has been struggling against the reputation 
of having “a bad record for creating value rather than commoditising its output”2.
In fact, the chemical industry has been traditionally analysed by its cost factors, 
including: (a) labour costs and productivity, and (b) energy price and efficiency in its 
use. Considering the first factor, Europe, Japan and the US have higher wage costs and 
higher productivity, as a consequence of the substantial accumulation of capital. 
Additionally, high labour costs have helped to stimulate technological progress and 
R&D in those countries (UN, 1994a, p. 2). The labour cost (as share of production 
costs) is respectively 20 percent in Europe, 17 percent in the US, and 13 percent in 
Japan (EC, 1997, p. 7-5).
Regarding the second factor, it may said that the energy “purchased by the 
European chemical industry is about one third more expensive than in the US”. 
Moreover, the “total energy consumption has remained constant since 1985 despite an 
increase of some 40% in chemical production, which means that there has been a 
major increase in energy efficiency” (UN, 1994a, p. 3). Overall, the search for lower 
costs of production has certainly been a strategy in financing R&D expenditures.
2 Financial Times, 25 September 1997, p. 2.
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A more recent aspect of the cost structure in the chemical industry is 
environmental protection expenditures, which has been indicated as an element 
affecting the competitiveness of chemical companies. The figures available are very 
scant, but it is said that these costs are the highest in Germany. Likewise, Britain has 
quite heavy costs, and in the US “environmental costs are only 2% of turnover or half 
as much as in Germany” (UN, 1994a, p. 4).
The chemical industry has a close relationship with the economy as a whole, 
following a similar cyclical pattern. However, the fluctuation in output is especially 
great for basic chemicals, due to the “stockbuilding both in downstream customer 
sectors and within the chemical industry” (EC, 1997, p. 7-3). The chemical industry 
“is driven by cycles of international economic growth, by movements in input and 
product prices and by adjustments to industrial capacity”3.
Accordingly, during a period of economic growth, “demand rises rapidly 
because chemicals are raw materials for other manufacturing industries. Profits rise 
more rapidly than sales because most of the costs of chemical production are in the 
capital invested in manufacturing plants”4. Besides this, chemicals plants are of 
varying ages and efficiencies requiring continual improvement in technological terms. 
Consequently, much of the profit earned in the previous stage is invested into the 
building of new plants leading to a sharp rise in manufacturing capacity. The increase 
in capacity will depress prices, and threat the profitability of some of the older (less 
efficient) plants.
In opposition to this, when the economic cycle turns down, “manufacturers of 
consumer and industrial goods cut their orders of raw materials and chemicals’ 
manufacturers reduce production in response”, undermining the profitability of less 
efficient plants. Consequently, cost structure is a strategic concern in the medium- and 
long-term, as the sector is threatened by falling prices (due to overcapacity). As a 
result a chemical company “lays off employees, closes older plants, restructures 
through mergers and acquisitions and waits for economic recovery”5.
Following the same cyclical explanation “the chemical sector will remember 
1994 as the year of recovery” with “the first significant rise in product prices of the
3 Financial Times, 25 September 1997, p. 1.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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1990s and a lower cost base after the restructuring”6 during the 1991-92 recession 
period. The second half of the 1980s had witnessed a rapid expansion of chemicals 
production and trade, in which the “world gross output in chemicals grew from US$ 
744 billion to US$ 1.136 trillion”. In 1991, “chemical trade accounted for 9 percent of 
total world trade” at US$ 295 billion. Overall, the OECD countries account for over 80 
percent of production and over 85 percent of chemical trade throughout the period 
1986-91 (ILO, 1995, p. 10).
Additionally, it has been indicated by ILO (1995, p. 11) that one “factor 
tending to integrate world chemical markets is the increasingly global frame of 
reference” of many chemical TNCs. In other words, a large amount of trade in 
chemicals is intra-enterprise in nature. More specifically, in 1991 “imports of US 
parent chemical companies from their foreign affiliates amounted to US$ 10.5 billion, 
which represented 72 percent of their total imports of US$ 14.5 billion, and 44 percent 
of national chemical imports of US$ 23.9 billion”. Likewise, the US subsidiaries of 
foreign chemical companies imported goods with a value of US$ 9.8 billion, of which 
US$ 7.7 billion” (i.e. 79%), originated from their foreign parent companies. Moreover, 
this “intra-enterprise trade is complementary with foreign investment”. Therefore, new 
FDI in chemicals will cause an increase in international trade flows.
At present, Europe is regarded as a major player in the world chemical 
industry, “with half of the largest chemicals firms being European in 1994, 
representing 51.5% of the total turnover of the world’s top chemical producers” (EC, 
1997, p. 51). However, the first position in the ranking of the world’s largest chemical 
companies is held by the American company - DuPont (as illustrated in table 4.1 
below).
6 Financial Times, 20 January 1995, p. 39.
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Table 4.1 - World’s top ten chemical companies -1994
Companies Country of origin Turnover (million ECU)
E.I. du Pont de Nemours US 28,707
Hoechst Germany 25,812
BASF Germany 22,711
Bayer Germany 22,579
Dow Chemical US 16,878
Ciba-Geigy Switzerland 13,599
Rhone-Poulenc France 13,123
ICI UK 11,863
Mitsubishi Chemical Japan 11,056
Akzo Nobel Holland 10,299
Source: Adapted from EC, 1997, p. 51.
More specifically, Europe is a global leader in chemicals because seven of the 
world’s ten largest chemical companies are European-based. Moreover, the world’s 
top thirty chemicals companies - of which eighteen have their headquarters in Western 
Europe - account for 28 percent of world chemical turnover (EC, 1997, p. 7-6).
However, whilst European, American and Japanese producers have been 
cutting a quarter of their workforce and reducing capacity, their new competitors in 
Asia have been building new plants. Therefore, there is the prospect of “another period 
of selling low technology products into crowded markets”7. For example, in bulk 
chemicals companies need to run plants close to 95 percent of production capacity to 
be profitable. But, from 1990 to 1994, “they were running nearer to 80 percent, leading 
to rock-bottom prices as producers fought for market share”8.
The competition from Asia’s exports will bring a fundamental change to the 
global structure of the commodities chemical industry. Markets are static within the 
mature economies, and most of the products are based on technology (out of patent 
protection) discovered in the 1950s and 1960s. Consequently, producers will rely 
heavily on volume growth to raise turnover9.
Another alternative is to switch to speciality chemicals, since the prices are less 
susceptible to overcapacity, the profit margins are generally better than in bulk 
chemicals and demand is still rising. In reality, it has resulted in the recent creation of
7 Financial Times, Survey, 27 October 1995, p. I.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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large chemicals businesses which intend to exclusively concentrate on this sector10. It 
is interesting to note that most of the large speciality groups have come into existence 
as a result of intense mergers and acquisitions11 in the period 1994-95. More 
specifically, in the early 1990s, “many companies tried to disinvest from non-core 
businesses they had acquired in the 1980s”. More recently, a number of European 
companies “were strengthening their core businesses through acquisitions and joint 
ventures, although this has been less the case in France and Germany” (EC, 1997, p. 7- 
6).
In addition to this, the demand for speciality chemicals is growing rapidly in 
Asia under fierce price competition because there is no technological barrier for local 
producers (to manufacture food additives, hair shampoos, etc.). Consequently, there 
are many local producers of agrochemicals. Besides this, American and European 
producers tend to have higher costs, and to claim that widespread dumping is 
depressing profits in Asia12. It is rarely mentioned however, how specific trade-offs are 
handled; “the growing markets are in Asia and the lowest labour and environmental 
costs are there as well”13. In such a case, high cost in the transportation of raw 
materials may be compensated by low labour and environmental costs.
Moreover, the standardization of product specifications “is forcing competitors 
to face each other out in every market in the world, or lose out altogether”14. Since 
demand and prices are suffering in the battle for market share, developments that 
affect the global industry are far more important than the state of a single economy.
Nevertheless, it is estimated that US$ 100 billion is being spent, from 1995 to 
2000, worldwide on new chemical plants, of which roughly half will be concentrated 
in the Asia-Pacific region15. There is also a significant degree of development in the 
Middle East, partly as a result of the strong financial position of the large chemicals 
companies. In the case of ethylene production another region with significant
10 Financial Times, 25 September 1997, p. 2.
11 For example, Clariant and Ciba are the result of spin-offs and mergers, and ICI sold its titanium 
dioxide and polyester businesses to DuPont for US$ 3 billion to acquire speciality businesses (Financial 
Times, 8 February 1997, p. 5).
12 Financial Times, Survey, 27 October 1995, p. I.
13 Financial Times, Survey, 25 September 1997, p. 4.
14 Financial Times, 14 April 1997, p. 8.
15 Financial Times, 3 April 1997, p. 4.
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expansion is South America where “capacity will increase 34.7 percent over the next 
four years, from 4.6 million tonnes/year to 6.2 million tonnes”16.
After the slowdown in the early 1990s the large chemical companies “have 
benefited from stronger demand, and have had the financial strength to consider 
expansion opportunities away from their main production bases in Europe and North 
America”17. However, the main consequence of this trend is over-supply, lower prices 
and damage to profits when the chemical plants were activated.
It was expected that producers would try to hold on to their market share in 
1997 and 1998 by undercutting price in many chemicals (such as polyurethane, 
acrylics, polypropylene and even ethylene). Although the scale of the oversupply will 
vary regionally, its effects will be global18. The expansion in the Middle East, and 
mainly in Asia, has an interest in establishing a market share, rather than achieving 
profits. Consequently, local production will remove the opportunity for western 
companies to export spare production to Asia. Moreover, production in Asia is 
damaging profit margins closer to home, because the Asian competitors are not only 
producing bulk products and standard chemicals, but also organic intermediates, 
pharmaceutical chemicals, and dyes and vitamins. Besides this, these competitors are 
coming to Europe through imports and direct investments (EC, 1997, p. 7-5).
Indeed, experts anticipate “a dramatic increase in the share of Southern and 
Eastern Asia (excluding Japan) in the global chemicals market (EC, 1997, p. 7-4). But, 
it is still evident that “Europe is the world’s largest geographic sector for chemicals 
with more than one third of global chemical production sitting within European 
borders” (UN, 1994a, p. 11). However, it has decreased from 32 percent in 1992 to 29 
percent in 1994 (see table 4.2 below). The explanations are based on higher energy 
costs, poorly developed and fragmented transport infrastructure, heavy taxation, and 
finally high labour costs in Europe (Ibid., pp. 12-14).
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Financial Times, 7 January 1997, p. 4.
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Table 4.2 - Geographic breakdown of world turnover on chemicals
1994
Area Participation (%)
European Union 29.0
USA 26.0
Japan 18.0
Asia(*) 11.0
Central and Eastern Europe(*) 5.0
Latin America(*) 4.0
EFTA 3.0
Other(*) 4.0
Source: Adapted from EC (1997, p. 7-4). Note: areas marked by (*) are estimates.
Another explanation for such a decrease in participation comes from the lower 
investment/turnover ratio in Europe when compared to the US and Japan. In the last 
few years, “investment has been stable at around 8% of turnover in the US, whereas it 
has declined dramatically in Japan to about 6% of turnover” (from 10% in 1990). In 
Europe, “chemical industry investment has been declining since the 1990 peak, from 
7% to less than 5% of turnover” (EC, 1997, p. 7-4).
Regarding future actions, the chemical industry will continue with its 
restructuring plans, which includes the reduction of the workforce, the shutting down 
of the least efficient plants in order to avoid structural overcapacity and the exchange 
of assets, mergers and joint ventures (UN, 1994a, p. 37).
4.1.1.2 - Overview of selected segments
The agrochemical segment of the industry includes the manufacture of 
insecticides, rodent killers, fungicides, herbicides, plant growth control products, as 
well as biological products designed to protect plants against diseases and parasites. 
On a worldwide basis, “cereals accounted for almost 20% of agrochemical use, 
whereas fruit and wines, maize, and cotton accounted each for nearly 10%” (EC, 1997, 
p. 7-25).
The implementation in 1990 of the ‘common agricultural policy’ in Europe has 
diminished the demand for agrochemicals. Consequently, the European portion of the
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world market (see table 4.3 below) has declined considerably. At the same time, 
American and Japanese groups are strengthening their position in Europe19 attracted 
by the potential prospects of East European markets (Ibid., p. 7-26).
Table 4.3 - Agrochemicals - world sales by area and product -1994
(million ECU) Herbicides Insecticides Fungicides Other Total
North America 5,460 1,825 610 405 8,300
Western Europe 3,020 1,175 1,935 590 6,720
Japan 1,475 1,600 1,535 90 4,700
Latin America 1,450 825 540 115 2,930
Far East 850 1,315 490 60 2,715
Eastern Europe 365 380 180 30 955
Others 375 990 130 10 1,505
Total 12,995 8,110 5,420 1,300 27,825
Source: Adapted from EC (1997. p. 7-26).
More specifically, demand for agrochemicals is closely linked to shifting 
dynamics within the agricultural sector. It is also affected by legal, economic or even 
environmental constraints. For example, climatic conditions favour the proliferation of 
parasites and insects influencing the demand for chemical products in agriculture. 
Finally, variances in labour costs can generate different demands among countries 
(e.g., herbicides are intensively used in countries with higher labour costs) (EC, 1997, 
p. 7-25).
Another relevant aspect of this segment is that R&D expenditures define 
competitiveness. Moreover, R&D in agrochemicals is responding to changes in 
agricultural practices and increasing environmental pressures. As such, the R&D costs 
in the top twenty world companies represent nearly 10 percent of their turnover in the 
sector. One of the main lines of research in agrochemicals is the development of 
products that are less endangering to the environment. Consequently, alternative 
products are becoming available as the result of biotechnological development (Ibid., 
p. 7-26).
In other words, progress in biotechnology may produce major changes in the 
market in the medium future. It is supposed that the market of plant/herbicide pairs (an 
activity not yet widespread) will affect the “structure of the sector since it will
19 For example, DowElanco has launched an investment programme in France and Germany, while 
DuPont is opening a research centre in Europe (EC, 1997, p. 7-26).
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facilitate the rapprochement of seed producers and agrochemical producers”20. 
Therefore, “transgenic crops could radically reshape the agrochemical market, shifting 
~ demand in favour of selected herbicides and slashing the use of chemical insecticides 
and fungicides” (Ibid.).
This segment of the chemical industry is relatively concentrated with the top 
twelve companies (from the US, Europe and Japan) controlling more than 80 percent 
of the world market. Accordingly, the five leading European companies - BASF, Ciba- 
Geigy, AgroEvo, Zeneca and Bayer - are also among the six leading world 
manufacturers. Furthermore, the favourable market prospects in Asia, especially in 
China21, and in Eastern Europe have motivated European producers to invest in these 
countries (Ibid., p. 7-27).
Moreover, the agrochemical industry is faced with changing technology and 
intensifying cost pressures. At present, technology is moving towards genetically 
engineered plants that will be more resistant (to disease, insects, drought, pollution and 
herbicides). Therefore, large agrochemical companies are investing billions “in small 
and medium sized biotechnology companies in the hope of accelerating their own 
transformation into life sciences companies”22. After acquiring control of the 
appropriate biotechnology, these companies can use their distribution capabilities to 
market the new technology more quickly.
This trend towards transgenic crops is unstoppable, though companies will 
have to become more sensitive to consumer attitudes, particularly in Europe. 
Therefore, the wave of biotechnology acquisitions has been largely driven by 
defensive reasons, namely, to stop competitors from gaining access to those 
technologies23.
20 However, the recent alliance between Zeneca (British company) and Monsanto (American company) 
has also resulted from weak demand, intensification of competition, and increased costs of R&D and 
registration (EC, 1997, p. 7-26).
21 More specifically, Zeneca has resulted from the ICI demerger, while AgroEvo is a joint venture 
created by the Hoechst and Schering groups in 1994. AgrEvo has been established in China since 1994, 
and has bought a firm in South Korea and Zeneca has joint venture projects in China for the 
construction of agrochemical plants (EC, 1997, p. 7-27).
22 In 1997, Monsanto acquired Calgene a pioneer in fruit and vegetable research. In 1996, AgrEvo 
bought a 75% stake in Plant Genetic Systems in Benelux (for US$ 550 million). Finally, in 1997 DuPont 
acquired a 20% stake in Pioneer Hi-Bred International in the US (for US$ 1.7 billion) (Financial Times, 
25 September 1997, p. 5).
23 Ibid.
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In conclusion, it is estimated that in 1996 the world agrochemical market grew 
by 3.6 percent to £ 31.3 billion24. More specifically, the restructuration included the 
reduction of workforce and distribution costs (by transferring responsibility to the 
hands of specialist companies25). However, the recovery of recent years is much more 
a result of factors outside the industry’s control, such as robust commodity prices and 
relatively good weather.
The segment of speciality (or industrial chemicals) includes a variety of 
heterogeneous products (e.g., explosives, glues and gelatins, essential oils, 
photographic chemical material, prepared unrecorded media, etc.), which have 
applicability in a number of industrial and household uses. Despite the intense 
competition, the prospect for industrial chemicals is still favourable. However, R&D 
expenditures will become increasingly important in order to retain or expand market 
shares. This includes the development of environmentally-friendly products since 
demand is expected to grow (EC, 1997, p. 7-59).
There are differences between the industrial and end-user markets in the 
chemical industry. As a result of this, the manufacturers of speciality have to meet the 
specifications of particular clients in a niche, which requires a service-oriented market 
approach and an excellent understanding of the clients’ products or production 
process. Consequently, this customised approach provides opportunities for higher 
profit margins (Ibid.).
It is relevant to note the lack of data on production and consumption, due to the 
variety of products in the speciality segment. Furthermore, a large part of these 
products are manufactured mainly by independent companies owned by TNCs, a 
specific group of TNCs and their regional and/or local subsidiaries. Despite the 
production concentration in the hands of TNCs, there are a multitude of small MNCs 
operating in niche markets within the industry. The complexity of this segment is 
enhanced “by the fact that vertical integration activities have made the market less 
transparent” (Ibid., p. 7-60).
24 Ibid.
25 This is mainly because the marketing of agrochemicals is expensive, accounting for approximately 20 
percent of sales revenues. Agrochemicals are sold to a diverse, conservative and cost-conscious market 
(Ibid.).
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4.1.2 - Brazilian chemical industry
The main chemical producers in Latin America are located in Brazil, Mexico 
and Argentina, and they have shown a quite distinct performance when compared to 
the industry worldwide. According to an ILO’s report (1995, p. 17) “Latin America’s 
gross output in chemicals stagnated during the mid-eighties”, while it expanded 
rapidly in the rest of the world. In this period “the region’s share of world chemical 
output diminished from almost 7 percent in 1985 to 5.6 percent in 1987”. However, 
from 1988 the chemical production of the region began to accelerate and grew until 
1990, reaching US$ 67.2 billion, at a rate similar to the rest of the world’s chemical 
industries. Consequently, the relative position of Latin America in the world chemical 
industry remained stable, and “exports increased between 1986 and 1991, from US$
3.6 billion to more than US$ 7 billion”, raising the exports share in the total chemical 
production.
Further to this, there are two new and inter-related issues affecting the 
chemical industry in the region. First, the creation of the trading bloc (that is, 
Mercosur), which may increase opportunities for new investments and trade patterns, 
despite the asymmetry in economic potential between the bigger (i.e., Brazil and 
Argentina) and the smaller members (i.e., Paraguay and Uruguay). Second, is the 
process of privatization and deregulation started in early 90s. For example, Brazil, 
which is said to have the largest and most developed chemical industry in Latin 
America, has privatized its highly fragmented petrochemical production (ILO, 1995, 
p. 17).
More specifically, the oil and gas exploration, and petroleum refining are still 
managed by Petrobras27. But state participation in the second phase of the production 
chain (that is, the manufacturing of basic chemicals and fertilizers) was privatized. 
This segment concentrated on three state companies (i.e., Copene, Petroqmmica 
Uniao and Copesul), which were acquired by private domestic groups. Consequently,
26 Petrobras remains a state-owned oil company which supplies much of the naphtha used as feedstock 
by the downstream industry (ILO, 1995, p. 17).
27 Based on a deregulatory law from August 1997, foreign companies will acquire a stake in oil 
exploration and production through joint ventures with Petrobras. The opening of this sector is based on 
the following aspects: (a) domestic production represents only 55% of the economy’s demand (1 million 
barrels a day), and (b) oil imports have generated annual trade deficits from US$ 6 to US$ 11 billion in 
recent years (Financial Times, 2 December 1997, p. 9).
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the second and third stages of chemicals manufacturing are now dominated by private 
companies. In such a context, foreign capital is concentrated in the petrochemical 
complexes of Sao Paulo state, and domestic capital in the petrochemical complexes of 
Cama9ari (Bahia state) and Triunfo (Rio Grande do Sul state).
The recent privatization in Brazil had no impact on the relative participation of 
foreign firms within the chemical sector28 (see table 4.4 below for an overview). 
Moreover, the changes in the capital composition of the industry29 had no influence 
over TNCs predominance in some segments (mainly those technologically and capital 
intensive) of the industry (such as agrochemicals, specialities, paint and varnishes, 
etc.).
Table 4.4 - Brazilian petrochemical and chemical industry 
participation per origin of capital*
Industrial sectors Domestic % Foreign % State %
Petrochemical & chemical
1995
14
1996
16
1995
22
1996
17
1995
64
1996
67
Source: Exame, ‘Melhores e Maiores’, July 1997, p. 11.
Note: * Share based on total sales o f the 20 biggest companies.
An important aspect of the Brazilian chemical industry is the lack of 
competitiveness of the domestic companies (which operate with one or few plants). 
These companies are dependent on technology, and in some cases equipment, from 
foreign groups (BNDES, 1988, pp. 82-83), which increases their vulnerability in face 
of foreign competitors operating in the country. Grosse (1989, p. 209) states that “the 
world’s twenty largest chemical producers have subsidiaries in Latin America, with 
concentrations in the largest markets”. Consequently, Brazil is no exception in such a 
phenomenon, with a very high level of concentration (similar to the concentration in 
the world chemical market).
28 There was very little foreign interest in the early privatization (Financial Times, 16 July 1990). A 
more recent study by KPMG (consultancy firm) says that foreigner investors are not acquiring Brazilian 
companies because o f their environmental liabilities, which represent financial- and image-related risks 
(Folha de S.Paulo, 1 June 1997, C-2, p. 2).
29 Based on the ‘list o f the 500 largest companies in Brazil’, it is possible to confirm the acquisition of 
major state-owned petrochemical and chemical companies by private domestic groups (Conjuntura 
Economica, August 1995, pp. 21-31).
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According to the BNDES (1988, p. 81) foreign companies hold no less than 40 
percent of the aggregated value of the Brazilian chemical market30, which is evidence 
of their capacity in the technological development of products and processes. There is 
also a great difference between the size of foreign and domestic chemical companies. 
Besides this, the Brazilian subsidiaries have access to the outcome of high investment 
in R&D. Consequently, these companies are usually multi-divisional, operating with 
local and international linkages throughout the productive chain.
It is recognized that TNCs “generally overshadow local competitors in the 
segments that they serve in any Latin American market”. The major exception in 
Brazil remains the petrochemical division of the state-owned oil company (Petrobras), 
which constitutes a major competitor in the region. Following the logic of large-scale 
economies, the TNCs’ production of many products tends to be centralized, which is 
usually concentrated in the home market. Therefore, “much of the sales that do occur 
in Latin American markets come from imported chemicals” (Grosse, 1989, p. 210).
This reality is particularly evident in the speciality chemicals segment. 
Considering that this segment is more intensive in R&D, foreign capital accounts for 
approximately 80 percent of the Brazilian market. Furthermore, foreign companies 
dominate the agrochemicals sector31, which has been described as an oligopoly. It is 
composed of the major world producers following a strategy of diversification based 
on technology. In Brazil there are subsidiaries of Dow, AgroEvo, Bayer, Novartis, 
Monsanto, Zeneca, BASF, DuPont and Akzo Nobel, accounting for more than 50 
percent of the total internal offers of agricultural products.
The dynamics of the Brazilian chemical sector are quite different from the 
world industry. Grosse (1989, p. 209) affirms that the industry itself may be best 
viewed “as a set of company groups, with relatively infrequent competition between 
competitors” in more than one of the following groups: commodity chemicals, 
industrial chemicals, fertilizers, pesticides, and plastics. The common aspect among
30 An estimated market o f approximately US$ 9 billion (including fertilizers and gases) in late 80s 
(Grosse, 1989).
31 The Brazilian association of agrochemicals producers (ANDEF), which represents 90% of Brazilian 
production, reported a revenue of US$ 1.86 billion in 1997 (21% increase compared to 1996). 
Accordingly, herbicides accounted for US$ 1 billion (54% of total), fungicides for US$ 342.5 million 
(29.7%), insecticides for US 382.5 million (24.7%), and other products totalled US$ 135 million 
(Manchete Rural, no. 130, Abril 1998, p. 32).
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“these businesses is a dependence on chemistry as the key technology underpinning 
the products”, of which most of the chemicals are petroleum- or natural-gas-based.
The increase of FDI in the Brazilian chemical industry was “dependent 
primarily on the growth of the huge national market”, even during the 1980s’ recession 
(Grosse, 1989, p. 213). However, data segregating private and foreign investment and 
sales in the distinct chemical segments is quite scarce. The table 4.5 illustrates FDI in 
major chemical segments.
Table 4.5 - Foreign direct investment in Brazil per segments of the chemical
industry 1994 (US$ million)
Industry segments Investments Reinvestments* Total
Chemicals 3,530 1,840 5,370
Basic chemicals 2,466 1,133 3,599
Petroleum by products 643 405 1,048
Paints, varnishes and lacquers 308 256 564
Fertilizers 113 47 160
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (position on 25 October 1994).
Note: * means new investment in current operation.
One of the reasons for scarcity of data is the absence of industry boundaries. In 
other words, it is quite complex to define the major competitors within each segment 
of the Brazilian chemical industry (as suggested by Grosse, 1989). The difficulty 
emerges from the fact that there are firms that have diversified into chemicals, that are 
classified in other industries and/or operating as conglomerates (e.g., oil firms such as 
Shell and Exxon are very active throughout Latin America). The core chemicals 
companies may also compete in some categories of products but not in all products 
within one category.
For example, in agricultural chemicals Zeneca, BASF and DuPont compete in 
the herbicides market; and Zeneca and DuPont compete in insecticides; however the 
competition in biocides is between BASF and Zeneca32. This would become more 
complex if other categories of products manufactured by the Brazilian subsidiaries 
were included. Moreover, there is a lack of reliable data (as well as disclosure) on the 
market share of diversified chemical companies in distinct segments. The data
32 Anuario das Industrias de Quimica Fina do Brasil, 1995, ABIFINA.
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available is usually present in aggregated form, ranking the major companies (as in 
table 4.6 below).
Table 4.6 - Ranking* of top twenty companies in the Brazilian
chemical industry** -1996
Company Sales 
US$ million
Industrial segment Origin of the 
capital
1 - Petrobras 23,584.7 petrochemical/chemical Brazilian state
2 - Copene 1,345.3 petrochemical/chemical Brazilian
3 - BASF 1,247.8 diversified German
4 - Trikem 737.6 petrochemical Brazilian
5 - Copesul 724.4 petrochemical/chemical Brazilian
6 - Kodak Brasileira 689.8 diversified American
7 - White Martins 668.4 chemical/gases Brazilian
8 - Bayer 634.6 diversified German
9 - Du Pont 619.3 diversified American
10- Rhodia 612.5 diversified French
11-3M 559.3 speciality American
12- Tintas Coral 489.5 paints English
13- Petroqufmica Uniao 477.4 petrochemical Brazilian
14- Hoechst 463.2 diversified German
15- Solvay 440.7 petrochemical Belgium
16- Ultrafertil 437.2 fertilizers Brazilian
17- Man ah 411.3 fertilizers Brazilian
18- Novartis 408.0 diversified Swiss
19- Polibrasil 379.4 chemicals Brazilian
20- OPP 375.4 polyethylene Brazilian
Total+ 35,305.8
Source: Adapted from Exame, ‘Melhores e Maiores’, July 1997, p. 192.
Notes: * Based on the companies’ classification by their gross revenue, ** Zeneca is not among the top 
twenty, but has the fifth position (with revenue of US$ 251 million in 1996) among the top British 
companies in Brazil (Exame, ‘Melhores e Maiores’, 1997, p. 95), + total of sales of top twenty 
companies.
According to ABIQUIM33 the chemical industry had a net income of 
approximately US$ 24 billion (including the petrochemical sector) in 1994, which 
represents 2 percent of the Brazilian GNP. Moreover, exports reached US$ 1.6 billion 
in 1994, compared to US$ 1.3 billion in 1993, and imports reached US$ 1.3 billion in 
1994. However, the period from 1991 until mid-1994 is characterized as recessive, 
during which companies adjusted to the greater openness of the economy with the
33 ABIQUIM is the Brazilian chemical industries association founded in 1964. It now has 215 members 
responsible for 90% of the national production in this sector (Gutberlet, 1996, p. 84).
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reduction of import tariffs. These economical changes in Brazil have coincided with 
the recession in the US, Europe and Japan resulting in an offer surplus in the 
international market. The table 4.7 shows the segments for which the association holds 
statistics34, representative of US$ 11.8 billion of the industry’s total sales.
Table 4.7 - Sales at the chemical sector - selected groups of products* -1994
Group of products Domestic market External market Export -
(US$ million) (US$ million) Import
Inorganic 1,253.9 50.6 (142.6)
Fertilizers intermediates 1,259.2 21.1 (335.1)
Basic organics 1,400.4 434.5 (19.4)
Thermoplastic resins 2,150.1 488.2 277.1
Other organics 1,230.6 211.2 93.8
Plastic intermediates 740.8 100.3 (3.8)
Fibers intermediates 557.8 55.2 7.7
Elastomers 265.9 82.0 19.1
Thermofixed intermediates 339.9 10.4 (30.2)
Plastifiers intermediates 291.4 54.7 24.8
Paints and organic pigments 262.2 27.2 (66.8)
Solvents 191.5 53.9 22.7
Detergents Intermediates 153.1 17.1 9.5
Agriculture intermediates 59.6 25.7 13.2
Total 10,152.4 1,632.2 (129.7)
Source: Conjuntura Economica, August 1995, p. 48.
Note: * there is no data available for segments such as: paint and varnish, fine chemical and specialties, 
soap, detergents, cosmetics and perfume, agrochemical, artificial and synthetic fibers and fertilizers.
Consequently, Brazilian exports of chemical products are concentrated in the 
basic stages of petrochemical manufacturing, thus these products are intensive in the 
natural resource petroleum. Other export products are also intensive in natural 
resources from the agriculture and forest industries (BNDES, 1993, pp. 22-23). Apart 
from this, the OECD (1992, p. 71) confirms that most of its chemical exports to the 
newly-industrialising economies (such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Brazil and Mexico) are constituted by speciality chemicals. These countries 
account for 8 percent of total OECD chemicals exports, and 28 percent of OECD 
exports of chemicals to non-OECD countries. Altogether this confirms the Brazilian 
dependence on more technologically intensive products.
34 These analyses of industrial sectors are not made on a systematic basis, therefore, there is no data for 
1995 onwards (Conjuntura Economica, August 1995, pp. 47-49).
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4.2 - Profile of the companies
A profile of the selected companies will be outlined in this section, which 
includes both corporate and subsidiary levels.
4.2.1 - Corporate overview
Firstly, the Zeneca Group will be described, which is the smallest and most 
recently created company of the three selected cases. In brief, ICI (British chemical 
company) demerged its pharmaceuticals and agrochemical units in 199335 creating a 
new company called Zeneca. It was suggested (by the media) that ‘financial logic’ was 
just one of the factors justifying disinvestments, because the ‘industrial logic’ was 
equally important. In the ICI-Zeneca case, the different businesses had nothing in 
common. Therefore, Zeneca concentrated on pharmaceutical and agrochemical and ICI 
on organic and inorganic chemicals36.
The ICI-Zeneca demerger therefore “allowed the manager of its pharmaceutical 
business to escape from under the shadow of the older, cyclical chemicals business” . 
The Zeneca Group concentrates on bioscience business, including R&D of 
pharmaceuticals, health care, agrochemicals and specialties. In April 1995, the 
company completed the acquisition of 50 percent of Salick Health Care, which with 
Stuart Disease Management Services forms the health care business in the US 
(Zeneca, 1995). The tables below shows an overview of Zeneca, its main business and 
the geographical scope of its activities (which are clearly out of the home country).
Table 4.8 - Corporate worldwide overview - Zeneca
1993 1994 1995 1996
Turnover (£m) 4,440 4,480 4,898 5,363
Net income (£m) 431 443 336 543
Number of Employees 32,300 30,800 31,400 31,100
Source: Zeneca Annual Report and Accounts, 1995 and 1996.
35 Financial Times, 6 March 1996, p. 17.
36 Financial Times, 10 February 1996, p. 18.
37 See Owen, G. and Harrison, T. (1995) for a comprehensive analysis of why ICI decided to demerge.
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Table 4.9 - Worldwide sales per business division
Zeneca -1996
Activity %
Pharmaceuticals 49
Agrochemicals 32
Specialties 17
Healthcare 2
Total 100
Source: Zeneca, Annual Report, 1996.
Table 4.10 - Worldwide sales per geographical area
Zeneca -1996
Area % o f total
United Kingdom 9
Europe 27
Americas 48
Asia, Africa & Australasia 16
Total 100
Source: Zeneca, Annual Report, 1996.
In Britain Zeneca is the third biggest pharmaceutical company (with exports in 
1995 of nearly £ 2 billion). Moreover, the pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals business 
are both said to have strong R&D pipelines containing innovative products. The 
corporation states that Zeneca is one of the world’s top five agrochemical companies 
(Zeneca, 1997). This is the Groups second biggest business area within which the 
major products are distributed, as follows: 54% herbicides, 20% insecticides, 10% 
fungicides, 9% seeds and 7% miscellaneous. The corporation stated that the demerger 
was successful for this segment because performance of agrochemicals was better in 
1995, than in 1994. Finally, Zeneca operates through 207 subsidiary companies, with 
manufacturing in 25 countries and products sold in over 100 countries worldwide 
(Zeneca, 1995, p. 67).
The second selected company - E.I. Du Pont de Neumours - is not only the 
biggest American-based chemical company, but also the world’s largest (EC, 1997, p. 
51; DuPont, 1996). The Group is organized into five business segments, as follows: 
petroleum, fibers, polymers, chemicals, and diversified businesses. It was founded in 
1802 by a Frenchman as a gunpowder plant (known as DuPont) in Delaware. The plant
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grew quickly and benefited from government contracts during the War of 1812 and 
later during the Mexican-American War (in late 1840s)38.
Additionally, DuPont added the manufacturing of dynamite and nitroglycerin 
(1880) and introduced guncotton (1898) and smokeless powder (1894). In 1903, the 
new owners instituted a centralized structure with functionally organized 
departments39, an innovation widely adopted by large companies. By 1906 DuPont 
controlled 70 percent of the US explosives market. Later the company was forced to 
divest of a part of the powder business (due to antitrust legislation). However the 
earnings gained from the First World War were used to diversify into paints, plastics 
and dyes businesses. In short, DuPont’s long list of inventions includes neoprene 
synthetic rubber (1931), Lucite (1937), nylon (1938), Teflon (1938), Orion and 
Dacron.
Conoco (former Continental Oil) was acquired in 1981. A partnership between 
DuPont and Merck began in 1991 through an independent drug company (DuPont 
Merck Pharmaceutical) to focus on non-US markets. Finally, DuPont has completed 
an agreement to acquire large parts of ICI (British company) industrial chemical 
business40. Overall, the company operates 200 manufacturing and processing facilities 
in 40 countries worldwide (DuPont, 1996). The tables below illustrate DuPont’s 
figures, business areas and geographical scope of activities (which are concentrated in 
the US market).
Table 4.11 - Corporate worldwide overview - DuPont
1993 1994 1995 1996
Sales ($m) 37,098 39,333 42,163 43,810
Net income ($m) 566 2,727 3,293 3,636
No. of Employees 114,000 107,000 105,000 97,000
Source: DuPont, Annual Report, 1995, 1996.
38 Hoover’s Handbook of American Business 1997, p. 521.
39 See Chandler (1994, pp. 76-77) for a detailed account.
40 Most interesting is that the tioxide business (i.e., pigments) has faced environmental problems in one 
of the British plants because of a toxic gas leak. However, the transaction (completed in 1998) includes 
polyester films, resins and intermediates, along with the white pigments operations in Europe, Asia and 
Africa (Wall Street Journal, 14 July 1997, p. 3).
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Table 4.12 - Worldwide sales per business division
DuPont -1996
Activity %
Petroleum 47
Fibers 16
Polymers 15
Chemicals 9
Other businesses* 7
Life sciences 6
Total 100
Source: DuPont, Annual Report, 1996.
Note: * include agricultural herbicides and insecticides, 
electronic materials, medical products, printing and publishing 
products, and safety and environmental services.
Table 4.13 - Worldwide sales per geographical area
DuPont -1996
Area % o f total
US 52
Europe 37
Other regions 11
Total 100
Source: DuPont, Annual Report, 1996.
The last selected case is BASF, which is the world’s third largest chemical 
manufacturer (EC, 1997, p. 51). The German conglomerate has five business areas, as 
follows: oil and gas, chemicals, health and nutrition, plastics and fibers, colorants and 
finishing products (BASF, 1996). The company (originally called Badische Anilin & 
Soda Fabrik) was founded in Mannheim (Germany) in 1861, but moved to 
Ludwigshafen in 1865. BASF was a pioneer in ‘coal tar dyes’ developing a very 
successful synthetic indigo in 1897. Additionally, ammonia was synthesized in 1909 
allowing the company to enter the nitrogenous fertilizers market in 1913. BASF joined 
the I.G. Farben cartel with Bayer and Hoechst in 1925, and during the World War II 
the company developed polystyrene, PVC, and magnetic tape41.
In 1952 BASF regained its independence, beginning to rebuild its destroyed 
factories. In late 50s BASF negotiated joint ventures abroad including one with Dow 
Chemical in the US. In 1969 the German oil and gas producer Wintershall was 
acquired and BASF consequently became a leading plastics and synthetic fibers
41 Hoover’s Handbook of World Business, 1997, p. 98.
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manufacturer. In the US, the company bought Wyandotte Chemicals (1969), 
Chemetron pigments (1979) and Immont paint and ink business (1985). Despite these 
acquisitions BASF remained largely dependent on the sale of basic chemicals.
In the early 90s BASF bought another chemical company in eastern Germany. 
It also concluded an agreement with Russia’s Gazprom for natural gas, and a contract 
with France’s Elf Aquitaine for North Sea gas. In 1992 Mobil’s polystyrene-resin 
business was added, achieving almost 10 percent of the US market. In early 1994, 
BASF bought ICI’s polypropylene business becoming the second largest producer of 
this plastic in Europe. In the same year the company acquired the pharmaceutical arm 
of Boots (UK) for US$ 1.4 billion. Added to BASF’s history is that audio and video 
tapes business was sold in 1996; the drugs division, Knoll, recently diversified into the 
generic German drug market; and textile dyes expanded following the acquisition of 
Zeneca’s business worldwide. Overall, BASF has production facilities in 39 countries 
and sells its products in 170 countries worldwide (BASF, 1996). The tables below 
provide an overview of BASF Group, as well as evidence of its concentration in 
Europe42.
Table 4.14 - Corporate worldwide overview - BASF
1993 1994 1995 1996
Sales (DM million) 40,568 43,674 46,229 48,776
Net income (DM 
million)
761 1,170 2,423 2,839
Number of Employees 112,020 106,266 106,565 103,406
Source: BASF, Annual Report, 1996.
Table 4.15 - Worldwide sales per business division
BASF -1996
Activity %
Plastics & fibers 25
Colorants & finishing 23
Health & Nutrition 19
Chemicals 15
Oil & gas 11
Other 7
Total 100
Source: BASF, Annual Report, 1996.
42 The corporation states that Europe is the company’s home market (BASF, 1996).
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Table 4.16 - Worldwide sales per geographical area
BASF - 1996
Area % o f total
Europe 36.6
Germany 26.6
North America+ 19.6
Asia, Pacific and Africa 11.7
South America 5.5
Total 100
Source: BASF, Annual Report, 1996. Note: + includes Mexico.
In short, the major competitors of DuPont in the chemical and agricultural 
businesses are BASF, Bayer, Novartis, Dow, Hoechst, Imperial Chemical, Monsanto, 
Rhone-Poulenc and Union Carbide. Similarly, the worldwide competitors of BASF are 
Bayer, Novartis, Dow Chemical, DuPont, Hoechst, Monsanto, Rhone-Poulenc, Royal 
Dutch/Shell and Union Carbide. Finally, Zeneca has the following competitors for its 
agrochemicals business, DuPont, BASF, Novartis, AgroEvo, Bayer and Dow Elanco.
4.2.2 - Brazilian subsidiaries
Considering the ranking of the biggest private companies in Brazil, the selected 
cases are positioned as follows: BASF is third in the industry classification, and 42nd 
among the biggest43; DuPont is 9th in the chemical sector and 100th in the general 
ranking; and Zeneca is 29th in the chemical sector and 300th in the general ranking. 
The table 4.17 compares their sales in Brazil.
Table 4.17 - Overview of selected Brazilian subsidiaries -1996
Company Sales (US$ million) Number of employees
BASF 1,247.8 4,429
DuPont 619.3 1,132
Zeneca 251.0 494
Source: Adapted from Exame, ‘Melhores e Maiores’, July 1997, p. 192.
43 Among the 500 biggest private companies, per sales in 1996 (Exame, ‘Melhores e Maiores’, 1997).
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It is interesting to start the account of the subsidiaries with Zeneca, because it 
has provided details of the restructuration since its demerger from ICI. More 
specifically, the Brazilian subsidiary (called ‘Zeneca Brasil S.A.’) manufactures 
agrochemicals and specialties. However, there are other Zeneca independent affiliates 
in Brazil responsible for pharmaceuticals44 and specialties45. More specifically, 
‘Zeneca Brasil’ manufactures herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, com seeds, biocides 
and public health products, though the core business is agrochemicals46. These 
business are organized by two sites (Jacaref and Paulmia) in the Sao Paulo state.
In fact, the business restmcturation started prior to the demerger from ICI, 
through changes in the internal organization in 1989. It was further implemented after 
the demerger following the strategic principle of ‘focus on strong businesses’47. 
Consequently, the site of dye manufacturing (including other units of silica gel and 
formic acid48) was rationalized and transferred (including staff and equipment) to the 
Jacaref site.
Similarly, the Paulmia site was reorganized by relocating all primary chemical 
manufacturing to one unit. This site is also partly responsible (other inputs come from 
Argentina) for the chemical manufacturing of biocides49 (specialties business). 
Another specialties business subordinated to Zeneca’s subsidiary is the production of 
resins, which is made by toll-manufacturing (that is, Zeneca provides raw materials to 
be processed by another company).
In summary, since 1996, ‘Zeneca Brasil’ has essentially become concentrated 
on agricultural businesses, which includes the seeds business50 (i.e., a joint venture
44 The joint venture with Wellcome was sold to Glaxo in 1995, but the site in Cotia (Sao Paulo state) 
became ‘Zeneca Farmaceutica’.
45 That is the manufacturing of industrial chemicals for leather coating; this affiliate (called STAHL) is 
located in Portao, Rio Grande do Sul state. Additionally, the production of textile dyes was sold 
worldwide to BASF in 1996.
46 The recent trend of demergers raised discussion over the meaning of ‘core business’. It is said that this 
new logic “challenges the validity of Telatedness’ between businesses as a sufficient justification for 
inclusion in the portfolio” (Financial Times, 24 November 1995, p. 14).
47 For example, the ‘plastic films’ site located in the Bahia state (an investment of US$ 100 million) was 
sold to the Brazilian group ‘Vicunha’ because of financial problems.
48 The silica gel unit was a joint-venture with Gessy Lever (Unilever subsidiary), therefore it was sold to 
them, as well as another site producing silicate of soda (located in Sao Paulo city). The formic acid unit 
had obsolete technology, but was sold to a domestic firm.
49 These inputs are basically used in the treatment of industrial reservoirs (in the leather and painting 
industries) and in swimming pools to prevent insects.
50 Zeneca’s seeds units are located in Cravinhos (Sao Paulo state), Paracatu and Janauba (Minas Gerais 
state).
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with Royal VanderHave Group based in the Netherlands). This joint venture explicitly 
recognizes the challenge for this segment, considering that bio-technologically 
modified seeds will influence, to an increasing degree, the agrochemicals business in 
the future. This is particularly the case in Brazil where the seeds market is very 
segmented and thus highly competitive. In Brazil, agrochemicals are sold to wholesale 
companies and/or large farmers; insecticides are sold mainly to large retail companies. 
Consequently, there are contacts with final and intermediate consumers.
The main competitors in the Brazilian market of agrochemicals are: Ciba- 
Geigy51, DuPont, Bayer, BASF and Monsanto. Accordingly, the domestic market is 
shared among TNCs’ subsidiaries, in which Ciba-Geigy has the first position, Zeneca 
has the second and DuPont the third.
At ‘Zeneca Brasil’ agrochemicals represented approximately US$ 150 million 
of a total revenue of US$ 227,222 million in 1995 (ABIQUIM, 1996, p. 245). There 
are two units producing herbicides at the Paulmia site (the oldest unit started in 1982, 
and the most recent in September 1996). The herbicide is sold in the domestic market 
and exported (a small percentage) to Latin American markets (see table below for an 
overview of Zeneca’s subsidiary).
Table 4.18 - Brazilian subsidiary - Zeneca
Net Income (US$ 1,000) 1993 1994 1995
Domestic 196,098 187,375 204,494
Export 16,411 20,391 22,728
Total 212,509 207,766 227,222
1993 1994 1995
Number of employees 752 733 890
Source: ABIQUIM, 1996, p. 245. Note: this publication is updated every two years and there is no other 
reliable source.
The Brazilian subsidiary is relatively important within the Zeneca Group’s 
structure in Latin America for having a unit of primary chemical manufacturing. 
Additionally, public health products (i.e., insecticides) represent a small percentage of 
revenues although the Paulmia site is the corporation’s worldwide manufacturing
51 Swiss companies Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy merged on March 1996 creating Novartis. The new 
company is the world’s second-largest drug group, and one of the world’s biggest seed and pesticide 
producers. Thus it competes with Zeneca in the same business areas (Economist, 9 March 1996).
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center52. Consequently, the general manager of this site is the manufacturing manager 
for Latin America. He is therefore responsible for the harmonization of operational 
procedures (including SHE aspects) among the subsidiaries in Argentina, Guatemala, 
and Mexico.
With a long and stable history in Latin America53, DuPont has fewer affiliates 
in the region than most of its competitors. More specifically, there are manufacturing 
subsidiaries in the five largest markets (that is, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela 
and Colombia). These operations within Latin America are coordinated by the 
‘regional headquarters’ located in Brazil (DuPont, 1994, p. 75), which means that 
there is a corporate level in the Brazilian subsidiary. According to Grosse (1989, pp. 
218-220), DuPont’s competitive advantages in this specific region are based on: (a) 
proprietary technology, especially in synthetic fibers and industrial chemicals; (b) 
product brands (e.g. Lycra, Dacron) that are associated with high quality; (c) scale 
economies from its small number of large plants; and (d) its position as the low-cost 
producer of titanium dioxide in the world.
The Brazilian subsidiary of DuPont has operations on the following business 
areas: plastics, industrial chemical, agricultural and veterinary chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, pigments, and mining. There are three sites in Brazil, which are 
located in Paulmia (Sao Paulo state), Barra Mansa (Rio de Janeiro state), and Uberaba 
(Minas Gerais state). The table below provides an overview of DuPont’s performance 
in Brazil.
Table 4.19 - Brazilian subsidiary - DuPont
Net Income (US$ 1,000) 1993 1994 1995
Domestic 277,758 325,404 361,507
Export 1,946 1,827 3,335
Total 279,704 327,231 364,842
1993 1994 1995
Number of employees 1,274 1,184 1,155
Source: ABIQUIM, 1996, p. 124. Note: this publication is updated every two years and there is no other 
reliable source.
52 This insecticides has the same active principle of pesticides (called ‘pyrethroid’).
53 Some restructuring is expected at DuPont Group from 1997; more specifically in the oil and gas 
business in order to build its life science business (Financial Times, 14 July 1997, p. 19).
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The BASF Group is in the process of restructuration54 through acquisition 
and/or demerger (a current trend in the world industry). This restructuration has 
implications in South America, by the relocation of businesses within this region. 
More specifically, it was decided that intermediate products for the leather industry 
should be under the command of the Argentinean subsidiary due to its strong leather 
market. Similarly, agrochemicals businesses are managed by the Brazilian subsidiary 
since it has the strongest market in Latin America.
Briefly, the BASF Group has unified the chemicals, paint and resins units in 
Brazil under the control of ‘BASF S.A.’. However, there are other independent 
business55 in Brazil (e.g., graphics inks, and pharmaceuticals). The Brazilian unit 
manufacturing chemicals for use in leather was closed and the product has therefore 
been imported from Germany. There was also the acquisition of a domestic firm - 
Elastogram - manufacturing polyurethane. Overall, these changes were made in order 
to implement the corporate business strategy of worldwide concentration in three 
fields - pharmaceuticals, energy and chemical-specialties (BASF, 1996).
In short, the major BASF56 businesses in Brazil are: paints and resins, plastics, 
industrial paints, agrochemicals, chemical products, and pharmaceuticals. The largest 
segment in terms of revenue is paint and resins, second is plastics, and third is 
agrochemicals (intermediate chemical and pharmaceuticals are not representative in 
the turnover). The main sites of ‘BASF S.A.’ (i.e., the subsidiary under investigation 
which manufactures basic chemicals, agrochemicals and speciality) are located in the 
states of Pernambuco (Jaboatao), Bahia (Cama?ari), Sao Paulo (Sao Bernardo do 
Campo and Guaratingueta), Rio de Janeiro (capital) and Rio Grande do Sul (Sapucaf 
do Sul). The table below shows the performance of the Brazilian subsidiary, 
confirming that BASF is the largest subsidiary among the selected cases.
54 A BASF official said that ‘the group’s restructuring efforts outweighed losses felt from the drastic 
plunge in world prices for its petrochemical products’. Besides it is stated that BASF has plans to 
expand in natural gas and pharmaceuticals (Wall Street Journal, 13 March 1996, p. 4).
55 Accordingly, the ‘FDO’ (aromatic chemicals) and ‘Sintesia’ (chemical products) businesses were 
sold, as well as the worldwide division of audio and video tapes. Another change in BASF’s worldwide 
business is the purchase of Zeneca’s dye textile division; the Brazilian subsidiary consequently 
incorporated the Zeneca site in Brazil (in Jacaref, Sao Paulo state).
56 The Brazilian subsidiary will receive investments of approximately US$ 300 million for the period 
1997-99, in which 80 percent will be invested in Brazil. The Guaratingueta site will install a new plastic 
unit (US$ 5 million), the Sao Bernardo do Campo site will modernize the manufacturing of paints and 
varnishes (US$ 21 million), and finally the pharmaceutical site of Knoll in Rio will be expanded and 
modernized (US$ 30 million) (Gazeta Mercantil, 28 November 1996, p. C-4).
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Table 4.20 - Brazilian subsidiary - BASF
Net Income (US$ 1,000) 1993 1994 1995
Domestic 225,250 505,375 784,743
Export 31,655 42,690 67,333
Total 286,905 548,065 852,076
1993 1994 1995
Number of employees 2,577 4,825 4,503
Source: ABIQUIM, 1996, pp. 71-72. Note: this publication is updated every two years and there is no 
other reliable source.
The BASF subsidiary57 has increased its income, but it registered a net loss for 
the late years. Nevertheless, it is the fastest growing chemical company in Brazil, with 
an increase of 20 percent in the 1996 income. This latter aspect is the main reason for 
recent increases in capital and the business restructuration58. This included the creation 
of a regional headquarters and changes in the board of director for South America. 
Consequently, the Brazilian subsidiary’s CEO is responsible for South America 
(coordinating 16 affiliates), since the regional headquarters were created in 1996. Until 
1992, the Brazilian corporate level was responsible for Argentina, Paraguay and Chile 
(so-called South Cone) however from 1996 the subsidiary has also coordinated 
operations in Venezuela, Colombia, Equator and Peru.
4.3 - Industry-specific explanations
This section aims to address the major environmental issues surrounding the 
chemical industry and consequently the responses taken to minimize its impacts on the 
environment. Finally, the empirical results from the selected cases are presented with a 
focus on industry-specific aspects (which are mainly regulatory and economic issues).
57 Gazeta Mercantil, 28 November 1996, p. C-4.
58 The BASF Group has stated that the regional trading bloc (Mercosur) required a new structure in the 
region. The Group’s sales in the ‘South Cone’ totalled US$ 1.28 billion in 1994, in which Brazil 
accounts for 77.3% and Argentina for 14.9% (Qufmica e Derivados, June, 1995, p. 40).
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4.3.1 - Environmental impacts and liabilities
4.3.1.1 - Environmental impacts caused by the chemical industry
There is little debate within the world chemical industry on the fact that strong 
environmental performance is critical to its success (Evan, 1974; Vaugham and 
Mickle, 1993; Arora and Cason, 1996). More specifically, there is evidence throughout 
the industry that more money, time and effort is being put into improving
environmental performance (UN, 1994a, p. 14). In addition to these investments, there 
is a strong commitment towards the Responsible Care (RC) initiative throughout 
chemical industries’ associations at national and international levels (ICCA, 1996; 
CMA, 1996; VCI, 1996; CEFIC, 1995; CIA, 1995).
The chemical industry’s environmental problems may be “separated into the 
pollution caused during the production process, and the downstream pollution that 
occurs during consumption and disposal of the industry’s final products” (EC, 1997, p. 
7-7). In general, the major environmental issues in this sector include risk 
management, health and safety, accidents and emergency response, and safe
distribution procedures (UNEP, 1994). Consequently, the industry’s priority has been 
placed into responses (basically through environmental disclosure) to stakeholders 
concerned with those issues.
However, according to UNEP (1994, p. 57), efforts should be concentrated on 
product stewardship and plastics recycling59 and the phase-out of environmentally 
harmful products such as CFCs60 and agrochemicals. For example, the use of 
agrochemicals is critical because “these substances can accumulate in the ground and 
in living organisms and their residues can affect water resources”. Therefore, a 
revision is expected of the European directives on the quality of ground and drinking 
water (fixing maximum limits on the concentration of some substances in water)
which has a major impact on the use of agrochemicals (EC, 1997, p. 7-27).
59 DuPont has created a service for recycling polyester waste which started to be commercialized in 
1996. The process was approved by the FDA in the US, consequently it may be used in food packaging 
after recycling (DuPont, 1996, p. 10).
60 DuPont claimed the cessation of CFC production for sale in developed countries while introducing 
alternative products (DuPont, 1995, p .l).
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Additionally, reduction in the use of pesticides61 within the EU (until the year 2000) is 
currently under discussion.
Moreover, it is necessary to explain how chemical companies are reducing 
their contribution to global environmental imperatives (i.e., climate change, ozone 
depletion and export of hazardous wastes62). For example, chemical companies are 
both producers and consumers of CFCs. They are also responsible for carbon dioxide 
emissions via the use of fossil fuels as intermediate and final consumers of energy, and 
emissions of nitrogenous oxides and ozone (e.g., production of nitrogenous fertilizers). 
In sum, these issues indicate the chemical industry’s direct involvement in global 
environmental issues.
International agreements regarding global environmental issues consequently 
have major implications for this industry. For example, the 1987 Montreal Protocol 
gave the developing world until 2010 to phase out ozone-depleting substances, but 
required industrialized countries to cease production in January 1996 (ELO, 1995, p. 
27). Any change in this treaty “would have important implications for both the 
chemical industry, which has already developed substitutes for most of the ozone- 
depleting substances, as well as businesses which either own or make equipment that 
uses the gases”63. In theory, this agreement has reduced the amount of CFC on the 
market (from 1 million tonnes before the phase-out to 200,000 tonnes in developing 
countries, in addition to 20,000 tonnes sold illegally in the US and Europe).
However, some gaps in the Montreal Protocol64 were fulfilled during a meeting 
of more than 100 governments in 1997. They agreed to tighten controls on chemicals 
that destroy the ozone layer, by setting a deadline (2005 and 2015, respectively in 
developed and developing countries) for phasing out methyl bromide. As well as this, 
an international trade registration system was adopted aiming to terminate the black 
market of CFC in Europe and the US65. This system will take effect from 2000 giving 
“police and customs greater powers to detect illegal imports and exports of CFC gases
61 A report from the WWF stresses that taxation can play an important role in the reduction of 
environmentally harmful pesticides. This argument is illustrated by the pesticide reduction programmes 
introduced in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden (WWF, 1995).
62 In 1989 the Basle Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes was adopted, 
placing a restriction on international trade of wastes. In 1994, the parties agreed to a complete ban of 
hazardous wastes from OECD to non-OECD countries (ILO, 1995, p. 27).
63 Financial Times, 8 September 1997, p. 5.
64 Financial Times, 19 September 1997, p. 3.
65 Financial Times, 15 January 1995, p. 17.
143
used in refrigeration and air conditioning”. However, Greenpeace and ICI officials 
have suggested that a more effective solution to smuggling would be to ban all sales of 
CFCs within the developed world66.
More recently, global warming was discussed by world leaders (five years after 
the UNCED) at the UN climate summit in Kyoto (Japan, in December 1997). This 
meeting resulted in an international agreement, despite the US refusal to make strict
fnemission-cutting commitments . However, it is necessary to stress the burden that this 
agreement places upon industrial activities68, though opinions are contradictory69. On 
the one hand, American business is concerned that energy-intensive industries (such as 
the chemical industry) relocate to developing countries, thus any agreement should 
include commitments from poor countries (which were exempted from emission 
targets in 1992)70. On the other hand, institutions such as the BCSD claimed that 
promoting energy efficiency is an opportunity to bolster the economy (as suggested by 
DeSimone and Popoff, 1997).
Altogether, it is recognized that over the last ten years the chemical industry 
has: (a) achieved important energy efficiency improvements; eliminated and reduced 
those most hazardous emissions beyond scientifically proven effect levels, (b) started 
to get involved in the management of post-consumer wastes, and (c) committed itself 
to a voluntary environmental reporting structure (UN, 1994a, p. 15). The progress in 
energy efficiency in the European chemical industry illustrates one of their 
achievements. In 1993 “energy consumption per unit of output was about 25% lower 
than in 1980”, which was by no means related to oil prices (EC, 1997, p. 7-8).
Nevertheless, the industry continues to be targeted by legislation, such as the 
widespread recommendation of the use of BAT. For example, the chemical industry is
66 Financial Times, 19 September 1997, p. 3.
67 In 1992, an agreement was reached in which greenhouse emissions (mainly carbon-dioxide from the 
burn of fossil fuel, coal and deforestation) should be cut back to 1990 levels by 2000. However, only 
Switzerland, Britain and Germany could meet this target. The US is responsible for more than 20% of 
world carbon-dioxide emissions and would hardly fulfill the commitment made in Rio (Economist, 11 
October 1997, pp. 75-76).
68 Prior to the Kyoto summit, the British chemical industries association agreed with the government that 
by 2010 it would cut carbon dioxide emissions from energy consumption by a total of 20 percent from 
1990 levels, which will count as part of sectoral compliance with UK curbs resulting from the Kyoto 
Conference (Financial Times, 15 December 1997, p. 4).
69 Newsweek, 8 December 1997, pp. 12-19.
70 Economist, 11 October 1997, pp. 75-76.
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affected by a large number of European Union directives, agreements, research support 
programmes and other regulations71 (Turner and Hodges, 1992; ILO, 1995, p. 28).
In such a context, it must be recognized that the preservation of the 
environment entails major costs, particularly for the chemical industry72 (see figure 4.1 
below73). These additional costs represent a loss of international competitiveness for 
the industry, thus “governments must know that if industry has to finance the costs” it 
must be profitable (UN, 1994a, p. 4).
Figure 4.1 - Capital spending on environmental protection per chemical industry 
in selected countries - 1992 (current US$ billions)
West Europe USA Japan
Source: Adapted from UN (1994, p. 28).
As regards speciality chemicals, environmental pressures have been translated 
into new products following high levels of R&D expenditures within the industry. It is 
suggested that the “current industry’s interest in environmentally-friendly materials is 
not only induced by stricter rules and the pressure of public opinion”. It is also a result 
of market changes in which consumers are buying more natural-based products. As a 
result, industries with direct interfaces with consumers are especially concerned with 
product developments that substitute existing polluting products (EC, 1997, p. 7-63).
71 Most relevant is the precautionary principle considering that it is a “policy principle in environmental 
matters which has great influence on the law making process” (EC, 1997, p. 7-8).
72 The CEFIC states that in 1991 capital expenditures on environmental protection as a share o f total 
expenditures from the chemical industry was respectively: 11.8 in Western Europe, 10.4 in the US, and 
3.9 in Japan (ILO, 1995, p. 34).
73 Unfortunately, there is no disclosure of similar data from the Brazilian chemical industry since 
environmental protection started to be incorporated after the launch in 1992 of the RC programme. 
However, the Brazilian market o f environmental equipment and services achieved capital spending of 
US$ 1.8 billion in 1996 (that is, US$ 150 million in air pollution control, US$ 900 million in basic 
sanitation, and US$ 750 million in soil pollution control) (Folha S.Paulo, 1 June 1997, C-2, p. 4).
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Additionally, the OECD has estimated that in 1990, the environment and 
services market amounted to US$ 200 billion (ILO, 1995, p. 35). Since then it has 
increased, reaching US$ 450 billion in 1996, of which the Europe represents US$ 180 
billion, and the US accounts for US$ 150 billion. Similarly, the Brazilian market was 
estimated at US$ 30 billion per year74 in 1996.
At this stage it must be said that the environmental impacts generated by the 
chemical industry are contingent upon the businesses' segments (as illustrated 
previously for agrochemicals and speciality). Moreover, the priority of some 
environmental impacts (rather than others) may be a consequence of regulatory 
pressures, which vary across countries creating difficulties for companies’ 
environmental management.
4.3.1.2 - Environmental impacts generated by the selected cases
Considering the Brazilian chemical industry, Gutberlet (1996, p. 126) states 
that the association of chemicals producers listed the potential pollution problems 
from this sector as: (a) air emissions, containing gases and steam from chemical 
products, particulate pollutants, gases from the combustion of fossil fuel, heat and 
noise; (b) water contamination at ground and underground levels by effluents 
impregnated with acids, alkalis, oil and metals; and (c) wastes from coal, organic 
materials, thermoplastics, metallic scraps and glass.
The empirical findings have confirmed that these are the main environmental 
impacts generated by the Brazilian chemical industry. More specifically, CETESB 
provided information75 regarding the selected companies located in Sao Paulo state. 
The document indicates that DuPont, Zeneca and BASF (that is, three sites in Sao 
Bernardo do Campo) were not penalized for events of non-compliance with 
environmental legislation. However, BASF’s site in Guaratingueta received two fines 
in June 1996 for the discharge of liquid effluents that breaches legal standards.
74 Folha de S.Paulo, 1 June 1997, C-2, p. 4.
75 Document from CETESB’s Pollution Control Department (dated 04/12/96) reporting the events of 
non compliance (from January 1995 to November 1996) among the selected companies.
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The cases have shown evidence of site-specific environmental impacts. First, 
Zeneca’s manager stressed that the Paulmia site is small, therefore the generation of 
wastes, consumption of energy and non-renewable resources are very low. There is an 
intensive use of plastic, which is recycled and/or incinerated. Besides this, there are 
control systems (end-of-the-pipe technology) for air emissions, water and effluents 
releases (prior to discharge into the river). In fact, most of the effluents are treated and 
re-used in the operational process.
Nevertheless, Zeneca has caused environmental impacts through the disposal 
of hazardous wastes in the soil contaminating both the soil and the underground water. 
As a result of a legal action against Zeneca, an agreement was made to remove the 
contaminated wastes and to clean up the soil in three years (from 1995 to 1998). 
Meanwhile, the subsidiary continues to analyse the underground water until it 
recuperates its former cleanliness.
According to the environmental authority77, this event at Zeneca’s subsidiary is 
an example of negligence in the handling of hazardous wastes. At the same time, it 
illustrates that the Brazilian legal system was able to obligate a company to restore the 
damage. However, the disclosure of Zeneca’s environmental problems was made 
through a complaint from former site managers. The environmental authority78 
confirmed that the public attorney (representing the Ministry of Justice in Paulmia) 
started a civil inquiry after denunciation of environmental impacts by illegal wastes’ 
disposal at the Zeneca site (since then this site is inspected monthly).
The CETESB’s inspector79 emphasized that there are three potential results of 
such civil inquiry, which are as follows: (a) abandon the process for the lack of 
evidence, (b) to sue the offender through a ‘public civil action’, and (c) to make an 
agreement, including a hearing with the offender and the environmental authority, that 
results in a ‘Compromise Term’ (as mentioned in section 3.3.2.1 of this thesis). This is 
a new judicial mechanism to enhance the recovery of degraded areas by offenders.
76 Interview at ‘Zeneca Brasil S.A.’ (on 19/09/96), with the occupational hygiene and environmental 
manager at the operational level of the Brazilian subsidiary (subordinated to the manager of technology 
and production). The interview was held at the Paulmia site (Sao Paulo state).
77 Interview with CETESB’s inspector responsible for Zeneca’s site (on 24/10/96), at the regional office 
in Campinas (Sao Paulo state).
78 Ibid.
79
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The ‘civil inquiry’ against Zeneca resulted in an ‘Adjustment Term’, which 
was signed between Zeneca and CETESB with the legal endorsement of the public 
attorney. Consequently, a three year plan devoted to the clean up programme80 was 
inaugurated in October 1995 (though the accusation was made in September 1994). In
o  1
sum, Zeneca’s site has been undergoing a large project of recovery, in which the soil 
is being processed (at a very high cost with financial and technical support from the 
headquarters) in order to separate the wastes for posterior treatment and/or 
incineration.
Moreover, the CETESB’s inspector82 added that the civil inquiry also 
questioned the ‘active principles’ of the pesticides manufactured by Zeneca, due to 
their high potential for environmental damage (throughout the production process and 
by its application at crops). Zeneca83 confirmed that this is a ‘pyrethroid insecticide’ 
with multiple uses (in agriculture, public health and cattle farming), which is 
dangerous but lacks substitutes84.
Additionally, Zeneca’s site85 had an accident with environmental consequences 
at the nearby swamp (on the shore of the Atibaia River). This accident was caused by a 
spill of rain water (impregnated with the same substance - brine with 12 percent of 
sodium chlorine - disposed illegally in the soil) accumulated at the reservoir. The 
effluents’ treatment system had structural problems therefore this reservoir was 
inadequate. The spill happened in 1986, but only in 1994 was the vegetation 
recovered. More specifically, CETESB’s inspector86 confirmed that the swamp nearby 
the plant has been damaged by a substance from the agrochemical manufacturing. The 
inspector explicitly said that it was caused by negligence in the management of a toxic 
substance; the company however rectified the damage.
Surprisingly, the CETESB’s inspector87 stated that Zeneca is now concerned 
with pollution control. For example, the company participates in the ‘Guariba Project’
80 Ibid.
81 Interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 76.
82 Interview with CETESB’s inspector (on 24/10/96).
83 Interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 76.
84 The corporate report refers to product safety (e.g., stewardship activities on herbicides use) and 
improvement of formulation (e.g., water-based herbicide and microencapsulated crop products). 
However, there is no reference to this insecticide (Zeneca, 1995, p. 25).
85 Interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 76. The evidence of this accident came from aerial 
photos of the site.
86 Interview with CETESB’s inspector responsible for Zeneca’s site (on 24/10/96).
87 Ibid.
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for the segregation and recycling of agrochemicals packaging88. This initiative that 
appeals to Zeneca’s public image (that is, less costly and more visible) has some 
positive results on the post-consumption of hazardous wastes. The company has been 
complying with local regulations, reporting changes in the products voluntarily, and its 
final effluents are disposed of by SABESP with CETESB’s authorization. Finally, 
Zeneca has a landfill site approved by CETESB for future wastes disposal, which 
represents a high investment made after the legal action.
Regarding BASF’s subsidiary, its manager89 stated that the community is 
unable to identify environmental impacts (which makes them more vulnerable to the 
industry’s report of impacts). In reality, the potential environmental impact at BASF’s 
subsidiary is posed by hazardous wastes. Therefore, the main concern is with the 
minimization of wastes (basically by elimination at the source) and the reduction of 
energy (focused on the efficient consumption of vapour and water).
Additionally, a survey made by Ernest & Young90 in the Sao Paulo state, in 
which BASF participated, was mentioned as evidence of the subsidiary’s priorities. 
This survey indicates the environmental challenges for the chemical industry, as 
follows: (a) training of employees, (b) reduction of energy and water consumption, (c) 
compliance with the legislation, (d) minimization of wastes, (e) recycling of materials, 
(f) installation of treatment equipment (end-of-the-pipe technology), and (g) 
implementation and development of environmental management systems (EMS).
Finally, DuPont’s manager91 avoided commenting on the environmental 
impacts of the subsidiary’s operations. The main argument supporting the lack of 
impacts was the corporate principle that ‘substances and/or processes that are 
technically and/or managerial out of control must be banned’. However, an accident 
that happened at the Barra Mansa site (Rio de Janeiro state) in early 90s resulting in
88 This initiative is sponsored by the Association of Agricultural Engineers of Sao Paulo state (AEASP) 
consisting of a campaign to promote the ‘triple washing’ of agrochemical containers and the releasing of 
the effluents wastes at the crop. The packaging wastes are collected to be recycled by a qualified 
(inspected and approved by CETESB) company, which produces electrical wires with the recycled 
containers (Gazeta Mercantil, 16 May 1996).
89 Interview at ‘BASF S.A.’ (on 16/10/96), with the coordinator of safety and environment at the 
corporate level of the Brazilian subsidiary. The interview was held at the Sao Bernardo do Campo site 
(metropolitan area of Sao Paulo).
90 Survey on industrial trends in the environmental area in the state of Sao Paulo, co-sponsored by the 
Secretary of State of the Environment and Ernst & Young (Ernst & Young, 1996).
91 Interview at ‘DuPont do Brasil’ (on 11/09/96), with the safety, health and environmental manager at 
the corporate level o f the Brazilian subsidiary. The interview was held at the South American 
headquarters in Sao Paulo city.
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environmental impacts into the river has not been cited (information provided by 
FEEMA92). Moreover, DuPont’s subsidiary has neither mentioned that CFCs are still 
manufactured in Brazil93 (at the Goiabal site) nor the companies measures to phase­
out, recover and/or dispose of this hazardous substance.
FEEMA’s inspector94 said that due to structural problems (in the agency) 
DuPont’s site in Barra Mansa has not been often inspected. Nevertheless, it has a well- 
designed plan for dealing with emergency situations, avoiding any accidental discharge 
into the river, and an effluents’ treatment system. These improvements facilitated the 
agency’s activities, since the site has mechanisms to control the pollution generated. 
However, these changes were made after the accident in 1990, in which a spill of 
chlorine acid caused environmental impacts at the ‘Parafba’ river95.
In the face of these environmental impacts the selected cases have shown signs 
of environmental liability. It is interesting how differently each subsidiary handled 
these issues (such as in Zeneca’s and BASF’s cases). But most important is what 
environmental liabilities represented for their business (as in DuPont’s case). For 
example, Zeneca (which was formerly ICI) was concerned in the 80s with the re-use of 
packaging impregnated by agrochemicals; it was therefore disposed of in the soil as a 
‘safe practice’96. In late 80s this practice became illegal, because the disposal of 
agrochemicals packaging in the soil started to require a pre-treatment. However, the 
company continued to dump material without pre-treatment for a while and is now 
removing the contaminated wastes and soil as the result of a legal action.
The environmental liabilities at Zeneca suggest that neither ICI’s minimum 
requirement (i.e., the local legislation) nor the corporate guidelines resulted in a better 
environmental performance97. The Paulmia site was installed in 1978, therefore the
92 Interview with FEEMA’s inspector (on 06/12/96) from the Division of Pollution Control at the central 
office in Rio de Janeiro city.
93 The corporation specifically stated that a limited production continues only in Brazil at the request of 
the Brazilian government (DuPont, 1995, p. 6).
94 Interview with FEEMA’s inspector (on 06/12/96). The aim of this interview was to gather data on 
DuPont’s site, which is inspected by the central office, because the control of large companies (located 
either in the capital or the interior of the state) is concentrated there.
95 DuPont has another site in Uberaba, Minas Gerais state; consequently an attempt was made to identify 
any major environmental impact there in the last years. Therefore, an NGO which publishes an annual 
list o f major polluters in this state was consulted. It was then confirmed that DuPont’s site has never 
been among the companies listed (interview at AMDA, on 18/10/96).
96 Interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 76.
97 Based on the commitment made at ICI’s environmental policy, June 1992.
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licensing of industrial activities had been introduced by the legislation98. However, 
ICI’s corporate recommendation99 for wastes disposal was not disclosed (and if the 
subsidiary should have followed it)100.
Overall, there was a long interim period from the operation start-up in 1978 
and the legal requirements in the late 70s, until the wastes were removed in 1996. 
Even assuming that ICI really stopped the disposal in the late 80s, there was no 
attempt to remove wastes prior to the legal action. Zeneca’s manager101 explicitly 
recognized that the company continued with the soil disposal for a period after the 
legislation was enforced.
Secondly, BASF reported that the Guaratingueta site had an incident during the 
reform of the effluents’ treatment system in 1996, in which some effluent was released 
into the river. As mentioned before, this event resulted in two fines from CETESB. 
Additionally, there was an accident in the transportation of raw material with serious 
consequences. That is, a chemical substance leaked from a truck after a crash and 
seeped into a stream of water and a lagoon nearby, which is the main source of water 
for a large company. Consequently, it was necessary to stop the company’s operations 
until the water was decontaminated by a clean up process executed by BASF under the 
supervision of the environmental agency. In the end, BASF’s response to the accident 
was immediate and satisfactory (as acknowledged by CETESB), which avoided a legal 
action.
98 At the federal level the regulation enforcing pollution control on industrial activities (Decree 1413, 
14/08/75) and mechanisms of prevention and control o f industrial pollution (Decree 76389, 03/10/75) 
were created in 1975. At the state level CETESB (created in 1973) was turned into the state 
environmental agency in 1975 (Decree 5993, 16/04/75), and the pollution control system (State Law 
997, 31/05/1976) was promulgated in 1976 (Decree 8468, 08/09/76) confirming CETESB’s competence 
and standards. Considering the latter state environmental legislation, Title IV is related to soil pollution, 
and Article 51 explicitly prohibits the disposal of hazardous wastes in the soil. Article 52 indicates the 
need for approval by the CETESB prior to any soil disposal, but special care should be exercised to 
protect the underground water. Finally, Article 53 says that hazardous wastes should be treated prior to 
final disposal.
99 In the UK, new special waste regulations came into force by the end o f 1995, replacing the 1980 
regulations (Waste Management Paper 23, published in 1981). These regulations also implemented the 
1991 Hazardous Waste Directive including the EC list of hazardous wastes.
100 For example, Monsanto (American company) installed its Brazilian site in 1978 when only pre­
treatment of effluents was required (by law 997, 31/05/75) prior to discharge at the public sewage 
system. Instead, corporate policy was followed and an effluents’ treatment system was installed 
(Guedes, 1993).
101 Interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 76.
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Additionally, BASF102 is implementing the self-assessment proposed by 
CETESB at the Guaratingueta site. Although there is no legal requirement enforcing 
self-assessment, this site is following the agency’s request on a trial basis. More 
specifically, BASF’s relationship with CETESB improved after the incinerator was 
installed, which is regarded as an adequate form of waste disposal. However, 
Greenpeace (1992) has questioned whether incineration of contaminated wastes causes 
dioxins emissions and the dispersal of contaminated ashes.
Finally, in a tactic rarely used in the Brazilian context103, DuPont uses its good 
safety performance as a ‘credibility attribute’ in the market. It means that the lack of 
environmental liabilities is stressed as a business strategy to sell products and services 
with the guarantee of long term supply. Such an approach is very relevant when 
compared with the situation in which environmental liability has damaged the 
company’s image (such as Union Carbide after Bhopal, Czinkota et al., 1992). 
Accordingly, DuPont’s subsidiary has changed its approach regarding the externalities 
in the manufacturing process. In the past externalities were considered as wastes but it 
is now an opportunity for productivity improvement in which the goal is ‘zero 
emissions’ (DuPont, 1996).
In brief, these improvements in the productivity of the process reduces 
operational costs. The ‘win-win rhetoric’ at DuPont’s subsidiary (that is, the policy 
that the incorporation of environmental concern is good business rationale) includes 
the avoidance of environmental liabilities, protection of the company’s image, and 
most importantly, a concern with the renewal of operational licences. Local legislation 
is regarded by DuPont as a minimum requirement. However, there are also 
compulsory corporate standards, so the subsidiary decides if either legal or corporate 
standards are attainable. DuPont’s manager104 affirmed that this corporate principle 
may be understood as reactive behaviour; however, it is just the adaptation of the 
corporate policy to the local context.
Overall, the three companies have quite distinctive approaches towards 
environmental liability. It ranges from negligence (and legal pressure to clean up) at
102 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 89.
103 A former environmental secretary in Rio de Janeiro affirms that Brazilian companies are unlikely to 
invest in environmental protection unless they have to. Besides this, the executive director of 
Greenpeace Brazil says that foreign companies in Brazil are not using the latest available ‘eco-friendly’ 
technology as they are in Europe and the US (Financial Times, 2 December 1997, p. 9).
104 Interview at DuPont’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 91.
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Zeneca, to prompt responses (or preparedness for emergencies) at BASF, and 
avoidance (by setting strict targets) at DuPont. Nevertheless, safety was identified as 
an industry-related aspect deemed important by DuPont and BASF (there is no similar 
evidence from Zeneca), in which both companies have good safety records. But 
DuPont clearly has a leading role within the industry justified by its history as a 
gunpowder plant (e.g., the first written safety instruction is dated from 1811).
Moreover, DuPont’s manager105 emphasized that the corporate concept of 
safety includes occupational health and environmental issues. However, in the early 
70s the occupational health division was created, and environmental issues remained 
part of the safety area. In the late 70s a new division was created for environmental 
issues. There are now three distinct areas, but safety is still the major concern, 
reflecting DuPont’s leadership in this area106.
CETESB’s inspector107 said that DuPont’s site in Paulmia voluntarily brings 
environmental issues to be discussed with the agency, however there are no past 
environmental problems. The corporate SHE policy and the existence of exclusive 
staff to manage these issues facilitates pollution control from the agency. For example, 
DuPont had a project to relocate a packaging unit for herbicides (from the Barra 
Mansa’s site) in Paulmia; they therefore requested CETESB’s evaluation. Another 
example of proactive practice is the wastes classification and disposal, because 
companies usually try to classify as much wastes as possible as ‘class II’ (i.e., non 
toxic) to avoid the costs of adequate disposal. On the contrary, DuPont attempts to 
classify it as ‘class I’ (i.e., toxic) to avoid future liabilities. Besides, there are no 
excuses based on financial constraints to accomplish requests from CETESB.
Similarly, there is a great emphasis on the safety aspects of the operations at 
BASF’s subsidiary, as a consequence of the industry’s characteristics and historical 
concern from the corporation. Accordingly, the operational process108 is considered as
105 Ibid.
106 The Brazilian subsidiary has received several awards from the Brazilian Association of Safety and 
Accidents Prevention (ABSPA). Additionally, DuPont is selling safety services through a programme 
called ‘STOP’ (which emphasises risk and safety management). Finally, the corporation claims that by 
reducing pollution, changing products and processes, and selling environmental and safety services it 
has increased its revenue (Gazeta Mercantil, 3 December 1997, p. C-8).
107 Interview with CETESB’s official at the regional office in Campinas (on 14/10/96), in which the 
inspector responsible for DuPont’s site in Paulmia was present to provide an overview of company 
performance.
108 That is an explicit reference to engineering excellence, which is regarded as one of the German 
industry’s ‘traditional virtues’. However, this seemed to be neglected whilst ‘quality circles’ and other
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the key element, because ‘a risky operational process will affect the environment’. 
Therefore ‘the process must be integrated with S&E issues to reduce potential risks’.
In conclusion, none of the cases have faced pressure from local NGOs because 
of environmental issues. However, such pressure towards other companies was 
identified, such as Rhodia (French chemical multinational). This case had particularly 
strong repercussions109 in Brazil because the company had invested ‘in creating an 
image of environmental quality’, and was suddenly affected by environmental 
liabilities110. Additionally, it is suggested that CETESB was aware of the 
environmental liabilities, but did nothing to control the degradation111.
In general terms, BASF’s subsidiary112 had some image problems in Brazil 
(specifically in the Rio Grande do Sul state) in the early 90s. The company was legally 
questioned by the public attorney on the registration of an imported product, which 
lacked a declaration of origin on the product label113. In effect, public attorneys are the 
most recent driving force in Brazil, challenging companies’ practices (as suggested in 
chapter three).
4.3.1.3 - Environmental commitment from the chemical industry
Considering the distinct responses to similar environmental impacts, it is 
relevant to address a potential source of harmonization of practices in the chemical 
industry - the Responsible Care programme114. At a rhetorical level this initiative has
management techniques from Asia and the US were being incorporated by the manufacturing industry 
(Economist, 18 March 1995).
109 Greenpeace (1996) has published a report in Brazil on the effects of organochlorines in the human 
health, which is illustrated by a photo of a contaminated child in Cubatao (Sao Paulo state).
110 Rhodia’s site in Cubatao was closed by the local public attorney on June 1993 after medical 
examinations confirmed that employees were contaminated by ‘chlorine-benzene’ (Folha de S.Paulo, 9 
June 1993, C-3, p. 3).
111 Interview with official at the Environmental Department of FIESP (on 27/09/96).
112 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 89.
113 The archives of the ‘Curadoria do Meio Ambiente’ (a public judicial agency for the environment) in 
Sao Paulo were consulted for legal cases against the selected companies (on 29/11/96). Only a 
communication from the public attorney in the Rio Grande do Sul state was found, suggesting an 
investigation of BASF’s intention to manufacture an agrochemical in Sao Paulo that was being tested 
there.
114 ‘Responsible Care’ was first adopted by the Canadian Chemicals Producers Association (CCPA) in 
1985. Since then it has been adopted by chemicals’ associations in another 39 countries (which account 
for approximately 86% of the world’s chemical production). This initiative aims “to improve 
continuously environmental, health and safety performance” of chemical companies’ operations and 
products in order to respond to public concern (ICCA, 1996, p. 4). At present, the growth and integrity 
of the RC is guided by the ICCA (the trade association representing chemical manufacturers
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provided uniform environmental commitment among chemical industries located in 
different countries. This is a worldwide attempt at self-regulation coordinated by 
chemical industries associations. In the US, Britain and Germany the respective 
chemical associations (CMA, 1995; CIA, 1995b; VCI, 1996) have been reporting the 
benefits of this voluntary scheme to stakeholders115. In the Brazilian case, it is still 
impossible to evaluate performance improvement based on the RC due to lack of 
disclosure.
Briefly, DuPont and BASF corporations are committed to the RC sponsored by 
chemical associations in the US, the UK and Germany. Zeneca Group is also 
committed to the programme in the UK and the US. Therefore, it is arguably relevant 
to introduce the characteristics116 of such programmes in the selected home (i.e., 
Germany, the UK and the US) and host countries (i.e., Brazil).
In Germany the RC was adopted in 1991 - with implementation from 1994 - to 
which all VCI members companies are required to commit themselves. The indicators 
of performance will be defined by the CEFIC, and companies have advisory panels 
and “open door days”. Despite the recent implementation, the VCI has published 
sector-wide reports on environmental expenditures and emission levels for many years 
(CEFIC, 1995). Accordingly, UNEP (1994, p. 26) affirms that the VCI’s 
recommendations on environmental costs were first published in 1973.
The first RC report (VCI, 1996, pp. 7-12) was published in September 1996, in 
which the VCI notes that from 1979 until 1994 there was a reduction in the discharge 
of suphur dioxide by 90 percent; nitrogen oxide by 72 percent, and volatile organic 
compounds by 84 percent. Moreover, from 1984 to 1994, the chemical industry spent 
DM 13.6 billion on environmental protection facilities; at the same time, operation 
costs for these plants were DM 57 billion.
In the UK the programme was adopted in 1989, and since July 1992 it has been 
a prerequisite for membership of the CIA. There are also thirty three local cells, liaison 
panels and former opinion groups throughout Britain. It has published indicators of 
performance and annual reports (since June 1993). Finally, the CIA (1995, p. 4)
worldwide), as such, some fundamental features of the RC must be present in each national association’s 
initiative (a brief progress report of each country is provided by ICCA, 1996).
115 Despite explicit concern with the public, the RC’s achievements are also widely used during 
negotiations with governmental authorities, as was reported by the official from the Chemical Industries 
Association in the UK (interviewed on 31/10/95).
1,6 Based on data from CEFIC (1995) and ICCA (1996).
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indicates that over £ 4.5 billion (on capital and operational costs) has been spent since 
1990, of which £ 952 million was spent in 1994.
The CIA (1995b, p. 10) states that (a) discharges of Red List117 substances 
“have been reduced by 83% since 1990 and there has been a 31% reduction in 1994”, 
(b) disposals of wastes118 off-site “have fallen by 24% since 1990”, and (c) the 
Environmental Index (i.e., five components with the most critical impact on the 
environment per site) continues to be widely used.
In the US, the programme was adopted in 1988. Since the beginning has been 
prerequisite for membership of the CMA. There are more than three hundred local 
community panels, many company “open door days”, and a national public advisory 
panel. It has published the indicators of performance and annual reports (since 1992) 
summarizing overall sector performance.
The CMA (1995, p. 23) claims progress since 1988 in reduction of: (a) air, land 
and water emissions by 49 percent, (b) disposal of EPA-permitted deepwells by 46 
percent, and (c) off-site transfers for treatment and disposal by 56 percent. It is relevant 
to note that the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) programme (established in 
1987) became the CMA pollution prevention report (the same TRI data is submitted 
by member companies).
In conclusion, the RC is visibly more advanced in the US and the UK, where it 
has been systematically implemented and results are regularly disclosed to the public. 
In Germany, the RC was only implemented recently, therefore the indicators of 
performance are not available.
In Brazil, ABIQUIM119 adopted a version of the RC programme in April 1992. 
A few months later, in July 1992, the association reported that 110 companies had 
signed the commitment120. In March 1996 the number of members increased to 118
117 Based on the Environmental Protection Regulations 1991 schedule 5 and the Trade Effluents 
Regulations 1990.
118 Defined by the Special Wastes Regulations 1980.
119 The RC must be sponsored by a nation’s leading chemical trade association representing both 
domestic and multinational chemical producers. As such, ABIQUIM is the Brazilian chemical industries 
association coordinating the RC’s implementation (ICCA, 1996, p. 24). The signatory companies (75% 
of the association’s members) represent approximately 90% of Brazil’s chemical sales. Besides this, the 
association is coordinating an initiative on waste management and the implementation of the APELL 
(Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level) programme from UNEP (Gutberlet, 
1996).
120 Based on correspondence from ABIQUIM, dated 27 September 1992.
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companies with a total of 156 members121 (of which TNCs account for approximately 
44% of total members). The process (not ‘programme’ as it is called in the US and 
Europe) is called “Atuagao Responsavel”, and it is not obligatory for membership to 
ABIQUIM. In March 1995, the executive committee recommended to ABIQUIM’s 
board of directors, that the RC should become an obligation for membership as soon 
as 90 percent commitment is reached (based on the total number of association’s 
members).
The RC’s health and safety committee has been discussing a new series of 
performance indicators to expand on the ones that have been used by the Brazilian 
industry for the past 10 years. The existing indicators are based on national legislation. 
In 1995, the association organized a national seminar on ‘environmental protection’, 
following the publication of the resource guide (for the implementation of the code of 
practice regarding environmental protection).
ABIQUIM’s version of the RC consists of guiding principles (twelve 
principles), codes of practice122, an executive leadership committee (constituted of 16
1 9 ^CEOs aiming to give political support), a public advisory committee and a self- 
evaluation process. The commitment is signed by the chairman of the association’s 
board of directors and the CEOs. The codes were prepared by working groups within 
the association, and implementation started by the members in January 1994. At 
present, there are no indicators of performance defined by the association, though the 
evaluation of performance started (in 1996) via annual self-assessment.
Since 1991, the association’s external communications on SHE issues are 
made by the community advisory councils. At the company level there are some 
initiatives for the community such as “open door days”. It deserves to be said that 
there is neither commitment to disclose indicators of performance in the future, nor 
incentive for companies to do so individually. The member companies share
121 Based on correspondence from ABIQUIM dated 12 March 1996. It includes a copy of the report 
sent to CMA in the US following a questionnaire from the ICCA’s programme of self-assessment.
122 There are six codes of practices as follows: Process Safety, Employee’s Health & Safety, Transport 
and Distribution, Environmental Protection, Dialogue with the Community and Emergency 
Preparedness & Response and Product Stewardship. The environmental protection code is concerned 
with the reduction of pollution and hazardous wastes generated by the chemical industry. However, in 
case of impossible reduction and/or elimination of pollution ways of adequate management must be 
identified.
123 The National Public Advisory Committee still remains to be created, however there are some 
Community Advisory Councils at regional, local and company levels which have been working since 
1991 (ABIQUIM, 12 March 1996, p. 7).
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experiences about the RC’s implementation in the so-called ‘local cells’. Because 
Brazil is a large country and chemical companies are located throughout the regions, 
the association created these local networks of companies to implement the RC and to 
work specifically on local projects.
As regards the environmental protection code, it has an implementation guide 
based on the ‘Pollution Prevention Resource Manual’ (from 1991) from the American 
CMA. However, modifications were made aiming to produce a guide compatible with 
current environmental management trends and the future norms from the ISO 
(ABIQUIM, 1995). Besides this, the association’s official states that “a simple copy of 
the American RC or from any other country, would not be adequate for the Brazilian 
chemical industry due to the managerial and national cultures”124. However, the 
number of TNCs’ representatives in the ‘technical commission of the environment’ (in 
which eight, out of nine, members are from multinationals) is evidence of their 
influence on the RC’s implementation in Brazil. The managers from DuPont, BASF 
and Zeneca are members of this commission125.
In short, ABIQUIM’s official126 affirmed that there is a clear variation, in terms 
of environmental management and performance among chemical companies; 
therefore, the investigation of few cases would not reflect the overall situation of the 
Brazilian chemical sector. This argument is relevant because it suggests that there is no 
industry-wide pattern for environmental issues. At least, it is a confirmation that the 
RC has not yet produced such a harmonization of practices.
More specifically, the Brazilian industry127 is comprised of petrochemical 
companies (representing from 50 to 60 percent of the sector). Even after privatization, 
domestic capital is still dominant (with 80 percent of the companies) in this segment. 
The environmental performance of petrochemical companies is dependent on new
124 ABIQUIM’s brochure: ‘Conhecendo o Atua?ao Responsavel’, n.d.
125 TNCs’ representatives (approximately 44% of the association’s members) seem to take the lead on 
this commission. More specifically, the other representatives are from Bayer, Gessy Lever (Unilever), 
Rhodia (Rhone-Poulenc), Hoechst, Ciba Geigy and White Martins (Brazilian company with technology 
from American Praxair) (ABIQUIM, 1995). However, the commission’s representatives have changed 
since 1992 but there is no evidence that domestic firms were represented. Otherwise, ABIQUIM (1992) 
cited Brazilian companies as part of the so-called ‘sub-commission of environmental management and 
total quality’. Besides, ABIQUIM (1994) reported representatives from five domestic companies and 
five MNCs in the ‘environmental management working group’.
126 Interview with ABIQUIM’s official (on 04/09/96), who is also the senior manager responsible for the
implementation o f the ‘Atua?ao Responsavel’, and the Brazilian representative (for the business 
community) in the international negotiations of the ISO (series 14000).
127 Ibid.
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technology. But these companies lack the resources and international connections to 
develop such technology. In some cases this problem was overcome by the existence 
of minor ‘share participation’ of foreign capital, which reflects the interest of TNCs in 
guaranteeing supply of basic chemicals. The other 40 percent of the chemical sector is 
constituted by ‘multi-divisional’ companies, in which the TNCs represent 80 percent 
of this segment. These companies have access to new technologies (of both process 
and management) to improve their EH&S performance derived from the headquarters.
According to ABIQUIM’s official128 there is only one industry-related factor 
relevant to explain environmental practices, that is, the characteristics of both product 
and manufacturing process. This is the principal single factor explaining the 
environmental management of companies in any industrial sector. However, what 
differentiates the environmental performance of TNCs’ subsidiaries from domestic 
firm is the existence of environmental guidelines from the headquarters. Besides this, 
there is technological access, which includes local adaptation and/or further 
development by the Brazilian subsidiary. Finally, the strategic position of the Brazilian 
subsidiary (e.g., as the regional headquarters) is another important variable supporting 
environmental performance (in which higher responsibility results in better 
performance such, as in DuPont’s case).
Additionally, it was argued129 that European companies find the programme 
difficult to be implemented, because of its resemblance to an American management 
style. This argument was refuted by BASF’s manager130; however, all agreed that 
domestic firms face difficulties in adapting their culture to the RC’s guidelines. In 
BASF’s case there are differences because the subsidiary follows corporate principles 
which could produce similar results.
Nevertheless, BASF’s manager131 claims that the subsidiary has been meeting 
demands from ABIQUIM. Despite the time consumed by bureaucratic tasks, the 
company is going through with both the RC’s implementation and qualification for the 
ISO 9000 certification. However, the RC has made no difference to the S&E practices 
at the Brazilian subsidiary because it was not incorporated into BASF’s organizational 
culture. This means that an EMS must reflect the ‘company’s culture’ (which may be
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 89.
131 Ibid.
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another level of culture-based explanations) to be absorbed by the organization. Only 
one aspect of company’s activities was affected by the RC, that is the relationship with 
the community. This finding has been replicated in the three chemical cases. As such it 
is a strong indication of the publicly-driven nature of the RC, which is designed to 
change the negative perception of the public towards the chemical industry132.
In addition to this, BASF’s manager133 has identified another potential 
contribution of the RC’s implementation, that is the concept of ‘continuous 
improvement’. This is a new managerial tool that may improve the Brazilian 
subsidiary’s practices. However such a process of ‘continuous improvement’ which 
started with the ‘total quality management system’ introduced recently has developed 
systematic planning and reviewing of operations to improve performance.
It is interesting to note that in four years since its adoption in Brazil, the RC 
has only changed companies’ approach towards the community without changing their 
internal practices. As well as this, the ABIQUIM’s official134 accurately suggested that 
German companies lack environmental management following a systemic perspective. 
However, the argument that European companies have more difficulties with the RC 
may be misleading. For example, BASF and Zeneca claimed that they have 
accomplished the annual targets, though they are not exclusively committed to the 
programme. Another exception to this argument is Hoechst (German company), which 
is recognized as leading the RC implementation in the area of Suzano (Sao Paulo).
BASF’s priority is total quality135, therefore resources and efforts are 
concentrated on the certification. In such a context, BASF has similarities with 
Zeneca, since both are attempting to reconcile ISO certification with the RC’s 
implementation. Besides, it is recognized136 that the RC has substantial parallels with 
‘total quality management’. Therefore, BASF and Zeneca’s subsidiaries may be 
following the right path in the incorporation of environmental management.
132 For example, the Financial Times (Survey, 27 October 1995, p. Ill) addressed the problem of image 
at the UK chemical industry and their response through the RC programme.
133 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 89.
134 Interview at ABIQUIM, as stated in Note 126.
135 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 89.
136 Interview with the official at the Chemical Industries Association (on 31/10/95) responsible for the 
RC programme in the UK. Moreover, the CBI (1995, p. 7) states that environmental management may 
be incorporated into business as part o f TQM or by an integrated EH&S system. Additionally, the 
emergence of the ISO certification for environmental management, based on the experience of the ISO 
9000 for quality management has certainly emphasized the similarities (Gazeta Mercantil, 24 April 
1996, p. 6).
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Otherwise, Porter and van der Linde (1995a/b) state that environmental 
concern is different from TQM because it is an issue coming from public and/or 
consumer pressures, which justifies governmental intervention. On the contrary, TQM 
was introduced, by market forces alone (mainly as a consequence of competition 
between American and Japanese companies).
Despite the lack of reference to total quality, the RC programme brought a 
strong industrial aggregation into the chemical association. However, it is easier for 
TNCs’ subsidiaries to adopt the RC rather than for domestic firms137 because the 
corporation has already incorporated the RC (mainly in the case of American 
companies). DuPont’s case supported this argument when it was suggested that the 
‘Brazilian subsidiary just adapted the previous structure’138. But Zeneca’s case refuted 
the proposal that the headquarters’ experiences are shared.
In reality, the chemical industry has the most clear and widespread 
commitment towards environmental issues among Brazilian industries. Consequently, 
it was expected that governmental authorities would change their perception towards 
the chemical sector. Besides this, ABIQUIM has demonstrated willingness to 
participate in any discussion regarding new environmental regulation (another novelty 
from the RC). Surprisingly, DuPont’s subsidiary deserves great merit for bringing the 
RC to Brazil. However, the company’s influence goes further, since the ‘Responsible 
Care Implementation Guide’ (issued in 1992 by ABIQUIM) was based on a 
managerial model from DuPont.
DuPont’s manager139 argued that the CEO signed the RC programme in the US 
in 1988, therefore it should be incorporated by affiliates worldwide. Consequently, the 
Brazilian subsidiary copied some aspects after visits to headquarters. However, when 
the RC was launched in Brazil it was adapted to the local context. This is mainly 
because ‘it is inappropriate to approach the community in Brazil similarly to the
137 Nevertheless, there are examples of domestic petrochemical and chemical companies leading the 
incorporation of environmental management. For example, OPP obtained the ISO 14001 certificate in 
November 1996 for its three resin manufacturing plants (Gazeta Mercantil, 17 November 1997, pp. 2- 
3).
138 Interview at DuPont’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 91.
139 Ibid.
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gringos’140. Moreover, owing to cultural differences the institutionalization of the RC 
as a ‘tupiniquim’141 programme was favourable to the subsidiary.
DuPont’s leadership142 within the chemical association confirms the 
statement143 about the TNCs dominance in the definition of the RC in Brazil144. Such 
influence facilitates future implementation in American subsidiaries due to 
compatibility with their corporate management style. In fact, some American 
subsidiaries are selling S&E services in the local market (such as DuPont, Dow and 
Monsanto). If leader behaviour is truly mimicked (as suggested by Beliveau et al., 
1994), the local environmental management will be influenced by American 
companies. Consequently, the ‘best available practices’ will be defined by American 
companies perpetuating their dominance in the chemical industry.
In brief, the chemical association has been evaluating RC implementation 
through annual self-assessment; there is thus no third party evaluation over firms’ 
performance. The only mandatory aspect is the percentage rate to be implemented 
annually for each guide (based on a deadline of five years for full implementation). In 
1996 the members were supposed to present their first self-assessment for the 
‘environmental protection code’; however the result was not disclosed.
Accordingly, the RC is still lacking two guides of implementation for 
‘emergency response and community relationship’ and ‘product stewardship’. The 
latter will require a SHE management, disseminated throughout the operational 
process and an impact assessment of the final product after consumption. This is a 
subject-area, according to the BASF’s manager145, in which American companies have 
advantages because they have already harmonized internal practices based on their
140 ‘Gringo’ is a colloquial way that Latin American refer to people from the US instead of using 
Americans. It is related to the Mexican-American war in the period of 1846-48, during which the 
American soldiers wore a green uniform, and the combat started under the command ‘Greens Go’. The 
expression was incorporated into the Spanish and Portuguese language as ‘gringo’ (phonetically the 
same as “greengo”).
141 Used in Brazilian Portuguese as an adjective related to the Indians of the ‘Tupi’ tribe, who lived near 
the Amazon river in Brazil. Its meaning here is specifically related to heritage from the indigenous 
people that nowadays constitute Brazilian culture.
142 The Financial Times (27 October 1995, p. Ill) stated that “in many businesses in the chemical 
industry, SHE performance is measured against DuPont, the US chemical company, which is considered 
the leader in this area”.
143 Interview with official of the Environmental Department of BNDES (on 29/08/96).
144 According to the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Rio, foreign companies often 
‘take the lead in establishing industry-wide environmental norms’ (Financial Times, 2 December 1997, 
p. 9).
145 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 89.
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SHE management systems. Nevertheless, the American approach towards SHE issues 
is criticized by UNEP (1994, p. 28) because their EMS are not as broad as those from 
Scandinavian and German companies.
Finally, in the specific issue of community-company rapport there are some 
interesting findings. Until quite recently there was an absolute and widespread lack of 
concern from any industry towards the community. It started to change in the early 80s 
when social mobilization against industrial pollution emerged in specific industrial 
areas such as Cubatao (Lemos, 1995; Zulauf, 1994). However, there is no evidence of 
the local community demanding S&E improvement in the selected cases. Elsewhere, 
the Zeneca manager146 said that the subsidiary never received any pressure from the 
local community. More specifically the site is located in an industrial zone, therefore 
there is no direct contact with the community.
According to DuPont’s manager147 the RC compromise has energized the 
company’s dialogue with external stakeholders because it is more comfortable to be 
part of an industry-wide effort than an isolated case. It has encouraged the company to 
take the initiative in approaching the local community, expecting that such behaviour 
will demonstrate its commitment to performance improvement. The selection of 
community representatives was made through the company’s “open doors” events 
(with an interest in attracting the community’s leaders). At the same time there was 
fear that such openness could cause problems for the company.
In a more realistic way, BASF’s manager148 emphasized that the chemical 
industry must improve its relationship with the community because its sites affect the 
community149. This is the main point which lacks recognition from the industry, 
though the RC will formalize this approach through the establishment of the 
‘committee of consultative community’ (already implemented by DuPont). 
Accordingly, from 1992 to 1996 two “open doors” events were promoted at BASF’s 
site in Guaratingueta.
Additionally, BASF’s was the only case to provide evidence of socially 
responsible behaviour towards the community150. More specifically, in the early 90s a
146 Interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 76.
147 Interview at DuPont’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 91.
148 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 89.
149 For example, in 1994 a new agrochemical unit installed at the Guaratingueta site had the exhaustion 
system directed towards the community; this was redirected after complaints of excessive noise (Ibid.).
150 Ibid.
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health centre was created nearby the Guaratingueta’s site. The same municipality was 
assisted in the creation of a new fire brigade (a concern shared by BASF). More 
recently, BASF started to incinerate (free of charge) the wastes from four public 
hospitals151.
4.3.2 - Economic and competitive aspects
4.3.2.1 - Technology-based explanations
First, it is relevant to mention that technological explanations for the business 
incorporation of environmental concern include technology of process, product, waste 
management and S&E management services. It is also important to note that 
technology is a key issue in efforts to reduce industrial pollution in developing 
countries (Miller, 1995). Consequently, transfer of technology is an issue which is 
constantly addressed by the UN (UNCTC, 1985 and 1990; UNEP, 1984) and 
international NGOs (such as Greenpeace, 1992 and FOE, 1992) in their efforts 
regarding environmental degradation and the transition towards ‘sustainable 
development’ (WCED, 1987).
According to DuPont152 one of the driving forces, responsible for turning 
pollution control into a business opportunity is industry-related. That is, DuPont, like 
other multinationals, has competitive advantages based on technological development. 
Consequently, the company has always explored business opportunities based on its 
technological vanguard such as the present incorporation of environmental concerns 
(following a win-win approach in the long term, Willums and Goluke, 1992).
More specifically, DuPont collaborated153 with the CFC phase-out in order to 
develop its technological capabilities further. As a consequence, DuPont invested 
more than US$ 500 million in the development of CFC substitutes (HFCs and 
HCFCs). However, the company is still waiting for return on its investments due to the
151 BASF’s subsidiary has an agreement with the municipality in which staff were trained for adequate 
disposal and special packaging to collect the wastes is supplied ( ‘Qufmica e Derivados’, 
December/January 1996, p. 34).
152 Interview at DuPont’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 91.
153 This pattern of behaviour should not be easily repeated. In the case of global warming, companies 
like DuPont want hard evidence prior to targets to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. The International 
Climate Change Partnership, grouping 23 multinationals such as Dow and DuPont, accepted the 
existence of a threat but questioned the emphasis on short-term targets (Financial Times, 13 March 
1996, p. 20).
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slow percolation of substitutes into the market resulting in overcapacity. Besides, the 
market potential for substitutes is about one-quarter of the CFC market154.
In the case of discrepancies between local regulation and corporate principles 
DuPont’s subsidiary should follow the ‘most reasonable solution’ based on its 
‘technical-economic viability’. It also implies the commitment that, if available, 
technology generating less effluent than the legal standards will be used. On the 
contrary, if a new legal requirement is stricter than the technology available, DuPont 
will negotiate with the environmental agency. Accordingly, the environmental impacts 
of present operations will be compared with new standards, because the Brazilian 
environmental authority enforces standards on a case-by-case basis.
Nevertheless, it is DuPont’s strategy to be ahead of the legal requirements to 
have the opportunity to rationalize investments. This is mainly because requirements 
imposed by the environmental agency carry deadlines that are not necessarily the most 
opportune for technological development, requiring larger investments in a short 
period.
Likewise, Zeneca155 said that the expectation of high cost is especially true for 
the use of BAT. Therefore the business community avoids this kind of commitment156, 
otherwise, commitments based on ‘best practice’ are to some extent under company’s 
control. Besides this, it is easier for large companies since they have already developed 
competitive managerial systems. Accordingly, an emphasis on BAP instead of BAT, is 
an issue where business associations (such as the ICC) and TNCs will usually exercise 
their lobbying power to influence undesirable commitments (Gleckman, 1995; Eden,
1994).
Nevertheless, Zeneca has examples of product development (Zeneca, 1995, p. 
25). For example, DDT157 was used in the 80s to kill the insect that transmits malaria 
(an endemic disease in Brazil), but now the company has a ‘pyrethroid insecticide’. 
More specifically, the products characteristics have been enhanced according to SHE 
concerns, which results in a powder insecticide enveloped in a ‘hidrosoluble sachet’. 
This is therefore less harmful for the operator and the environment. This product is
154 Financial Times, Survey, 27 October 1995, p. IV.
155 Interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 76.
156 A similar argument was made by the ICC’s director in the UK (interviewed on 07/12/95).
157 Agrochemicals based on organochlorine (such as DDT) were banned in Brazil from 1985 (by the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s regulation 329, 02/09/85).
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exported to England, which probably explains its higher SHE standards. Finally, there 
is evidence that the subsidiary has received investment (Zeneca, 1995) for a new unit 
of agrochemicals (due to increasing demand), which started operations in 1996.
Accordingly, BASF’s manager158 said that old technology jeopardizes any 
attempts to improve S&E issues in the operational process. The closure of a specialty 
unit in Brazil was based on the impossibility of technological improvement. Another 
current case of old technology disrupting environmental performance is in the paint 
segment; however this process tends to be terminated. In fact, BASF Group has 
already developed technology to replace the solvent in solvent-based paints. As a 
result, there is a project to manufacture water-based paints in the Sao Bernardo site for 
the automotive industry159. The substitution of hazardous materials (such as solvents) 
has positive impacts on S&E improvement of processes and products.
Overall, the recent modernization of the Brazilian subsidiary has resulted in 
fewer environmental impacts (e.g., the installation of the incinerator). The new unit - 
manufacturing an agrochemical for use in rice plantations - at the Guaratingueta site 
prompted a strong S&E concern (for its high operational risks and advanced 
technology). This unit has equipment controlling energy consumption and air 
emissions (within legal standards) during the operational process. Thus, it avoids the 
generation of wastes and effluents. The reservoir that used to be an intermediate part 
of the process of effluents’ treatment (BASF, 1987) was disconnected. Instead it 
became an emergency basin to contain hazardous substances from an accident and/or 
contaminated water from a fire (avoiding a bigger accident such as at the Sandoz site, 
in Basel, Frederick et al., 1992, p. 456).
Finally, BASF has invested in the business of wastes incineration. This is the 
most relevant improvement in technological terms at BASF’s site in Guaratingueta160 
in the 90s. Since June 1994, the unique incinerator for hazardous wastes in the Parafba 
Valley161 has been in operation at BASF. The equipment (an investment of
158 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 89.
159 In the US, acquisitions in the paint segment of the chemical industry are a recent trend, driven by the 
process of globalisation, particularly in automotive markets requiring global suppliers (Financial Times, 
25 September 1997, p. 5).
160 Another unit (representing an investment of US$ 3 million) was built on this site to manufacture 
vitamins (for food and pharmaceutical industries) to be commercialized in South American countries 
(Gazeta Mercantil, 18-20 October 1996, p. C-2).
161 Gazeta Mercantil, 29 January 1996, p. A - l l .
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approximately US$ 6,5 million) has burnt 3,100 tonnes of wastes from a total of 5,100 
tonnes that the company has stored over the last thirteen years.
In 1996 BASF generated an average of 16 tonnes of hazardous wastes per 
month. The total volume has been reduced each year, compared to 40 tonnes per 
month of wastes in 1994. In the future, from 20 to 30 percent of the installed capacity 
will depend on the market, aiming to generate return on the investment and current 
operational costs of the incinerator. The incinerator has a mechanism for continuous 
monitoring of air emissions, and the new technology is assisting CETESB in the 
transition to environmental self-assessment. However, CETESB has defined time- 
consuming and bureaucratic requirements to control the wastes incineration. For 
example, the analysis of wastes prior to the transport for incineration, issuing the 
‘Certificate of Approval of Destination of Industrial Wastes’.
4.3.2.2 - Cost-based explanations
The three cases have indicated that the incorporation of environmental concern 
into current activities is cost-intensive. This evidence confirms Walley and 
Whitehead’s (1994) argument that gains from investment in environmental 
improvements are at least achieved in the long term. However, the findings also 
suggested that proactive and incremental investment is better than massive investment 
required by the authorities, for example, in clean up programmes162. Moreover, the 
environmental burden of current operations is so high that it is impossible for Zeneca 
to make proactive investments to upgrade the site.
Accordingly, there is evidence that the EH&S management represent high costs 
(as suggested by UN, 1994a). In this case, the most interesting aspect of comparing 
ICI’s policy statement with Zeneca’s policy comes from its cost-related commitments. 
The ICI version stated that ‘the environmental impacts will be reduced to a practicable 
minimum’. But Zeneca has made changes by stating that: “it will manage its activities 
ensuring that the environmental impact is reduced to a practicable minimum at an
162 Similarly a Brazilian scholar affirms that companies without environmental management might be 
closed by strict legislation, social pressure and governmental intervention (Diario do Comercio e 
Industria, 21 June 1994, p. 7).
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1acceptable cost to the Group and Society” . Considering these statements, Zeneca’s 
manager164 claims that the current version ‘is more pragmatic, making clear that the 
company will reduce impacts only if the costs are acceptable’. The ‘corporate 
environmental policy should be feasible’ otherwise ‘the public will criticize the 
company for the lack of results’. Zeneca’s policy statement implicitly contains the idea 
of ‘best available practice’ not necessarily at the highest cost. Consequently, if the cost 
to curb environmental impacts is too high, the business is unacceptable, and thus the 
company will stop that activity.
The feasibility of the corporate environmental policy is much more restricted 
by economic than ecological aspects. Therefore, the ‘corporate environmental 
objectives’ (setting quantitative targets) from ICI’s policy were eliminated by Zeneca. 
There are no longer pledges of a uniform, worldwide pattern, targets and deadlines for 
pollution elimination and/or reduction. This is all in the name of cost-affordable, and 
consequently realistic commitments from the company165.
The cost-related concern at Zeneca’s subsidiary is illustrated by the local 
development of a recycling process to recovery the salt from effluents in 1996. The 
Brazilian site is the only affiliate to produce this hazardous effluent (though it is not 
clear if the raw material could be substituted and/or the process upgraded), which is 
now partly recycled and the salt is sold to Solvay (Belgium manufacturer from which 
Zeneca buys soda166). Finally, it was claimed that the recycling programme was 
induced by past environmental impacts caused by this effluent in the soil and nearby 
swamp167.
The cost of environmental improvement became a key aspect of the 
performance evaluation of current facilities. Zeneca affirms that there are cases in 
which is impossible to improve performance, thus the site is closed. In Brazil an
163 Based on ICI environmental policy, June 1992; and Zeneca Safety, Health and Environmental policy 
and management, 1994.
164 Interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 76.
165 There is no disclosure of capital expenditures on environmental management. But it is recognized 
that Zeneca is exposed to environmental liabilities regarding its past operations, principally with respect 
to soil and ground water remediation costs, though these costs are unlikely to materially impair Zeneca’s 
financial position (Zeneca, 1995, 1997).
166 Zeneca’s subsidiary did not mention a price-related explanation for the recycling. However there was 
an increase in the domestic and international demand of soda, consequently the price increased from 
US$ 100 to US$ 400 (Conjuntura Economica, August 1995, p. 49).
167 The final effluent wastes are sent to treatment at SABESP (in Barueri, Sao Paulo state), at a cost 
ranging from US$ 70 to US$ 100 for cubic meter.
168 Interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 76.
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acrylic unit was closed because the cost-benefit analysis demonstrated that any 
improvement would made the business unfeasible. This confirms the cyclical feature 
of the chemical industry, in which revenue is continuously invested into technological 
upgrading of the operations (EC, 1997).
Likewise, BASF’s manager169 said that ‘costs’ are the main barrier for the 
incorporation of environmental issues at the Brazilian subsidiary. In broad terms, it is 
the economic burden170 of making the necessary changes to improve performance by 
incorporating S&E issues. Environmental investments are directly dependent on the 
‘net income’ obtained by BASF businesses in Brazil. Consequently, the amount of 
investments to be allocated to the S&E area will vary each year and/or by project. For 
example, the amount spent on the installation of the incinerator was never repeated 
since then. Overall, environmental improvement is not only ‘cost intensive’, but it 
competes for scarce resources distributed throughout the functional areas.
Finally, the cost-related explanations from DuPont’s case are focused on 
technological innovation in order to anticipate future legal requirements. Of course, 
there is also concern about the reduction of environmental impacts (through clean up 
programmes such as the Superfund in the US) by way of the costs they represent171, 
but this is mainly the case at the corporate level (DuPont, 1995b).
4.3.2.3 - Competitive aspects
According to Czinkota et al. (1992, p. 554) American companies “place major 
emphasis on obtaining quantitative data”, which “allows for good centralized 
comparisons against standards and benchmarks or cross-comparisons between 
different corporate units”. But these standards may also inappropriately indicate 
reward or punishment whilst neglecting other dimensions (mainly those behavioural 
and culturally-oriented, not to mention the economic fluctuations in distinct contexts).
169 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 89.
170 In 1996, BASF spent DM 223 million on capital expenditures for environmental protection. Besides, 
the operating cost (i.e., net costs) for the BASF Group’s environmental protection facilities amounted to 
DM 1,621 million in 1996 (BASF, 1996b, p. 41).
171 For example, in 1995 DuPont spent approximately US$ 30 million on environmental projects 
(including those required by law and its own goals) and estimated expenditures of US$ 400 million for 
1996. Besides this, it states that the cost of compliance with environmental laws, regulations and internal 
programmes would not impact on the company’s competitive and financial position (DuPont, 1995, p. 
30).
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Accordingly, DuPont’s manager172 called such a management perspective that 
of market-orientation. Even though the company has the best SHE indices within the 
industry there is benchmarking with competitors. The comparison is usually made with 
Dow Chemical (recognized for its ‘excellent’ performance in SHE issues), and 
Monsanto (which has a ‘good’ performance). There is no comparison with European 
companies because they do not have ‘outstanding SHE practices’, apart from the 
cultural differences which complicate the comparison. Finally, DuPont is often 
consulted within the Brazilian chemical industry on SHE management.
DuPont’s leadership173 in SHE issues has been acknowledged within the 
Brazilian chemical industry, in which DuPont is recognized as having the most 
advanced practices (setting the benchmark174). For example, BASF’s manager175 has 
cited DuPont as a leader in the chemical industry regarding SHE issues. But it is 
interesting to mention that DuPont’s leadership is not a positive aspect, because BASF 
and DuPont compete in some segments. However, such leadership is not affecting 
BASF business in Brazil, though it may affect businesses worldwide.
More specifically, DuPont has its image linked to ‘safety and environmental 
services’ (DuPont, 1994). The S&E programmes were developed for internal use, but 
in late 80s the company realized the new market opportunity. Until 1988, DuPont had 
been disseminating a programme in a collaborative way within the industry. Since 
then, a business division has been created at the corporate level to sell its managerial 
instruments (e.g., a safety programme called STOP is now commercialized in Brazil). 
DuPont’s collaborative approach within the industry is confirmed by Willums and 
Goluke (1992). Moreover, the authors state that DuPont Group has the best indices of 
accidents and incidents within the world chemical industry.
Nevertheless, BASF’s subsidiary is among the best for transport safety, and a 
good example of workplace safety. In terms of environmental issues, BASF became a 
benchmark in the industry after the incinerator was installed. BASF’s manager176 has 
emphasized the fact that Hoechst and Bayer (both German chemical companies) have
172 Interview at DuPont’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 91.
173 Financial Times, 27 October 1995, p. III.
174 In the Brazilian context, benchmarking regarding environmental issues is understand as a continuum 
and systematic process of evaluation, adoption and adaptation of the best methods and practices 
followed by leader companies in EMS (Gazeta Mercantil, 3 April 1996, p. 3).
175 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 89.
176 Ibid.
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incinerators in Brazil. The explanation for these investments in the biggest German 
companies is their competitive advantage in environmental technology177 and the
1751potential market in Brazil. However, the installation of incinerators is an example of 
proactive action in Brazil (because there is no legal requirement for such technology of 
waste disposal).
The incineration business is not a widespread practice in Brazil. Consequently, 
there is a large potential market for companies that already have an incinerator in 
operation. The market opportunity is specifically for the disposal of hazardous wastes 
(legally called ‘class F) because, according to the environmental agency179, these 
wastes must be disposed of adequately, thereby excluding the use of landfill sites. 
Finally, Zeneca’s case lacks empirical evidence of competitive aspects linked to 
environmental issues.
4.3.2.4 - Market-related explanations
BASF’s case has generated a large number of market-related explanations for 
environmental improvements. However, there is no similar evidence in Zeneca’s and 
DuPont’s cases. More specifically, the BASF’s manager180 said that the technology for 
water-based paint had been available for a long time at the corporation, but it was not 
introduced to Brazil due to lack of demand. However, there is a new demand from the 
automotive industry in Brazil (thus a market opportunity was created due to the 
globalization and export-orientation of this industry). Schot and Fischer (1993) state 
that industrial consumers are pressuring suppliers to enforce environmental 
requirements.
Another aspect of product development in the paint business is the replacement 
of heavy metals from pigments, in which lead and chrome are responsible for the 
definition of paints’ colours. Consequently, BASF Group is developing a substitute,
177 The worldwide leadership of German companies in environmental technology is recognized by 
Porter and van der Linde (1995a). Additionally, increasing participation of these companies in the 
Brazilian market is expected (Folha de S.Paulo, 1 June 1997, C-2, p. 4).
178 The president of CETESB affirms that the greatest business opportunities in Brazil are related to 
hazardous wastes’ management including incinerators and landfill sites (Gazeta Mercantil, 17 
November 1997, special report, p. 1).
179 Interview with official at the regional office of CETESB in Campinas, Sao Paulo state (on 14/10/96).
180 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 89.
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because of the environmental consequences of manufacturing and applying paints 
containing metal substances. BASF’s manager181 claimed that the units would be 
substituted gradually until the Group terminated with the current operations worldwide 
(Choucri, 1993, stressed the creation of new markets for environmentally sensitive 
products).
These market-oriented explanations for new investments and technologies at 
BASF’s subsidiary are relevant evidence of the former lack of environmental concern 
in Brazil. More specifically, BASF was never faced with “green pressure” from 
customers; a finding contrary to expectations (and/or wishful thinking from 
environmentalists, advertising and media professionals) of consumers’ environmental 
awareness in Brazil (Wong et al., 1995, has found similar evidence in the UK).
Overall, in the Brazilian context S&E concern will not affect the buying 
decisions of industrial customers. These decisions are based on ‘price, delivery time 
and more recently quality’. In sum, BASF’s subsidiary has only a small percentage 
(7% of 1995 turnover) of exports to other South American countries; likewise it was 
never faced with S&E pressures from these customers.
However, there is some evolution regarding SHE issues within the chemical 
segment because clients are now requesting product sample and safety information (on 
environmental risk, correct usage and final discharge). The number of requests is so 
high that BASF has developed a data bank to answer potential clients. Apart from 
increasing S&E awareness from clients, the use of information technology is a new 
trend in managing customers’ demands in the chemical industry. Consequently, the 
tool needed to deal with supply and demand cycles, new competitors, restructuring, 
more sophisticated customers and globalisation is not chemistry but information 
technology182. Considering that chemical companies ‘cannot turn manufacturing plants 
off and on in response to customer orders’, the use of information systems does help 
them to manage what they produce for different customers.
181 Ibid.
182 Financial Times, 25 September 1997, p. 3.
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4.4 - Conclusions
The comparative analysis183 based on the chemical sector may be summarized 
as follows. The RC is clearly an initiative aiming to harmonize the environmental 
approach of the chemical industry within national borders. The fact that it has been 
adopted (and sponsored) by chemical associations in many countries is evidence of 
their major concern to respond to external pressures. Specifically due to its 
international and rhetorical commitment, the RC is a key guideline (representing the 
attempts at self-regulation by the industry) to be investigated. As such it was used in 
the investigation of the implementation of corporate environmental policies in selected 
chemical cases. The main benefit of such a methodological decision is that the 
parameters of good environmental performance were set by the industry, not by the 
researcher. Therefore, it may increase the validity of the data presented since it draws 
conclusions from the cases’ evidence in face of a parameter accepted by chemical 
companies.
At this point the similarity between the three cases - Zeneca, DuPont and 
BASF has emerged. It was confirmed that the major contribution from the RC 
programme (during the period 1992-96) has been the improvement of company- 
community relationships. Besides this, there is also the introduction of a ‘systemic 
management approach’ (which should be further developed). It has changed the 
companies’ organizational structure aiming at the incorporation of EH&S issues (e.g., 
the creation of committees and/or work groups to implement each code of practice at 
the operational level).
The RC programme is, undoubtedly, a recent driving force in Brazil; it has 
already harmonized the rhetorical commitment of TNCs’ subsidiaries. However, this 
does not mean that formalization of common practices has been achieved. In Brazil, 
companies have the autonomy to implement it according to their capabilities, up to a 
deadline defined by ABIQUIM. Any cross sectional analysis could mislead such an 
aspect of the RC progress in Brazil. Therefore, it is interesting to be able to compare
183 The methodological approach followed for data analysis started with the elaboration of individual 
cases studies. This task included the organization of data by distinct sources and analysis within cases. 
The next step in the data analysis was the determination of the most relevant categories of data (that is, 
organization of the data by issues). Finally, the data categories across cases was compared, based on the 
similarities and differences between them (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
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its evolution since it was launched in 1992 (Guedes, 1993). In brief, the RC 
programme has produced some common knowledge of what external audiences are 
expecting from chemical companies. The difficulties will emerge as a consequence of 
the need to translate the RC codes into organization language. Concerning this aspect 
it is interesting to note that DuPont’s case is an exception, for the peculiar reason that 
the company has directly influenced the RC’s adoption by ABIQUIM.
More specifically, two cases (DuPont and BASF) have strongly suggested that 
safety is a major concern for chemical companies. At the same time an increasing 
awareness of environmental issues has accompanied safety as the most relevant issue. 
Additionally, an environmental issue common to all cases is hazardous wastes, of 
which the most relevant points are: (a) lack of adequate treatment and disposal in the 
80s (resulting in contamination at Zeneca), and (b) the current availability of 
incineration in Brazil (such as in BASF).
It is important to note other similarities across cases, specifically considering 
the environmental impacts generated by chemical industries. For example, it is quite 
evident that all subsidiaries are concentrated in ‘end-of-the-pipe’ measures to control 
industrial pollution. More specifically, Zeneca has a clean up programme to recover 
soil and ground water contamination. BASF incinerates hazardous wastes that have 
been stored for a long time. Finally, DuPont is reducing the generation of by-products 
in the operational process. In such a context, environmental incorporation is regarded 
as cost-intensive in all selected cases.
However, there was evidence of investments in technological and managerial 
skills to minimise environmental impacts in the Brazilian subsidiaries. The 
environmental investments are concentrated in current operations (because physical 
capital is immobile, as indicated by Leonard, 1988). Nevertheless, the assumption that 
technological improvements will solve environmental problems faster (Caimcross,
1995) is partially refuted in the case of Brazilian subsidiaries. This happens because 
investment and/or access to corporate technology are limited by the subsidiary 
revenue. The exception for large technological investments (e.g., Zeneca’s clean up 
programme and BASF’s incinerator) is the legal requirement of adequate treatment of 
wastes.
174
Consequently, the empirical findings suggest that the evaluation of TNCs’ 
environmental performance must be site-specific, demanding that industry-based 
explanations are transcended. Warhurst (1994) has argued that environmental 
management is site-specific. Accordingly, investigation at Brazilian subsidiaries 
revealed that the type of process and product determine the approach to be followed. 
Besides this, in a continental country such as Brazil with decentralized environmental 
agencies, there is always the possibility of uneven pressure from the local community 
and/or authorities. Finally, the environmental performance of remote sites will also 
depend on the availability of qualified services (e.g. waste management, incinerator, 
etc.).
It has been indicated184 that the local context is a relevant factor in explaining 
the environmental management of companies in Brazil. Especially relevant is the 
geographical location of the company and the nature of its relationship with the 
community. For example, Ferreira (in Ferreira and Viola, 1996) suggests that the 
recent democratic process in Brazil has resulted in innovative environmental initiatives 
by municipalities.
Moreover, the site location will directly influence the further implementation 
of corporate requirements requiring new investments. This latter argument is based on 
a successful experience in the Northeast of Brazil at the petrochemical complex of 
Camagari (Bahia state). Zulauf (1994, p. 77) has indicated that this complex has nearly 
collapsed, due to lack of environmental control from the authorities and lack of 
concern from the companies, with serious health and environmental problems.
However, these companies are now more advanced in environmental issues 
than those located in the Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul petrochemical complexes. 
The main reason for such performance is the existence of a special commission 
encouraging companies towards environmental self-assessment. Finally, there is an 
environmental management firm185 exclusively responsible for all effluents’ treatment 
and wastes incineration within the pole.
Needless to say that there are differences among the cases regarding the 
industry-related elements. Some aspects (such as technology and competitiveness)
184 Interview at ABIQUIM, as stated in Note 126.
185 Cetrel is a privatized waste management company, which is now owned by the 52 companies (70%) 
in the complex and the state government (30%), with a revenue of US$ 30 million per year (Gazeta 
Mercantil, 17 November 1997, p. 3).
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could be explained by the distinct positions of the selected companies in the world 
chemical industry, mainly by the corporate availability of S&E technology to DuPont 
and BASF. Consequently, subsidiary access to technical and managerial capabilities 
could explain the differences in their competitiveness and market-orientation in EH&S 
issues within the Brazilian context. At this point the differences become quite clear 
because each company (with its particular organizational characteristics and resources) 
has got distinct styles of environmental management (confirming that firms differ 
based on discretion, as suggested by Nelson, 1991).
Most important are the reported difficulties in dealing with some of the 
representation (i.e., meaning of environmental discourse, as discussed by Dryzek, 
1997) of the environmental initiatives within the industry. It was suggested that 
European companies present a kind of ‘rejection of green marketing and image 
concern’. More specifically, BASF’s case has clearly confirmed such an assumption, 
becoming an exception to the dominant rhetorical commitment of the association. 
Zeneca lacks both the human resources to fully implement the corporate principles and 
special commitment to ‘green marketing and image-related issues’. In contrast, 
DuPont has been investing time and resources in building an image of world 
leadership in SHE issues186, which confirms Sorsa’s (1994) and, Porter and van der 
Linde’s (1995a) arguments that investment in environmental protection can create 
comparative advantage in sensitive sectors.
One proposition was introduced in the framework of analysis (presented in 
section 2.5 of this thesis) to address specifically the potential industry-related 
explanations (based on Porter, 1980; 1991; Beliveau et al., 1994; Gleckman, 1995; 
Pearson, 1985, among others), as follows: I f  industry associations have 
environmental guidelines, TNCs, subsidiaries have stricter implementation o f  
corporate environmental policies. The findings (presented throughout this chapter) 
from the three case studies confirmed this proposition. However, the cases presented 
variances regarding the influence from the industry association on their environmental 
management.
It is possible to argue that high environmental impacts caused by chemical 
companies worldwide have resulted in industrial commitment. Thus their ‘collective
186 This is made explicit in DuPont’s report (1992, p. 4) and Willums and Goluke (1992). For a critical 
view of such corporate positioning, see the Editorial, The Ecologist, Vol. 21, no. 3, May/June 1991.
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action’ seems to be based on a shared vulnerability regarding public opinion. The RC 
programme was launched with the specific purpose of responding to public concern 
about risks related to chemical operations (ICCA, 1996). Accordingly, there is 
evidence that Zeneca, DuPont and BASF are committed to RC initiative in Brazil with 
a similar purpose. There is, however, the recognition by major competitors and by the 
association that DuPont is the leading company in SHE issues in Brazil. Such 
leadership concerning the implementation of the RC practices worldwide (and 
specifically in the US) is mentioned in the corporate environmental report (DuPont, 
1995b). However, there is some indication that DuPont has imported (slightly different 
from a process of mimicking behaviour suggested by Beliveau et al., 1993) its 
standards as the legitimate pattern of behaviour in the industry.
Finally, the discrepancies amongst the categories of data in the cases may be 
understood as inevitable consequences of the qualitative approach followed. The lack 
of evidence in one case despite evidence in another is a secondary consequence of the 
use of case studies (that is, some lack of control over the data gathered). In fact, the 
large amount of data gathered in each case was by no means a guarantee that all 
categories would be uniformly represented. The same methodological explanations 
(here introduced) are suitable for the next chapter which analyses pharmaceutical 
cases. Any distinctive aspect of the pharmaceutical industry (in methodological terms) 
will be duly addressed.
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Chapter V - Case studies analysis - pharmaceutical sector
This chapter will discuss (employing the same industry life-cycle approach 
presented in the previous chapter) industry-related explanations for the implementation 
of corporate environmental policies in TNCs’ subsidiaries. The chapter focuses on the 
pharmaceutical industry (its selection was justified in section 1.2 of this thesis). 
Consequently, it addresses the findings of three cases - Glaxo, Eli Lilly and Hoechst 
Marion Roussel - in this industrial sector. The chapter is organized into the following 
sections: first a profile of the pharmaceutical industry (globally and in Brazil), second 
a profile of the selected TNCs (including their Brazilian subsidiaries), and finally, 
industry-related explanations based on the data from the case studies. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, the findings presented here are specifically of a regulatory and 
economic nature. Thus, it complements the chapter three (on the host country context) 
leaving other explanations to be discussed in chapter six.
In brief, it is expected that the variance from one industrial sector to another 
will illuminate the industry-specific explanations. Consequently, it is assumed that the 
minor environmental impacts (specifically when compared with the high impacts from 
the chemical industry) caused by pharmaceutical companies should result in lax 
environmental incorporation. More specifically, the selected cases should present 
weak corporate environmental policies and poor environmental performances. The 
existence of contrary evidence will indicate other (than the causal relation set by the 
research proposition, which was introduced in section 2.5) explanations for 
environmental practices in a sector with minor environmental impacts.
5.1 - Profile of the industry
This section will briefly present the main aspects and trends that characterize 
the world pharmaceutical industry. Additionally, it will introduce the main 
characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry in the Brazilian context. Similar to 
chapter four, the findings from the case studies in the pharmaceutical industry will be 
analysed in the light of these industrial characteristics.
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5.1.1 - World pharmaceutical industry
In the 1930s the pharmaceutical industry was a commodity business. By the 
end of the 1950s, the pharmaceutical industry had transformed itself into a research- 
and advertising-intensive business which concentrated on specialties. According to 
Gereffi (1983, p. 169) “the vertically integrated company that combined drug 
discovery, production, and marketing functions in a single corporate network came to 
dominate the industry”.
The structure of the pharmaceutical industry is similar to a pyramid (differing 
greatly from the structure of the chemical industry). At the top, there are twenty to 
twenty five big companies with large R&D operations. In the middle there are several 
hundred medium-sized firms exploiting their own research and other companies’ 
products under licence. At the base there are thousands of small companies working in 
specialised fields or involved in biotechnology (EC, 1997, p. 7-39).
Consequently, the pharmaceutical industry is marked by strong inter-firm 
competition, in which no single company has a dominant position. The top ten 
pharmaceutical producers “represent somewhat over 20% of the world pharmaceutical 
market” (EC, 1997, p. 7-40). This industrial sector is also characterized by a high ratio 
of R&D expenditures to gross output (i.e., high-technology industry). Accordingly, 
this industry is more technologically-intensive (such as communications and 
semiconductors, computers and office machinery, and electrical machinery industries) 
than the chemical industry (OECD, 1992, p. 111).
In addition to this, Gereffi (1983, p. 173) states that pharmaceutical TNCs are 
diversified, with varying interests in other industries (e.g., veterinary products, 
vitamins and fine chemicals, nutritional products, agrochemicals, hospital and 
laboratory supplies and equipment), though strictly speaking pharmaceutical refers to 
‘ethical drugs’ that usually require medical prescription.
In brief, the market for pharmaceuticals is customarily divided into two 
categories determined by the way in which the products are purchased. The first 
category is that of prescription drugs, that is, a class of products created by 
government regulations to be sold by medical prescription. The prices in this category
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are largely regulated, therefore companies’ competitiveness depends on the 
improvement of products as well as therapeutic innovation. The second category is 
that of non-prescription pharmaceuticals, which can be either purchased directly by the 
patient or prescribed by a physician. This category is commonly defined as ‘over-the- 
counter’ (OTC); fierce price competition is observed because OTC products are 
generally not regulated. Additionally, pharmaceutical products specifically for human 
use are divided in terms of brand and generic manufacturing.
This industry faces specific problems related to ‘regime appropriability’ 
(Teece, 1988, p. 48) that is aspects of the commercial environment, excluding firm and 
market structure, that govern an innovators’ ability to capture the rents associated with 
innovation. The most important dimensions of such a regime, argues Teece (1988, p. 
49) are the nature of the technology and the efficacy of legal mechanisms of protection 
such as patents, copyrights and trade secrecy. Likewise, Mintzberg and Quinn (1991, 
p. 383) have stressed that one factor affecting the profitability of ‘ethical drugs’ is the 
ability to manage the institutional environments, and the control over distribution, 
patent and copyright protection.
In practical terms, the pharmaceutical product protected by patent is marketed 
only by the original brand manufacturer. When the product loses its patent protection, 
competitors may market essentially identical products under a generic name, which are 
generally less expensive than their brand name analogues (EC, 1997, p. 7-24). For 
example, the UK has one of Europe’s highest rates of generic prescribing, in which 
pharmacies dispense the unbranded version of a patent-expired drug rather than the 
original brand1.
It is well-known that pharmaceutical research for product development 
represents a long and costly process, which requires on average from ten to twelve 
years before a substance can be finally approved and marketed as a product. 
Considering that the average total cost has far exceeded 250 million ECU, innovation 
is left mostly to bigger firms (EC, 1997, p. 7-39). Therefore, pharmaceutical 
companies must sell the new product to as many markets as possible under the patent 
protection, to recover their investments.
1 Financial Times 24 April 1997, p. 2.
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In Europe R&D is mostly entirely financed by the industry itself, which has 
effects on the proportion of active substances worldwide developed by European 
companies. For example, from 1975 to 1979, Europe developed 61 percent of the 
world’s new medicines, declining to 48 percent between 1990-94. In the same period 
the US increased their share from 26 to 31 percent and Japan from 11 to 25 percent 
(EC, 1997, p. 7-39). In 1990, the R&D/tumover ratio for the 500 largest European 
pharmaceutical companies was 10.8 percent compared to Japan’s ratio of 10.1 percent 
and the US’s ratio of 9.5 percent (Ibid.).
Additionally, one of the fastest growing segments within the whole industry is 
applied biotechnology and R&D expertise in this area is concentrated in the US. 
However, chemical process still represents the majority of pharmaceutical 
manufacturing. More specifically, “bio-pharmaceuticals have been estimated to 
command more than 4% of world pharmaceutical products’ sales” (EC, 1997, p. 7-24).
As a result, the acquisition and/or merger with biotechnology firms has been a 
popular tactic within the pharmaceutical industry2. The big companies are searching 
for new R&D ideas (as the patents on their existing drugs expire3) and the 
biotechnology companies need financial resources. Besides this, the pharmaceutical 
companies discovered that it is worth purchasing from small outside suppliers because 
their laboratories tend to suffer from internal conflict as they become bigger. As is 
stressed by Teece (1988, p. 57) in-house arrangements may facilitate control, but at the 
expense of being “costly in terms of managerial and financial resources”.
In Europe this trend has been most striking in Germany, “where biotech 
companies had faced political neglect and public opposition on ethical and 
environmental grounds”4. In Britain - one of Europe’s most important centres for
2 According to Simpson et al. (1996, p. 166) “natural organisms’ genetic codes contain the ‘recipes’ for 
chemical compounds of potential value in pharmaceutical products”. However, the Biodiversity 
Convention that resulted from UNCED-1992 (already signed by the US) “guarantees states sovereignty 
over their generic resources and forbids their appropriation without prior informed consent”. Therefore, 
organizations are now entering into commercial agreement with foreign pharmaceutical researchers, and 
the markets for transactions in indigenous genetic resources have emerged (Ibid., p. 167).
3 The access to combinatory chemistry (to find new drugs) is the reason for recent acquisitions. For 
example, Glaxo’s purchase of Affymax for US$ 539 million; Eli Lilly’s acquisition of Sphinx 
Pharmaceuticals in North Carolina for US$ 75 million; and Marion Merrell Dow’s (prior the merger 
with Hoechst) takeover of Selectide for USS 58 million, in Arizona (Economist, 13 May 1995).
4 Financial Times, 15 May 1997, p. 21.
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R&D5 - there is a rapid growth of biotechnology companies, though it has lost half of 
the large pharmaceuticals companies in the past three years to mergers and takeovers6.
The influence of the regulatory climate is a relevant factor for the 
pharmaceutical industry (Turner and Hodges, 1992, p. 184). The regulatory agencies of 
Europe, the US and Japan have made an effort to co-ordinate standards for the 
approval of new drugs. Meanwhile companies will need large numbers of experiments 
for the drugs’ approval in these markets, which is a key element of the industry’s cost- 
structure (EC, 1997, p. 7-41).
The nature of pharmaceutical products (as a determinant of human health) has 
forced the industry to operate in a highly politicized environment, subject to 
governmental scrutiny and control. The governmental influence varies from one 
country to another, across many issues. It may include setting high standards for drug 
purity, safety and efficiency, or the location of pharmaceutical production within 
national frontiers (Ballance et al., 1992). In developing countries there are also 
economic considerations such as interest in increasing exports, minimizing imports, 
and improving employment prospects (Gereffi, 1983, p. 167).
In spite of its apparent risks, the pharmaceutical industry “is one of the most 
lucrative in the world, usually ranking first or second among all industries in 
profitability since the mid-1950s” (Gereffi, 1983, p. 190). Likewise, the EC (1997, p. 
49) states that “firms producing pharmaceutical goods overwhelmingly dominate the 
ranking of the world’s most profitable firms as they held in 1994 eight of the first ten 
positions in terms of net income to turnover ratio” (as illustrated in table 5.1 below). A 
lot of the success of drug firms derives from their ability to control entry (by patents 
and trademarked brand names), substantial seller concentration in therapeutic markets, 
the captive nature of the consumer, and the price insensitivity of doctors (Gereffi, 
1983, pp. 191-192).
5 Such attractiveness is supported by: (a) the lower cost of employing research scientists, (b) the 
‘Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme’ governing the drugs prices since the 1950s, (c) the capital 
market encouraging the growth of biotechnology companies, and (d) the location in London of the 
‘European Medicines Evaluation Agency’ since February 1995 (Financial Times, 5 December 1995, p. 
19).
6 Financial Times 24 April 1997, p. 2.
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Table 5.1 - Top worldwide pharmaceutical companies per prescription sales 
(for human use, 1994, million ECU)
Companies Country Total sales
Glaxo Wellcome UK 10,276
Merck USA 7,916
Hoechst Marion Roussel Germany 7,862
American Home USA 6,242
Bristol-Myers Squibb USA 5,860
Roche Switzerland 5,247
Pfizer USA 4,885
SmithKline Beecham UK 4,651
Pharmacia & Upjohn Sweden-USA 4,459
Eli Lilly USA 4,412
Johnson & Johnson USA 4,336
Takeda (1) Japan 4,924
Sandoz(2) Switzerland 4,070
Ciba(2) Switzerland 3,753
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer France 3,736
Source: Adapted from EC, 1997, p. 7-37. Notes: (1) includes OTC sales; (2) Ciba and Sandoz merged 
on March 1996 creating Novartis.
In the period from 1988 to 1994, pharmaceutical firms had faster growth in 
turnover and higher profitability than the rest of the chemical firms, because of the 
rising demand for health care products (EC, 1997, p. 51). Demand in the 
pharmaceutical industry (differing from the chemical industry) is little affected by 
cyclical changes in the larger economy. Rather, it is dominated by structural 
developments such as an ageing population, higher standards of living and 
technological progress in medical science (Ibid., p. 7-42).
The European Community has a relative dominance in human pharmaceutical 
production, consumption and exports relative to the US and Japan. Accordingly, 
Europe’s share of nominal pharmaceutical production increased from 40 to 43 percent 
from 1985 to 1994. In the same period, the American share declined from 38 to 31 
percent, though the American nominal production increased by more than 50 percent 
in absolute terms. Consequently, the American market share was lost to Japan, since 
its production more than doubled (EC, 1997, p. 7-36). There is a similar pattern in 
nominal consumption from 1985 to 1994, in which the European market share 
increased from 37 to 40 percent, at the same time that the American share declined
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from 39 to 31 percent and the Japanese share increased from 24 to 29 percent (Ibid., p. 
7-37).
However, the most important movement has been the growing 
internationalization of markets in which the pharmaceutical exports from the Triad 
have more than doubled between 1985-1994. Japanese exports nearly tripled in 
absolute terms showing that the Japanese industry has altered its traditional focus on 
the domestic market. The governmental budgetary cutbacks in this area made this 
industry look for business alternatives abroad (through acquisitions in the US and 
Europe and new production units in Asia). Altogether, the main challenges for the 
pharmaceutical industry are, as follows: (a) enhanced competition at world level due to 
the emergence of new technology, (b) downward pressure on prices and profits from 
governments trying to reduce their health spending, (c) rising R&D costs, and (d) 
increased market harmonisation (Ibid., p. 7-40).
Consequently, the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies may follow two 
strategies in response to these challenges. The first strategy involves the acquisition of 
other drug companies to achieve market share in complementary segments (e.g., 
Glaxo’s purchase of Wellcome and Roche’s acquisition of Syntex). The second 
strategy is the purchase of drug distributorships (such as accomplished by Merck, 
SmithKline Beecham and Eli Lilly).
This distinct consolidation process has changed the nature of competition. It is 
said that during 1994 and 1995 there have been around US$ 70 billion worth of 
mergers and acquisitions in an industry with a yearly turnover of just US$ 200 billion7. 
This novelty took place in both European and American markets, in which the 
industry’s giants have done most of the takeovers (see table 5.2 below). Finally, the 
most important mergers were between similar-sized companies, such as the American 
companies Pharmacia and Upjohn (in 1995), and the Swiss companies Sandoz and 
Ciba (in 1996).
7 Economist, 26 August 1995, and Financial Times, 25 March 1996, p. II.
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Table 5.2 - Major acquisitions in the world pharmaceutical industry
(1994-1995)
Purchaser Target Cost
Glaxo Wellcome $14.8 billion
American Home Products Cyanamid $ 9.7 billion
Hoechst Marion Merrell Roussel $ 7.1 billion
Roche Syntex $ 5.3 billion
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Fisons $ 2.7 billion
BASF Boots Pharmaceuticals $ 1.3 billion
Source: Adapted from the Financial Times, 25 March 1996, p. II.
In spite of that, there was one group of firms - the big chemical companies that 
own large drug assets8 - that were left behind by dedicated drug firms, such as Merck 
and Glaxo, during the 80s. More recently, drug firms have moved into the health care 
and biotechnology businesses; other conglomerates have separated their chemicals 
from pharmaceuticals business9. Otherwise, pharmaceutical businesses have been 
acquired by large chemical companies (e.g. Bayer’s acquisition of SmithKline 
Beecham’s OTC business in the US in 1994; Hoechst bought Marion Merrell Dow in 
1995; and BASF’s purchase of Boots Pharmaceuticals in 1995)10. Moreover, the 
largest drugs companies in Germany are also its top chemicals companies, which are 
Bayer, Hoechst and BASF11.
In conclusion there are two distinct strategies taking place: (a) the Anglo- 
Saxon strategy of concentrating on fewer core businesses, and (b) the continental 
European companies decision to retain diverse interests (such as Rhone-Poulenc, 
BASF, Hoechst and Bayer). However, Sandoz had demerged its chemical business - 
Clariant - prior to merging with Ciba (in 1996) following the Anglo-Saxon strategy. 
The new company - Novartis - became the world’s second biggest pharmaceutical in 
sales and the world’s biggest company in agrochemicals. The table 5.3 shows the 
market share of the world largest companies.
8 Economist, 28 January 1995.
9 For example, ICI demerged its bioscience business creating Zeneca; Dow Chemical sold its 
pharmaceutical business - Marion Merrell Dow; and Eastman Kodak sold Sterling Health to SmithKline 
Beecham (Financial Times, 8 March 1996, p. 17).
10 Financial Times, 25 March 1996, p. II.
11 Financial Times, 20 January 1995, p. 39.
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Table 5.3 - Worldwide pharmaceutical sales by market share
1996
Company Market share (%)
Glaxo Wellcome 4.7
Merck 3.5
Hoechst Marion Roussel 3.5
Bristol-Myers Squibb 3.1
American Home Products 3.0
Pfizer 2.9
Johnson & Johnson 2.9
Roche 2.6
SmithKline Beecham 2.5
Ciba* 2.5
TOP 10 31.2
Rhone-Poulenc 2.2
Bayer 2.1
Eli Lilly 2.0
Sandoz* 1.9
Schering-Plough 1.9
Astra 1.8
Abbott 1.8
Pharmacia & Upjohn 1.7
Sankyo 1.6
Takeda 1.6
TOP 20 49.8
Total** $ 205 billion
Source: Financial Times, 25 March 1996, p. 1.
Notes: * Ciba and Sandoz merged with a market share of approximately 4.5%, 
** worldwide sales of prescription drugs.
More recently, the drug sales in ten of the world’s biggest markets rose by 7 
percent in the first-quarter of 1997, compared with the same period in 1996. 
Nevertheless, the Japanese pharmaceutical industry will face tough operational 
conditions as a consequence of health care cost-cutting. Additionally, health care 
reforms will reduce purchases in Europe (mainly in France and Germany)12. This 
sector was once provider-oriented, but is becoming increasingly payer and consumer 
driven13. Consequently, the profitability levels of pharmaceutical companies in Europe 
started to be affected between 1993-94 by cost containment measures adopted by 
European governments to control health care costs (EC, 1997, p. 61).
12 Financial Times, 9 June 1997, p. 4.
13 Financial Times, 24 April 1997, p. 3.
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The larger companies, such as Glaxo, Hoechst, Roche and Novartis, can cope 
with the changes in the health care industry (in both the US and Europe), but many 
other will face difficulties14 (e.g., German, Italian, French and Japanese medium sized 
companies). In the American market, increased competition made manufacturers 
discount the prices of the drugs they sold to hospitals and managed-care organizations. 
Besides this, American drug firms have increased profits by controlling costs15.
European companies, such as Glaxo Wellcome and Novartis, achieved strong 
positions in the US and managed to offset the effects of weak European demand16. The 
strategy was to penetrate the US market by the increasing use of direct-to-consumer 
advertising, which is permitted in the US but not in Europe. Despite the costs of such a 
form of advertising, Glaxo credits the success of one of its “blockbuster” drugs to 
direct-to-consumer advertising. These campaigns, via television or newspapers, are 
highly effective in the US because they inform prospective patients of the availability 
of treatment for some diseases (namely, patients who usually request doctors to 
prescribe the drug).
Finally, there is the understanding among European and American companies 
that self-medication is the fastest-growing segment of the pharmaceutical industry. 
Therefore, some European companies are “producing generic versions of their own 
branded products in an effort to retard the decrease in revenue” that will occur through 
the loss of patent protection (EC, 1997, p. 7-40).
According to Gereffi (1983, p. 189), “these structural aspects of the industry 
are powerful forces in conditioning, shaping, and constraining the actions of firms, 
governments, and social groups, but ultimately they do not fully determine or explain 
behavior”. In order to understand the impact of the pharmaceutical industry and the 
response it has generated, it is necessary to look at the interaction of TNCs with the 
host countries. This task will be accomplished in the next section by addressing the 
pharmaceutical industry in Brazil.
14 Economist, 26 August 1995.
15 Economist, 30 September 1995.
16 Wall Street Journal, 8 August 1997, p. 9A.
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5.1.2 - Brazilian pharmaceutical industry
To clarify, the world pharmaceutical industry has a relatively small number of 
large companies, which are faced with governmental demands. In the specific case of a 
developing country this relationship may be conflictive, because of the dependence on 
foreign companies for the supply of reasonably priced drugs, so that the benefits of 
pharmaceuticals could reach the population (Gereffi, 1983, p. 167-168). Consequently, 
the motives for intervention through price control are similar in industrialized and 
developing countries. However, the fact that TNCs dominate the markets in 
developing countries so completely, has resulted in unique problems (Ballance et al., 
1992, p. 164).
Additionally, there are other issues for which pharmaceutical TNCs have been 
continuously criticized such as the appropriateness of products and technologies, and 
marketing practices. Moreover, artificial manipulation of transfer pricing17 is more 
common in the pharmaceutical sector than in any other industry as a means of 
avoiding taxation. There is an excessive gap between ‘transfer and market prices’, 
according to Gereffi (1983, p. 195), which creates special expectations from public 
authorities.
In the 1950s the outward investments of pharmaceutical TNCs was directed at 
Western Europe, the Commonwealth countries, and the relatively advanced nations in 
Latin America (such as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina) (Gereffi, 1983, p. 179). 
Consequently, there was a significant shift in the pharmaceutical industry, in which 
local production - based on active ingredients imported - was beginning to substitute 
the direct importation of finished pharmaceutical products. However, most of the 
production of active ingredients has remained concentrated in some developed 
countries (such as the US, Japan and Germany).
The developing countries continued to depend on imports (mainly from the 
US, the UK, Switzerland, France, and Germany) for the majority of their drugs needs 
(Ibid., p. 181). These imports consist of finished drugs, bulk drugs in final dosage form 
for repackaging, chemicals for dosage formulation, and chemical intermediates that
17 Transfer prices refer to intra-firm sales between TNCs’ affiliates worldwide which may be 
manipulated through over-pricing or under-pricing of pharmaceuticals intermediates. In the first case, 
the profits of the selling subsidiaries are increased; in the second, additional funds from seller to buyer 
are transferred (Ballance et al., 1992, p. 164).
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require further processing (Ibid., p. 182). Accordingly, Brazil is among the developing 
countries able to manufacture a broad range of active ingredients from intermediate 
and raw materials, and also able to accomplish local R&D on new and adapted 
pharmaceutical products and processes.
However, the domestic industry is oligopolistic and largely controlled by 
TNCs’ subsidiaries, including local firms operating with technology licensed from 
international companies (Ibid., p. 188). More specifically, foreign firms account for 85 
percent of the private market of drugs, and 40 percent of governmental purchasing. 
The rest of the market is shared equally by state laboratories and domestic firms 
(UNCTC, 1984, p. 91), in which government purchasing policy has been used to 
encourage local industry.
The amount of FDI substantially increased from 1957 to 1977; when the 
Brazilian pharmaceutical industry went through a major period of denationalization. 
Indeed, thirty-four of the largest domestic firms were acquired by TNCs (Evans, 
1979). The government attempted to increase competitiveness by abolishing patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals in 1969. A decade after this measure the ten largest 
national drug companies had increased their market-share by almost 10 percent. 
However, in 1978 and 1979 more national firms were acquired by TNCs. The 
evidence denied the argument that the absence of patents would reduce attractiveness 
to foreign investors; FDI in the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector rose from US$ 113 to 
US$ 646 million in the period 1971-79.
In 1996 Brazil passed a strong patent bill18 and therefore, it has attracted 
‘promises’ of US$ 1.2 billion in pharmaceutical investment19 until the end of the 
century. The assumption that patent protection will attract more foreign investment is a 
bargain instrument utilized by TNCs (and their home governments) over developing
oncountries. As a result of an agreement at the WTO , developing countries have until
18 Brazil has been pressurized since 1989 by GATT’s Uruguay round of negotiations (which include the 
discussion of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights), and the American threat of trade 
retaliations (based on Section 301 of the trade law) (Conjuntura Economica, March 1996, pp. 28-29).
19 Wall Street Journal, 13 December 1996, p. 1.
20 Since the completion of the GATT negotiations in December 1993, which also created the WTO, 
country-members are supposed to pass and enforce laws protecting copyrights, patents and trademarks 
under threat of legal action at the WTO (Economist, 17 February 1996). Moreover, the agreement on 
trade-related investments measures (TRIMs) obligates members of the WTO to ban rules such as those 
forcing foreign companies to use local inputs. However it does not grant foreign companies the ‘national 
treatment’, that is, the right to be treated as local firms (Economist, 10 June 1995). Surprisingly, Brazil
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the year 2000 to enact and enforce intellectual-property protection, despite American 
threats to impose trade sanctions for copyright piracy21. Finally, there is no guarantee 
that it will work for other developing countries, though it has worked in Brazil .
According to the BNDES (1988, p. 84) the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry 
has around 80 foreign companies of a total of 600 companies (including state-owned 
laboratories). However, the TNCs’ subsidiaries have approximately 80 percent of the 
total pharmaceutical market (including animal and human medicines). The market 
share of foreign subsidiaries in Brazil has always been high, ranging from 78 percent 
to 88 percent in the late 70s. The table 5.4 shows the current participation of foreign 
companies as 73 percent of the industry.
Table 5.4 - Brazilian pharmaceutical industry - participation per origin of capital
Industrial sectors Domestic % Foreign % State %
1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996
Pharmaceutical 37 27 63 73 - -
Source: Exame, ‘Melhores e Maiores’, July 1997, p. 11. Note: * share based on total sales from the 20 
biggest companies.
Overall, the position of domestic firms was weakened by the fierce competition 
from foreign subsidiaries which maintain ownership close to 100 percent equity 
(UNCTC, 1984, p. 87). The competitiveness of TNCs’ subsidiaries is based on: (a) 
their considerable financial and technical resources, (b) their product differentiation 
and heavy promotion expenditures, which ensured their domination of the market 
despite the lack of patents protection, (c) their transfer pricing policy, which is 
commonly used to over-invoice the import of raw materials and intermediates, and 
finally (d) the dependence of local firms on imported supplies of raw materials and 
intermediates (UNCTC, 1984, p. 88).
has eliminated the distinction between foreign and national firms during the Constitutional Review of  
1994.
21 Economist, 18 May 1996.
22 There is evidence of new investments in Brazil. For example, Knoll - BASF pharmaceutical division - 
will invest US$ 30 million to double its production and marketing new products (Gazeta Mercantil, 27 
November 1996, p. C -l). Another example is Glaxo W ellcome’s investment of US$ 111.3 million in a 
new site in Rio (Informativo CRQIII, December/January 1996, pp. 6-8).
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More specifically, product differentiation is used by large firms to assert and 
maintain their domination over particular markets. In Brazil it represents an average of 
22 percent of total sales (including sales representatives, free samples, and medical 
literature23). An impressive amount (up to 32.8 percent) of the personnel employed by 
TNCs’ subsidiaries is concerned with promotion and sales (UNCTC, 1984, p. 89). 
More recent investigation into the cost structure of the industry has indicated that 
production cost varies from 29 to 35 percent; and distribution and sales costs varies 
from 27 to 28 percent24.
Additionally, TNCs are further concentrating their operations on specific 
categories, aiming to achieve and/or maintain leadership. More specifically, fourteen 
TNCs’ subsidiaries represent 41 percent of total revenue in Brazil. There is only a 
Brazilian company - Ache - among the top 15 with a share of 4.72 percent. The 
remainder is shared by four hundred private and foreign laboratories (see table 5.5 
below).
23 Ballance et al. (1992, p. 253) has indicated similar figures for the cost structure of pharmaceutical 
firms in Brazil, which are respectively 35% for manufacturing and 21% for marketing in 1984.
24 Informativo CRQIII, December/January 1996, pp. 6-8.
25 Ibid.
Table 5.5 - Top ten pharmaceutical companies in Brazil
1994*
Company Participation (%)
Roche 4.75
Ache 4.72
Bristol Meyers 4.58
Biogalenica 3.88
Eli Lilly 3.40
Schering Plough 2.90
Boehringer de Angeli 2.85
Hoechst** 2.67
Merrell LePetit** 2.56
Sandoz 2.42
Rhodia Farma 2.34
Prodome 2.28
Wyeth 2.23
Abbott 2.17
Sanofi 2.10
Total (15 top companies) 45.84
Others (400 companies)+ 54.16
Source: Informativo CRQIII, December/January 1996, p. 8.
Notes: * Data from ABIFARMA (total revenue in 1994 was US$ 6.5 billion),
** Hoechst and Merrell LePetit merged in 1995, becoming the largest 
company in Brazil - Hoechst Marion Roussel (approximately 5.23%),
+ Including Glaxo Wellcome.
Despite the potential attractiveness for FDI, the recent patent law has damaged 
the Brazilian industry even further. Therefore, a vast majority of domestic companies 
support the position of state laboratories against the new patent law. Their argument is 
that developed countries only passed patent laws for pharmaceuticals after they had 
already developed technology to manufacture the drugs needed.
The pharmaceutical TNCs’ interest in emerging markets26 in Asia and Latin 
America reflects the cost-containment that is reducing drug sales in previously 
attractive markets in Europe and North America. For example, Brazil is among the 
world’s ten largest pharmaceutical markets with a total revenue of approximately US$ 
6.5 billion in 199427. Finally, the top twenty companies account for approximately 
US$ 4.9 billion (or 75%) of the industry’s total revenue. The table 5.6 shows that six
26 Wall Street Journal, 31 January 1997 p. 11 A.
27 Informativo CRQIII, December/January 1996, pp. 6-8.
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Brazilian companies are among the largest, however most of them manufacture 
generic product and/or products licensed from foreign companies.
Table 5.6 - Ranking* of top twenty companies in the Brazilian
pharmaceutical industry** -1996
Company Sales 
(US$ million)
Number of 
employees
Origin of 
capital
1 - Hoechst Marion Roussel 554.0 1,388 German
2 - Ache 525.5 2,246 Brazilian
3 - Roche 469.7 1,490 Swiss
4 - Bristol-Myers Squibb 425.0 1,467 American
5 - Boehringer de Angeli 331.6 1,067 German
6 - Schering-Plough+ 299.8 1,135 Brazilian
7 - MS D 296.2 n.a. American
8 - Eli Lilly 232.7 931 American
9 - Sanofi 231.7 n.a. French
10- Glaxo Wellcome 194.3 744 English
11- Merck 185.7 n.a. Swiss
12- Rhodia Farma 180.8 - 780 French
13- Abbott 170.7 n.a. American
14- Prodome 150.2 581 Brazilian
15- Tortuga 135.0 657 Brazilian
16- BD 119.0 1,521 American
17- Lab. Americano 103.7 n.a. American
18- Searle+ 97.6 538 Brazilian
19- B. Braun 85.8 n.a. German
20- Uniao Farmaceutica 84.7 598 Brazilian
Source: Adapted from Exame, ‘Melhores e Maiores’, July 1997, p. 158.
Notes: * classified by gross revenue, ** includes pharmaceuticals for human and animal health, 
+ licensed products, n.a. = not available.
In 1981, Brazil initiated a number of measures designed to tighten up drug 
regulatory procedure. More specifically, an ‘Interministerial Group on the 
Pharmaceutical Industry’ was set up with the aim of developing the national 
pharmaceutical industry, by taking active measures to reduce the import of drugs 
(UNCTC, 1984, pp. 91-92). Nevertheless, the current situation is said to be far from 
satisfactory, because the inspections from the Ministry of Health concentrate on the 
products manufactured within the country. Thus imported products are not inspected
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(though legally they should be); this constitutes discrimination against local 
production28.
More than a decade later, is possible to say that these measures have failed. 
Besides this, the import of active principles and intermediates is still around 80 percent 
of total national needs. Current governmental interference in the pharmaceutical 
industry is restricted to a programme from the Ministry of Health, which includes a list 
of 138 drugs and the management of 17 laboratories maintained by federal and state 
governments in Brazil. The state-owned laboratories produce mainly generic drugs for 
the national health system.
Regarding the local production of raw materials (though the data is scant), the 
industry is still heavily dependent on imports. More specifically, up to 80 percent of 
active principles are imported, and a large amount of intermediates . Most relevant is 
the lack of technology at private and state laboratories for producing drugs for endemic 
diseases.
Imports had been subject to governmental control (through import licences). 
However, deregulation in early 90s brought some negative effects on the Brazilian 
trade balance. Additionally, domestic companies have been affected by competition 
from cheaper products imported from India and China. For example, the import of 
pharmaceuticals was approximately US$ 12 million in 1982, but in 1995 it reached 
around US$ 482 million (see figure 5.1 below). More relevant evidence comes from 
the net revenue, which has increased from $ 3.5 billion in 1990 to $ 6.5 billion in 
1994. However, the volume of commercialized products remained the same for the 
period 1990-94 at approximately 1.8 billion units.
Figure 5.1 - Brazilian import of pharmaceuticals
□  U S $  m i l l i o n
1982 1987 1992 1993 1994 1995
Source: Informativo CRQIII, December/January 1996, p. 8.
In other words, economic liberalization in Brazil did not result in new 
investments in the pharmaceutical sector. In fact, the reduction in import tariffs has 
consolidated TNCs’ leadership in this segment of the industry by increasing their 
import instead of producing them locally. In addition to this, TNCs’ subsidiaries are 
restructuring their operations in Brazil and other Latin American countries, which has 
resulted in lower levels of local production30.
As well as the above, the end of the price control regime in 1993 resulted in a 
high increase in pharmaceutical prices (400 percent on average, with some cases 
varying from 400 to 1,130 percent, based on 1990 prices31). Considering that these 
prices did not completely depreciate, there is evidence that a small number of 
producers had generated higher prices. Besides this, the profit margins of Brazilian 
subsidiaries are determined by the parent; the tariff reduction was therefore not 
deducted from the product price resulting in a larger profit margin.
Consequently, a recurrent issue is the need for a governmental policy to 
discourage imports, giving incentives to local technological development and 
production. One simple solution is the implementation of Decree 793 (from 1993). 
This law aims to motivate the marketing of generic pharmaceuticals instead of the 
current marketing of brand pharmaceuticals32. Moreover, it has the potential to 
decrease self-medication and drug prices (by reducing advertising and marketing
30
32
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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expenditures33). However, its implementation depends on government action through 
preferential purchase and the use of generic medicines throughout the national health 
system.
In conclusion, is important to mention that there is no reference to 
environmental issues regarding pharmaceutical operations in the literature analysing 
this industry in the 80s and early 90s (such as Gereffi, 1983; UNCTC, 1984 and 
Ballance et at., 1992). This lack of evidence may be a consequence of low 
environmental impacts from pharmaceutical companies. Nevertheless, the empirical 
findings regarding the industry’s environmental impacts will be addressed later in this 
chapter (in section 5.3.1). Meanwhile, it is necessary to provide an overview of the 
selected pharmaceutical companies, and this is the purpose of the following section.
5.2 - Profile of the companies
This section will provide a profile of the selected pharmaceutical companies, 
which includes an overview of the corporation - on a worldwide basis - and an 
overview of the Brazilian subsidiaries. In terms of the Brazilian context, it is relevant 
to say that the subsidiaries are not operating in all business areas of their corporations. 
According to Ballance et al. (1992) this is exactly one aspect that differentiates the 
pharmaceutical industry in industrialized countries (with diversified manufacturing 
and advanced research) from the same industry in developing countries 
(manufacturing specific products).
5.2.1 - Corporate overview
The first selected pharmaceutical company is Glaxo Wellcome, a British group 
focused on the discovery, development, manufacture and marketing of medicines 
(Glaxo, 1994). The company started with baby food in the early 1900s which were 
commercialized in Britain, India and South America. The company entered the
33 As a consequence of the widespread use of self-medication by the population, physicians and 
pharmacies are equally important as targets for drugs promotion. It was estimated that between 50 and 
75 percent of the drugs are commercialized without prescription in Brazil (UNCTC, 1984, p. 89).
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pharmaceutical business in 1927 by introducing a vitamin D fortified formulation, and 
in the 30s it introduced vitamin-fortified milk34. During the World War II the company 
produced penicillin and anesthetics, but in the mid-1950s Glaxo diversified, acquiring 
veterinary, medical instrument, and drug distribution firms. In the 1980s Glaxo sold its 
non-drug operations and concentrated on pharmaceuticals. In 1981, the company 
launched Zantac in the US market becoming the leader in anti-ulcer drug sales by 
achieving a 53 percent market share.
Since then one product - Zantac - accounts for about 43 percent of the 
company’s revenue. The patent expired in 1997 (as well as its antiviral “blockbuster”) 
and Glaxo has been spending heavily on R&D and diversification of its drug offerings. 
Besides this, Glaxo, established (in 1993-94) new manufacturing operations in 
Argentina, Australian Egypt, Germany, Japan, Singapore, Spain, and the UK, 
following a strategy of commercial expansion.
Glaxo is the biggest pharmaceutical company in Europe, and after acquiring 
Wellcome (a world leader in antiviral medicines worth US$ 14.8 billion) in 1995, it 
became the world’s largest drug maker. However, its overseas sales account for almost 
90 percent of the revenue (Stopford, 1992, pp. 567-569), and of this the US is the 
largest market (43 percent of total revenue in 1994) for Glaxo products.
A determination to focus on prescription drugs led Glaxo to sell its stake in the 
joint venture with Warner-Lambert for US$ 1.5 billion in 1996. Finally, the Group 
invested £ 30 million in information technology systems to improve its internal supply 
chain in order to respond quickly to consumers demands35. In addition to this, Glaxo 
aims to expand its business in fast-growing, emerging markets of South America, 
Africa and the Far East36.
In sum, the Group sells its products in about 150 countries, and has production 
facilities in 31 countries and 70 subsidiaries. The major competitors are Bristol-Myers, 
Novartis, Eli Lilly, American Home, Roche, Hoechst Marion Roussel, Merck, Pfizer, 
and SmithKline Beecham. The tables below provide an overview of the Glaxo Group,
34 Hoover’s Handbook of World Business, 1997, p. 224.
35 Financial Times, 3 September 1997.
36 Glaxo’s chief operations officer responsible for North and South America said that more flexible 
marketing strategies are needed, which mean “developing as well as pricing new drugs differently in 
different parts of the world” (Wall Street Journal, 31 January 1997, p. 11A).
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where it is possible to see the importance of the US as the single most important 
market.
Table 5.7 - Corporate worldwide overview - Glaxo Wellcome
1993 1994 1995 1996
Turnover (£ million) 
Profit Bef Tax (£ million) 
Number of employees
4,930
1,675
40,024
5,656
1,835
47,189
10,490
3,635
52,419
8,341
2,676
53,808
Source: Financial Times, Major UK Companies Handbook, 1997, p. 342.
Table 5.8 - Worldwide sales* per business division
Glaxo Wellcome -1996
Drug division (%)
Respiratory 22
Gastro-intestinal 20
Viral infection 18
Bacterial infection 11
Central nervous system 11
Other 18
Total 100
Source: Glaxo Wellcome, Annual Review, 1996.
Table 5.9 - Worldwide sales* per geographical area
Glaxo Wellcome -1996
Area (%)
Europe 32
North America 46
Asia Pacific (includes Japan) 15
Latin America 4
Other 3
Total 100
Source: Glaxo Wellcome, Annual Report, 1996.
The second selected pharmaceutical company is American-based Eli Lilly, 
which in 1876 installed its first plant (a process of coating pills with gelatin) in 
Indianapolis37. Later in 1923, Lilly introduced insulin and during the 20s and 30s, it
37 Hoover’s Handbook of American Business 1997, p. 524.
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created products such as Merthiolate (an antiseptic), Sconal (a sedative), and treatment 
for anemia and heart disease.
In the 70s, Lilly diversified, buying Elizabeth Arden (cosmetics) and IVAC 
(medical instruments). In 1982 Lilly become the first company to market a 
biotechnology product, introducing Humulin (licensed from Genentech), which is 
identical to human insulin. In 1986 Lilly acquired Hybritech, a biotechnology 
company, for more than US$ 300 million, and the next year Elizabeth Arden was sold.
In 1992, Lilly bought drug maker Beiersdorf GmbH and surgical products 
maker Origin Med-systems. Two years later Lilly acquired McKesson’s pharmacy 
benefit management business38, and PCS Health Systems (the largest drug benefit 
manager in the US for US$ 4 billion). In 1995 Lilly sold Hybritech to Beckman 
Instruments for a price estimated to be less than US$ 10 million. Finally, in 1996 an 
agreement was made with Merck to co-develop disease- and health-management 
programmes for patients with diabetes.
The company is well-known for its insulin, but its top-selling drug is the 
antidepressant Prozac (which is the unique drug marketed in the US for both 
depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder since 1994). It has also produced 
treatments for animal diseases and products for animal food production (subordinate to 
the Elanco division39).
In short, Lilly has a very strong presence in the US40 (approximately 57% of 
total sales). However, the corporation has been making investments in its worldwide 
pharmaceutical operations aiming to increase sales outside the US (Lilly, 1996). 
According to Lilly (1993) the 80s was focused on the world’s largest pharmaceutical 
markets (that is, Europe, Japan and Canada). The 90s will have targeted developing 
countries (such as India and China). Among the major competitors are Bayer, Bristol- 
Myers Squibb, Norvatis, Glaxo Wellcome, Hoechst, Merck, Pfizer, Roche, American 
Home, Pharmacia & Upjohn, Zeneca and SmithKline Beecham. The tables below 
summarize Eli Lilly’s main figures, as well as its focus on the US market and main 
pharmaceutical areas.
38 Lilly announced that it was turning from a drug into a ‘disease-management’ firm aiming to achieve 
R&D savings and profits (Wall Street Journal, 24 July 1997, p. 6).
39 Elanco was a joint venture with Dow Chemical manufacturing agricultural products. However, in 
1997 Lilly sold its stake (for US$ 1.2 billion) to Dow (Ibid.).
40 Malnight (1995) states that Lilly is a traditionally ethnocentric firm, which has recently initiated a 
process of globalization.
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Table 5.10 - Corporate worldwide overview - Eli Lilly
1993 1994 1995 1996
Sales ($ mil.)
Net income ($ mil.) 
Number of Employees
5,199
480
26,200
5,712
1,286
26,400
6,764
2,291
28,500
7,347
1,524
29,200
Source: Eli Lilly, Annual Report, 1995,1996.
Table 5.11 - Worldwide sales per business division
Eli Lilly -1996
Business (%)
Central nervous system 36
Anti-infections 20
Endocrine 18
Animal health 8
Gastrointestinal 7
Health care management 5
Cardiovascular 4
Other 2
Total 100
Source: Eli Lilly, Annual Report, 1996.
Table 5.12 - Worldwide sales per geographical area
Eli Lilly -1996
Area (%)
US 58
Europe, Middle East and Japan 31
Other regions 11
Total 100
Source: Eli Lilly, Annual Report, 1996.
The third selected company is the pharmaceutical division of Hoechst - 
Hoechst Marion Roussel created in 1995. Hoechst was founded in 1863 in a German 
village of the same name to produce dyes41. Then it moved into the pharmaceutical 
field, producing diphtheria vaccines and analgesics (1890s) and a medicine to cure 
syphilis (1910). In 1923 the company managed to isolate insulin and acquired German 
dye and fertilizer producers. During the period 1925-1952 the company was part of the 
I. G. Farben cartel with other German chemical companies such as BASF and Bayer.
41 Based on Hoechst, 1990, 1991b, 1992, 1993b and 1994c.
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Taking into consideration that most of the Hoechst plants have survived the war, the 
expansion was fast in the postwar period including the incorporation of plastics, fibers 
and petrochemicals businesses.
In the 70s Hoechst acquired majority control of Roussel Uclaf (French 
pharmaceutical and cosmetics company). The company had success in 
pharmaceuticals, particularly with diuretics, diabetic medications, antibiotics, and 
polio vaccines. In the 80s Hoechst emphasized expansion in the US market, by 
acquiring Celanese (chemicals) located in New Jersey in 1987, and later acquiring the 
controlling interest in Celanese Mexicana (the largest private chemical company in 
Mexico). In 1993 Hoechst bought a 51 percent stake in the US drug maker Copley 
Pharmaceutical (generic drugs). The expansion in Europe was accomplished in 1992 
by buying the powder coatings group of Beckers (Sweden), and the fiber activities of 
Chemiefaser Guben in eastern Germany.
Considered the world largest chemical manufacturer42 (and Europe’s biggest 
chemicals and drugs group), the Hoechst Group concentrates on the following 
businesses: dyes, plastics, pharmaceuticals, agrochemical, fibers, paints, and industrial 
gases. It has operations in 120 countries in which the major competitors are: Akzo 
Nobel, BASF, Bayer, Dow, DuPont, Eli Lilly, Glaxo Wellcome, ICI, Merck, 
Monsanto, Rhone-Poulenc, Roche and SmithKline-Beecham. The tables below 
provide an overview of Hoechst Group, which confirms its concentration in Europe 
and the organization of business in independent companies.
Table 5.13 - Corporate worldwide overview - Hoechst
1993 1994 1995 1996
Sales (DM million) 46,047 49,637 52,177 50,927
Operating profit (DM 1,476 2,318 3,591 4,013
million)
Number of employees 170,161 165,671 161,618 147,862
Source: Hoechst, Annual Report, 1994,1996.
42 Hoechst has been forced to end the production of the controversial abortion pill (developed by 
Roussel Uclaf and sold in France, Britain and Sweden), after US anti-abortion activists announced a 
boycott through newspapers advertisements. This is the first time that “a leading pharmaceuticals 
company had given up the rights to a drug which was judged by regulators to be safe and effective” 
(Financial Times, 9 April 1997, p. 32).
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Table 5.14 - Worldwide sales per business division
Hoechst -1996
Affiliates/Activities (%)
HMR/pharmaceutical 25.6
Speciality chemicals 13.8
Celanese/chemicals 12.7
Trevira 11.2
AgrEvo/agrochemicals 7.1
Plastics 5.5
Messer/industrial gases 4.6
Herberts/paint 4.6
Ticona 2.6
Behring/diagnostics 1.8
Hoechst Roussel Vet/ agriculture 
products
1.5
Other 9.0
Total 100
Source: Hoechst, Annual Report, 1996.
Table 5.15 - Worldwide sales per geographical area
Hoechst -1996
Areas (%)
Europe 58
Americas 36
Africa, Asia, Australia 12
Intra-group (6)
Total 100
Source: Hoechst, Annual Report, 1996.
In 1994, the corporation indicated its objective to strengthen cooperation 
between Hoechst and Roussel Uclaf in regional joint ventures (Hoechst, 1994a, pp. 23- 
24). Accordingly, joint ventures in Italy and the UK were established, and mergers in 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Greece. Additional joint ventures were 
planned in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico. However, in early 1995 Hoechst 
acquired the American drug company Marion Merrell Dow and Dow Chemical’s 
pharmaceutical business in Latin America (for US$ 7.1 billion) subsequently renaming 
it Hoechst Marion Roussel (Hoechst, 1995, p. 29). Hoechst had for a long time, the 
majority of shares in Roussel Uclaf (57%) and the remainder was fully acquired (for
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US$ 3.5 billion) in December 1996 to consolidate the pharmaceutical division 
(Hoechst, 1996a, p. 3).
In short, after these acquisitions the worldwide integration of pharmaceutical 
activities into HMR became the major challenge and was accomplished by the end of 
1996. The new company - HMR43 - is the fourth largest drugs producer44 in the world 
(after Novartis, Glaxo Wellcome and Merck), headquartered in Frankfurt (Germany). 
The table 5.16 provides an overview of HMR.
Table 5.16 - Worldwide overview - Hoechst Marion Roussel
(DM million) 1994+ 1995 1996
Sales 9,577 11,530 13,020
Operating profit 1,386 532 2,249
Number of employees - - 45,160
Source: Hoechst, Annual Report, 1995, 1996. Note: + position as a division of Hoechst Group.
The new pharmaceutical division is directly subordinated to Hoechst Group, 
since it was disconnected from the chemical business within the group45. The Group 
planned to separate the drugs business as an independent company in early 1997 (with 
shares to be negotiated in the stock market in the US), however this has been 
postponed.
5.2.2 - Brazilian subsidiaries
In terms of the ranking of the biggest private companies in Brazil, the selected 
cases are positioned as follows: HMR is first in the industry classification, and 113th 
amongst the biggest46; Lilly is 8th in the pharmaceutical sector and 324th in the 
general ranking; and Glaxo is 10th within the sector and 364th in the general ranking. 
The table 5.17 compares their sales in Brazil.
43 Hoechst Group is committed to concentrating its activities on life sciences, therefore, HMR agreed to 
sell the Rugby Group (generic drugs) to Watson Pharmaceuticals in the US. The HMR’s CEO said that 
“participation in the generics drugs business is not part of our core business strategy” (Financial Times, 
27 August 1997, p. 18).
44 HMR makes pharmaceuticals for treating hypertension and angina pectoris, for allergies and 
infections, and it has a majority stake in Copley Pharmaceuticals (generic drugs) in the US.
45 Financial Times, 15 March 1996, p. 1.
46 Among the 500 biggest private companies, per sales in 1996 (Exame, ‘Melhores e Maiores’, 1997).
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Table 5.17 - Overview of selected Brazilian subsidiaries - 1996
Company Sales (US$ million) Number of employees
Hoechst Marion Roussel 554.0 1,388
Eli Lilly 232.7 931
Glaxo Wellcome 194.3 744
Source: Adapted from Exame, ‘Melhores e Maiores’, July 1997, p. 158.
The Brazilian subsidiary of Glaxo is constituted by one site located in Jacare - 
Rio de Janeiro city. The subsidiary’s operations include the manufacturing, packaging 
and commercialization of products. Therefore, there are products imported (in bulk 
form) to be finished locally, and products imported ready for final consumption. The 
latter will be locally packaged and distributed.
These imports are said to be a consequence of the impossibility of diversifying 
local production with the current technology; besides this, there was no scale of 
production that would justify local manufacturing (as suggested by Gereffi, 1983). 
Likewise, the ABPI’s official47 suggested that Glaxo should have only ‘secondary 
production’ at the Brazilian subsidiary, because all ‘primary manufacturing’ is 
concentrated in industrialized countries. Nevertheless, some raw materials will be 
produced in Brazil. More specifically, the Brazilian site manufactures the final stages 
of ‘primary production’ with basic inputs imported from England. The headquarters 
centralizes the purchase of raw materials that are used by many subsidiaries.
The Brazilian subsidiary exports to Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Peru and Ecuador, however the growth of exports to South American markets is 
limited by the small capacity of production. Nevertheless, there is a plan for expansion 
as the subsidiary received an investment of US$ 111.3 million for a new site in Brazil, 
which will still be located in the Rio de Janeiro city. This site will be among the most 
modem factories of the Group’s worldwide48. Consequently, it represents a telling 
sign of the relative importance of the Brazilian market (see the main figures in the 
table below).
47 Interview with official from the Association of British Pharmaceutical Industries (on 20/03/96).
48 Informativo CRQIII, December/January 1996, p. 8.
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Table 5.18 - Brazilian subsidiary - Glaxo Wellcome
Net Income (US$ 1,000) 1993 1994 1995
Domestic 61,241 76,892 95,043
Export 450 1,482 3,070
Total 61,691 78,374 98,113
1993 1994 1995
Number of employees 735 748 756
Source: ABIQUIM, 1996, p. 146. Note: this publication is updated every two years and there is no other 
reliable source.
Finally, Wellcome had a site located in the Cotia (Sao Paulo state) as a joint 
venture with Zeneca’s pharmaceutical division. This partnership was sold to Zeneca, 
but Glaxo’s products will still be manufactured there until 1999 (when the new site 
begins its operations).
The commercialization of pharmaceutical products in Brazil from Eli Lilly 
started in 1930. Later in 1944, a commercial office was created in Rio de Janeiro city. 
It was only when the Brazilian process of industrialization was more mature that the 
first site (for pharmaceutical secondary manufacturing) was installed in Sao Paulo 
(Morumbi site) in 1953. The Elanco division49, that is the business of animal health 
products, was created in 1962. In 1977, the Cosmopolis site started its operations, 
including manufacturing of ‘primary pharmaceuticals’, animal and agriculture 
products (i.e., herbicides).
In 1993 the company spent US$ 10 million on installing an incinerator. The 
industrial director claims that ‘the company decided for this kind of equipment 
because it was best available technology to dispose wastes’. The company invested 
more US$ 1 million in a new equipment for the incinerator (see table 5.19 for 
investments at the subsidiary). Therefore, it increased the capacity of treatment of solid 
and liquid wastes50 by 64 percent in 1997. The acquisition of the incinerator was also 
justified by its potential to provide services to third parties (offered by the spare 
capacity of the equipment). At present the incinerator is processing 8 million litres per 
year of waste (half from Elanco and half from other companies in the region, such as 
Zeneca and Shell Chemical).
49 This joint venture with Dow Chemical was sold in 1997 (Wall Street Journal, 24 July 1997, p. 6).
50 Gazeta Mercantil, 29 January 1996, p. A -l 1.
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Table 5.19 - Eli Lilly do Brasil - Investments (US$ 1,000)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Environment, increased 
capacity & modernization of 
facilities
23,000 33,000 39,000 45,000 55,000
Source: Eli Lilly do Brasil, December 1995.
In 1996, the Brazilian subsidiary ranked as the eighth largest among the 
corporation affiliates. Moreover, the Morumbi site was classified as ‘Class A’ (the 
highest grade) by the corporation. This means that medical research will be undertaken 
locally with the purpose of enabling the simultaneous registration of new products in 
different part of the world (a new trend in the world industry). Finally, Lilly’s main 
figures are illustrated in the table below.
Table 5.20 - Brazilian subsidiary - Eli Lilly
Sales (US$ 1,000) 1993 1994 1995
Domestic 116,000 136,000 180,000
Export 3,000 13,000 14,000
Total 119,000 149,000 194,000
1993 1994 1995
Number of employees 938 1,102 1,336
Source: Eli Lilly do Brasil, December 1995.
Finally, the Hoechst Group started its operations in Brazil in 1949. At present, 
the Brazilian business includes industrial chemicals, fibres, pharmaceuticals, 
agrochemical, paints and resins. There are three site in the Sao Paulo state, that is 
Osasco, Suzano (chemical and pharmaceutical units) and Ermelino Matarazzo, and 
participation in a petrochemical company (polyethylene producer) in the Triunfo 
complex (Rio Grande do Sul state)51. The table 5.21 illustrates the operations of the 
Hoechst Group in Brazil.
51 Folha de S.Paulo, 18 September 1994, pp. 2-10, and Hoechst, 1994b.
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Table 5.21 - Brazilian subsidiary - Hoechst*
Net Income (US$ 1,000) 1993 1994 1995
Domestic 370,140 465,569 500,891
Export 69,957 74,926 64,852
Total 440,097 540,495 565,743
1993 1994 1995
Number of employees 4,958 4,838 2,811
Source: ABIQUIM, 1996, pp. 151-152. Notes: this publication is updated every two years and there is 
no other reliable source, * there was no data exclusively for the pharmaceutical division, because the 
separation of chemical and pharmaceutical businesses in Brazil was accomplished in 1996.
In Brazil, the merger between Hoechst and Marion Merrell Dow took place in 
November 1995, when the Santo Amaro site was incorporated into the Hoechst 
pharmaceutical division. Besides this, there was another site in Rio de Janeiro city 
(from Roussel), but it was sold in 1996. According to the HMR newsletter52 the 
Brazilian subsidiary is at the top of the industry ranking. More specifically from 
January to September 1996 the net income was US$ 244 million (with the sales in 
September 1996 around US$ 27.7 million). Such volume of sales accumulated in 1996 
and made HMR the largest pharmaceutical company with a 5.4 percent market share; 
HMR achieved total sales of US$ 540 million in 1996.
Additionally, HMR has invested US$ 120 million in a new factory in the 
Suzano site53. Consequently, the Brazilian subsidiary will be transformed into one of 
the two regional manufacturing centres within Latin America to export products within 
the region. As a result of this investment, the Santo Amaro site (former Merrell- 
LePetit) will be returned to Dow, because it was not included in the merger. More 
precisely, the site estate belongs to Dow while the machinery installed there belongs to 
HMR. Consequently, the Suzano site has an expansion project in course (with a 
deadline for starting the operations in the year 2000). In short, all pharmaceutical 
manufacturing will be concentrated in Suzano, which now represents 61 percent of the 
total manufacturing in Brazil (29% is made up by the Santo Amaro site and 8% of the 
products are imported).
52 HMR’s newsletter ‘Linha Aberta’, year 1, number 8, October 1996.
53 Gazeta Mercantil, 3 December 1996, p. C -l.
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5.3 - Industry-specific explanations
5.3.1 - Environmental impacts and liabilities
5.3.1.1 - Environmental impacts caused by the pharmaceutical industry
According to Ives (in Ives, 1985) there are some difficulties in identifying the 
major environmental impacts (e.g., air emission, wastes and effluents) generated by the 
pharmaceutical industry. This is mainly because the most important issues are health 
and safety-related, such as: (a) safety and occupational health at workplace, (b) use of 
toxic substances and generation of toxic wastes, (c) changes in biological organisms 
through biotechnology, (d) tests on animals and/or human, and (e) animal 
medicaments (i.e., hormones) that later will cause health problems in human (through 
the food chain).
In developing countries the commercialization of products that have been 
banned or restricted for sale in industrialized countries and/or home countries is 
especially controversial. In such cases the disclosure of TNC’s production of toxic 
substances worldwide should be applied to pharmaceuticals as well (including the 
degree of toxicity and side effects for consumers). Finally, Ives (1985, p.5) criticizes 
the US policy (by the FDA) which endorses drugs banned in the domestic market as 
suitable for export.
As far as products’ characteristics are concerned, they may be able to explain 
environmental commitment at industry level. Hazardous substances in medicines may 
be fatal to consumers. Therefore, the impact of pharmaceutical products in animals 
and humans is a polemical issue. In sum, the industry is criticized because employees 
are at constant risk and humans suffer from the side effects of drugs.
Lilly’s subsidiary54 responded to these criticism with the argument that the 
population is wealthier today because of the pharmaceutical industry. Nevertheless, 
earlier discoveries (such as insulin in 1920 and later penicillin), were made from 
substances with unknown side effects. Since the main objective was to save lives 
and/or mitigate suffering, side effects were balanced alongside the benefits. At present, 
AIDS drugs are the best example of such cost-benefit analysis (as they cannot cure but
54 Interview at ‘Eli Lilly do Brasil’ (on 23/09/96), with the industrial director of the Brazilian subsidiary, 
who is also responsible for SHE issues. The interview was held at the Morumbi site (Sao Paulo city).
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only prolongs life). These ‘unknown’ side effects of medicines are taken as the 
inherent risk of the industry, since knowledge in medical science is incomplete at best.
Based on the findings from the selected cases, it is possible to affirm that 
environmental impacts by pharmaceutical firms are mainly the result of two elements - 
the technological pattern of the site and the existence of primary pharmaceuticals 
manufacturing. Thus environmental impacts are site-specific, and as such, will differ 
from case to case (confirming Warhurst, 1994). In conclusion, cross-case similarities 
can be reported exclusively in reference to theoretical abstractions regarding 
pharmaceutical manufacturing.
It must be stressed however that sparsity of literature will result in a more 
descriptive than analytical report of the empirical findings. For example, Glaxo Group 
states the potential environmental impacts from pharmaceutical primary and secondary 
manufacturing55. The Brazilian subsidiary has a small primary and medium sized 
secondary production, as such it has potential environmental impacts. In reality, 
Glaxo’s subsidiary56 discharges the water from the process (including the liquid wastes 
from tanks washing) into the public sewage system without prior treatment.
In brief, it was argued that the current site lacks the area to build an effluents’ 
treatment system. In fact, the site has twenty five years worth of operations and does 
not comply with the urban zoning legislation (that is, law 466 from 1981). The site is 
located in a residential area without industrial pollution control (for the release of 
effluents), an illegal situation which has persisted for at least sixteen years. Finally, 
despite the impacts caused by current operations, Glaxo is monitoring the water at the 
location of the new site aiming to prevent future environmental liabilities.
Another major challenge for the Glaxo subsidiary is the prevention of 
accidents57. The industrial director58 claimed that accidents are induced by employees’ 
attitudes and their resistance to wearing personal protection equipment. This attitude 
jeopardizes the overall task of occupational medicine. But at some point it was
55 The by-products of such operations are: gases, dusts, odours and vapours from ferments, vessels, 
tanks, scrubbers, filling lines, incinerators and boilers, noise and visual impacts, spent catalysts, 
washings, solvents, filter media, packaging, reject products and protective clothing (Glaxo, 1992, p. 4).
56 Interview at ‘Glaxo Wellcome do Brasil’ (on 01/10/96) with the industrial director of the Brazilian 
subsidiary, who is also responsible for safety and environmental issues at the site located in Jacare (Rio 
de Janeiro city).
57 Such concern is clear in the subsidiary’s safety manual (Glaxo, n.d.).
58 Interview at Glaxo’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 56.
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recognized that the site is very old, thus its own structure makes prevention of 
accidents very difficult. For example, the old machinery lacks concern for 
environmental protection and requires many technological adaptations. Moreover, it is 
not always possible to improve the safety and environment performance of old 
equipment by the use of end-of-the-pipe technology.
Consequently, only relocation to the new site will solve these technological 
limitations that increase the potentiality of accidents at the subsidiary. Therefore, this 
site will be closed in 1999. According to FEEMA’s inspector59, the licensing process 
of the new site (in Jacarepagua, Rio de Janeiro city) is in progress, in which the major 
requirement is the effluents’ treatment system.
FEEMA’s official60 explained that the regulation on urban zoning (from 1981) 
has allowed companies to remain in residential areas if their pollution emissions are 
controlled. A period was granted by the environmental authority for the necessary 
adaptations. Therefore, companies that refuse to incorporate pollution control systems 
must be relocated to an industrial area. Glaxo had these options, that is to control 
industrial pollution or to relocate. The main explanation from FEEMA61 for such long 
process of negotiation was the fact that companies usually threaten the authorities with 
closure of the site thereby increasing unemployment (which confirms Zulauf, 1994) .
Glaxo’s director63 affirms that long negotiation with FEEMA was based on the 
possibility of installing an effluents’ treatment system at the current site. Later, the 
subsidiary’s decision to relocate was based on the following factors: (a) non- 
compliance with corporate safety principles, (b) economic stability in Brazil, (c) 
availability of resources, and (d) lack of space to build a facility for effluents’ 
treatment. Besides these factors, the current site is located in a very poor residential
59 Interview with FEEMA’s inspector responsible for Glaxo’s site (on 06/12/96).
60 Interview with FEEMA’s official in the Pollution Control Division (on 02/10/96).
61 Ibid.
62 Although there are no specific cases reported by the media, Zulauf (1994, pp. 76-77) classified these 
cases as ‘urban companies’ (from textile, food and chemical sectors), which have real difficulties in 
installing effluents’ treatment due to the lack of space. These companies are reactive towards legislation 
with a predominant and recurrent pattern of environmental degradation. Finally, they usually threaten 
authorities with termination of their operations, but in some cases the environmental improvements are 
genuinely unfeasible due to financial problems.
63 Interview at Glaxo’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 56.
210
area, which represents higher risks of fire and contamination in an already vulnerable 
environment64.
Negotiation with the environmental agency has been a recurrent issue for the 
Brazilian subsidiary. In the early 90s, primary manufacturing was questioned by 
FEEMA because the chemical process was supposed to be extremely polluting. It was 
another polemic negotiation, which was caused by two factors. First, the agency lacked 
knowledge of the operational process based on industrial secrecy. Second, the 
‘company representative had paid an agent to get the licence illegally’65, which 
constitutes a typical situation “in a society full of mediations”. According to Amado 
and Brasil (1991, p. 55) “these mediators are, in fact, institutionalized ‘jeitinho’. That 
is why there are some laws that simply do not apply”. Moreover, excessive 
bureaucracy in Brazil “causes the displacement of objectives, a certain accommodation 
and disharmony between the written rule and the behavior it induces”. Consequently, 
the main concern is to avoid or ignore legal requirements (Ibid., pp. 48-49).
In terms of the selected companies located in Sao Paulo state, CETESB has 
provided some information66 indicating that Eli Lilly and HMR were not penalized for 
events of non compliance with the environmental legislation67. More specifically, 
Lilly’s director68 said that the main concern at the Cosmopolis site is with liquid 
wastes because of the potential impacts of chemical substances on the river. It was 
explained that accidents with liquid wastes are more critical due to their immediate 
effects. However, there is also the potential that solid wastes disposed in the soil will 
contaminate the underground water (if not constantly monitored). Accordingly, 
CETESB’s official69 affirmed that Lilly has no major environmental impacts; neither
64 The former environmental secretary in Rio de Janeiro argued that many urban environmental 
problems are, indeed, the result of population pressures and inadequate planning; but industries continue 
to be responsible for serious air, soil, and water pollution (Financial Times, 2 December 1997, p. 9).
65 It is recognized that “as long as regulations are lax and enforcement is inadequate, there will be 
companies trying to get out o f environmental responsibility in Brazil”. Accordingly, companies typically 
bribe officials’ to have authorization for environmental-related requirements (Financial Times, 2 
December 1997, p. 9).
66 Document from CETESB’s central office in Sao Paulo (dated 04/12/96) which covers the period from 
January 1995 to November 1996.
67 Lilly (in Morumbi) and Hoechst (in Suzano) sites were included in the Tiete Project in 1991. Lilly 
should be connected to SABESP’s effluents’ treatment system. Hoechst installed a system to control the 
effluent’s pH and made an agreement with SABESP for effluent collection and treatment (CETESB, 
1995).
68 Interview at Lilly’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 54.
69 Interview with CETESB’s official at the regional office in Campinas, Sao Paulo state (on 14/10/96).
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the incinerator nor the Elanco unit manufacturing herbicides (both located in the 
Cosmopolis site) received negative evaluation from the environmental authority.
Overall, it was stated that ‘the pharmaceutical industry causes less potential 
damage to the environment than to employees’ (confirming Ives, 1985), suggesting 
that contamination will happen by lack of control over manufacturing practices. 
Moreover, there is no guarantee of contamination avoidance in the industry because 
there is no homogenous behaviour among pharmaceutical companies.
In Lilly’s subsidiary corporate principles are more important (and stricter) than 
local requirements, though local legislation is taken into consideration. There was also 
the argument that these corporate requirements will influence local authorities. For 
example, CETESB’s technicians were invited to participate in the installation of the 
incinerator at Lilly’s site in order to acquire knowledge of the new technology. This is 
a practice beyond legal requirements, thus, a case of overcompliance claimed by the 
subsidiary. CETESB70 stated that Lilly’s site has its pollution emissions under control, 
but this was not a case of overcompliance.
Considering the environmental impacts caused by HMR’s sites71, it was stated 
that air emission is not a problem. However, the product packaging will generate a 
large amount of solid wastes. Besides this, liquid effluents may produce some 
environmental impact as well, given that any operational mistake may contaminate the 
effluents. In such a case the effluents will be impregnated with ‘active principles’ in 
small quantities that will produce a negative effect on the river’s water.
Additionally, HMR’s manager72 said that there are specific requirements 
imposed by the operational licensing at CETESB. First, is the obligation to pay (it is 
paid by organic volume discharged per thousand litres) SABESP for collecting and 
treating the effluents (a service that is not already in operation). Secondly, is the 
obligation to report (every three months) the generation of solid wastes73, since there
70 Ibid.
71 Interview at Hoechst Marion Roussel (on 07/11/96), with the EH&S and engineering manager of the 
Brazilian subsidiary at the operational level (who is also responsible for governmental relations 
regarding operational aspects). The interviewee was formerly the SHE manager of Dow Chemical 
located in Salvador (Bahia state), transferred to Marion Merrell Dow site in Santo Amaro (where the 
interview was conducted, in Sao Paulo city) prior to the merger with Hoechst.
72 Ibid.
73 CETESB collects data regularly on the generation and disposal of wastes from all industries in the 
Sao Paulo metropolitan area, which generates more than 180,000 tonnes per year. In 1992, a summary 
of hazardous wastes was disclosed. The pharmaceutical industry produced 138 tonnes, which is minor
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are hazardous and non-hazardous wastes at the HRM’s sites. It is relevant to 
emphasize that these requests from CETESB are evidence that the agency is, to some 
extent, controlling industrial pollution. Finally, waste management at HMR focuses 
more on the possibility of inadvertent ingestion of products disposed in landfills than 
on their potential environmental impacts. As with any other medicine it may be toxic if 
taken indiscriminately; wastes are therefore incinerated at Hoechst Chemical.
Surprisingly, Glaxo’s director74 blamed the legislation for the current 
difficulties of waste management in Brazil. For example, there is a legal obligation to 
dispose of wastes within the same state where they were generated (to avoid the 
transfer of hazardous wastes to states that lack mechanisms of adequate disposal). 
Moreover, there are strict legal requirements for wastes disposal through incineration 
(confirmed by Lilly’s case).
In total, environmental management in the pharmaceutical industry focuses on 
safety issues. Based on the findings, safety concern has been replicated in all cases. 
However, the safety approach varies from one company to another. For example, it is 
possible to note that Glaxo has a very traditional approach in which safety statistics 
(measured by hours/days lost with accidents) is the key criteria for evaluating 
performance.
Interestingly, Glaxo’s director75 argued that in the past the focus was 
exclusively on fire prevention. In the subsidiary’s safety manual (Glaxo, n.d.) such a 
focus is still explicit. Besides this, the corporate policy for HS&E issues is 
subordinated and managed by the ‘Group Risk Management’ (Glaxo, 1992). Overall, it 
was identified a concern with occupational health and accidents in the Brazilian 
subsidiary. Nevertheless, environmental concern is solely identifiable by the use of 
end-of-the-pipe technology to control air emissions and noise.
In other words, environmental performance is measured by the number of 
accidents rather than by the prevention of environmental impacts. The absence of 
accidents is explicitly considered at Glaxo’s subsidiary, as an evidence of control over 
SHE issues. As an example of outdated business thinking (as suggested by Zulauf, 
1994), Glaxo is keen on accident statistics as a standard of efficiency without due
when compared with the chemical industry that generated 88,952 tonnes (Gazeta Mercantil, 29 January, 
1996, p. A - ll) .
74 Interview at Glaxo’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 56.
75 Ibid.
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concern for its effluent releases. Moreover, Glaxo’s subsidiary76 received an award in 
1995 for the achievement of one year without accidents, which was used as evidence 
that corporate principles had been implemented. This is a valid indicator of 
performance for safety, however this award is not a guarantee of good environmental 
performance.
Overall, some pharmaceutical companies usually associate ‘good 
manufacturing practices’ (GMP) with safety practices. These industrial 
recommendations were initially related to the manufacturing, processing and 
packaging of pharmaceuticals, but later included medicinal chemicals to make sure 
that drugs are safe, efficient and stable (Ballance et al., 1992, pp. 141-146). In practical 
terms, GMP is concerned with the use of appropriate individual safety equipment, 
filters to collect powder during manufacturing, and measures to safeguard 
simultaneous production of drugs against the danger of cross contamination.
Lilly’s case reveals a more proactive approach towards safety issues. For 
example, Lilly’s subsidiary77 participates in a voluntary initiative launched by the 
business community in Paulinia78. The scheme was developed by a group of 
companies (e.g., Petrobras, Rhodia, Elanco, Zeneca and others) with the purpose of 
preventing and/or combating accidents. Therefore, equipment was acquired to create a 
private fire brigade. The main justification for the initiative is that accidents in this 
industrial complex may cause great problems (such as explosions, hazardous spills and 
emissions) if not promptly stopped.
Finally, HMR considers that safety depends on the overall improvement of 
performance at the subsidiary which will in turn minimize risks. In fact, safety is the 
unique area which already has performance indicators which are reported to the 
headquarters since the merger. The HMR’s manager79 mentioned that the level of 
accidents at the workplace used to be high in Brazil. In recent years, it is decreasing as
76 From the Brazilian Association of Safety and Accident Prevention, which is not an environmental 
award. For example, the Brazilian Association of Sales and Marketing Representative selects the best 
cases of environmental management since 1993 (Estado de S.Paulo, 25 September 1995, p. BIO). The 
most recent winners of its ‘Top Ecology’ award are: ABIQUIM, Cetrel, SABESP, Degussa, Hering, 
Malwee, OPP, Petrobras, TetraPak and Unibanco (Gazeta Mercantil, 17 November 1997).
77 Interview at Lilly’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 54.
78 The petrochemical complex of Paulinia was legally created in October 1996 by federal law, though it
already has a large concentration of companies. However, it received investments of US$ 4.8 billion for
expansion (Gazeta Mercantil, 17 October 1996, p. C-3).
79 Interview at HMR’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 71.
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a consequence of high investment (in equipment and human resource development) to 
prevent accidents within the industry.
In terms of environmental issues, the Santo Amaro site received an award from 
the governmental authority80 when the project to recover the Tiete river was launched. 
However, the project required the installation of a facility to control the ‘pH’ of liquid 
effluents discharged into the river, and another facility for effluents pre-treatment on 
this site. The company’s system must be connected to the collector duct from 
SABESP81; however, the connection was not accomplished until 1996. In conclusion, 
the lack of both control of ‘pH’ and pre-treatment of effluents until the early 90s may 
be considered as a major environmental impact from this site, as well as a sign of poor 
environmental management at Marion Merrell.
5.3.1.2 - Environmental commitment from the pharmaceutical industry
Based on the empirical evidence, the minor environmental impacts justify the 
lack of environmental concern in the pharmaceutical industries associations. However, 
this industry lacks an initiative similar to the Responsible Care programme in the 
chemical industries. More specifically, the industry associations (in the UK, the US 
and Brazil) admitted the lack of guidelines for the improvement of their members’ 
environmental practices, and the recurrent justification for this was the industry’s 
minor environmental impacts.
For example, the British association (ABPI)82 stated that its members are 
signatories of the RC programme from the CIA. Therefore the association has no 
immediate need for programmes related to environmental issues. Moreover, the 
ABPI’s official said that the environmental impact caused by the pharmaceutical 
industry is more a consequence of the use of chemicals (e.g., solvents) during ‘primary
80 This site was formerly Merrel-LePetit and as such received a certificate from the Sao Paulo Secretary 
of State for Water Resources for its participation in the project to recover the Tiete river (in 30 
November 1993). Besides this, HMR’s manager received an award for his environmental activities at 
Dow Chemical ( ‘1992 President Environmental Care Awards).
81 SABESP has invested approximately US$ 3.5 billion (from 1995 to 1998) to rationalize the use of 
water, reduce wastes and to preserve the springs. The sewage collection increased from 64% of the 
population in 1994 to 79% in 1997 in the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo. The sewage treatment 
increased from 25% (in 1994) to 46% (in 1997) of the collected amount, and it should reach 60% in 
1998. Finally, from 1998 the treated sewage will be re-used by the industry at lower prices.
82 Interview with official from the Association of British Pharmaceutical Industries (on 01/04/96).
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manufacturing’. This manufacturing stage is done in the UK, and is an activity that 
pharmaceutical companies usually concentrate within industrialized countries, major 
markets and/or home countries.
The second phase of pharmaceutical processing, that is, ‘manipulation’, has 
insignificant environmental impacts (e.g., due to the disintegration of tables). This is 
the activity often located in developing countries, for the formulation of products to be 
commercialized in domestic markets (such an argument confirms the dependence of 
developing countries on imports of active principles, as suggested by Gereffi, 1983 
and Ballance et al., 1992).
Likewise, the American association (PhRMA)83, which represents the 
American pharmaceutical industry worldwide, states that its major concern is public 
policy advocacy for the industry within major markets. Similarly, the PhRMA has no 
policy and/or guidelines relating to environmental issues.
In the Brazilian context, the industry association (ABIFARMA)84 affirmed that 
it has not been working with its members on environmental issues. Once again, the 
minor environmental impact generated by the industry was used to justify this lack of 
concern. Likewise, the Brazilian subsidiaries confirmed that the industry association 
has never made reference to environmental issues. Besides this, they understand that 
the association’s major role is the political representation of the industry’s interests in 
governmental spheres.
More specifically, Glaxo’s director85 stated that there are meetings at the 
industry association to discuss technical issues related to GMP, but environmental 
issues are not addressed. The reason for such lack of concern was that companies’ 
managers and business representatives are not environmentally driven (considering 
that this is a new social and political issue in Brazil). For example, Glaxo’s subsidiary 
has no interest in being certified by the ISO 14000 or BS 7750 (though the corporation
OiT
recognizes certification as useful ) because the marketing opportunities in Brazil are 
insignificant as a consequence of the certification.
83 Based on a letter from the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (dated 19/03/96).
84 Based on a letter from the Brazilian Association of Pharmaceutical Industries (dated 03/04/96).
85 Interview at Glaxo’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 56.
86 The corporate newsletter emphasizes the relevance of systematic environmental management (such as 
BS 7750 and the European Community’s EMS). Moreover, the affiliates should develop their own EMS 
based on these initiatives (Glaxo, 1994b).
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Likewise, Lilly’s director87 said that the industry association has neither 
pressurized the member companies for better SHE issues nor issued guidelines to be 
followed to this end. In the Brazilian context, the association has political power to 
represent the companies’ interests, but lacks resources to monitor their behaviour. 
More specifically, the Brazilian association lacks resources and interest in controlling 
companies practices on secondary matters because its major task is to lobby for its 
members’ interests (e.g. for the approval of the patent law). Finally, HMR’s manager88 
affirmed that since the pharmaceutical industries association lacks any strategy for 
EH&S issues the subsidiary was never pressurized by them.
Despite the lack of commitment from the pharmaceutical industries 
associations, most of the large pharmaceutical TNCs have primary manufacturing sites 
where chemicals substances (e.g. solvents and highly inflammable substances such as 
alcohol) are handled. Therefore, the RC scheme has members from the pharmaceutical 
industry. More specifically, Glaxo is a member of the initiative in the UK and 
Germany, but not in Brazil. Eli Lilly is a signatory of the programme in the US and 
Brazil, because of their primary pharmaceutical manufacturing and chemical 
operations. Hoechst is committed to the RC sponsored by chemical associations in the 
US, the UK, Germany and Brazil. However, HMR’s subsidiary has not committed 
itself to the RC in Brazil.
Lilly’s director89 recognized that after the RC’s implementation there were 
changes in the perception of the community towards the company and vice versa. The 
“pharmaceutical industry is a big window at which to throw stones”; therefore, the RC 
will improve the company’s public image. However most important is the novelty of 
the business-community relationship in the Brazilian context. Consequently, the 
subsidiary promotes “open doors” events for employees’ families and the local 
community, at the Morumbi site. Similarly, the chemical cases have indicated that the 
RC is improving the companies’ relations with the community as well as their public 
image.
Apart from these findings from Lilly, concern with local communities is not 
among the priorities of the selected subsidiaries. Furthermore, there is no shared
87 Interview at Lilly’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 54.
88 Interview at HMR’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 71.
89 Interview at Lilly’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 54.
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agreement among the cases of what should be their responsibilities towards local 
communities. Nevertheless, social responsibility is a key element of pharmaceutical 
industry relationships with the public90. Moreover, pharmaceutical companies are 
particularly prone to being recognized by their social responsibility rather than 
environmental performance. However, the initiatives mentioned by the corporate 
reports are not in existence at the Brazilian subsidiaries. Consequently, it is plausible 
to argue that such social concern is usually intense in the home countries (and/or 
community where the headquarters is located91), which emphasizes the political role of 
the headquarters even further.
Glaxo’s director92 confirms that the Brazilian context lacks environmental 
concern, thus companies and employees are just reproducing their context93. However, 
there are no special guidelines from the headquarters, though Glaxo’s site is 
surrounded by a shanty town. The lack of special guidelines for affiliates located in 
developing countries was also found in Lilly’s and HMR’s cases, confirming findings 
from UNTCMD (1993). Moreover, Lilly’s director94 affirms that “Brazilians do not 
believe in safety measures”. It is necessary to patrol their behaviour, for example, over 
the use of personal protection equipment, because “they are extremely rebellious”95.
Considering that there are no external guidelines to be followed by 
pharmaceutical companies, the corporate policies become the most relevant guidance 
for environmental incorporation at subsidiary level. Some aspects of these EMS are 
industry-specific, such as waste management and/or recycling programmes. There is 
evidence of such practices in all cases. For example, Glaxo’s subsidiary has recycling 
programmes for glass and paper96. However, the most interesting example of waste 
management concerns a respiratory product (in aerosol form containing CFCs). More 
specifically, after filling the products some gas is left in the containers and it must be
90 Lilly (1995a) and Lilly’s subsidiary provide examples of benefits for the Indianapolis’ community 
sponsored by the corporation. In Glaxo (1995) there are references to worldwide charitable work from 
Glaxo’s affiliates. Finally, Hoechst (1996b) introduced a magazine called ‘Change’ aiming to 
demonstrate its engagement on social, ecological and economic responsibility worldwide.
91 For example, Glaxo became a sponsor of the government’s initiative to protect endangered species 
throughout the UK. Glaxo’s official says that “species with a medical link would clearly be of interest to 
us, and the leech clearly falls into that category” (Financial Times, 2 September 1997, p. 9).
92 Ibid.
93 This kind of institutional isomorphism is generally used as an excuse for more environmental 
degradation (Financial Times, 2 December 1997, p. 9).
94 Interview at Lilly’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 54.
95 A more elaborate discussion on Brazilian management style is made by Amado and Brasil (1991).
96 Interview at Glaxo’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 56.
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removed prior to packaging incineration. Consequently, the wastes are sent to the US 
resulting in a very expensive procedure97. The subsidiary acknowledged the existence 
of incineration services in Brazil, but the companies running them refused to bum 
packaging with CFCs wastes.
As a consequence of the high costs of incineration, Lilly is concerned with the 
reduction of the volume of wastes generated by the manufacturing process. Some 
reduction has been achieved by diminishing the use of acids and changing raw 
materials for less toxic substances. Lilly’s director98 stated that wastes impregnated 
with acids and nitrogen have recently been transformed into fertilizers. Finally, there 
are recycling programmes at HMR for wastes of PVC, aluminum, cardboard, paper, 
fuel, glass and wood99. However, wastes that have been in contact with ‘active 
principles’ during the packaging process will be incinerated at Hoechst’s chemical 
division in Suzano.
In contrast to Glaxo’s opinion, HMR’s manager100 claimed that environmental 
awareness is increasing in Brazil101. Thus, ‘in the past MNCs brought the technology, 
concepts and policies that the local employees thought to be exaggerated’, because the 
corporate requirements were far beyond the local experience. More recently, 
globalization has helped to disseminate good and bad practices from experiences in 
other countries, which also helped to raise the Brazilian employees’ concern with 
environmental issues.
Additionally, HMR’s manager102 states that it is still difficult to implement the 
corporate ‘basics principles’ fully in the Brazilian site. However, it has changed 
dramatically in the last ten years from the decentralization and total autonomy of the 
subsidiaries to a more restrictive type of management. Today, the corporations are 
much more concerned with their operations in Brazil103, because there is “the
97 Glaxo (1992, p. 14) states that high priority is being given to the development of an alternative 
propellant.
98 Interview at Lilly’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 54.
99 Interview at HMR’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 71.
100 Ibid.
101 The Brazilian Foundation for Sustainable Development (FBSD) was created in 1992 as a 
consequence of the UNCED in Rio. This initiative is basically sponsored by large domestic companies, 
which have gained credibility at national and international level (at the UN) for its projects in alternative 
energy, biodiversity conservation and the promotion of exchange between public and private sectors 
(Estado de S.Paulo, 7 April 1995, p. A2).
102 Interview at HMR’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 71.
103 The Brazilian automotive industry (which is dominated by TNCs) is discussing a project of car 
recycling in conjunction with governmental environmental agencies and universities. Another interesting
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possibility that their bad practices in developing countries will appear in the 
international media”. The main reason for such change is the TNCs’ high concern with 
their image (a similar argument is made by Turner and Hodges, 1992).
5.3.2 - Economic and competitive aspects
There are some findings explicitly related to the structural (and basically 
economic) aspects of the pharmaceutical industry, namely, technology, costs, 
competition and market. These findings will be addressed throughout this section.
5.3.2.1 - Technology-based explanations
Firstly, it was discovered that most of the environmental impacts at current 
operations of the selected subsidiaries are caused by the technological limitations of 
the operational processes. However, the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals requires 
some special concern in order to avoid contamination. Glaxo’s subsidiary claims that 
the corporate environmental policy is completely based on ‘world pharmaceutical 
concepts’104 (that is, the manufacturing guidelines from the WHO105). Ballance et al. 
(1992, pp. 141-148) affirm that the WHO has developed an international set of 
recommendations for good manufacturing practices in the pharmaceutical industry.
For example, when the basic input is a powder it is necessary to protect the 
employees and to control dust emissions into the atmosphere. This contamination is 
avoided at Glaxo’s subsidiary by the exhaustion system and the use of personal 
protective masks. Similarly, wastes from the compression of tablets will be 
incinerated, though they may release solvent vapour during tablet coating processes 
(Glaxo, 1992). The wastes from the manufacturing of cream and liquids are difficult to
case comes from recycling initiatives from the subsidiaries of Unilever, Tetra-Pak, Danone and 
Mercedez-Benz (Cempre News, No. 37, March, 1998).
104 According to Glaxo’s newsletter (1994b, pp. 1-2) more than a corporate environmental policy is 
needed to improve performance; an EMS should therefore be established by affiliates with the support 
of the ‘Group Environmental Protection Manual’.
105 See WHO (1987) ‘Certification scheme on the quality of pharmaceutical products moving in 
international commerce and text of good manufacturing practices’ (PHARM/82.4, Rev. 3), Geneva: 
WHO.
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segregate (that is, the liquid effluents from the washing of tanks106). This water 
becomes an industrial effluent that must go to the decanter tank (to attenuate the active 
principles of the raw materials) and later it is sent to the treatment system. Overall, 
Glaxo’s subsidiary107 has emphasized that the environmental impacts of its operations 
is low, though the site has neither effluents’ treatment nor an incinerator.
The technological pattern of the Brazilian subsidiaries is claimed to be similar 
to Lilly’s other affiliates108, because the corporation has only ‘one standard 
worldwide’109. In 1996, a corporate meeting of ‘site heads’ from all affiliates was held 
in Brazil, which is evidence of the high local standards. More specifically, the 
Brazilian subsidiary undertakes both stages of pharmaceutical production. The primary 
manufacturing is done at the Cosmopolis site, where Lilly made an investment of US$ 
10 million in 1993 for the installation of an incinerator110 to dispose of both liquid and 
solid wastes. There is also special treatment for gas emissions made by a “scrubbers” 
system. The waste of this washing process - soda - will be burnt in the incinerator. 
Besides this, there is a biological treatment system for sewage prior to discharge into 
the river. The Cosmopolis site manufactures a large amount of antibiotics and 
herbicides, and both have a high risk of contamination. Therefore, there are monitoring 
points throughout the site to check potential contamination. In conclusion, the 
subsidiary claims that the manufacturing processes have adequate control to avoid 
environmental degradation111.
According to HMR’s manager112 the key element constraining better 
environmental management is the technological pattern of the site. Besides this, access 
to technological solution will influence and enhance the effective implementation of 
the corporate requirements. However, the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry is mostly
106 Glaxo (1992, p. 10) provides some recommendation of ‘best practices’ that all affiliates should 
follow. For example, sites with primary production will produce at least “10% of organic material, salts 
and inorganic filtering materials” which require effluent controls. In secondary production plants the 
“liquid wastes are usually discharged, under licence, into local sewage systems and treated by municipal 
water companies”. However, these are ‘minimum standards to be improved upon wherever possible’.
107 Interview at Glaxo’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 56.
108 Interview at Lilly’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 54.
109 There is a managerial tool called ‘Lilly Team Excellence’ representing the corporate philosophy 
(Lilly, 1993, p. 7) of total quality management, which reflects the strategy of achieving global presence 
and critical capabilities (including organizational effectiveness and biotechnology expertise).
110 Gazeta Mercantil, 29 January 1996, p. A - ll .
111 These pollution control mechanisms at Lilly’s site were confirmed by CETESB’s official (on 
14/10/96).
112 Interview at HMR’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 71.
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made up of old machinery, so there are limits to environmental improvements. At 
HMR there is ‘a combination of old machines (installed 20 years ago) and last 
generation machines’ (e.g., to inspect products automatically). The subsidiary received 
investments to modernize the Suzano site until the year 2000.
Accordingly, new technology has been introduced at HMR’s subsidiary during 
recent years to improve the EH&S performance, which automatically generated a 
lower level of wastes. The operational process also became more rational with less 
employees exposure to ‘active principles’. This is evidence that an ‘aggressive and 
risky process’ must be improved by technological change. If technological change is 
unachievable then employees are protected with personal equipment. In sum, HMR’s
i i - }
manager stated that both sites in Brazil have manufacturing processes designed to 
avoid employees contaminating the product, consequently they are presumed immune 
from contamination.
A similar explanation was given by Glaxo and Eli Lilly regarding employees, 
though HMR and Lilly have more modem and larger sites than Glaxo. Most important 
is the replication of the findings, that is the main impact of pharmaceutical 
manufacturing is related to occupational health. The fact that Brazilian employees are 
less qualified (as asserted by Glaxo and Lilly) and consequently require special 
protection, is not the main point. More comprehensive and plausible explanations were 
given by HMR. The risks and impacts of pharmaceutical manufacturing may be 
controlled at the level of the operational process, therefore the employees exposure is 
reduced.
The same technological access is required for waste management in the 
subsidiaries. However, the lack of resources limits the technological upgrading. For 
example, Glaxo’s director114 mentioned that the Brazilian subsidiary has no resource 
to invest in an incinerator, which represents an investment of approximately US$ 15 
million. Therefore, the wastes generated by the manufacturing of tablets and creams 
from Glaxo are sent to Bayer’s incinerator (German chemical company). At the new 
site the procedures for wastes segregation will be changed, considering that the plant 
lay-out does not permit easy access to the manufacturing area. At the current site this 
is possible, increasing the potential of contamination.
113 Ibid.
1,4 Interview at Glaxo’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 56.
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The incinerator at Lilly115 has an automatic monitoring system, which will 
release gases only if they are within the acceptable standards. However, there are some 
restrictions on the type of wastes to be incinerated. The company is not burning ‘heavy 
metals or substances containing phosphorous and chlorine’ in order to avoid 
environmental liabilities related to the release of dioxin and/or the disposal of 
contaminated ashes (as criticized by Greenpeace, 1992). Additionally, the incineration 
represents a high investment, which requires a high volume of waste to become 
profitable. Consequently, Lilly stored three thousand tonnes of waste (in a warehouse 
approved by CETESB) for five years prior to the incinerator start-up in 1994, which 
was fundamental in justifying the investment. The subsidiary has been using 60 
percent of the incinerator capacity and selling 40 percent to other companies.
The Hoechst Group initiated the incineration of hazardous wastes116 in Brazil 
in 1987. It is alleged to be the first incinerator installed in the chemical industry and 
the first for solid wastes in Brazil (Hoechst, 1994b, p. 5). The incinerator was built to 
destroy the wastes stored by the Suzano site and other Brazilian sites. Later the wastes 
incineration became a new business, in which 50 percent of the burning capacity is 
reserved for external users (totalling 100 clients). This equipment is licensed by 
CETESB to bum all types of hazardous wastes117. Therefore, Hoechst118 is responsible 
for the analysis, elaboration of documents for transportation, packaging and the final 
destination of the ashes (disposed of at the landfill of ‘Ecossistema’ in Sao Jose dos 
Campos, Sao Paulo).
As regards product development, Glaxo’s report (1994a, p. 16) makes 
reference to ‘investment in the development of CFC-free propellants for use in 
respiratory treatments’. The new propellant and the gas filling equipment would be 
available from 1997, thus Glaxo Group will schedule the change of equipment among 
the affiliates because it represents a large investment. The Brazilian subsidiary will 
probably receive the new technology when the new site is activated in 1999.
Based on the literature (Evans, 1979; Gereffi, 1983; and Ballance et al., 1992), 
there are no R&D activities in subsidiaries located in developing countries. This
115 Interview at Lilly’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 54.
116 Gazeta Mercantil, 29 January 1996, p. A - l l .
117 According to CETESB the wastes are classified as Class I - hazardous, Class II - contaminated by 
toxic substances, and Class III - inert (Gazeta Mercantil, 29 January 1996, p. A - ll) .
118 Gutberlet (1996, p. 135) has indicated that Hoechst has been spending approximately US$ 12 
thousand per year on its internal environmental programmes.
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assumption has been corroborated in all cases. However, there are laboratories for the 
development of process and product in both sites of HMR. Moreover, Lilly’s case has 
a surprising finding since the current status of the subsidiary has been changed to 
include clinical trials (though it has been developing industrial routes since 1994). 
Since the patent law was passed in 1996, partnership between local scientists and 
companies has started to flourish for applied research. For example, Lilly has 
contracted two scientists to develop medical research aiming to secure the approval of 
new products by governmental authorities. In effect, Lilly aims to achieve 
simultaneous approval for new products in many countries, because this is an essential 
and expensive part of drug development119.
This simultaneous launching of new products in distinct markets is a key 
aspect of the globalisation in the world pharmaceutical industry. It aims mainly to 
accelerate the return on R&D investments (since the bulk of the revenue will come 
from being first or second to market a new compound). At present, large firms are able 
to accomplish a worldwide launch in only three years (in the past they required eight to 
ten years). Ballance et al. (1992, p. 124) stated that Glaxo was one of the pioneers by 
undertaking a worldwide launch (of its anti-ulcer pill) rather than focusing on just a 
few national markets. The product became Glaxo’s best-selling product reaching US$ 
24 billion in 1989.
Another critical issue in the pharmaceutical industry is biotechnological 
development. It is claimed that biotechnology enjoys the benefit of making chemical 
substances without major environmental impacts (though UNTCMD, 1993, says that 
there is scarce evaluation of the environmental implication of biotechnology 
applications). In the past the industry usually manufactured a large quantity of raw 
materials to produce a small quantity of products with a substantial amount of by­
products. Now it is necessary to develop highly sophisticated molecules to combat 
novel diseases. Therefore, biotechnology120 is regarded as the next most promising 
source of innovation within the pharmaceutical industry.
There are allegations that European and American laboratories have been 
registering patents of substances from Amazon plants; also that these companies are
119 For example, “in America it takes, on average, £ 86 million and just over nine years to go from the 
first human test o f a substance to final regulatory approval” (Economist, 1 February 1997).
120 Eli Lilly stressed that biotechnology is one of the areas of expertise that the company will 
concentrated on to provide specifically tailored solutions for health care needs (Lilly, 1995c).
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exploring indigenous knowledge in their research without paying royalties to local 
communities, thereby contravening the UN Biodiversity Convention signed in 1992. In 
the past, the revenue gained from the genetic manipulation of plants’ seeds or active
1 *71principles was exclusive to those who commercially explored it . Under the new 
rules the profits should be shared with local communities. It is also claimed that drugs 
based on substances from Amazonian species account for US$ 32 billion per year in 
the world market122.
5.3.2.2 - Cost-based explanations
According to Ballance et al. (1992, p. 127) the cost structure of pharmaceutical 
companies in developing countries “appears to vary with the country level of 
development and size of the home market”. In larger and comparatively sophisticated 
markets (such as Brazil) manufacturing accounts for 50-60 percent of total costs and 
the marketing costs are also somewhat high (from 15-30 percent of total).
Despite the lack of specific reference to environmental costs in the literature, it 
is possible (based on the cases’ findings) to state that environmental improvements 
represent additional costs for the subsidiaries. In Glaxo’s case, the new site represents 
the biggest investment ever made in a Brazilian subsidiary (it will cost US$ 111.3 
million123, more US$ 30 million in equipment). At the same time, the Glaxo Group is 
closing down 17 factories worldwide. More specifically, Glaxo’s director124 stated that 
the fact that the technology was obsolete did not justify the investment in itself. 
However, the abolition (in 1993) of governmental price control for pharmaceutical 
products was a political factor supporting this investment in Brazil.
In short, the investment was not made on environmental grounds. Eventually 
pressure from the Brazilian environmental agency was another source of pressure, 
since the current site could have legally been closed since the late 80s. On the other 
hand, the site could be closed by the headquarters (because it was not complying with 
corporate principles). Altogether, the site was neither complying with Glaxo’s GRM,
121 For example, Bristol-Myers-Squibb developed a drug for high blood pressure (generating US$ 2.5 
billion per year) based on the effects of the poison of a native snack from Brazil (Veja, 10 July 1992, 
pp. 74-76).
122 Folha de S.Paulo, 1 June 1997, p. 2.
123 Informativo CRQIII, December/January 1996, p. 8.
124 Interview at Glaxo’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 56.
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GMP and quality policies nor with local legal requirements. In such a context the deal 
with FEEMA was crucial, because it gave more time to relocate Glaxo’s site. In sum, 
the threat to close the site was used (as a bargaining counter) by all sides involved in 
the long negotiation.
Eli Lilly has a distinct cost-related approach. For example, Lilly’s director125 
stated that waste’s reduction is a major concern because it incurs costs. In the early 
90s, wastes were irrelevant but at present ‘they are important because any extra cost 
may challenge the company’s competitiveness’ . Waste’s reduction is mainly
197achieved through the improvement of process efficiency , which will contribute to 
reducing the costs of adequate disposal (that is, incineration). Such a perspective is 
very similar to the ‘win-win approach’ that less waste means more productivity and 
less costs for disposal (Smart, 1992; Schmidheiny, 1992).
In conclusion, the improvement in environmental performance is a 
consequence of the cost reduction approach. Additionally, there are new 
investments128 planned for the Cosmopolis site, which will inadvertently result in 
better environmental performance. Corporate policy has determined that any new 
project must already have incorporated S&E concern. For example, the current 
projects are focused on increasing productivity, reducing costs and the number of work 
hours lost through accidents. This will be accomplished without the use of substances 
that harm the environment (such as solvents, brine and CFCs). Consequently, the 
project will be more expensive now than it would be ten years ago.
Finally, the main cost-related concern at HMR regards manufacturing 
efficiency. This means a production process with well-adjusted technology and low 
externalities, which will consequently reduce production costs and potential liabilities. 
The HMR’s manager129 stated that, despite environmental improvements, that such 
approach may achieve low costs, was paramount for the company’s competitiveness.
125 Interview at Lilly’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 54.
126 The same argument about cost competitiveness is made by both the corporate report (Lilly, 1995a) 
and the subsidiary’s report (Lilly, 1995b).
127 The corporation states that environmental liabilities and litigation represented a figure of US$ 342 
million in 1995 (Lilly, 1995a, p. 43). Given that the company was designated as responsible for clean up 
sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (known as 
Superfund) in the US. In 1992, a total of US$ 139,400 was spent on the ‘asbestos abatement program’ 
and other environmental and legal matters (Lilly, 1993).
128 The subsidiary’s report (Lilly, 1995b) has indicated investments (US$ 55 million in 1995) on the 
environment, to increase operation capacity and modernization.
129 Interview at HMR’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 71.
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The implementation of corporate environmental policy is constrained by the 
need for investment to meet strict standards130. The investment aiming to achieve “fine 
tuning” in the manufacturing process must also be justified in business terms, though 
environmental improvements may place the company ahead of its competitors. Porter 
and van der Linde, 1995a, suggest that an environmentally friendly process is a 
competitive advantage. However, there is no need to be far ahead of competitors 
because each step forward may represent a higher cost.
Other cost-related factors for HMR’s subsidiary are energy price, availability of 
resources, and low labour costs (which tends to be less qualified in Brazil reducing 
productivity). In summary, these are also the advantages of being located in Brazil, 
since companies are not installed there as a consequence of lax environmental 
legislation. However, such a lax regulatory context will prevent technological 
innovation (resulting in improvement of the environmental performance in the core 
markets) from being made in Brazil. This lax context results in another cost-related 
factor, since the Brazilian subsidiary will require lower investments. In short, HMR 
provided a very clear overview of cost-related aspects and their implications for the 
environmental performance of TNCs’ subsidiaries in Brazil.
5.3.2.3 - Competitive aspects
In brief, Glaxo’s director131 stated that large pharmaceutical companies have 
very “good environmental policies, which have a specific focus on safety and 
prevention of accidents”. On the other hand, domestic firms lack such concern, 
therefore ‘foreign companies tend to lead in this area’. Regarding Glaxo’s findings, 
such leadership is probably at corporate (and rhetorical) level since the Brazilian 
subsidiary has a poor environmental performance. Besides this, it became clear that the 
environmental practices of major competitors, such as Roche (Swiss company) and 
Merck (German company), include well-defined plans with an emphasis on accident 
prevention and fire combat.
130 Hoechst Group invested DM 265 million in environmental protection measures in 1995. At the same 
year the operational costs of environmental protection were around DM 1,470 million (Hoechst, 1996c).
131 Interview at Glaxo’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 56.
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It was affirmed that Glaxo’s new site will be visibly superior when compared 
with local competitors. It is said to have state-of-the-art technology, incorporating the 
most modem concepts available within the industry. For example, EH&S concern is 
already integrated into the manufacturing process (e.g. including air emissions control, 
waste management and an effluents’ treatment system). Overall, it is claimed to be a 
major investment among the pharmaceutical companies located in Rio. However, 
other pharmaceutical companies have also been investing recently in the 
modernization of their Brazilian businesses (such as Zeneca132, Hoechst133 and 
BASF134).
HMR’s subsidiary is the largest laboratory in Brazil, and its competitors are 
Bristol Meyers Squibb (American), Roche (Swiss) and Ache (Brazilian company); 
though the company competes with small laboratories in specific products lines. The 
subsidiary claims to be ‘one step beyond the competitors’ in EH&S issues. This stems 
from the fact that the chemical industry is susceptible to large accidents and risks. 
Consequently, the pharmaceutical companies that are linked with chemical operations 
achieved some expertise in EH&S issues (specifically the managerial ability to control 
the risk of operations).
On the contrary, exclusively pharmaceutical companies have an incipient 
concern when compared with those aggregated to chemical groups. However, some 
aspects of EMS in chemical operations do not suit pharmaceutical processes; others 
are appropriate though not yet widespread within the industry. Therefore, HMR has 
expertise to go beyond the purely pharmaceutical companies. The current HMR 
approach towards EH&S issues originated in the chemical divisions of both Dow and 
Hoechst136. Marion copied from Dow Chemical and Hoechst pharmaceutical was 
managed in conjunction with the chemical division. Thus, the HMR subsidiary will 
incorporate the best aspects of Marion Dow’s legacy into a German structure.
132 Zeneca’s pharmaceutical division has been investing in Brazil since the demerger from ICI in 1993 
(interview at Zeneca Agrochemical, on 19/09/96).
133 HMR is investing US$ 120 million in a new factory at the Suzano site (Gazeta Mercantil, 3 
December 1996, p. C -l).
134 BASF’s pharmaceutical division - Knoll - received US$ 30 million to modernize and expand its 
operations in Rio (Gazeta Mercantil, 28 November 1996, p. C-4).
135 Interview at HMR’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 71.
136 ABIQUIM’s official said that Dow has good environmental practices and Hoechst is leading the 
regional coordination of the RC’s implementation from its site in Suzano (interviewed on 04/09/96).
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Amongst the foreign pharmaceutical companies in Brazil, Glaxo’s subsidiary is 
one of the few straight pharmaceutical companies. Glaxo focuses on pharmaceutical 
standards and as such it claims to have one of the best safety records within the 
industry. However, there are many diversified subsidiaries with joint chemical and 
pharmaceutical activities (such as Bayer, BASF, Hoechst, Rhodia, Novartis and Eli 
Lilly). Generally, a difficulty for companies with chemical and pharmaceutical 
businesses is to segregate the environmental impacts of each operation. Safety 
activities are usually directed towards the higher risks, that is, on the chemical 
operations.
Overall, this is the main industry-related difference between Glaxo and the 
other pharmaceutical cases. This reinforces the relevance of the research stratified 
sample, which comprises firms with clearly distinct characteristics. This latter aspect 
has elaborated the evaluation of industry differences, since the selected cases display 
diversity among large pharmaceutical companies. Besides this, they clearly represent 
the Brazilian reality, which resembles the world pharmaceutical structure of a few 
large companies of which some are part of chemical groups.
To restate, the initial criteria was to investigate companies operating 
exclusively in the pharmaceutical sector. However, in the Brazilian context most 
companies have interfaces with both chemical and pharmaceutical sectors (such as 
Lilly and Hoechst). Therefore, it was impossible to select purely pharmaceutical 
companies. According to Gereffi (1989) only a few American companies started as 
exclusive producers of ‘ethical drugs’. At present pharmaceutical companies have 
diversified businesses (including OTC drugs, toiletry products and animal medicines).
In sum, the EH&S standards are integrated in companies with chemical and 
pharmaceutical businesses. If on the one hand, this may result in stricter environmental 
guidelines, on the other it may neglect specific pharmaceutical requirements (such as 
those regulated by the WHO). These issues should be further explored considering that 
Glaxo (a genuine pharmaceutical company) has the poorest environmental 
performance among the three cases.
The influence of chemical on pharmaceutical practices was emphasized by the 
findings for Lilly137. It was indicated that DuPont (chemical company) sets the
137 Interview at Lilly’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 54.
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‘benchmark’ for SHE issues in Brazil. DuPont’s outstanding practices are justified by 
the following aspects: (a) its history as a manufacturer of explosives, thus safety has 
always been a major concern, (b) its strict practices in Brazil, such as the emergency 
barriers in the motorway near the explosive site, and (c) the site manager living at the 
plant to guarantee safety performance.
Concern with leading practices from the chemical sector may be related to 
Lilly’s herbicide unit at the Cosmopolis site. However, it is relevant to note the lack 
of leadership in SHE issues among pharmaceutical companies. It is claimed that 
domestic firms have neither concern about employees nor with the environment138. 
The difference between domestic and multinationals lies in the background of the 
headquarters.
It is interesting to emphasize this assumption about multinationals’ 
performance in Brazil139 because this a very common comment from TNCs’ 
subsidiaries, government authorities and media. However, there are exceptions across 
industries in both types of companies: domestic ones (e.g., Cetrel, Petroflex, Vale do 
Rio Doce, Aracruz, Bahia Sul and Hering) with good performance140, and TNCs with 
poor performance141 (e.g., Rhodia and Bayer).
5.3.2.4 - Market-related explanations
The marketing behaviour of a selected subsidiary must be analysed in face of 
the peculiar characteristics of the local market. For example, there is a strong emphasis 
on selling medicines by brand name and without prescription. Glaxo’s subsidiary142 
suggests that these aspects facilitate the commercialization of pharmaceutical products 
in Brazil. On the other hand, the economic instability of the Brazilian economy was 
indicated as one of the factors limiting investments at Glaxo (e.g., the new site was
138 Such a claim was confirmed by government authorities regarding small and medium companies in 
Brazil (Gazeta Mercantil, 27 November 1996, p. A -l). However, there is no evidence specifically on 
large pharmaceutical companies, such as Ache, Prodome, and Tortuga.
139 Nevertheless, a survey from Price Waterhouse affirms that only 15% of the biggest companies in 
Brazil have environmental management. Among those mentioned for having an EMS most are 
multinationals such DuPont, Volvo, Sandoz, IBM, with the exception of the Brazilian mining company - 
Vale do Rio Doce (Exame, 24 April 1996, pp. 66-67).
140 Schmidheiny, 1992; UNEP, 1994; and ‘Saneamento Ambiental’, no. 37,1996, pp. 46-47.
141 Informativo CRQIII, December/January 1996, p. 5, and America Economia, January, 1998, p. 22.
142 Interview at Glaxo’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 56.
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postponed due to lack of financial resources). It was after 1995 with the economic 
improvement in Brazil, that the Latin America affiliates became more important for 
the corporation. In the end, it was mainly this market-related aspect that justified the 
new site project .
In Lilly’s case the majority of its production is sold in the domestic market 
(around 92%), but since 1994 exports have been increasing (from 5% to 8% in 1996) 
to Latin America countries and Japan. Despite the common focus on the domestic 
pharmaceutical market (an orientation shared by Glaxo and HMR), Lilly has 
developed other interests in the local market. There is specific interest in the 
opportunities for waste management in Brazil, and the customers for incineration 
services are multinational companies144. This is a very interesting aspect of the 
incineration business145, because TNCs have invested in technology to bum their 
wastes and consequently to provide similar services to other companies. However, 
local firms are neither in the business of incineration nor able to use those available, 
because of the high cost it entails.
Likewise, the Brazilian domestic market is responsible for the consumption of 
approximately 90 percent of HMR’s subsidiary production. A small proportion (from 5 
to 10%) of the production is exported to other Latin American markets. As a 
consequence of the merger, HMR’s current subsidiaries in South America will be 
restructured in the near future to rationalize regional manufacturing. Additionally, 
HMR’s manager146 emphasized that a fundamental change took place between 
government and industry. After a long period, the price control regime was abolished 
in 1993. Thereafter, the company has concentrated more on restructuring and on 
market aspects of the business.
Overall, the only case to present evidence of concern with consumers was 
HMR. After the merger of Marion and Hoechst it developed a ‘minimum requirement’ 
for pharmaceutical operations within HMR. During this process it eliminated the 
references to chemical operations. For example, in the pharmaceutical case the concept 
of EH&S must include the final consumer. Moreover, it is necessary to be aware,
143 According to Glaxo (1997, p. 5) Brazil now represents the Group’s tenth largest market.
144 Interview at Lilly’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 54.
145 The market of hazardous waste management is already dominated by TNCs’ subsidiaries, such as 
Hoechst, Novartis, Elanco, BASF and Bayer (Gazeta Mercantil, 29 January 1996, p. A- l l ) .
146 Interview at HMR’s subsidiary, as stated in Note 71.
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during the manufacturing process, that any mistake may result in a serious and 
expensive problem outside the company.
The fact that pharmaceutical companies have products for final consumers is a 
key aspect in explaining their EH&S concern. This aspect is not so relevant for the 
chemical industry as its products will be re-processed by other manufacturers. In such 
a case the products will reach the consumer after having passed through many forms of 
inspection. On the contrary, medicines will go directly from the manufacturing site to 
consumers.
5.4 - Conclusions
The pharmaceutical sector’s survival depends on a continuous stream of 
innovation, requiring a large injection of financial resources to underwrite R&D and a 
regulatory climate that facilitates innovative processes. This is mostly because when 
the patent protection expires the generation of revenue quickly declines as generic 
imitations are launched (EC, 1997).
Such a brief summary of the pharmaceutical industry’s characteristics enhances 
the dynamic context in which pharmaceutical companies operates. However it over 
simplifies the interfaces of this industry with other industries, and the social and 
political consequences of their actions in face of their products’ nature. It is evident 
that most of the concern with industrial analysis in the pharmaceutical sector is 
directed towards regulation of product protection by patents (which is a truly 
distinctive characteristic of this sector). This approach may be criticized for its 
emphasis on the sector’s critical factor (i.e., patents) without questioning the by­
products and/or potential impacts of pharmaceutical manufacturing (such as suggested 
in section 5.3.1.2; the industry associations concentrate on lobbying for its members 
and not on their EH&S performances).
Based on the industry profile and empirical findings presented earlier in this 
chapter, it is possible to draw some conclusions. Firstly, considering that other 
industries produce higher levels of pollution, the pharmaceutical industry has been 
exempt from environmental pressures. For that reason, pharmaceutical companies may
232
have maintained ‘rhetorical’ commitment towards environmental issues, but lack the 
practical side of their pledge (confirming Gleckman, 1995 and Levy, 1995). 
Moreover, UNTCMD (1993) suggests that pharmaceutical TNCs have innovative 
environmental policies and programmes as a consequence of the availability of 
financial resources; this assumption was refuted by Glaxo and HMR, but confirmed by 
Lilly.
For example, the pharmaceutical cases issued formal statements on 
environmental matters. However, none of the subsidiaries have staff exclusively 
responsible for environmental issues (as is common practice among chemical 
industries). It is usually the industrial director (e.g., Glaxo and Lilly) that is the 
individual responsible for the implementation of corporate environmental policy. The 
environmental impacts caused by their operations (primary and secondary 
manufacturing in all subsidiaries) are considered by both companies and 
environmental authorities as minor problems147. Consequently, there is no industry 
association commitment and/or pressure upon its members regarding environmental 
issues (such as in the chemical industry, which refutes Pearson, 1985). This fact also 
suggests that there are policy implications for those situations in which the 
pharmaceutical industry is regarded as a segment of the chemical industry. There are 
close interfaces that will be implicated in their major environmental impacts. 
Nevertheless, there are other EH&S issues very peculiar to pharmaceutical 
manufacturing (such as occupational and consumer health), which should be addressed 
separately.
At this point, is relevant to mention that are structural similarities between the 
chemical and pharmaceutical sectors in the Brazilian context. Briefly, both industrial 
sectors - chemical and pharmaceutical - are oligopolistic and dominated by TNCs’ 
subsidiaries. Besides this, these subsidiaries are all diversified companies (thus 
intensive in technology and capital). Finally, these are mature industries which have 
had their structural organization extensively analysed in the literature (UN, 1994; ILO, 
1995; EC, 1997; Ballance et al., 1992 and Gereffi, 1983), though environmental issues 
are not addressed in the pharmaceutical sector.
147 CETESB informed that the pharmaceutical industry is responsible for 0.08% of hazardous wastes 
generated in the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo (Gazeta Mercantil, 29 January 1996, p. A -10).
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It is possible to argue that the lower (especially when compared with chemical 
operations) potential environmental impact in the pharmaceutical sector has led to less 
concern. At least such an argument has been constantly used to justify the lax 
environmental commitment and lack of specific staff in the cases. Paradoxically, it is 
primary manufacturing that will elevate the preoccupation with risk and safety. It is 
also recognized in all instances that the health of employees and consumers is at stake. 
Consequently this is regarded as a major impact of pharmaceutical operations.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the proposition defined in the 
framework of analysis (Porter, 1980, 1991, 1995; Gleckman, 1995; Pearson, 1985; and 
Beliveau et al., 1994) was specifically devoted to potential industry-related (such as 
technology, costs, market, and competition) explanations for the implementation of 
corporate environmental policies in TNCs’ subsidiaries. More specifically, the 
proposition was: I f  industry associations have environmental guidelines, TNCs’ 
subsidiaries have stricter implementation o f corporate environmental policies.
Overall, the lower potential of environmental degradation resulted in less 
media, public and NGOs attention towards this industrial sector. Consequently, there 
is a causal relationship between low impacts and lack of commitment from the 
pharmaceutical industries associations. However, there is no evidence to suggest that 
the association commitment would improve the companies’ environmental 
performance. In view of this evidence, this proposition should be re-written according 
to the pharmaceutical cases, as follows: The industry sectors with a high (or low) 
potential o f  environmental degradation (that is, by volume o f  pollutants) will result 
respectively, in strict (or lax) implementation o f  corporate environmental policies in 
TNCs’ subsidiaries.
Surprisingly, but still indirectly related to the proposition’s assumption, the 
most obvious difference among the pharmaceutical cases comes from the combination 
with chemical operations. This is specifically the case with HMR and Lilly, therefore 
concern with primary operations is higher in these companies when compared with 
Glaxo (a genuine pharmaceutical company). HMR and Lilly are also more concerned 
with environmental impacts and operational risks. Additionally, both companies have 
a more proactive view towards safety (the industry’s major focus); this included a
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voluntary emergency scheme supported by Lilly’s site in Paulmia, and investments in 
new technology aiming to reduce operational risks at HMR.
In general terms it proved difficult (but interesting) to compare Glaxo with the 
other cases. The current state of the site is very poor (the environmental authority 
affirmed that it should be closed) and environmental management has been introduced 
only recently, resulting in a comparison of extremes (even though the company 
announces major investments in the Brazilian subsidiary).
In such a case, it is relevant to comment on the fact that the use of a small 
(stratified) sample based on polar (or opposites) types is suggested by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967); besides it was empirically applied by Pettigrew (1990, p. 267) and 
discussed by Eisenhardt (1989, p. 537) among other examples of case studies research. 
The latter states that “given the limited number of companies cases which can usually 
be studied, it makes sense to choose cases such as extreme situations and polar types 
in which the process of interest is ‘transparently observable’”. Therefore, as was 
followed in this research, the theoretical sampling assisted in the replication of some 
findings. Finally, Yin (1994) has recommended this method for imposing variance 
within the sample thereby increasing reliability in case studies research.
In conclusion, there are no common points among the cases’ approaches for 
EH&S issues, apart from the same pharmaceutical external guidelines for ‘good 
manufacturing practices’. Moreover, HMR has the biggest market-share and Lilly is 
the 8th biggest pharmaceutical companies in Brazil. Glaxo, however, was not among 
the largest pharmaceutical companies until 1995, which suggests that the subsidiary 
was a marginal business (representing 0.6% of the Group sales in 1995148) within the 
corporation. More recently the subsidiary received investments for a new site which 
has already changed its ranking in the Brazilian pharmaceutical market (that is, tenth 
in the ranking by total sales in 1996149).
As far as the three cases are concerned, the most unexpected findings came 
from Eli Lilly. The company’s high EH&S concern and practices are impressive when 
compared with the other cases. There is some evidence that Lilly is concerned with its 
public image. As well as this there is strong influence from its chemicals operations
148 Glaxo Group sales was US$ 15,850 million in 1995 (Hoover’s Handbook of World Business, 1997, 
p. 225), and Glaxo’s subsidiary sales was US$ 98.1 million in 1995 (ABIQUIM, 1996).
149 Glaxo is among the major British companies in Brazil with US$ 194.3 million in sales in 1996 
(Exame, ‘Melhores e Maiores’, 1997, p. 95).
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within the whole company. There is also clear interest in exploring market 
opportunities in the waste management business. Finally, there are empirical findings 
that are not industry-related (both in their nature and in comparison with the other 
cases), therefore other potential explanations will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter VI - Case studies analysis based on the interdisciplinary model
The main objective of this chapter is to address the research propositions that 
were used as ‘rivals’ to industry-related explanations (discussed in chapters four and 
five of this thesis) for the implementation of corporate environmental policies in 
TNCs’ subsidiaries. Consequently, this chapter will answer the research question (in a 
complementary way), since the industry-related explanations were not sufficient to 
explain the incorporation of environmental issues by the Brazilian subsidiaries of 
foreign owned firms.
The present discussion is based on the comparative analysis of findings from 
six case studies. The first section focuses on explanations related to the countries of 
origin and corporate management of the selected cases. The following section will re­
evaluate the research design in order to discuss the methodological implications of the 
empirical data. In this latter section research propositions will be addressed and 
relevant evidence will be summarized. Finally, the last section presents the 
conclusions of this thesis and suggests aspects that deserve further research.
6.1 - Comparative analysis
The research design (introduced in section 1.2 of this thesis) set out a pattern of 
analysis focused on cross-country and cross-industry comparisons. After the empirical 
phase of research was completed, the data analysis was organized into categories; this 
was partially accomplished in the previous chapters. More specifically, chapter three 
described and analysed the contextual conditions in Brazil. Chapters four and five 
described the characteristics of the selected industries and economic and regulatory 
aspects that have affected the implementation of corporate environmental policies in 
the Brazilian subsidiaries.
The present section has among its objectives: (a) to complement the previous 
explanations of corporate environmental policy implementation, (b) to refute any 
simplistic view from the literature that has indicated either that corporate 
environmental policy is explained by single factors such as regulatory policy or the
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technological and economic characteristics of the industry, and (c) to reinforce some 
aspects from the previous analysis. This dialectical position is particularly reliant on 
empirical investigation which claims that similar and divergent findings are also the 
result of different perspectives used by the researcher: “when one adopts a different 
perspective with which to view ostensibly the same organizational phenomena, one 
simply focuses on different things” (Gioia et al., 1989, p. 503).
In conclusion, it is expected that the empirical findings presented in this 
section will support the a^sumptio)i that the origin of the subsidiaries is a relevant 
aspect of their environmental policies and practices. Accordingly, the national and 
management aspects of environmental practices are based on findings from two 
companies in each country of origin. Consequently, any generalization from them 
should be carefully understood as analytical generalization (as such this stratified 
sampling is supported by the literature without jeopardizing the objectives of this 
research, Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994 and Yin, 1993).
Otherwise, if such an assumption is not supported by the findings the 
implementation of corporate environmental policy will be a result of other variables, 
such as industry character (basically representing economic factors) and/or the host 
country character (representing a regulatory factor, since no social pressure affecting 
Brazilian subsidiaries was identified).
6.1.1 - Explanations grounded in the home countries
This thesis assumed that the regulatory policy of the home country would be a 
major driving force in the definition of corporate environmental policy. Consequently, 
aspects of the regulatory context in the countries of origin should be identified in the 
implementation of corporate environmental policies in the subsidiaries, based on the 
influence of the so-called national character. Considering the broad scope of analysis 
followed in the attempts to explain corporate policies, the discussion that follows in 
this section will stress cultural and economic embeddedness in order to explain 
differences among national contexts.
Vernon (1993, p. 14) has emphasized “the power and persistence of national 
characteristics that are likely to distinguish the respective roles” of the US, Japan and
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the European Community in future environmental negotiations. Moreover, Vemon 
suggested that the understanding of “the history, institutions, and values of national 
decision-making processes may prove especially critical” (Ibid., p. 42) in the 
enforcement of international agreements. UNTCMD (1993, p. 38) states that “a close 
relationship between regulation in the home country of the corporation and corporate 
EH&S practices” was repeatedly established by the findings of its benchmarking 
survey. More specifically, “sixty two per cent of the respondents indicated that the 
development of EH&S laws and regulations in the home country had motivated 
changes in environmental policies and programmes” (the same source of influence 
was found in American companies, by Flaherty and Rappaport, 1991).
National character is a construct emerging from literature in the psychology1, 
anthropology2 and sociology fields. Approaches are broadly divided into culture- 
centered and personality-centered (the latter is not taken into consideration by this 
thesis). Following an anthropological perspective (based on cultural anthropology in 
which the nation-states are often the primary unit of analysis), Milton (1996) suggests 
that cultural theory is a valuable resource for the environmental cause. More 
specifically, Milton (Ibid., p. 55) stressed that “environmental knowledge varies 
among cultures, and the description and analysis of this diversity, are important 
resources in the quest for environmental protection and improvement”.
Benton and Redclift (in Redclift and Benton, 1994, p. 3), state that “the 
opposition between nature and culture (or society) made room for social sciences as 
autonomous disciplines distinct from the natural sciences, and undercut what were 
widely seen as the unacceptable moral and political implications of biological 
determinism”. From a sociological perspective, the distinction between what is human 
and what is nature allowed the creation of the social sciences. At present the link 
between these scientific fields must be re-established.
In brief, the culture-centered approach focuses on habits, practices, norms and 
values peculiar to a culture structure. Milton (1996, p. 63) stressed that culture consists 
of perceptions as well as interpretations situating humans within the world. Moreover,
1 See Alex Inkeles and D. J. Levinson’s “National Character”, in Lindzey and Aronson’s Handbook of 
Social Psychology, 2nd edition, vol. 4 (Addison-Wesley, 1969).
2 See Margaret Mead’s “National Character”, in the reader by Sol Tax, Anthropology Today (University of 
Chicago Press, 1962).
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“it is indeed the case that we could not survive without it, for it is what makes the 
world meaningful to us”.
In political science national character is also based on cultural explanations. 
According to Stoessinger (in Little and Smith, 1991, p. 27) national character patterns 
are a fact, but “their uniqueness and their significance in supporting national unity vary 
from nation to nation”. National character is often addressed in international relations 
by studies following a realist perspective. This happens basically through its specific 
focus on nation-states and their representation of power. As such national character is 
an intangible source of power available to the nation-state. Stoessinger (Ibid., p. 26) 
states that this is surely one of the most perplexing concepts. Accordingly, “few social 
scientists would deny that certain cultural patterns occur more frequently and are more 
highly valued in one nation than in another”. Paradoxically, at the same that “national 
character seems to be an indisputable factor” the literature lacks agreement on what 
“cultural patterns” are.
According to Erramilli (1996, p. 233), ’’classical trade theory explains the 
direction and composition of international trade based on the resources endowments of 
individual nations”. More recent theoretical approaches (e.g., Porter, 1990) explain 
national competitive advantage as being created by the interplay of economic and 
strategies factors. Additionally, Hampden-Tumer and Trompenaars (1995, p. 4) stress 
“that culture of origin is the most important determinant of values. In any culture, a 
deep structure of beliefs is the invisible hand that regulates economic activity. These 
cultural preferences, or values, are the bedrock of national identity and the source of 
economic strengths and weakness”.
In specific relation to MNCs, Doz (1986) affirms that the home country 
becomes a sanctuary market because of the high percentage of companies’ sales there. 
Such a phenomenon has consequences in the philosophy of management followed by 
TNCs. More specifically, this is illustrated by the ‘ethnocentric’ type (Perlmutter, 
1969) of multinational company, in which emphasis is placed on the cultural values of 
the home country.
Among the potential explanations for such behaviour is the fact that the size of 
the domestic market will determine a high and/or low percentage of sales. For 
example, in European-based companies the domestic sales may be less than 10 percent
of overall sales. The same figures for US-based companies are about 50 percent 
(Czinkota, 1992, pp. 299-301). On the other hand, such figures also constitute 
evidence that the importance of the ‘world market’ will vary from one TNC to another. 
In sum, table 6.1 illustrates such an argument for the selected cases.
Table 6.1 - Selected transnational corporations per sales -1996
Industrial sectors
—*c.._
Home country 
(% o f sales)
UK (9%)
.... .................. -
Total sales 
(US$ million)
8,903
Foreign sales 
(US$ million)
8,102 91
DuPont++ US (52%) 43,810 21,029 48
BASF+++ Germany 28,032 20,463 73
(27%)
2- Pharmaceutical
92Glaxo Wellcome* UK (8%) 13,012 11,971
Eli Lilly** US (58%) 7,347 3,086 42
Hoechst*** Germany
(21%)
29,268 23,121 79
Sources: + Zeneca (1997), ++ DuPont (1996), +++ BASF (1996), * Glaxo (1997), ** Lilly (1996),
*** Hoechst (1996), in which the HMR’s sales accounts for 25.5% of total group sales.
The relative importance of the home market should place higher or lower 
emphasis on the local constraints faced by TNCs (e.g., the environmental regulatory 
policy). The empirical evidence from the American cases (DuPont and Lilly) has 
confirmed Doz’s (1986) suggestion that characteristics of the country of origin 
permeate the TNCs’ management when the home market is responsible for a large 
portion of corporate sales. Doyle et al. (1992, p. 432) states that American subsidiaries 
in the UK have a classic home country orientation, mainly in “their reliance on US 
managers and their centralized control systems”. In sum, “they retained an 
ethnocentricity more typical of companies at the early stage of internationalisation” (as 
indicated by Perlmutter, 1969).
The British cases (Glaxo and Zeneca) have not produced clear evidence of 
influences from their home countries because the UK is not a sanctuary market (as 
shown in table 6.1). The German cases presented more ambiguous evidence because 
their home market is an important market but not the largest. However, German 
society has tight links between employees and industry (defined as “meso-economy”
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by Hodges and Woolcock, 1993) which enhances the relative influence of the home 
context. For example, BASF’s chairman affirmed that the company “continues to 
manufacture its products in Germany in spite of the high costs and strict environmental 
regulations”3.
Finally, evidence from the British and German cases refuted the UNTCMD’s 
(1993) results in which home legislation was indicated as the main constraint for 
TNCs’ environmental management (Glaxo, Eli Lilly, BASF and Hoechst were among 
the respondents of this survey). It also justifies the benefits of case studies in 
evaluating TNCs’ environmental management; because a quantitative approach (in 
which findings are aggregated) is inadequate to indicate the specific behaviour of each 
category investigated.
Overall, this section does not simply aim to conclude that there are differences 
between TNCs due to their origin, but to explain why these differences exist and if 
there are any links with their patterns of behaviour towards environmental issues. 
Consequently, the empirical findings presented in the subsequent section show the 
differences between the selected companies based on specific characteristics of their 
home countries. The table 6.2 illustrates the context in terms of corporate governance 
in the selected countries.
3 However, BASF will manufacture more chemicals abroad than at home (Economist, 10 May 1997).
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Table 6.2 - Benchmarking of selected business environment
Concentration 
of ownership
Strategic role 
of boards
Strategic
information
Rate of return on 
investment
United
States
Dispersed, but 
some consolidation 
through 
institutional 
ownership.
Majority of 
boards are 
dominated by 
managers.
Excellent 
diffusion of 
public 
information.
Companies are 
recognized as 
profit maximising 
organizations.
Germany Vested in founding 
families and 
concentrated in 
enterprises. Proxy 
rights are
concentrated in the 
hands of banks.
Supervisory 
boards exercise 
only an
overseeing role. 
Real managerial 
functions are 
exercised by 
management 
boards.
Large share­
holders and 
proxy holding 
banks are fully 
informed.
Profit (return on 
capital) is 
considered 
necessary, but is 
not recognised as 
the overwhelming 
objective of 
resources 
allocation.
United
Kingdom
External fund 
management which 
stresses risk 
diversification, 
liquidity and short­
term performance.
Greatest influence 
is exercised by 
executive 
directors.
Liquidity and 
capital gains to 
stock market; 
company strategy 
to emerging 
stable ownership.
Profit
maximisation is 
recognized as a 
prerequisite of 
economic 
efficiency.
Source: Adapted from OECD, 1997 (pp. 174-175, pp. 178-179 and pp. 182-183.)
6.1.1.1- British origin
Glaxo4 and Zeneca5 have provided vague evidence regarding the influence of 
the regulatory policy from the home country on the subsidiaries’ practices. Based on 
the empirical findings, it may be said that the two British companies have maintained a 
poor environmental performance. Moreover, there are no specific targets regarding the 
incorporation of environmental issues. More specifically they have been reported as 
not complying with Brazilian environmental legislation. Consequently, their sites have 
been causing adverse environmental impacts (as mentioned in chapters four and five).
Additionally, both subsidiaries lack a corporate administration level in Brazil, 
in such a case the corporate environmental policy is adapted and implemented directly 
at operational level. It was also recognized that their sites are technologically obsolete.
4 Interview at Glaxo’s subsidiary (on 01/10/96).
5 Interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary (on 19/09/96).
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Finally, in both cases it became clear that the subsidiaries’ financial situation is the 
only issue really controlled by the headquarters. This aspect is confirmed by Carr (in 
Papadakis and Barwise, 1997, p. 107). The author states that “British short-termism 
reflects a preponderance of strong financial control style companies over-reliant on 
high ‘comfort factor’, financial hurdle rates, and is generally less proactive, less 
strategically focused”.
As expected, there are some differences between the two British companies. 
Among the most obvious are their location in Brazil, and the industrial characteristics. 
Both cases presented environmental liabilities, but Zeneca has a more qualified and 
committed staff (though very small). Glaxo’s staff is less qualified for environmental 
issues though the corporate commitment is more ambitious. The companies have 
distinct positions within their segments. At present Glaxo is the 10th biggest 
pharmaceutical company, but Zeneca is second in the ranking of the agrochemical 
segment. Nevertheless, it was suggested that both are emerging from a very retroactive 
phase in terms of financial results, restructuring of the business, reinvestments and/or 
access to new technology.
More specifically, Glaxo claims that corporate environmental policy has an 
international scope and background. At the same time it is related to very structural 
(thus homogeneous) factors such as the GMP norms regulating pharmaceutical 
manufacturing. However, it should be mentioned that the analysis was complicated in 
both cases by the huge discrepancies between policy statement from the headquarters 
and implementation at site level.
Moreover, the environmental commitment from Glaxo Group (Glaxo, 1992, 
pp. 15-16) makes explicit references to initiatives in the UK (such as ICC and RC). 
There are also references to the BS 7750 and EMS from the European Commission 
(Glaxo, 1994), of which the first could be understood as home country influence in the 
definition of the company’s environmental management. In terms of environmental 
performance there are many references to sites in the UK and mainly commitment to 
wildlife conservation in the UK coast or worldwide (managed by UK-based NGOs). 
There is no reference to the Brazilian site, but it is quite obvious that the poor 
environmental performance of this site could not produce any ‘best practice’ to be
244
disseminated throughout the corporation. Therefore, it is clear that the focus is placed 
on best practices at British and European sites.
To summarize, the similarities between Zeneca and Glaxo are poor 
environmental performance, non-compliance with local requirements, decentralized 
structure (that is, the subsidiaries have autonomy to adapt and implement the corporate 
environmental policy) and high dependence on local profits to make new investments. 
It may be argued that there are connections between the decentralized approach 
followed by British companies (Campbell and Goold, in De Witt and Meyer, 1994, p. 
301) in Brazil and the historical perspective of environmental incorporation by 
business in the UK (Smith, 1993). The fact that British environmental authorities 
eschew confrontation but negotiate case-by-case (Vogel, 1986) may be an indicator of 
a more lax climate (Wintle, 1994). At the same time, there is lack of interest from 
Britain (mainly in business terms) in Latin America (Miller, 1993).
Considering such background, Glaxo’s poor performance as well as Zeneca’s 
past liabilities (which could be partly explained by ICI’s internationalization through 
acquisition of domestic companies) could be more easily explained. For example, both 
Groups are highly dependent on foreign sales, of which Latin America represents a 
small percentage of their turnover. This fact could explain why two leading companies 
are promoting “greenwash”. However, the analysis of British cases is complicated by 
other contradictory factors, such as the existence of environmental groups at home 
with a radical stance towards the business community (illustrated by the Greenpeace 
versus Shell case, Dickson and McCulloch, 1996).
According to McGrew (in Smith, 1993, p. 21) the British environmental 
movement “consists of a diverse and diffuse array of groups whose only common 
objective is a concern to protect the environment”. But this is not atypical, since the 
same diversity is found in other industrial societies. Vaughan and Mickle (1993, p. 30) 
state that environmental pressure on business practices is quite strong from NGOs, 
public, media and competitors and more superficial from trade bodies in the UK. In 
short, it is obvious that the high environmental concern at home was not imitated by 
British subsidiaries in Brazil.
Consumer pressure for corporate change has been noted in the UK, although 
British consumers do not appear willing to pay a premium on green products. For
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example, the sales of unleaded petrol only became substantial (approximately 30% of 
total passenger vehicle fuel sales) after the government imposed a lower tax, making 
unleaded cheaper (Vaughan and Mickle, 1993, pp. 36-37). A similar pattern of 
consumer behaviour backed by legislation and/or economic incentives in the UK was 
observed by Wong et al. (1995) regarding household detergents, recycled paper, 
unleaded petrol and automobile catalytic converters.
Despite the move towards deregulation and self-regulation implemented in the 
UK, a contrary trend is evident with greater direct regulation of environmental matters 
(McGrew, in Smith, 1993, p. 19). Moreover, the European Community is increasingly 
active in establishing environmental regulations, directives and decisions aiming at 
community participation and harmonization of national policies. However, the 
implementation of environmental initiatives remains a source of conflict and concern. 
According to Smith (in Smith, 1993, p. 3) “the UK badly needs a Freedom of 
Information Act that would remove the secrecy that has surrounded pollution 
regulation in the past”.
Despite being deceptive as results, the comparative research design was 
improved by this relatively low level of environmental concern in the British 
subsidiaries. Moreover, these cases brought other potential explanations into the 
analysis which are out of the main scope of this thesis (as will be discussed in section 
6 .2 .2).
6.1.1.2 - American origin
There are some interesting findings common to the two American subsidiaries,
f \  7that is, DuPont and Lilly . First, and perhaps most relevant, is the concern with 
liabilities. More specifically, this means the existence of image and legal concerns at 
corporate and subsidiaries levels. The subsidiaries stressed how common it is for 
American companies to adopt a new procedure with a previously defined deadline. 
Subsidiaries of American companies are usually required to implement general 
corporate policy, though this does not mean that American companies will implement 
corporate policies evenly. American companies are keen on this type of corporate
6 Interview at DuPont’s subsidiary (on 11/09/96).
7 Interview at Lilly’s subsidiary (on 23/09/96).
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dissemination of homogeneous procedures worldwide. Moreover, such a rigid 
approach reflects that the criteria set by US legislation are being incorporated by the 
headquarters and spread widely to affiliates.
It is suggested that ‘American companies understand (better than TNCs from 
other origins) that there is no point in making environmental improvements at home 
but not abroad’. In this sense the global visibility of those companies combined with 
pressures from environmental NGOs within the US are the major explanations for 
such pattern of behaviour. Consequently, these companies demonstrate high concern 
with their image in the face of an aggressive media8, and the threat of legal action 
(even from incidents and/or accidents in the foreign affiliates, such as Bhopal9). 
UNTCMD (1993, p. 39) states that environmental policies in American corporations 
were in most cases “driven by the threat, that is, fear of lawsuits or criminal 
prosecution, rather than by the opportunity to enhance the benefits of strategic 
environmental planning”.
Secondly, both companies claim to be beyond the local legal requirements 
regarding their SHE activities. Such a claim is supported by the environmental 
investments made in the Brazilian subsidiaries. Accordingly, UNTCMD (1993, p. 39) 
states that North-American companies “were most likely to state explicitly their policy 
of complying with applicable national and local standards of countries hosting foreign 
affiliates”.
Third, it may be said that both American companies have good environmental 
records. Also clear in both cases is the relevance of technological modernization and 
the convergence of interests in new business activities regarding environmental 
management services (e.g., Lilly operates an incineration service and DuPont sells 
managerial programmes on safety and risk in Brazil).
Fourth, the similarity in terms of management is very apparent. Lilly and 
DuPont’s managers were very precise in the use of specific terms to emphasize
8 Robert Repetto (from WRI) suggested that one positive effect of globalisation is the possibility of 
American NGOs denouncing the double-standards of American TNCs worldwide in the US media. This 
comment was made in the Seminar on International Trade and the Environment, which was held in Sao 
Paulo in October 1996, co-sponsored by the Secretary of State for the Environment and Ernst & Young.
9 One of the biggest industrial accidents of all time, involving the release of methyl-isocyanate from the 
Union Carbide plant at Bhopal, India, killing approximately 3,000 people and condemning many thousands 
more to progressive debilitation and premature death. This accident shook the chemical industry, 
particularly in the US, not only in terms of questioning the safety of operations but also in the legal actions 
in American courts for compensating the victims. See Shrivastava (1992) for a comprehensive analysis.
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corporate principles and control over subsidiaries. Finally, both companies have clear 
plans of investment regarding environmental improvements and they hold a good 
position within their market segments.
The most obvious differences between Lilly and DuPont are the size and 
industry sector, though both are members of the Responsible Care initiative in the US 
and Brazil. As assumed by one of the research propositions, Lilly (pharmaceutical 
company) has less environmental problems in relation to those of DuPont (chemical 
company). Moreover, Lilly’s subsidiary has recognized DuPont’s leadership in SHE 
issues. However, Lilly’s strong environmental commitment must be acknowledged. Its 
primary pharmaceutical and herbicide (former joint venture with Dow Chemical) 
productions are managed as a chemical operation, with investments in new technology 
to make it safer and cleaner.
More specifically, it is possible to identify compliance with legal demands10 in 
the US in DuPont’s report (such as at the ‘1993 Progress Toward Goals’, UNEP, 1994, 
p. 73). This evidence supports the assumption of influence from the ‘country of origin’ 
at the EMS (as suggested by the subsidiary). Accordingly, DuPont’s subsidiary is a 
typical example of imported technology and managerial culture, in which it was 
necessary to understand the corporate history in order to understand the current SHE 
practices.
Likewise, Lilly’s subsidiary presented evidence of some indicators of 
performance, which have been collected at the Brazilian subsidiary. One of them - the 
percentage of accidents based on the OSHA standards - is a clear example of the 
corporation incorporating standards from the country of origin. It was said that “the 
corporation attempts to turn into internal norms all requirements from the 
Environmental Protection Agency” (e.g., the list of prohibited substances). Those legal 
requirements will be translated into the company’s language and then turned into 
practices. This is very interesting evidence of the home country’s influence, mainly if 
combined with the ethnocentric characteristic of Eli Lilly (Malnight, 1995, analysed 
Lilly’s case in face of its recent strategy of globalisation).
10 There are specific explanations based on American standards for toxic air emissions, and carcinogenic air 
emissions. Additionally, reduction in the releases of ‘33/50’ chemicals is reported, which is a voluntary 
initiative launched by the EPA. There is also reference to hazardous wastes with goals based on the US 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (UNEP, 1994, p. 105).
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Additionally, Frederick et al. (1992, p. 236) summarize the main federal 
agencies in the US by type of regulation. In the category of ‘social regulatory agencies’ 
are the FDA, EPA and OSHA. These are the same agencies mentioned by Lilly’s 
subsidiary as influencing the corporate principles, and indirectly the respective 
Brazilian governmental agencies. More specifically, Brazilian regulations on water, air 
and soil contamination are said to be based on American standards. However, this 
assumption resulted in a counter argument from the Brazilian environmental authority. 
According to CETESB’s official11 the American companies follow ‘recipes from the 
headquarters’ and they have no intention of adapting them to local demands. As such, 
there is ongoing and exhausting negotiation with local authorities to liberate them 
from Brazilian legal requirements.
In the US, business responses to environmental issues started with command 
and control regulations in the 70-80s. However it has since then changed, which may 
be related to some particular features of business in the US. One interesting aspect is 
that companies do not have a single owner. They are all floated in the stock market 
and many shareholders are demanding improved environmental performance 
(Frederick et al., 1992). The US companies are concerned with long term efficiency 
and disclosure because of shareholders interests12. Moreover, there are market 
instruments (such as pollution permission) and voluntary schemes for pollution 
control. In sum, there is a mixed regulatory approach towards industrial pollution.
The technological incorporation (which started with end-of-the-pipe equipment 
during the 70s and 80s, Frederick et al., 1992; Choucri, 1991; DiMento, 1986) is now 
highly advanced in so-called environmental technology. However, double-standards 
(between industrialized and developing countries) remain a permanent feature of 
TNCs’ operations. However the technological differences are not as huge as they were 
in the 60s-70s mainly because of ‘global competitiveness’. At present the corporation 
disseminates technical and managerial development to all subsidiaries to keep the
11 Interview with official at the CETESB’s Pollution Control Division. This official is also the coordinator 
of the Secretary of the Environment’s special programme for pollution control (on 07/11/96).
12 These interests include short-term pressures for ‘reasonable returns’ and concern with the long-term 
economic performance. Moreover, the US Securities and Exchange Commission has confirmed that 
corporate environmental policy is a matter of extraordinary importance and of direct financial concern to 
shareholders - an argument in line with a precedent response it issued when shareholders asked DuPont for 
a faster CFC phase out. The investor will measure corporate environmental performance based on legal 
compliance, accidents and the management policies, programmes and procedures in comparison with 
industry benchmarks (Business and the Environment, May 1994, p. 2).
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companies’ overall position worldwide. This assumption of globed pressure is mainly 
true to the extent that some US companies have been largely dependent on the 
domestic market (as sanctuary market, Doz, 1986), and are now willing to increase 
their participation in the global market (such as in Lilly’s case). Additionally, there are 
new opportunities in emergent markets outside the Triad (i.e., Europe, Japan and US).
In conclusion, American companies are not solely or even primarily concerned 
with ‘environmental liabilities’. There are other driving forces such as shareholders, 
marketing demands and opportunities. Yet surprisingly, for some NGOs and 
environmentalists, they have been proactive even in the developing world (DuPont is 
recognized as such in Brazil). The voluntary installation of an incinerator by Lilly 
without being requested to do so by the Brazilian authorities is claimed to be a 
proactive investment.
Overall, investments in waste management happened because companies (not 
only American - Lilly - but German as well - BASF and Hoechst) have realized that 
hazardous wastes became a critical issue in developed countries. For that reason these 
companies started to dispose of their wastes properly in Brazil, anticipating that it 
would become a critical issue for the local authorities. Thus they acted proactively at 
the same time as reducing future liabilities and exploring market opportunities.
6.1.1.3 - German origin
First, it is interesting to note that German companies (that is, BASF13 and 
HMR14) are concerned with the best way of manufacturing15. More specifically, a 
common concern with process safety (engineering) was found in both German cases. 
However environmental improvement represents costs at this stage, though the 
changes seem to be very substantial. This means that goals are more realistic and the 
search for causes (not effects) is the focal point of their EMS, in spite of its recent
13 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary (on 16/10/96).
14 Interview at HMR’s subsidiary (on 07/11/96).
15 Regarding the recent creation of HMR, additional data was requested from Hoechst’s chemical division 
in Brazil (on 03/12/96). This request was made to the manager responsible for EH&S issues, who was 
previously also responsible for the pharmaceutical site in Suzano. Most importantly past environmental 
practices and influences from the headquarters were enumerated. Finally, some documents (such as ‘Press 
Releases’, ‘Progress Report 1996 for Environmental Safety and Health’, and the environmental magazine 
‘Change’, launched in 1996 by the Hoechst Group) were provided to complement the HMR’s case.
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introduction. The concern with public opinion and image (most common among 
American chemical companies, as suggested by the RC scheme) was unimportant in 
both cases. There are investments in the modernization of current operations, which 
include the installation of new units. Finally, both companies have established 
incineration services for the disposal of wastes.
High concern with manufacturing activities at BASF and HMR is reflected in 
any discussion on EH&S, in which the operational process is the focal point. There is 
also a prominent and explicit concern with employee safety. As well as this, 
consumers (though BASF and HMR have different types of consumers) were often 
mentioned as sources of concern and/or constraint. There is a clear emphasis on risks 
associated with the manipulation of chemical substances. This issue is not so relevant 
now, in HMR’s case, as it used to be prior to the separation of pharmaceutical and 
chemicals operations at Hoechst. Finally, there are similarities in management style, 
considering that it is not predictable, systematic and lacks a tight control mechanism 
(such as that used in American companies).
As mentioned before, industry-based differences are evident between the 
German cases as well. Since HMR has recently become an independent (from Hoechst 
chemical division16) company, its environmental management is not as strict as in 
BASF. The latter has indicated special concern with the international connection of 
workers’ unions and consequent of local matters to headquarters. It is relevant to say 
that both Hoechst and BASF are publicly committed to and active in the RC 
programme. Hoechst is a leading member of the ‘regional cell’ in Suzano, however, 
HMR has not become a member of this national initiative in Brazil.
In briefly, the main characteristics of the environmental regulatory context 
(considered to be over-regulated) in Germany are strict and rigid standards, with an 
emphasis on technological procedures. According to Vaughan and Mickle (1993, p. 
33) companies consider the German procedures for legislation implementation too 
complex. For example, “pollution discharge permits can take up to 13 months to 
obtain; if there is a declared national public interest the time can be far longer”. 
Moreover, companies indicated that the German federal government interprets 
European regulations “somewhat more stringently than do other member states”.
16 The HMR is worth around DM 30 billion, out of a total of DM 48.6 billion for Hoechst. Moreover, the 
refusal to sell HMR has cut 20 percent off Hoechst’s share price (Economist, 10 May 1997).
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Finally, “German companies felt that environmental standards applied nationally are 
currently emphasized too much”, suggesting that voluntary agreements are better for 
the industry. Similar aspects have been highlighted in evidence from the Brazilian 
cases. Such as, the argument by BASF’s subsidiary that environmental protection 
represents high ‘costs’. It is also clearly seen in German cases that technological 
procedures and rigid standards are the basis of their EMS.
Altogether, the rigid environmental standards have resulted in trouble for the 
German economy and its business community, since it has become highly cost­
intensive for companies to comply with these strict standards. Some adjustment is 
expected in the near future, because pressures from labour unions and consumers are 
too intense for firms to resist.
The environmental driving forces in Germany are quite distinct from what was 
stated previously as regards British and American companies. The workers’ unions 
constitute a key factor in explaining the environmental concern of German companies. 
Roberts (1995, p. 40) has indicated that employees are the major source of pressure on 
German companies (based on Vaughan and Mickle, 1993, p. 30). They will represent 
the strongest force requesting safety and environmental protection across the industry. 
Additionally, some pressure may come from the media and consumer, and to a lesser 
extent from competitors. Besides this, Germany is the only European market where 
consumers are “currently willing to pay a premium on ‘green’ products” (Ibid., p. 36). 
Finally, these aspects confirm Hodges and Woolcock’s (1993, p. 332) statement that in 
Germany “consensus among management, owners and the work force of each firm and 
with society as a whole is considered a prerequisite for sustained prosperity”.
BASF’s case has provided unique findings regarding pressure from the home 
country in the subsidiaries’ implementation of the corporate environmental policy. The 
pressures come from environmentalists and workers’ union in Germany, through their 
connections with their Brazilian counterparts. It is worth noting that pressures and/or 
criticism from environmentalists and/or workers’ representatives will reach the 
subsidiary through the headquarters. For example, news of an accident in the transport 
of raw material in Brazil (as mentioned in chapter four) reached the headquarters 
through complaints from workers’ representatives. More specifically, the workers’
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unions in the ‘ABC area’17 are connected to their German peers (including within the 
governmental agency GTZ). Due to the same connections, information from Germany 
will also reach the Brazilian subsidiary18.
The correlation (similar to the ‘causal links’ investigated by this thesis) 
between home country’s legislation, corporation’s requirements, host country’s 
awareness, and finally subsidiaries’ behaviour were clearly made by HMR’s 
subsidiary. First the HMR’s subsidiary stated that the regulatory requirements from the 
home countries were incorporated by TNCs and later disseminated to subsidiaries. The 
most strict environmental legislation come from Germany, Holland, Sweden and the 
US; consequently the most strict standards of operation will be found at companies 
with origin in these countries. Finally, the implementation of corporate requirements 
by the subsidiary will depend on the strictness of the context of the host countries.
After BASF restructuring19 in Brazil the S&E area became subordinated to the 
engineering division. It used to be linked to the technical division at subsidiary 
corporate level (designed to provide support), though this was eliminated during the 
restructuring. The S&E coordination is now subordinated to the engineering division 
to emphasize even further the incorporation of these issues into the operational process 
(in technological terms). This approach followed by BASF in S&E is supposed to be a 
common characteristic among German companies. Accordingly, Hampden-Tumer and 
Trompenaars (1995, p. 233) stressed “the German’s enthusiasm for applied science, 
especially engineering”. More specifically, ‘the making and running of things’ have 
equal status, because “technik includes everything necessary to make techniques work, 
including good management”.
Another relevant finding comes from concern at BASF’s subsidiary about 
product life-cycle (also called ‘from cradle to grave’) assessment. This evidence 
particularly confirms UNEP’s (1994) indication that German companies are following 
an EMS based on life-cycle assessment. Besides this, the Brazilian subsidiary has 
highlighted two relevant aspects of such an approach. First, at company level the
17 This is a highly industrialized part of the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo, including the municipalities of 
Santo Andre, Sao Bernardo do Campo and Santo Caetano, where well-paid and organized workers’ unions 
(including metallurgical, chemical engineers, etc.) are located in Brazil.
18 For example, the subsidiary’s staff was aware that German workers went on strike at BASF on October 
1996.
19 Since 1991 BASF Group has reduced its workforce by 25,000 which is now 103,000 (Economist, 10 
May 1997).
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indicators of performance have not yet been established because of the complexity of 
connecting pollution sources and effects throughout the operational process.
Second, BASF’s life-cycle approach has similarities with the ‘process 
stewardship code’ from the RC. However, BASF’s manager stressed that the Brazilian 
chemical industry has no idea of how complex it will be to implement this 
commitment or to achieve practical results20. In conclusion, this is a critical 
commitment (copied from the American chemical manufacturer association) in which 
results will be heavily dependent on the interest of TNCs’ headquarters in the 
incorporation of environmental issues. Here, German and Scandinavian companies 
may have a competitive advantage following findings from UNEP (1994).
6.1.1.4 - Cross-country comparison
According to the ABIQUIM’s official21 the comparison of environmental 
policies and practices from American, British and German companies will merely 
indicate that they have distinct ‘managerial cultures’. It was said that there is a clear 
difference between American and European companies, in that American companies 
may implement environmental initiatives more easily. They follow the policies, 
manual and procedures from the headquarters at the same time that they have access 
to technologies for environmental management.
Moreover, American companies are more similar among themselves in their 
environmental practices. For example, DuPont’s basically focuses on American 
companies when doing benchmarking. In the Brazilian context, the subsidiary will 
exchange information mainly with American companies assuming that they are at the 
same level of performance. DuPont’s manager22 added that it is difficult to comparing 
SHE practices with European companies because “there are some cultural 
differences”.
20 Gutberlet (1996, pp. 128-129) stresses that domestic companies (in the mining, textile, paper, chemical 
and steel sectors) lack financial and/or technological resources for further implementation of EMS in 
Brazil. Ernst & Young’s (1996, p. 6) survey shows that companies in the Sao Paulo state are investing in 
environmental management, however, investments to assess the life-cycle of products is scarce.
21 Interview with ABIQUIM’s official, who is responsible for the Responsible Care programme (on 
04/09/97).
22 Interview at DuPont’s subsidiary (on 11/09/96).
254
Additionally, Lilly’s director23 denied that American and European companies 
exercise the same level of EH&S concern. There is a widespread perception in Brazil 
that Europeans are ‘more adaptable’ (i.e., lax) than the American companies. This 
implies that their approach accepts, ‘on average practices’ instead of the ‘best 
available’. In sum, American companies follow strict principles with less flexibility to 
local adaptation than European companies. Elsewhere, Zeneca’s manager24 stressed 
further differences. For example, the headquarters (including ICI and Zeneca) never 
imposed changes, practices and procedures, but agreed objectives, which is much more 
flexible (with potential for staff discretion) than an American company.
When comparing US with European companies it is evident that the latter lack 
some guidance from headquarters. This lack of corporate guidelines could be 
specifically related to the RC, because Zeneca, HMR and BASF provided evidence of 
access to technology for environmental management. Besides this, the example (by 
ABIQUIM’s official25) that BASF received the recommendation from the headquarters 
to implement the Brazilian version of the RC and to report its achievements has been 
cited. This happened because the RC’s implementation started almost at the same time 
in Germany and Brazil (ICCA, 1996). In conclusion, there is a different structure of 
environmental management in American and European companies. Surprisingly, the 
ABIQUIM’s official26 said that environmental management in Rhodia (a French 
chemical company penalized for wastes contamination in Cubatao) was better than 
English and German companies, because the company has more access to 
environmental technologies.
BASF’s subsidiary27 stated that the American management style has given 
American companies an competitive advantage in EMS. They are one step ahead in 
the development of the EMS in the Brazilian context. The main consequence is that 
their EMS became the benchmark for the Brazilian chemical industry (consolidating 
the already strong US influence). Once again, this happened without any querying that 
the American style cannot be assumed to translate appropriately to different contexts 
such as Brazil (as suggested by Amado and Brasil, 1991).
23 Interview at Eli Lilly’s subsidiary (on 23/09/96).
24 Interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary (on 19/09/96).
25 Interview at ABIQUIM as stated in Note 21.
26 Ibid.
27 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary (on 16/10/96).
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However, BASF’s subsidiary did not question the limitations of the EMS 
approach followed by American companies (as suggested by UNEP, 1994). Therefore, 
one should asked what the peculiar characteristics of the American approach are, 
because they may be specifically related to the RC’s implementation. In sum, if the 
parameter of comparison is the RC’s implementation, American companies are more 
advanced than European ones the Brazilian context. But if the parameter is the life­
cycle assessment of the operations, there are some indications that German companies 
could achieve it more successfully in the future than American companies (which are 
mostly based on checklist and standards for specific aspects of industrial pollution, 
lacking a broader understanding of environmental impacts).
In short, Brazilian subsidiaries employ some practices which are more 
advanced than those imposed by legislation. At the same time they have environmental 
problems similar to domestic firms. CETESB’s official28 illustrated this point with two 
examples, as follows: (a) Souza Cruz (B.A.T’s subsidiary) has continual problems 
with the community due to the odour from tobacco processing at the Sao Paulo site, 
and (b) Bayer makes a strong rhetorical commitment without operational 
implementation. Similarly, an environmental consultant from GTZ29 said that the 
Brazilian affiliates of German companies lack standards similar to those instituted in 
the home country (mainly for pre-treatment and integrated measures at the 
manufacturing process). However they may be more advanced in environmental 
control than other companies in Brazil.
In conclusion, these findings highlight the importance of context and culture in 
establishing environmental management approaches (similar to a claim made by Carr, 
in Papadakis and Barwise, 1997, p. 123, comparing strategic management in Britain 
and Germany). The table 6.3 shows the differences between the German and British 
economic context, aiming to reveal the idiosyncrasies of European companies.
28 Interview with CETESB’ official, as stated in Note 11.
29 This consultant worked in a cooperation project (from 1993 to 1996) between the German agency (GTZ) 
and the Brazilian environmental agency in Rio (FEEMA) aiming to improve inspection mechanisms 
(Informativo CRQIII, December/January 1996, p. 5).
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Table 6.3 - Comparative data on Germany and Britain
Contextual factors Germany United
Kingdom
Stability of economic framework High Low
Proximity of corporate relationships versus arms- 
length made relationships
High Low
Consumer’ emphasis on high quality versus low 
price
High Low
Availability of highly skilled labor High Low
Effectiveness of conflict resolution with respect to 
industrial relations
High Low
Availability of managers with high degree of 
technical versus generalist competence
Very high Low
Status/skills of engineers and operational staff Very high Low
Source: Adapted from Carr (in Papadakis and Barwise, 1997, p. 109).
In the end, the explanations for distinct approaches of environmental 
management may be based on differences in the regulatory structures of the home 
countries (e.g., governmental investments to curb pollution, in the table 6.4). This 
argument is also appropriate in the Brazilian case, in which the environmental 
regulatory structure is decentralized. Therefore, it is possible to identify regional 
variances of environmental performance, because there is no federal agency 
coordinating the efforts in a similar way to the EPA in the US or the Department of the 
Environment in the UK.
Table 6.4 - Environmental expenditure on pollution abatement and control
( %  of GDP)
Home Countries 1990
Germany* 1.65
United Kingdom** 1.5
United States*** 1.6
Source: * OECD, 1993a, p. 106 ** OECD, 1994, p. 101, *** OECD, 1996a, p. 132.
According to UNTCMD (1993, p. 37) the US regulatory context is highly 
legalistic and contentious, and environmental regulation has been keen to restrict 
administrative discretion and to establish uniform standards. In the case of Europe, it is 
stated that there are common features shared by Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and
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Scandinavian countries especially after the European Community directives (aiming to 
harmonize environmental regulations). It is suggested that the approach followed 
resulted in a more cooperative and consensual relationship between regulators and 
industry representatives.
Hodges and Woolcock (1993, pp. 330-331) stressed that “several features 
distinguish the different forms of European capitalism”, but “a key element is the 
degree of discretionary intervention by the state”. Accordingly, Germany has an 
extensive regulatory framework allowing market forces to operate only within 
prescribed rules. Moreover, it limits the scope for discretionary intervention. 
Otherwise, Britain has traditionally based its policies on discretionary interpretation, 
without the restrictions of a regulatory framework, and on public interest assessed by 
the political party in government.
In conclusion, Hodges and Woolcock (1993) indicate that a sort of regulatory 
framework similar to the German model will emerge in the European Community as a 
consequence of the creation of the Single Market. However, the most relevant aspect 
of the present discussion is the indication of the differences between the social market 
economy in Germany and the liberal market in Britain. The latter (called the Anglo- 
American model or Atlantic capitalism) is characterized by its focus on individual 
achievement and short-term profits. The German model (or Rhine capitalism) places 
emphasis on collective achievement and public consensus.
0
6.1.2 - Explanations grounded in corporate management *
This thesis was motivated by the scarcity of studies on the incorporation of 
environmental issues by TNCs’ subsidiaries. Consequently, the driving forces 
influencing environmental issues in Brazilian subsidiaries were investigated, which 
resulted in interesting findings to be presented in this section. Moreover, a common 
pattern of behaviour was found among cases of the same origin. Despite the 
complexity of TNCs’ management, there is evidence that specific aspects, that is 
authority and control, are critical in explaining the implementation of corporate 
environmental policy.
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Overall, as the previous section of this chapter has shown, there are similarities 
among the cases that may be explained by the context of the country of origin, to the 
extent that every action in a social system is always influenced by the wider cultural 
system (as suggested by the resource dependence perspective of Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Hofstede (1994) has developed a ‘worldwide typology’ on differences among 
national cultures, which criticizes the assumption of culture-free theories of 
management. According to Hofstede (Ibid., p. 39) “management is not a phenomenon 
that can be isolated from other processes taking place in a society”, because “it 
interacts with what happens in the family, at school, in politics and government. It is 
obviously also related to religion and to beliefs about science”.
Likewise, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1992, p. 42) state that the “influence of a 
nation’s history, infrastructure, and culture permeates all aspects of life within the 
country, including the norms, values, and behaviours of managers in its national 
companies”. Consequently, these characteristics become “part of each company’s ‘way 
of doing things’ and shape its international organization structure and processes”.
Additionally, Hymer (in Little and Smith, 1991, p. 357) states that MNCs 
hierarchy presents a type of specialization by nationality. On the one hand, MNCs 
“must adapt to local circumstances in each country. This calls for decentralized 
decision making. On the other hand, they must coordinate their activities in various 
parts of the world and stimulate the flow of ideas from one part of their empire to 
another. This calls for centralized control”. Consequently, MNCs have to “develop an 
organizational structure to balance the need for coordination with the need for 
adaptation to a patchwork quilt of languages, laws and customs”. In short, this 
problem is solved by labour division based on nationality between headquarters and 
affiliates. Likewise, Hofstede (1994, p. 45) states that the existence of MNCs is based 
on their ability to coordinate “employees with extremely different national cultural 
values. What keeps them together is a corporate culture based on common practices”.
The notion that the multinational’s nationality may influence the subsidiary’s 
behaviour is a recurrent issue in the literature on international business. For example, 
Erramilli (1996) concludes that there are significant differences in ownership30 
preferences among various nationalities, which are explained by cultural and economic
30 The focus on ownership is justified by the fact that it often “represents the degree to which the parent 
multinational corporation exercises control over its subsidiary’s activities” (Erramilli, 1996, p. 225).
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variables. According to Erramilli (1996) there were some successful works linking 
patterns of behaviour to firms’ nationality (e.g., Hofstede, 1983; Kelley et al. 1987; 
Kogut and Singh, 1988 and more recently, Doyle et al., 1992). Finally, strong 
corroboration of the importance of the firms’ nationality came from Porter’s (1990, pp. 
18-19) study on nations’ competitive advantage.
The study from Egelholf (1984), on the patterns of control in American and 
European multinationals, found that the company’s nationality had a strong influence 
on the type of managerial control exercised over affiliates. The author concludes that 
there is a common belief that American MNCs exercise tighter control over their 
foreign subsidiaries than European firms, however “the difference is more one of type 
of control than of volume or level of control” (1984, p. 81). More specifically, the 
American chose output-based control and the European preferred behavioural-based 
control systems.
o  I
It is worth noting that there is a vast quantity of business literature which 
provides many approaches for environmental management, all of which have in 
common the definition of patterns of behaviour based on environmental performance. 
However, the positive and negative aspects of all those normative and prescriptive 
studies will not be addressed here because the present focus is on the dependence of 
the subsidiary on the headquarters for managerial and technological resources.
Prahalad and Doz (1981) have addressed the dilemma of centralization versus 
decentralization, naming it “strategic control”. Historically, headquarters depend on 
control over strategic resources (such as capital, technology, management or access to 
markets) as a basis for strategic control over subsidiaries. In sum, the headquarters “is 
not only interested in influencing the strategic decisions of subsidiaries but also in 
monitoring their progress toward fulfilling the strategic expectations” (1981, p. 6). 
Additionally, the authors have identified the contradictory forces feeding this dilemma. 
On the one hand, a small number of worldwide competitors pressures MNCs to make 
a global strategy (increasing the tendency to centralize). On the other, host government 
demands (in both developing and developed countries) penalize centralization.
31 For example, DeSimone and Popoff, 1997, discuss the concept of eco-efficiency; Bennett et al., 1993; 
Coodington, 1993; Schmidheiny, 1992; Willums and Goluke, 1992; Buzzelli, 1991 and Davis, 1991, 
introduce strategies for the greening of business; and finally CBI, 1995b; Chynoweth et al., 1992; Gentry, 
1990; Greeno and Robinson, 1992; Pierce, 1992 and Taylor, 1992, elaborate environmental management 
systems.
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According to Bartlett and Ghoshal (1992, p. 43) large British companies were 
dominated by ‘family capitalism’32 until World War n, in which the “overseas 
businesses were often treated as a portfolio of investments rather than an integrated 
worldwide business”. Elsewhere, the management of American companies was based 
on a corporate meritocracy, which supported the “development of a new class of 
professional managers, to whom owners delegated the authority of running the 
business” resulting in ‘managerial capitalism’33.
More specifically, European companies that expanded in the pre-war period 
adopted the classic model of ‘multinational’ organization; that is, “a decentralized 
federation of assets and responsibilities, a management process defined by simple 
financial control systems overlaid on informal personal coordination, and a dominant 
strategic mentality”, which regarded foreign operations as a portfolio of national 
businesses (Ibid., p. 49). American companies followed the model of ‘international’ 
organization that became predominant in the postwar decades. That is, a combination 
of professional management, delegation of responsibility, and coordination and 
“control through sophisticated management systems and the specialist corporate 
staffs”. Consequently, “subsidiaries were more dependent on the center for the transfer 
of knowledge and information” (Ibid., pp. 50-51).
Accordingly, the advent of modem corporations (Chandler, 1990), which 
separated ownership and control, gave rise to an agency relationship between 
stockholders, as principals, and managers, as agents. Therefore, two basic mechanisms 
are available to stockholders to tackle the problem: (a) development of systems of 
measurement and control, and (b) development of incentives for the concurring of 
interests between the principal and the agent. The table 6.5 illustrates the implications 
of centralization versus decentralization on the subsidiary’s autonomy (that is, the 
degree of discretion in adapting and/or implementing the corporate policies).
32 See Chandler (1990) for a more detailed account of this concept.
33 Ibid.
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Table 6.5 - TNC’s strategic management versus subsidiary’s autonomy
Decentralized Centralized Coordinated
decentralization
Authority
(over
strategy)
High - subsidiary as 
profit center
Low - strategic 
decision concentrated 
at headquarters
Low - overall 
strategy at 
headquarters
Control
(over
operations)
Loose - bureaucratic 
control over output
Tight - bureaucratic 
and/or cultural 
control over output 
and/or behaviour
Not so tight - agreed 
or decentralized 
implementation
Source: Adapted from Czinkota et al., 1992, pp. 544-545, and Mayer and Whittington (in Whitley and 
Kristensen, 1996, p. 90.
Additionally, the most famous organizational types of international firms are 
represented in this table. First, the decentralized model is basically found in holding 
companies (in which strategic control over subsidiaries is personal, provisional or 
partial); the centralized model represents the functional organization (highly 
centralized around key functions); and finally the coordinated decentralization 
corresponds to the ‘M-form’ or multi-divisional companies (originating in the US).
Mayer and Whittington (in Whitley and Kristensen, 1996, pp. 89-90) state that 
the M-Form (with centralized strategy and decentralized operations) is justified by the 
internalization of the market by the firm, due to market imperfections. However, the 
“survival of the holding company in Europe [mainly in France, Germany and Britain] 
and the relative failure of the multi-divisional support an institutional rather than 
universality approach to economic organization” (Ibid., p. 105).
Moreover, the successful acquisition of control by headquarters requires 
changes in the balance of power34 between headquarters and subsidiaries. Changes in 
the external context (e.g., environmental protection pressures) “that require increased 
headquarters control may trigger power shifts: these changes may increase the 
importance of interdependencies among subsidiaries or between headquarters and 
subsidiaries” (Doz and Prahalad, 1981, p. 27).
Doz et al. (in Bartlett et al., 1990, p. 119) state that strategic management in 
multinationals is based on three capabilities: (a) control of subsidiary actions; (b) 
ability to change internal relationships, and (c) flexibility to coordinate marketing
34 See Pfeffer, 1981, for a comprehensive discussion of power struggles within organizations.
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efforts. In brief, strategic control is the sum of operational control and strategic co­
ordination (Ibid., p. 122), meaning that “subsidiaries are usually dependent on system- 
wide R&D and management skills (Ibid., p. 123).
According to Bartlett and Ghoshal (1992, p. 171) those subsidiaries in a non- 
strategic context (e.g., Brazil) have limited capabilities which will determine their 
“implementation role”. In this case, they “have little ability to contribute to corporate 
information flows and are normally out of the loop of the organization’s resources 
flows”. Moreover, these subsidiaries “tend to be managed by formalized systems, 
which allowed headquarters to coordinate their activities with the least expenditure of 
corporate management time” (Ibid., p. 172).
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1992) have indicated the similarities of coordination 
mechanisms among companies from similar backgrounds; for example, American 
companies are based on formal systems, policies, and standards. That is, coordination 
through ‘formalization’, which is different from centralization (i.e., direct actions and 
intervention from the headquarters). Formalization subjects “decision making to an 
impersonal set of policies that assume a power independent of the interests and 
motives of either headquarters or subsidiary”, which results in “important operating 
efficiencies” such as lower operating costs (Ibid., p. 161). Consequently, this entails 
“high fixed costs of establishing the systems, policies, and rules so that they become 
effective and reliable surrogates for issue-by-issue decision making” (Ibid., p. 162).
Otherwise, European companies coordinate their operations through 
‘socialization’, which “overcomes centralization’s problem of headquarters overload, 
and formalization’s inflexibility” by enhancing the simultaneous influence of 
headquarters and subsidiaries (Ibid., p. 163). Theoretically “it relies on shared values 
and objectives”, consequently decisions reached by negotiations between groups with 
common objectives should be “better than those made by superior authority or by 
standard policy” (Ibid.). However, considering the costs it represents (e.g., in top 
management training and use of expatriates) companies will not rely solely on this 
mechanism.
A large number of European companies still fit their national stereotypes, such 
as British financiers, German bank-dominated giants and the engineering tradition in 
small firms. Overall, Europe has provided an alternative to American capitalism. For
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example, northern countries in Europe emphasize continuity, consensus and training; 
because European capitalism “has been good at building skills and businesses for the 
long term, and at avoiding the financial and social excesses of corporate America”35. 
Moreover, corporate America confers quasi-heroic status on tough managers, which is 
emphasized by business education and management consultancy. Corporate Europe is 
more careful, at least at home, in terms of equality and social justice (though the 
workforce has been reduced). The table 6.6 summarizes cultural differences in the 
business context of the selected home countries.
Table 6.6 - Cultural differences per selected countries
Organizational factors Germany UK US
Profit is only real goal* 24 33 40
Sees company as a set of tasks 41 55 74
Competition is a vital antidote to 41 65 68
collusion
Personal initiatives encouraged 84 90 97
Limited commitment to organizations in 83 94 99
respect to career duration
Inner directed individual 65 51 68
Source: Adapted from Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1993, pp. 32, 57, 60, 65 and 71. 
Note: these figures represent the percentage of managers/respondents from each nationality 
agreeing with and/or identifying themselves with each proposition.
In short, the time-frame for implementation of the corporate environmental 
policy was expected to be different between headquarters and subsidiary. However, the 
fact that autonomy and loose control resulted in environmental liabilities is a 
surprising finding, following a perspective of strategic control (which was grounded in 
Doz, 1981, 1986; Prahalad and Doz, 1986; and Czinkota et al. 1992). The evidence 
from Zeneca suggests a case of TNCs’ subsidiaries exploiting the lax regulatory 
context in a developing country36. Besides this, evidence from the cases reinforces the 
view that the ‘traditional business rationale’ is still present - that is, the predominant 
economic view of short-term profits (as criticized by Smith, 1993) and environmental 
externalities.
35 Economist, 23 November 1996.
36 There other cases reported in the literature, such as DuPont’s project in India in Cohen and Sarangi 
(1995), and several cases of corporate “greenwash” according to Greenpeace (1992).
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6.1.2.1 - British origin
The driving forces for the incorporation of environmental issues in Zeneca’s 
subsidiary37 are, as follows: (a) the company’s image, (b) the guarantee of renewal of 
operational licences, and (c) the possibility that environmental improvements may 
result in cost reduction and/or revenue (e.g., waste minimization as control of 
inefficient use of resources). At present, Zeneca’s subsidiary claims to be 
accomplishing goals established by the corporation rather than by other stakeholders. 
However, it is paradoxical that the corporation is the main source of constraint since 
the management is decentralized - that is the subsidiary has autonomy to implement an 
EMS. Besides this, the subsidiary defines the priority issues, based on local 
capabilities (i.e., availability of financial resources38). In reality, the corporation 
requires the formalization of locally developed environmental procedures in order to 
perform audits.
The subsidiary environmental policy is a full translation of the corporate 
environmental policy, which is used to disseminate SHE issues among the employees. 
It was signed by the president of ‘Zeneca Brasil’ to demonstrate the commitment from 
top managers. In 1995, Zeneca Group reformulated its corporate environmental 
policy39 to be more concise, omitting targets and deadlines. Such a lack of quantitative 
commitment in the corporate policy may be regarded as a weakness (according to CBI, 
1995b and UNEP, 1994). It is interesting to note that the subsidiary was not consulted 
in the definition of the corporate environmental policy, which confirms lack of ‘good 
SHE practices’. Consequently, the policy implementation became harder due to its 
distance from the local context.
The first stage of policy implementation is the formalization of local 
procedures. The safety area had established procedures long ago as a consequence of
37 Interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary (on 19/09/96).
38 The Brixham Laboratory (UK-based) belongs to Zeneca Group since the demerger from ICI due to its 
focus on bioscience. The subsidiary had access to this laboratory just once, when samples of the 
underground water were sent to be analysed after the soil contamination in Brazil.
39 Until this date the corporate environmental policy was a copy of ICI’s policy issued in June 1992. The 
Zeneca version states support and encouragement for the principles of the RC and the ICC’s Business 
Charter for Sustainable Development. The Brazilian version of the policy states more generally the 
principles of sustainable development instead of the ICC’s Charter.
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legal requirements (subject to inspection) from the Ministry of Employment. The 
second stage is the evaluation of the policy implementation by corporate audits. 
Additionally, there is a Tetter of assurance’40, which is an instrument informing the 
headquarters about the implementation of SHE standards in each business.
At present, the Brazilian subsidiary lacks corporate staff for SHE issues. It is 
quite obvious that SHE issues have lost salience within the organizational structure 
since the demerger41. The SHE department was eliminated in 1992 and since then 
these activities have been organized by the so-called ‘focal point’ approach (i.e., each 
area at operational level is responsible for the definition of its procedures).
Consequently, safety, health and environment are distinct areas at the site level. 
In fact, health is the responsibility of the doctor of the site. There are safety staff 
comprising one supervisor and a technician. Finally, there is a coordinator responsible 
for environmental management. The staff exclusively devoted to environmental issues 
consists of six (low qualified) workers. They are basically responsible for water 
treatment, waste management, and effluent treatment. There is no systematic training 
for environmental issues, though the corporate policy indicates that employees should 
receive SHE training.
The lack of staff and priority (i.e., environmental concern is a secondary issue 
for the site’s managers) are the main explanations for the current struggle to formalize 
environment procedures. However, the corporation requires procedures to be 
formalized to control the subsidiary (mainly in bureaucratic terms for both output and 
behaviour, Czinkota et al., 1992). There are two types of audits42 - operational and 
managerial - the latter is accomplished by English auditors every two years.
The Brazilian legislation is the external driving force that has motivated 
Glaxo’s subsidiary43 to develop an environmental commitment. However, there is also 
concern with the corporate mission on human health and its image considering that
40 A copy of this document was shown as evidence of corporate control over the subsidiary’s practices. The 
‘letter of assurance’ is an instrument of self-assessment for the affiliates, in which the site top managers 
evaluate the degree of compliance with corporate requirements. Additionally, this instrument aims to 
harmonize the companies’ practices; because the corporation will report back to the subsidiary with 
recommendations for performance improvement.
41 In late 80s ICI had a corporate SHE manager in Brazil aiming to coordinate safety, environment and 
occupational hygiene issues among its affiliates (including support at the site level). After ICI’s 
restructuring (preparing for the demerger) this manager became an executive at the site level subordinated 
to the site manager of technology and production.
42 Interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary (on 19/09/96).
43 Interview at Glaxo’s subsidiary (on 01/10/96).
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Glaxo is the world’s biggest pharmaceutical company. Glaxo (1992) states that the 
implementation of the corporate environmental policy must be made by the technical 
staff of the affiliates, and a policy statement should be produced by them. Since 1996 
Glaxo’s subsidiary has had a formal statement for environmental issues, which is a full 
translation of the corporate policy (as in Zeneca’s case).
The present version of the corporate policy is from 1993, though environmental 
issues have been addressed by the Group since the 70s. The first corporate 
environmental policy, created in 1978, was called ‘environmental control policy’. 
Nevertheless, the subsidiary has no historical recollection of environmental concern 
within the Glaxo Group, which may be understood as evidence of the lack of cultural 
control by a shared philosophy of management.
The ‘Group Environmental Policy’ (Glaxo, 1994b) includes the environmental 
guides that are disseminated to subsidiaries to be translated into local policies and/or 
procedures. However, Glaxo’s subsidiary claimed that ‘a strict corporate 
environmental policy is useless’; because the Brazilian subsidiary lacks the resources 
for its implementation (another aspect similar to Zeneca’s case).
In sum, Glaxo’s management approach is decentralized, thus subsidiaries have 
high autonomy. Accordingly, Glaxo Group will provide a long-term mission and some 
policies, and the subsidiary is ‘free to move around’ when pursuing its objectives. In 
practical terms, the corporation states that local legislation is a minimum requirement, 
but the subsidiary knows that this ‘minimum standard should be improved by the 
implementation of corporate principles’ in order to receive full approval. The 
subsidiary was neither following the corporate nor the Brazilian legislation regarding 
effluents and risk of fire. This is because the deadlines to implement the corporate 
guidelines are usually negotiable.
Accordingly, the GRM will define the EH&S principles (as centralization of 
strategic decisions) and check them later by audit (a form of control over output). This 
decentralized approach resulted in a lax implementation of corporate policy. 
Furthermore, the low priority placed on environmental performance at Glaxo’s 
subsidiary is due to the recent launch of the corporate environmental policy in Latin
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America. The first event devoted to EH&S issues was organized by the headquarters44 
in July 1996.
Likewise, Zeneca’s case has presented similar findings suggesting a British 
management style. But most important is the evidence that in both firms the highest 
priority has been assigned to implementing corporate marketing efforts (as discussed 
by Doz et al., in Bartlett et al., 1990, p. 119) in the Brazilian market. Such an 
“implementation role” (which means that subsidiaries in non-strategic environments 
have limited capabilities, as suggested by Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1992, p. 171) resulted 
in neglect of the subsidiaries’ social responsibilities.
The lack of environmental staff is evidence (similar to Zeneca’s case) that this 
issue is of secondary importance. More specifically, the industrial director is 
responsible for ‘the adaptation and implementation of corporate guidelines in every 
day operations’. However, there is clear emphasis on safety issues during the 
implementation, which is made by safety staff consisting of an engineer and three 
safety technicians.
The corporate newsletter (Glaxo, 1994b) made reference to the development 
and implementation of EMS by affiliates. Nevertheless, the subsidiary was ambiguous 
about any environmental management system, though the existence of corporate audits 
(every two years) was acknowledged. After these inspections a ‘travel report’ is sent 
from the headquarters to the subsidiary. Based on this report the subsidiary will 
evaluate improvements and brief the headquarters every three months. In reality, this is 
a qualitative evaluation of the site’s manufacturing process, including risk assessment. 
In sum, Glaxo’s subsidiary seemed to be unaware of its own evaluation of 
performance45. In other words, it is not clear if the risk assessment includes EH&S 
issues, despite the corporate claim that they are coordinated by the GRM (Glaxo, 
1992).
44 Glaxo’s subsidiary provided evidence of a workshop (held in Rio on July 1996) on ‘health, safety and 
environmental protection’. This event was chaired by the corporate GRM director, and the corporate 
medical director with an audience of industrial directors from affiliates in Latin America. As part of the 
organization of the workshop, the corporate environmental policy was translated into Portuguese creating 
the subsidiary policy.
45 Interview at Glaxo’s subsidiary (on 01/10/96).
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6.1.2.2 - American origin
The incorporation of environmental issues by DuPont’s subsidiary46 is based in 
the following company-specific explanations. Firstly, DuPont’s long experience on 
safety issues has become a business area, marketing safety programmes developed by 
the firm. Furthermore, there are fewer legal liabilities related to safety and 
occupational health, because the number of accidents and/or incidents is very low. 
Secondly, the company transcends legal requirements, as a result of the internal 
connections between environmental management and its former safety and 
occupational health performance.
At external level the major driving force for DuPont is the concern with the 
corporate image, in which “anything that may damage its image will started the 
internal digestion”47. Accordingly, the scientific evidence linking CFCs to the 
destruction of the ozone layer became a threat to DuPont’s image accelerating the 
“internal digestion”48. In sum, DuPont kept the technological vanguard and provided 
an immediate answer by finding a substitute based on the scientific capabilities of its 
R&D area.
From a historical and linear perspective49, the CFCs ban by the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) is the main single factor 
explaining DuPont’s strong environmental commitment since this event made the 
corporation more visible worldwide50, posing a real threat to its image. Nevertheless, 
the subsidiary did not indicate when CFCs would be phased out (at the Goiabal site)51 
in Brazil. However, the SHE progress report (DuPont, 1995) states that Brazil is the
46 Interview at DuPont’s subsidiary (on 11/09/96).
47 Ibid.
48 The Montreal Protocol (curbing the use of ozone-depleting CFCs) was secured with support from 
DuPont and ICI. In 1988, DuPont, the world largest producer of CFC, backed a total ban on their use, 
becoming the leader in the market for CFC substitutes (Economist, 3 June 1995).
49 Mainly based on Willums and Goluke’s (1992, p. 277) accounts of SHE issues at DuPont.
50 Smart (1992, pp. 185-199) has reproduced DuPont’s case written by its CEO (Edgar Woolard). 
Accordingly, the decision to phase out CFC was made in 1988, and the turning point for environmental 
issues within the corporation happened in 1989 (the same year that Woolard became Chairman and 
described himself as DuPont’s ‘chief environmental officer’). The CEO claims that the company had a 
substantial environmental background prior to those events. For example, the corporate environmental 
committee was created in 1966, and the company received its first award for environmental issues in 1987.
51 It was announced that the Goiabal site is phasing out the production of freon gas used by the refrigeration 
industry, as part of major changes in the composition of local businesses. Additionally, the production of 
insecticides and fungicides will be expanded (Gazeta Mercantil, 03 December 1996, p. C-l).
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last subsidiary producing CFCs, because of a special request made by the Brazilian 
government.
DuPont’s environmental statement is a formal commitment signed by top 
executives, which is called the ‘DuPont Compromise’. The local version (full 
translation of the corporate policy) is a one page statement signed by the Board of 
Directors at the regional headquarters and distributed to employees. Such a statement 
was last reviewed in 1993 resulting in a more concise version, which makes support to 
the RC scheme explicit.
It was claimed that the policy statement originated with the EMS, therefore the 
policy has avoided the risk of an inadequate compromise. The SHE policies are 
established at corporate level (that is, centralized strategic decision), and subsidiaries 
are obligated to follow, aiming at the harmonization of procedures. The 
implementation of these principles will require adjustment to the local reality, because 
of the principle of compliance with local legislation as a minimum requirement. The 
local demands will be accomplished based on their “technical and economic” viability, 
faithful to what was called a “pragmatic management” (or contingency perspective in 
organization theory literature, Ghoshal and Westney, 1993). Furthermore, the 
subsidiary claimed that corporate principles and local legislation are considered in 
relation to each other and subsequently the stricter standard is followed.
In general terms, DuPont’s management approach is based on two principles: 
managerial support and organizational commitment (as the corporate ownership 
advantages). The SHE issues are implemented following these principles, but more 
specifically, ‘safety concern is a condition of employment’. This strong organizational 
culture (that is, cultural control over behaviour by shared philosophy of management, 
Czinkota et al., 1992, p. 552) is explicitly stated in the SHE policy52. Furthermore, the 
company has the ‘goal to establish SHE aspects as part of the organizational culture’, 
because DuPont has its image linked to SHE issues.
The EMS is structured by a line of responsibilities and working groups. As 
such, the top manager of each site is responsible for accidents and/or incidents in 
conjunction with the supervisor and employee(s) directed implicated. The SHE staff 
(at the subsidiary’s corporate level) gives support (without direct involvement) to
52 Moreover, DuPont’s high safety standard has been confirmed by other sources within the Brazilian 
chemical association and managers from other American companies.
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incorporate these aspects into the business operations. The SHE manager has basically 
to guarantee that the subsidiary is complying with the standards defined by both 
corporate policy and local regulation.
At the operational level, every site has a “central SHE committee” constituted 
(chaired by the site manager) and “sub-committees of activities” with multi-functional 
members. The committees are responsible for the implementation of policies and 
guidelines at the site level53. The coordinator of the sub-committees has authority to 
make changes in order to achieve their goals. As a consequence of this type of 
organizational structure the number of employees working on SHE issues varies 
according to the site’s size.
It was stressed that DuPont’s subsidiary is focused on safety and occupational 
health because it represents the immediate care of employees at the site. In the 
medium- and long-term it will be necessary to take care of environmental issues as 
well as to complement the short-term tasks. As exemplified by DuPont’s case, it is 
very difficult to conciliate the short-term need to keep the business running (or to 
make profits) with the long-term vision of sustainability. Moreover, the business time­
frame for incorporating environmental concern is different for environmentalists and 
for the expectations of legislators. For example, safety-related issues are specifically 
short-term because accidents may disrupt the operation. Environmental protection is 
therefore usually a long-term task which may be turned into short-term as a 
consequence of accidents.
The Brazilian legislation (similarly to the US regulation) makes no connection 
between safety, health and environmental issues (which was criticized by Neder, 
1992). Thus the emphasis on one issue will not directly produce results in the others. 
Despite the fact that the managerial model requires responsibility for all SHE areas, 
there is clearly priority placed on safety and health issues at DuPont. Thus, 
environmental improvement will be to some extent a consequence of prior 
achievements in these issues.
53 Such an organizational structure was confirmed by the SHE supervisor at DuPont’s site in Paulmia. More 
evidence specifically focused on DuPont’s environmental practices was collected during a seminar held at 
UNICAMP (on 18/09/96). During this event DuPont presented its implementation of the RC and was 
criticized for its lack of environmental disclosure. The same criticism was direct towards ABIQUIM for its 
lack of transparency in the management of the RC programme in Brazil.
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DuPont’s structure of environmental management resembles a pyramid54 (see 
figure 6.1 below), suggesting that power (in terms of strategic decisions) is 
concentrated at the locus of the corporate environmental policy’s definition (i.e., the 
headquarters). The guidelines translate the policy into operational language, later 
resulting in programmes (e.g., environmental audit became an independent programme 
in 1992). There are six procedures for audits based on the six codes of practices from 
the RC programme, which are coordinated from the South American headquarters in 
Brazil.
Figure 6.1 - DuPont’s environmental management model
Policy
Guidelines
Programmes
Procedures
The forces driving the incorporation of environmental issues at the Lilly’s 
subsidiary55 are basically from sources that may exercise ‘control’ over the company’s 
practices. Firstly, the home and host legislation are extremely important, even 
assuming that the company has the intention of improving its EH&S performance. The 
legislation (which includes inspections) will motivate the company’s measures to 
improve performance. Consequently, Lilly has provided the most direct indication of 
how crucial legislation is as a driving force, confirming similar arguments from Wong 
et al. (1995), Porter (1991), Porter and van der Linde (1995), and Gleckman (1995). 
Moreover, it implicitly has stressed the combination of two aspects: (a) the intentions 
of the company, and (b) the pressure of legislation through inspection and control. 
Nevertheless, this is not a critical issue for Lilly because of its ‘philosophical concern 
with quality excellence’. That is, continuous improvement is ‘the norm number one in
54 Based on the interview at DuPont’s subsidiary (on 11/09/96) when documents (including the corporate 
environmental policy, guidelines, programmes and procedures) were used as evidence of environmental 
management.
55 Interview at Eli Lilly’s subsidiary (on 23/09/96).
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the organizational culture’ (i.e., cultural control over behaviour, Czinkota et al., 1992), 
which is similar to DuPont’s case.
The Eli Lilly environmental policy is stated in the ‘company guidelines and 
policies’ (or Red Book56) as part of the corporate ethical code, which is signed by the 
CEO. The corporate environmental policy is defined by the corporation (which 
centralizes strategic decisions) and disseminated to affiliates. Moreover, Lilly has a 
‘term of compromise’ that employees are obligated to sign, representing their 
awareness of the corporate commitments. At the same time they declare that practices 
and guidelines are compatible. Consequently, employees are responsible for the 
accomplishment and/or non compliance regarding the corporate guidelines (that is, the 
anecdotal “P to P” - “from the President to the Porter” - approach followed by 
American companies).
However, the subsidiary has ‘some discretion’ in the implementation of the 
corporate environmental policy, though there is a core that must be homogeneously 
implemented. Nevertheless, it is realistically recognized that the ‘timing of 
implementation among subsidiaries is different’, but it should not be interpreted as 
double-standards.
It is worthwhile saying that it is possible to negotiate the applicability of 
corporate principles. These guidelines set norms (a form of cultural control over 
output), but if the Brazilian subsidiary lacks the technological complexity of another 
affiliate it may have a different programme. For example, there is a corporate norm 
banning underground tanks, but there are still two of these tanks in the Morumbi site. 
Lilly’s subsidiary kept these tanks , due to its location in an urban area, claiming that 
they are safer than tanks on the surface. Following a corporate recommendation it now 
has to perform ‘well inspections’ to detect spills. In addition, the subsidiary could 
never make unilateral decision, because it has to justify discrepancies from the 
guidelines during the audits. This is evidence of tight control over the subsidiary’s
56 The ‘performance manual’ for SHE issues (including an ‘environmental corporation affair’ leaflet) was 
used as evidence during the interview at Lilly’s subsidiary. This ‘manual’ includes the SHE guidelines and 
the result of the corporate audit in the affiliates worldwide (classified by issues such as: energy 
consumption, fuel, vapour, inputs, etc.). Finally, a copy of the corporate statement for environmental issues 
was provided. Such a statement is reviewed on an annual basis to re-affirm the commitment with 
environmental and ethical issues (Portuguese version is called ‘Diretrizes da Companhia’, Eli Lilly, 1995,
p. 11).
57 The subsidiary’s justification also included the argument that all fuel tanks in Sao Paulo city are 
underground, and the fact that the Brazilian authorities allow this type of tank.
273
practices similar to findings from DuPont’s case, which suggests a common 
characteristic of American companies.
The first exclusively environmental audit58 was made in Lilly’s subsidiary in 
early 1996. It aimed to evaluate the current status of affiliates worldwide, as the first 
assessment from the recently created ‘corporate environmental affairs’. Accordingly, 
the environmental area has been transferred from the human resources division to 
report directly to the CEO of the corporation. This represented an upgrading within the 
corporation, resulting in more power and influence to improve environmental practices 
(which started with the worldwide self-assessment).
The corporate report (Lilly, 1995) states that there is an approach to total 
quality called the ‘Lilly Team Excellence’. In reality, there are three affiliates 
(including the Brazilian affiliate) out of twenty manufacturing sites which are 
considered as ‘class A’ (that is, the highest grade of performance) within the corporate 
ranking. However, there is no evidence that SHE issues are part of the TQM (such as 
in BASF and Zeneca). The performance standards includes the indices of ‘employees 
in training’ programmes (that is, a behavioural control), ‘accident rates’ and 
‘flexibility of the process’ (in terms of efficiency of process and timing of production). 
These latter indices were implemented in the Cosmopolis site achieving a reduction in 
the production timing (another characteristic common to American companies).
These standards constituted the first step in the creation of internal indicators 
of performance by Eli Lilly. This is also evidence (such as in BASF’s case) of how 
complex it is for companies to measure efficiency. Furthermore, the lack of 
performance indicators shows that the incorporation of environmental issues is a long 
process. The evidence presented here indicates that Levy (1995) was correct in 
suggesting that performance is the key variable in evaluating the companies’ 
incorporation of environmental issues because such incorporation is more complex 
and time and resource demanding, than is suggested by the business literature 
(confirming the criticism made by Walley and Whitehead, 1994, on the win-win 
rhetoric).
58 The subsidiary’s newsletter notified that the first environmental audit, with American staff, was made in 
Brazil, in which both sites achieved ‘satisfactory results’ (Lilly em contato, year 29, no. 266, May-June 
1996, p. 7).
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6.1.2.3 - German origin
There are a set of factors driving BASF’s subsidiary towards the incorporation 
of environmental issues (such as pressures from headquarters, local legislation, 
workers’ unions, image and the threat from Brazilian public attorneys). Brazilian legal 
requirements were identified as a source of external pressure, following the corporate 
principle that legal compliance is a minimum requirement. Nevertheless, it is 
principally pressure from headquarters that will make the subsidiary improve its S&E 
performance.
At the internal level, BASF’s manager59 stated that the incorporation of 
environmental issues will depend on the ‘responsibility and awareness of the local top 
executive’. In this case there is a lack of continuity because the top executive (an 
expatriate) will be changed every four years. Moreover, the S&E coordinator has to 
justify present practices and future projects to a new top executive, which is a unique 
characteristic of BASF when compared with other German subsidiaries in Brazil.
Accordingly, there is always adaptation of the corporate environmental policy 
to the characteristic of each host country. There is also discrete implementation 
according to businesses segments. Therefore, the subsidiary’s role is clearly focused 
on adapting and implementing corporate guidelines (Czinkota et al., 1992; Doz and 
Prahalad, 1986).
The environmental area in the Brazilian subsidiary consists of corporate and 
operational levels. At the corporate level, the S&E manager coordinates and gives 
support to all Brazilian sites, though there are environmental staff at the operational 
units. This group is exclusively dedicated to the implementation of S&E aspects. 
Finally, in 1996, the corporate S&E area was restructured to include other South 
American affiliates. Consequently, the Brazilian subsidiary has more importance 
within the corporation’s structure as the regional headquarters (including access to 
information and resources).
The relationship with the headquarters is the single most important factor 
explaining the environmental improvements at BASF’s subsidiary, a pattern similar to
59 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary (on 16/10/96).
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that evident in other TNCs’ subsidiaries in Brazil (in reference to a survey60 made by 
Ernst & Young, 1996). In BASF’s case ‘it is undoubtedly the headquarters that 
commands the process’, through technological access and support. For example, 
BASF’s subsidiary exceeds the minimum requirements in the RC evaluations by the 
chemical association. This performance was basically achieved via the implementation 
of corporate policies, guidelines and norms.
The first audit carried out exclusively for S&E issues was made in 1997 
(previously it was only for safety). Through these audits, which are scheduled for 
every four years, the headquarters will define targets for the subsidiaries. Based on 
these targets, the subsidiary will elaborate on a timetable of activities and report back 
to the headquarters. Consequently, the subsidiary’s progress will be a responsibility for 
local executives.
It is interesting to note the absence of specific guidelines from BASF’s 
headquarters concerning performance indicators for environmental issues. There are 
safety indicators in use throughout the company, which are reported every three 
months to the headquarters. However, there is only a qualitative report on 
environmental issues from affiliates (generating the corporate environmental report). 
On a trial basis, the Brazilian subsidiary has been monitoring the efficiency of the 
process (via energy consumption). Overall, it is possible to identify the positive 
evolution, since the early 90s, in the development of an environmental monitoring 
system. Whittington (1989, pp. 130-131) suggested that companies look for strategic 
continuity; strategic changes do not therefore take place as often as assumed by the 
business literature. Consequently, it takes some time for new strategic issues (such as 
EH&S) to mature and produce tangible results within companies.
The difficulties in defining indicators of performance are mainly the result of 
company-specific factors. These indicators must represent targets, otherwise they are 
meaningless. Consequently, resources will be required in order to achieve the targets 
(e.g., waste reduction, high energy use efficiency, etc.). Another internal obstacle 
concerns staff participation, considering that there is always resistance when practices 
are evaluated through audits. Finally, financial constraints seem to be a core aspect of
60 According to this survey (encompassing 160 domestic and foreign companies located in Sao Paulo state) 
two factors have a major influence on companies’ environmental performance: (a) shareholders and internal 
policies (including corporate policies), and (b) environmental legislation.
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the implementation of corporate environmental policy; thus companies must be 
profitable in order to improve their environmental performance (as stressed by UN, 
1994a).
BASF’s model for environmental management indicates that there are policy 
and guidelines, which should be implemented by the subsidiaries through operational 
procedures. Recently, these guidelines started to be called an environmental 
management system and is represented through a pyramid model61 (such as in 
DuPont’s case). Moreover, this model indicates the respective organizational level 
responsible for each set of tasks (see figure 6.2 below).
Figure 6.2 - BASF’s environmental management model
With reference to this management model, the implementation of the corporate 
environmental policy is a responsibility of the top executive in each host country. 
Consequently, it is difficult to accomplish the S&E tasks if the top executive is not 
committed to these issues. Besides, S&E issues compete with other functional areas 
for resources, because the amount of new investments devoted to the Brazilian 
subsidiary is calculated on an annual basis. When applying for resources the S&E area 
has to submit a project based on a cost-benefit analysis (that is, with indications of the 
gain in reduction of energy consumption, and efficiency in the use of raw materials, 
etc.).
61 Based on the ‘Safety and Environmental Management Directives’ (BASF, 1995, p. 3). This document 
indicates that the elements of the EMS and the ‘BASF Quality Management Directives’ form the unified 
code of practice for all group companies and majority holdings. There is a version in Portuguese from 
November 1995.
Corporate Policy, 
Directives and 
Management System
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For example, BASF’s manager62 said that the Guaratingueta site ‘has recently 
completed some investments related to environmental issues’. Accordingly, the 
installation of the incinerator was accomplished in 1994, the effluent treatment system 
was renewed in 1996, and there is a planned landfill area to complete the cycle of 
waste treatment. Since improvements in the environmental management were made, 
this site competes with other BASF’s affiliates for new units63. Ultimately, the most 
relevant recent change in the management of the Brazilian subsidiary was the 
introduction of total quality management aimed at achieving ISO 9000 certification, 
which connects the corporate cost-reduction measures and the restructuring of the 
Brazilian subsidiary.
According to HMR’s manager64 the driving forces of the incorporation of 
EH&S issues are: (a) legislation from home and host countries, (b) capital to be able to 
cope with strict standards, (c) corporate image in the international media, and finally 
(d) the location of the site (mainly in a large country, i.e., Brazil). Based on the 
regulatory demands is the inherent need for investments to fulfill strict standards. For 
example, it is necessary to invest in order to develop the manufacturing process. 
Occasionally, the environmental investments are so high that they must be justified in 
business terms (as in BASF’s case).
When the data was collected at HMR’s subsidiary, there was no formal 
environmental policy statement. In this case, Hoechst’s commitment to EH&S issues 
(which includes a corporate environmental policy statement) was taken into 
consideration during the analysis of HMR’s case. However, it was claimed that HMR 
will combine the policies from Hoechst and Marion Merrell Dow. But, there is a high 
probability that it will be defined by the headquarters in Frankfurt: the ‘Supervisory 
Board of the Hoechst Group’ (Hoechst, 1996, p. 92) has reiterated its concern to the 
further development of ‘environmental and safety management’, with particular focus
62 Interview at BASF’s subsidiary (on 16/10/96).
63 The Brazilian subsidiary has a new unit in Guaratingueta. In addition to market explanations for the 
selection of Brazil as the corporation’s sourcing centre for this new fungicide, the S&E manager said that 
the existence of another agrochemical unit, and the site’s pollution control system were among the factors 
justifying such a decision (an investment of US$ 38 million). This fungicide will be exported to Germany 
and Belgium. After the proper registration it will be sold in the countries forming Mercosur. Finally, the 
Brazilian agrochemical business accounts for US$ 90 million in 1995, representing 7.8% of the Group 
income - US$ 1.1 billion (Gazeta Mercantil, 13 November 1996, p. B-16).
64 Interview at HMR’s subsidiary (on 07/11/96).
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on its importance in the future structure of the Hoechst Group65. Such discussions 
followed incidents at two German sites (in Griesheim and Hoechst) at the beginning of 
1996.
The HMR corporate level has not produced any new set of ‘basic principles’ 
for EH&S issues since the merger in 1995, but corporate guidelines are expected in the 
future. At the present it is considered more relevant for the company to assess the 
HMR sites worldwide. Evaluation has already started concerning the EH&S 
performance of all affiliates, and the Brazilian subsidiary claimed to be among the 
most advanced.
Immediately after the merger each site followed its own procedures, thus, 
initially the previous guidelines were kept. But at the second stage the EH&S’s 
manager started to select the best practices from both sites in Brazil, aiming to 
formalize them later at the Suzano site66. The final EH&S approach will be a “hybrid 
model”, that is, a combination of Hoechst and Marion Dow, because Roussel followed 
a policy of compliance with the local legislation. On the contrary, ‘Hoechst and 
Marion Dow have more than local requirements, which were set with the objective of 
avoiding double-standards’.
Prior to the merger, Hoechst pharmaceuticals followed the minimum 
requirements, which are called ‘EH&S basic principles’. In Marion Dow they were 
called ‘minimum requirements’ (the same concept using different terminology). The 
EH&S ‘basic principles’ are established by Hoechst’s headquarters and the 
subsidiaries must implement them. It was also part of Hoechst’s policy to evaluate the 
implementation of the ‘basic principles’ through audits every two years. It is carried 
out by EH&S auditors from the corporation who produce a report with 
recommendations for performance improvement.
The audit is focused on ‘operational performance’ (including quantitative 
evaluations) and it later forms the basis for ‘action plans’. The corporation intends to
65 In 1993, Hoechst’s spotless environmental record was tarnished by a series of freak chemical spills that 
resulted in governmental investigations and the early retirement of the chairman (late in 1994). In this same 
year, Hoechst faced strong environmental pressure and decided to end the production of chlorinated 
solvents. It also started to build a plant to produce an alternative to CFCs (called R 134a). In 1994 a new 
plant was built to make an environmentally friendly water-based paint (Hoover’s Handbook of World 
Business 1995-1996, p. 252).
66 From 1998, all pharmaceutical manufacturing will be concentrated in this site, which already contains 
Hoechst’s pharmaceutical and chemical units. However, it was confirmed by the EH&S’s manager of the 
chemical division (interviewed on 08/11/96) that these are two independent sites (separated by the railway).
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avoid double-standards by implementing policies defined at the headquarters in all 
subsidiaries. But the subsidiaries ‘will always face problems in implementing such
f \ 7policies’. It was emphasized that the German approach to ‘correct making’ also aims 
to save resources68. Therefore, the focus is on the constant improvement of the 
manufacturing process (such as in BASF’s case).
6.1.2.4 - Cross-country comparison
It should be reiterated that the degree of autonomy left to subsidiaries to adapt 
corporate policies according to host countries’ demands turned out to be the weak link 
in the implementation of corporate environmental policy. It mainly happened because 
the Brazilian context is more lax on environmental matters than the home countries. 
As such, the combination of lax legal enforcement, the low environmental awareness 
of managers and lack of institutionalized public concern (that would be expected in 
developing countries) resulted in poor environmental performances.
Most important are the recent changes in the Brazilian regulatory context (as 
mentioned in chapter three, from command-and-control to economic instruments). 
Consequently, companies will gain more flexibility (i.e., discretion) by increasing the 
use of self-assessment instruments, which may be accompanied by lack of knowledge 
about the environmental impacts of products and processes (Guimaraes et al., 1995, p. 
80).
More specifically, the subsidiaries’ discretion in the implementation of the 
corporate environmental policy was the element responsible for the ambiguous 
explanations in justifying performance. The degree of discretion varies among the 
cases, but there is a pattern among companies from the same home country. In such 
cases, there is evidence that British and German companies enjoyed more discretion in 
implementing their corporate environmental policy than American companies. The 
latter are subject to stricter control (through auditing and check-lists) as part of their
67 Interview at HMR’s subsidiary (on 07/11/96).
68 Hoechst is considered a pillar of traditional German industry, in which centralised and hierarchical 
management ideally suited the high demand years after World War II. Indeed, “a manager’s performance 
was measured in output, not profitability”. Since 1994 changes have been made (including the plan to spin 
off HMR) during which “business units were given much greater autonomy, but they were also required to 
reach a certain level of profitability within three years or face sale or closure” (Economist, 23 November 
1996).
EMS. On the other hand, the decentralized approach followed in the British cases have 
resulted in poor environmental performance. This finding suggests that Rappaport and 
Flaherty’s (1992) argument that decentralization is better for environmental issues 
because solutions are site-specific should be treated with some caution. The strictest 
control at Zeneca and Glaxo is exercised over the subsidiaries’ financial results. Hamel 
and Prahalad’s (1985) argued that the business culture of Anglo-Saxon countries is 
heavily biased towards cost-reduction rather than revenue generations as a means of 
producing profits69.
The German subsidiaries have showed a moderate degree of discretion, where 
attempts have been made to implement the basic corporate principles. At the same 
time, the subsidiary’s CEO has the discretion to set local priorities, but must comply 
with legal requirements. However, there are tight controls from the headquarters, 
which are not so rigid such as in the American cases (Hofstede, 1994).
There are therefore, clear differences between German and American 
companies in terms of environmental management. The German companies usually 
follow a more 'philosophical approach’, in which new values must be internalized to 
change former values. In such a case the solution for environmental problems will be 
achieved by understanding its causes and changing behaviour. On the contrary, the 
American companies follow a more pragmatic approach. Consequently, the 
internalization of environmental concern is achieved by the extensive use of ‘check­
list procedures’.
6.2 - Re-evaluation of the research design and methodological implications
This section will first review the propositions defined by the research 
framework, in order to re-evaluate the research design. Secondly, it will discuss the 
methodological implications of the research design in view of the empirical results. 
Finally, the selected home-host dichotomy will be analysed to stress the limits of the 
research design followed during the investigation of TNCs’ subsidiaries in Brazil.
69 As suggested in the British media (Financial Times, 3 February 1996, p. 8).
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6.2.1 - Cross-cases analysis and verification of propositions
The propositions (defined by the research framework) were confirmed (even 
though deserving certain qualifications) among the explanations for the 
implementation of corporate environmental policy in TNCs’ subsidiaries in Brazil. In 
other words, the empirical findings confirmed the influences from the home and host 
countries’ environmental regulatory policies, the industrial sectors’ structure and 
environmental commitment, and the headquarters’ commitment and control towards 
the incorporation of environmental concern in the subsidiaries’ operations.
There is no substantive evidence (that could be replicated) among the cases of 
international pressures on the implementation of corporate environmental policies. 
Despite the lack of formal propositions in the research design, it was expected that 
international agreements, business association’s environmental guidelines70 and 
environmental concern from NGOs71 at the international level would influence TNCs’ 
practices in Brazil. However, the findings from the Brazilian subsidiaries 
demonstrated that these aspects are not among the driving forces in their incorporation 
of environmental issues.
Nevertheless, BASF’s case is an exception regarding international pressures 
because German and Brazilian workers constantly exchange information on 
environmental issues. For example, BASF’s headquarters has been pressurized by the 
German workers’ union (which have links with their Brazilian peers) when the 
Brazilian subsidiary had an accident during the transport of raw materials that had an 
adverse environmental impact.
70 According to UNEP (1994) these guidelines are taken into account in environmental reporting. There are 
distinct reporting frameworks available to companies, such as: CERES (Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies, in North America); CEFIC (European Chemical Industries Council, 1993 
guidelines); PERI (Public Environmental Reporting Initiative, followed by North-American and some 
European companies); GEMI (Global Environmental Management Initiative which has an environmental 
self-assessment program); WICE (ICC task force to review current environmental reporting and to develop 
guidelines); ISO (at the sub-group on EMS, the proposed standard will include public reports of 
performance as part of obtaining the certification); and finally BS (the EMS at BS 7750, though it does not 
obligate companies to publish environmental reports).
71 Despite examples of confrontation between environmentalists and business (such as Shell, BP and 
Conoco cases), the environmental groups have changed their approach during the 90s. Accordingly, these 
groups are more conciliatory towards business and government as shown in the Kyoto Conference. Another 
characteristic of current environmentalism is a high level of education, which is required to sustain the 
‘solutions campaigning’ of groups such as WWF, Greenpeace and Environmental Defense Fund (Financial 
Times, 30 December 1997, p. 8).
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More specifically, there is evidence from two case studies confirming the first 
proposition, that is: The home country’s environmental regulatory policy is th 
source o f  pressure fo r  the implementation o f  corporate environmental policies in 
TNCs’ subsidiaries. The evidence supporting this proposition came exclusively from 
the two American cases. In such a case it was confirmed that the American 
environmental regulatory policy (specifically enforced by the Environmental 
Protection Agency) is usually incorporated into the corporate principles. In DuPont’s 
case the evidences are very clear in the environmental reporting (DuPont, 1995), 
which includes TRI releases and compliance with other special programmes set by the 
authorities. Likewise, Lilly’s case confirmed that it is corporate policy to incorporate 
requirements from the US legislation and disseminate it among subsidiaries.
At this point, it relevant to note that American companies are particularly 
vulnerable in the face of a legal system that allows them to be prosecuted in the US for 
practices abroad (such as in the Bhopal case). There are possible legal liabilities in the 
home country as a consequence of actions in host countries. This regulatory context is 
not as strict in the UK and Germany.
In the other cases the evidence available is more ambiguous. For example, 
Zeneca’s case showed evidence of particular characteristics from the UK context, such 
as corporate guidelines for transport by train and the EMS based on the British 
Standard. In HMR’s case it was suggested that Germany has strict legislation which is 
incorporated and to some extent disseminated by German companies. The links 
between the home country’s culture, legal system and corporate behaviour were 
mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter. However, these are instances where 
replication was not achieved.
Nevertheless, the overall empirical work has indicated other evidence of 
national character in the implementation of corporate environmental policies. In 
reality, the research design was mistaken in assuming that environmental regulatory 
policy was the most suitable representation (or variable representing the concept of 
national character) of the country of origin at subsidiary level. The incorporation of the 
regulatory standards by TNCs should be investigated following an institutional 
approach (Ghoshal and Westney, 1993; Sally, 1994), in which the corporate 
environmental policy is investigated at headquarters level. On the other hand, there is
main
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empirical evidence (in which replication by country of origin occurred) that the 
management approach followed by the subsidiaries best represented the ‘national 
character’ of the countries of origin.
The findings from four cases have confirmed the second proposition, that is: 
The implementation o f  TNCs’ corporate environmental policies includes the 
compliance with the host country*s environmental regulatory policy as a minimum 
requirement. On a rhetorical level all subsidiaries claimed to comply with Brazilian 
legal requirements as a minimum requirement from the corporation.
First, it is necessary to emphasize how important the local regulatory context is 
as a source of pressure on subsidiaries’ operations. Despite the recognized weakness of 
the environmental regulatory authority in developing countries (as discussed in the 
literature Gladwin, 1977; Haas et al., 1993; Pearson, 1985 and 1987), this is still the 
main source of pressure in the local context. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that 
corruption has been an obscure issue in Brazil as regards the state environmental 
agencies. There is no hard evidence, though it is openly discussed by journalists, 
managers, governmental and non-governmental officials that this is a ‘chronic’ aspect 
of the Brazilian bureaucracy (as suggested by Zulauf, 1994). Moreover, the 
institutionalization of an intermediate agent to negotiate with the authorities has lead 
to numerous cases of bribery72.
In fact, there are no extraordinary environmental practices among the selected 
cases, though DuPont is said to have a leading performance. Furthermore, DuPont, 
BASF, Lilly and HMR have been complying with the regulatory requirements. Their 
major interest lies in the renewal of operation licences granted by the Brazilian 
environmental authorities. Nevertheless, the poor performance of a large number of 
domestic and foreign companies in Brazil is a consequence of lax enforcement 
(Zulauf, 1994). However it could be worse without the current structure for industrial 
pollution control. In other words, what is there is needed in order to prevent more 
“free-rider behaviour” from TNCs’ subsidiaries. The British cases (Glaxo and Zeneca) 
may undoubtedly confirm this since they have (past and current) histories of non­
72 For example, Friends of the Earth’s official states that logging companies, particularly from Asia, 
pressurize land owners in the Amazon region to obtain rights to extract woods. These companies “typically 
bribe officials to have generic environmental impact studies rubber-stamped” (Financial Times, 2 
December 1997, p. 9). Such practice is also found with companies located in urban areas according to 
Zulauf (1994).
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compliance. The existence of accidents at DuPont and BASF sites was also identified, 
as well as improvement in Lilly and HMR, as was required by the authorities in the 
early 90s.
The third proposition - I f  industry associations have environmental 
guidelines, TNCs’ subsidiaries have stricter implementation o f  corporate 
environmental policies - was evaluated in chapters four and five (sections 4.4 and 5.4 
respectively). To summarize, the empirical findings from the cases in the chemical 
sector have confirmed the proposition, namely, the existence of an environmental 
initiative in the industry association has resulted in the strong incorporation of 
environmental issues by the TNCs’ subsidiaries. However, there was no disclosure of 
their achievements since the Responsible Care programme was launched in 1992.
Otherwise, the findings from the cases in the pharmaceutical sector have not 
confirmed the proposition. First, this is an industry with minor environmental impacts 
(if compared with the chemical sector), thus there are no environmental guidelines 
from the industry association. Secondly, there is no evidence that an environmental 
initiative would improve the performance of pharmaceutical companies. Nevertheless, 
there is evidence that pharmaceutical companies have areas regarding EH&S issues 
which are to be improved because of their involvement in processing chemical 
substances.
The empirical findings partially supported the fourth proposition, that is: The 
corporate environmental policies o f  TNCs* subsidiaries is defined by the 
headquarters, following a strategy o f centralization. This is mainly because there are 
some variations in the strategic approach adopted by the headquarters, though all 
corporate environmental policies were defined by the headquarters.
In brief, the American and German cases follow a centralized approach, though 
they have distinct mechanisms of control. On the contrary, British cases presented a 
decentralized approach in which subsidiaries have the autonomy to define their own 
policies and practices for environmental issues. In practical terms, corporate policies 
had been previously defined and Brazilian subsidiaries ‘autonomously’ made a full 
translation of these policies.
The most controversial set of findings, starting with the expected confirmation 
that all corporate environmental policies were defined by the headquarters, are
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correlated with this proposition. First of all, it is relevant to state that the rhetorical 
commitments made by the headquarters were not followed up in the corresponding 
implementation at the selected subsidiaries. However, the so-called double-standard 
was not part of this investigation since all subsidiaries are located in the same host 
country. Thus, the evidence from the case studies comprehensively suggests that 
corporate principles are far from being fully implemented at the subsidiaries. The 
excuses for such a gap are based on technological obsolescence, lack of resources, 
staff and/or support from the headquarters, local legal requirements, low qualification 
of employees, and finally the lack of environmental concern in the local context 
(which included the market, consumers, community, authorities and also the 
subsidiaries top managers).
At the same time there is a widespread assumption (among the subsidiaries’ 
managers) that corporate principles go beyond the local legislation. However, these 
principles have never been fully implemented, thereby making the latter statement 
meaningless. However, corporate principles are often used as a justification for the 
superiority of TNCs’ practices over local authorities73 and companies. According to 
the Brazilian authorities they are bluffing because this superiority remains rhetorical 
and there are still cases of non-compliance with local requirements.
More specifically, evidence from Zeneca’s case74 suggest that the headquarters 
‘started to be really concerned with environmental issues’ after the denpurice^followed 
by legal action) of underground water and soil contamination by agrochemical wastes 
at the Brazilian site. As regards the two British companies, it is possible to say that 
there is some resistance from the subsidiaries towards corporate guidelines. The other 
cases - DuPont, BASF, Eli Lilly and HMR - have indicated that the headquarters are 
the single major source of pressure in the incorporation of environmental concern.
Overall, it is confirmed that TNCs’ environmental policies in a developing 
country are the result of a mixture of regulation and self-regulation (as suggested by 
the framework presented in section 2.1 of this thesis). However, the major driving 
force is of a regulatory nature, in which the regulatory context of the host country plays 
a key role (as stated in the second proposition). It is also confirmed that TNCs’
73 A senior official from CETESB affirmed that American companies are constantly trying to convince the 
local authorities that their corporate guidelines should be accepted as the pattern of pollution control instead 
of the parameters defined by the local legislation (interviewed on 07/11/96).
74 Interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary (on 19/09/96).
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subsidiaries from home countries with strict environmental regulatory policy (such as 
the US) have stronger environmental policies (as stated in the first proposition).
In addition to this, the concern and scope of the incorporation of environmental 
issues is higher in the most environmentally sensitive sector, that is, the chemical 
industry. Consequently the environmental commitment of the chemical industry 
association is stronger, mainly if compared with the lack of specific concern in the 
pharmaceutical association. The composition of both sectors, based on the origin of 
FDI, is similar, with a preponderance of foreign companies. Therefore, it may be 
suggested that the commitment in the chemical sector is much more a result of the 
(higher) potential environmental impacts. In short, the chemical sector subscribes to 
the RC initiative, aiming to improve public perception of their operations (as stated in 
the third proposition). It has been a source of pressure to companies and its major 
contribution is the improvement of the relationship with the community.
Finally, there is evidence from the cases supporting the assumption that 
headquarters’ strategic decisions (as stated in the fourth proposition), concerning their 
subsidiaries’ environmental incorporation, are directly related to performance. In other 
words, this means that the most consistent implementation of corporate environmental 
policy among the six cases resulted from direct (and continuous) pressure and control 
from the headquarters over the Brazilian subsidiaries. Accordingly, the headquarters- 
subsidiary relationship is claimed to be the explanation for some proactive practices 
(or cases of overcompliance) in face of the Brazilian regulatory policy. Moreover, the 
cases with the poorest environmental performance lack strong connections with the 
headquarters.
Taking into consideration the empirical findings (present in chapters four, five 
and in this chapter) the research question should be re-stated as follows: ‘What are the 
main driving forces explaining the adoption and implementation of environmental 
policies by TNCs’ subsidiaries in Brazil?’. Empirical investigation confirmed that 
there is no simplistic answer to such a question. The answer is rather a set of issues, 
explanations and assumptions. As such it is evident that the regulatory context has 
exerted pressure on all companies (both at home and host countries levels). It is also 
evident that there is a gap between headquarters’ rhetorical statements and 
subsidiaries’ implementation of the corporate environmental policy.
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The main assumption of this research - that is, the implementation of TNCs’ 
environmental policies in subsidiaries located in a developing country is mainly 
explained by ^xtemaTy^riables - was confirmed by the case studies. Some tangible 
variables (such as the legislation, operational licencing, etc.) and some intangible 
variables (such as image and public concern) were indicated by the cases as the driving 
forces conducive to the incorporation of environmental concern into their operations. 
In some cases the absolute lack of environmental concern prior to a turning point 
and/or crisis (e.g., environmental contamination, threat of closure, and CEO 
commitment) was reported.
In conclusion, mtemal variables (that is, variables representing those factors 
intrinsically related to business management, such as shareholders, leadership, and 
profitability) were not the main focus of investigation in the empirical phase (as 
mentioned in section 1.3 of this thesis). But some internal variables were identified 
and addressed during the literature review (in section 2.6 of this thesis). This reflected 
an intentional attempt to keep this investigation within feasible limits.
However, each case study has its own very peculiar explanations for the 
implementation of corporate environmental policy. For this reason, the so-called 
internal variables are among the cases’ findings and were addressed in -the^.cases’ 
description and analysis. This mainly happened because th^headquarters-subsidi^ 
relationships turned out to be a critical variable explaining good- and/or poor 
environmental performance among the selected cases (which confirms Rappaport and 
Flaherty, 1992).
6.2.2 - Methodological implications
There are some epistemological and methodological considerations that should 
be addressed at this stage of the data analysis. This thesis was based, in 
epistemological terms, on empiricist and positivist premises. It was therefore 
constrained by the principle that scientific practice should not validate value 
judgments. Consequently, theoretical propositions (addressed in chapter two) were 
developed according to rule of formal logic prior to the empirical phase.
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However, in practical terms, this investigation was based on value premises 
when choosing scientific texts (Miles and Huberman, 1994, pp. 4-8). This aspect is 
grounded in the Weberian tradition that a satisfactory theory of social explanation 
must take account of both the meanings and the causes of social phenomena (Skinner, 
1985, p. 6). Moreover, “the social scientist does not go out into the field as a tabula 
rasa and return with an account” (Outhwaite, in Skinner, 1985, p. 29) of what it is like 
to be a ‘Brazilian subsidiary’s manager’.
In methodological terms, it is relevant to note that the researcher is an insider 
on two counts - as a Brazilian and as the interviewer. Some authors (Yin, 1994; 
Eisenhardt, 1989) say that the insider’s knowledge of the context (on how it operates) 
may be useful during data collection. Such an assumption was certainly confirmed 
when accomplishing the data collection and changing the research design 
simultaneously.
Nevertheless, to be an insider during the data analysis may be disturbing. The 
main reason is the difficulty for one to be objective (or impartial) when some findings 
seem to present no correlation with the ‘theoretical reality’ expressed in the literature, 
most of the time produced in particular socio-economic contexts. This aspect is 
surprisingly addressed by Rosenau and Durfee (1995, p. 181). Apart from the 
“frustration over the premises of social sciences in developed countries”, there are 
many peculiar aspects that are only visible to insiders75. Consequently, patterns of 
behaviour found in Brazilian subsidiaries could not be analytically generalized.
Additionally, there is the discussion of the (not so glamorous) source of 
primary data (i.e., subsidiaries’ managers) used to investigate the implementation of 
corporate environmental policy. Based on the case studies literature (Yin, 1994; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Ragin and Becker, 1992), the data collected should include peculiar 
aspects such as consequences of the idiosyncrasies of the local culture, which should 
be addressed as a central point regarding comparative research (Oyen, 1992).
For example, the long interview at Zeneca’s subsidiary made it possible ‘to 
escape’ from the guideline for interview to consult internal documents (as evidence of
75 This point may be illustrated by body language or non-verbal clues, shared values, off-the-record 
information contradicting the earlier evidence, access to public bureaucracy, and finally (and perhaps most 
importantly) the narrative impregnated by the context (Thompson, 1981). This latter aspect means “magical 
realism” (Angulo, 1995) in the Latin American context, that is, the interviewee’s narrative is usually 
permeated by this literary style.
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its practices). However, the manager was not completely comfortable with the 
situation (though qualified to answer the questions). In fact, the discomfort was related 
to the legal action against Zeneca due to its environmental impacts. After the interview 
the manager reported off-the-record how the accusation was really made against the 
company, that is, by former site managers that were fired after the demerger from ICI. 
In the end, similar information from the environmental agency and industry 
association confirmed the data received off-the-record.
However, this situation stressed the vulnerability of the data collection method 
in defining past driving forces explaining the subsidiaries’ environmental 
performances, because they are usually hidden or lost between one management team 
to another. Another relevant aspect comes from Glaxo’s case. More specifically, the 
industrial director was uncomfortable with the headquarters’ recommendation to 
provide information on the implementation of the corporate environmental policy in 
the Brazilian subsidiary. In other words, the previous contact with the headquarters 
was regarded as a negative aspect from the subsidiary’s point of view.
In DuPont’s case, the semi-structured interview guideline was avoided on the 
grounds that the historical perspective of SHE issues within the corporation was more 
important in understanding the subsidiary’s environmental performance. 
Consequently, data collection at the subsidiary’s corporate level is not so rich in details 
about practices when compared with cases where data was collected at the site level. 
Therefore, other source of data were investigated to confirm DuPont’s environmental 
practices. Likewise, in Lilly no details about practices were provided.
In other words, the EH&S managers located on site are more specific about 
operational practices and procedures, at the same time that the researcher has the 
opportunity (despite a lack expertise about operational processes) to visit the site 
(which should be understood as the use of observation as data gathering in case 
studies, as suggested by Eisenhardt, 1989). Altogether, the data collection in the site 
level of the subsidiaries is more plausible evidence of environmental practices; that is 
a major contribution to this thesis.
Finally, the highest degree of disclosure was achieved in the German cases. In 
BASF’s case the cooperative behaviour could be understood as an attempt to drive the 
interview to topics where disclosure was acceptable. Besides this, the researcher was
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acquainted with this case (Guedes, 1993). Considering the recent creation of HMR, it 
was impossible to produce written evidence on the subsidiary’s practices. However, an 
analysis of Dow Group and Hoechst Group’s environmental policies was 
recommended, because HMR’s corporate environmental policy would be a “hybrid” of 
both. The manager was very careful to explain the “grey area” between reality and his 
perception (a relevant aspect of an interview as a method of data gathering).
Considering the research design, there are no surprises in the limits of drawing 
conclusions from the empirical data. Nevertheless, the scope of the data collection may 
generate some questioning. Therefore, it is relevant to anticipate some aspects 
regarding the limits of extrapolating generalizations from six case studies.
Firstly, it is out of the scope of this research to compare the environmental 
performance of Brazilian subsidiaries with practices of subsidiaries located in the 
home countries and other developing countries. Consequently, it is necessary to be 
aware of the ‘rhetorical’ nature (as suggested by Dryzek, 1997 and George, 1994) of 
statements from the headquarters, because what is being compared is the statements 
made by the corporate environmental policy and reports (referring to high 
environmental concern, uniform implementation among subsidiaries, beyond legal 
requirements, etc.) with the practices (i.e., the formalization of commitments) in 
Brazilian subsidiaries.
Secondly, it was necessary to be careful in the comparative analysis due to the 
characteristics of the selected companies. It was necessary to identify how 
“progressive or retroactive” the subsidiaries in Brazil were, that is, if the company was 
competitive or if it was declining in its position in the local and/or global market. It is 
assumed here that this characteristic is more important than the size of the company 
(Nelson, 1991).
6.2.3 - Critical appraisal of the dichotomy between home-host countries
An interesting aspect emerged during the data analysis; that is the difference 
between the corporate rhetoric toward environmental issues and its practices in a 
developing country. Glaxo’s case in particular is an example of an ambitious corporate
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environmental policy and poor practices in what is (or was) a marginal business in 
South America.
Another relevant aspect regards the distinct layers of analysis, which require 
constant cross-analysis from the national to the international context and vice versa. 
The explanations from the international level are much more related to economic 
issues (i.e., global market and competitiveness) rather than regulation and management 
style (which are country-specific). Consequently, the structure and characteristics of 
the chemical and pharmaceutical industry worldwide were useful in explaining 
pressures from the international towards the national level (since there are no other 
sources of pressures over subsidiaries’ practices).
More specifically, production from the subsidiaries is directed towards the 
Brazilian domestic market. Besides, the major markets of the selected corporations are 
located in the North (mainly the US and Europe), as well as their shareholders. 
Therefore, the TNCs’ environmental commitment regarding their operations in a 
developing country (e.g., Brazil) is residual (that is, it is not a priority). Thus, it is 
possible to conclude that environmental concern for peripheral business will never be 
relevant by itself (or due to local reasons). On the contrary, it is always a consequence 
of hidden (or pragmatic) economic interests at the corporate level.
According to Whittington (1989, p. 8) “these large corporations constitute 
major actors within our society, whose strategies have vast repercussions. But 
deterministic theories absolve them from any social responsibility for their actions. 
Protected from internal query by rank and from external challenge by commercial 
secrecy, the small elites controlling these companies protest that they are merely 
servants of the abstract economic rationality of the markets”. However, “far from 
being dependent upon the macro environment, these firms are active forces in 
determining it”.
The conflicting priorities between the corporation and its affiliates are not 
really a matter of concern in the literature on TNCs and the environment (with the 
exception of Sklair, 1994). The discrepancies in terms of management (which 
includes cultural aspects) are not suggested and/or investigated as relevant issues. 
Rappaport and Flaherty (1992, p. 34) suggested that there is a real tension between
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headquarters and affiliates, in which environmental problems (regarding they are site- 
specific) may prove particularly challenging to this relationship.
However, the attempts to manage global environmental issues bring these 
distinct perspectives together. Consequently, international agreements should not be 
focused on the definition of rules but on how to reconcile distinct perceptions and 
priorities. Otherwise, global environmental management will once again be directed 
from the top (international community) to the bottom (local communities in less 
developed countries) without addressing the idiosyncrasies (Thomas and Wilkin, 
1996). Moreover, the TNCs’ double-standards remain unquestionable76 since all 
attempts to regulate their worldwide operations have resulted in failure (UNCTC, 
1990; Eden, 1994; Gleckman, 1995; Thomas, 1995 and Miller, 1995).
Based on the empirical findings, flexibility and conflict in the implementation 
of corporate environmental policy was identified; both aspects are manipulated by 
local staff with acknowledgment of the corporation (as suggested by the British cases). 
For example, the anecdotal use of language (such as the ‘piv’77 from Zeneca’s case) 
may be understood as a rejection of norms dictated by the headquarters. According to 
Amado and Brasil (1991, p. 58) “by being flexible and labile, Brazilians have a chance 
to face their authoritarian and discriminatory environment, as well as to resist change”. 
Moreover, the language usage stresses how dubious corporate guidelines are, that is 
some are “really to be done”, others are “nice to have”. In the end, there is frustration 
with the lack of concern about SHE issues from both headquarters and local top 
managers.
In a different way, explanations based on language usage were also present in 
DuPont’s case; for example the SHE manager was careful with language usage to 
represent precisely the rhetorical statement made by the corporation. It was suggested 
that there is no exact equivalent for either ‘commitment’ or ‘accountability’ in 
Portuguese. However, what is not addressed is that the difficulty comes from the
76 Despite the self-deceiving recurrent media statements that Western multinationals are embracing business 
ethics, defining code of conduct and signing international guidelines such as the ICC’s Business Charter for 
Sustainable Development. The same argument is made textually twice by the Economist (24 June 1995 and 
20 July 1996).
77 See Caldeira (1995, pp. 209-216) for an interesting account of the business and diplomatic relationship 
between Brazil and Britain in the last century. It was shows by the author that the expression “for the 
Englishmen see” (in Portuguese “para Ingles ver”) was created during that period. Likewise, Freyre (1948) 
wrote an original analysis of the English influences in Brazil. For a British version of the events that 
produced such expression see Miller (1993, pp. 42-44 and pp. 53-55).
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complexity of translating an approach saturated with American culture into the 
subsidiary’s context (because, according to Hickson, 1997, management is not culture- 
free).
Additionally, one crucial question is left unanswered; that is, why rhetorical 
statements made by the headquarters in industrialized countries are considered a 
reliable source (and data from the subsidiaries is not taken into consideration) in the 
literature (Hamel and Huse, 1997; Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Shrivastava, 1994). In 
reality, neither subsidiaries’ managers nor headquarters’ executives are reliable 
sources of data78, thus triangulation is required. For example, the headquarters’ 
rhetoric is not translated into practice at the subsidiary level and the headquarters 
systematically deny (through public relations mechanisms) the existence of critical 
issues at subsidiaries.
Moreover, the rhetorical environmental commitment is useful to some extent 
for both headquarters and affiliates. For example, the corporate environmental policy 
is disseminated to subsidiaries, but their implementation is not the headquarters’ 
responsibility (due to decentralized management, as argued in Zeneca’s and Glaxo’s 
cases). At the same time, the corporation is aware of the impossibility of improving 
performance without resources. Nevertheless, there are formal corporate statements for 
EH&S issues in all selected cases claiming that affiliates worldwide are concerned 
with environmental issues. In sum, these are findings that go beyond home-host 
explanations.
78 The pilot case studies at British B.A.T. and Reckitt & Colman have shown that the two headquarters 
(interviewed on 02/04/96 and 21/03/96, respectively) were not aware of subsidiaries’ practices (interviewed 
on 02/10/96 and 17/09/96, respectively). However, it must be recognized that rhetorical statements were 
closer to current practices in B.A.T.’s case rather than for Reckitt & Colman.
294
6.3 - Conclusions
The empirical findings have suggested that the implementation of corporate 
environmental policy in TNCs’ subsidiaries is a quite complex phenomenon. In this 
case, the explanatory nature of this thesis required a broad level of analysis, in which 
contradictory forces were brought together. It is relevant to mention that the 
comparative analysis (aggregating the data by industrial sectors and home countries) 
reflects the current paradigm of investigation into TNCs within international relations 
(Strange, 1994; Sally, 1995). Moreover, it includes, at the empirical level, the interface 
between the unit of analysis with distinct levels of analysis. For example, the table 6.7 
illustrates regulation versus self-regulation and its consequences for subsidiary’s 
management.
Table 6.7 - Summary of regulation versus self-regulation per industry sector
Major constraint Sensitive industry Non-sensitive Subsidiary’s
per type of industry industry discretion
Regulatory Chemical Pharmaceutical Low
(A) (B)
Self-Regulatory Responsible Care * High
(C) (D)
Industry’s Low High
discretion
Source: Adapted from the research design (sections 1.2 and 2.1 of this thesis) following methodological 
recommendations from Miles and Huberman, 1994. Note: * self-regulation attempts in a non-sensitive 
industry is regarded as a surprising finding.
Altogether, this table summarizes some aspects of the empirical work. First, 
there is no industry-specific regulation in Brazil, although there is an environmental 
regulatory policy enforced by state agencies (as mentioned in section 3.3 of this 
thesis). However, the Brazilian chemical industry association has launched the 
Responsible Care programme, but the pharmaceutical industry lacks any similar 
scheme. Secondly, the more sensitive industry is obviously the chemical, the 
pharmaceutical industry being less susceptible to environmental problems (as 
discussed respectively in sections 4.3.1 and 5.3.1 of this thesis). Finally, the most
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surprising case (corresponding to cell ‘D’ in table 6.7) is the American pharmaceutical 
company - Eli Lilly.
Despite theoretical efforts (covered in chapter two of this thesis) to build this 
typology, the empirical findings regarding the subsidiary’s discretion demonstrated a 
distinctive pattern. Once again, Eli Lilly is a surprising case (among pharmaceutical 
companies) followed by Zeneca (among chemical companies). Zeneca is an interesting 
case of high discretion and poor performance in a sensitive industry, which is subject 
to self-regulation initiatives. Otherwise, Lilly is a case of low discretion and high 
performance in a non-sensitive industry, which lacks self-regulation.
In brief, the pattern that emerged in terms of subsidiary’s discretion (a concept 
discussed in section 6.1.2, grounded in Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987) is a 
consequence of the corporate management suggesting the existence of a national 
character. As such, DuPont and Eli Lilly have low discretion in the corporate 
environmental policy’s implementation; BASF and HMR have balanced discretion, 
and finally, Zeneca and Glaxo have high discretion.
In addition to this, there is some evidence suggesting that the regulatory policy 
of the home country is a key constraint in the incorporation of environmental issues by 
American companies (discussed in section 6.1.1). However, this assumption was not 
confirmed by German and British subsidiaries (which may be linked to the historical 
explanations for the internationalization of European versus American companies, 
according to Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1992; Mayer and Whittington, in Whitley and 
Kristensen, 1996). Nevertheless, there are common elements of the managerial 
approach followed by subsidiaries from the same origin, suggesting a ‘management 
style’ with the home country (developed in section 6.1.2). Overall, these findings 
highlight a weakness of this thesis, that is the limit of generalizations about national 
character and management structure based on two firms from each country of origin.
The investigation of TNCs’ subsidiaries headquartered in industrialized 
countries but located in a developing country, brings out an interesting pattern of 
analysis for environmental issues (Redclift, 1987; Miller, 1995; Sklair, 1995). Far 
from being a weak point of the research design the focus on one host country is a 
contribution to the literature. Prior investigations have been usually focused on 
companies with the same origin operating in distinct host countries (Flaherty and
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Rappaport, 1991; Leonard, 1988; Pearson, 1985-1987; Ives, 1985; Gladwin, 1977). 
Additionally, the choice of TNCs from different origins has produced an 
understanding of the distinct pressures that TNCs’ subsidiaries are subjected from their 
home countries. It was also found that TNCs’ practices in a developing country are 
influenced by the predominant management pattern from their country of origin. The 
table 6.8 summarizes the finding regarding the type of management approach followed 
by the subsidiaries and its consequence in terms of environmental performance (that is, 
the control of industrial pollution according to the Brazilian legal requirements).
Table 6.8 - Summary of management approach versus performance
per country of origin
United States United
Kingdom
Germany
Management approach:
Decentralized X
Formalized coordination X
Centralized coordination X
Environmental impacts:
under control X X
out of control X
Source: Adapted from the research design (sections 1.2 and 2.1 of this thesis) following methodological 
recommendations from Miles and Huberman, 1994.
To illustrate, Glaxo Group has a very ambitious corporate environmental 
policy. In such a case, the corporation is neither subject to strict environmental 
regulatory policy nor industry attempts at self-regulation in environmental issues (in 
the home country). However, the environmental commitment was made and a number 
of corporate reports disseminated instruction that affiliates should adopt and 
implement the corporate environmental policy following a decentralized management. 
Nevertheless, there is no strict control over operational performance, the result was a 
poor environmental performance in Glaxo’s subsidiary. In conclusion, decentralization 
seems to be a very ineffective strategy to be followed for environmental issues (if one 
includes subsidiaries located in developing countries).
The subsidiaries’ discretion and how it could be related to environmental 
performance, may be easily justified by the ‘agency versus structure’ discussion 
(Wendt, 1987; Ghoshal and Westney, 1993). In such a case, the subsidiaries are parts
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of the corporation’s structure at the same time that they challenge such a structure. 
Zeneca’s case is an interesting example of conflict with headquarters over the 
implementation of the corporate environmental policy. The local managers used their 
discretion (granted by the decentralized approach) to reject, delay and misinterpret the 
corporate requirements (similarly to Glaxo’s case). The managers usually indicated 
their decisions by reference to local requirements (it may include a legal obligation 
and/or the lack of obligation, such as in Lilly’s case).
As shown in the literature review (addressed in chapter one) the discretion of 
TNCs’ subsidiaries to adopt environmental policies was not anticipated, mainly due to 
their location in a developing country (Sklair, 1994). Other authors (Strange, 1994; 
Gleckman, 1995; Doz, 1981; and Ghoshal and Westney, 1993) also suggested this lack 
of discretion in the TNCs’ subsidiaries. On the other hand, reports from NGOs and 
environmentalists disagree that there is environmental concern in subsidiaries located 
in developing countries. Accordingly, the double-standards will prevail as a 
comparative advantage of transnational business (Bruno, 1992; Greenpeace, 1992; 
Commoner, 1990).
The scarcity of literature on the implementation of corporate environmental 
policies has motivated this thesis. Moreover, the investigation of this phenomenon is 
mainly relevant for developing countries, where a set of constraints posed by the late 
and unequal process of development still makes environmental awareness a luxury for 
large groups of people (Keck, 1995; Castro, 1972). Nevertheless, developing countries 
are changing their views towards both TNCs (becoming more pragmatic, Stopford et 
al., 1991), and environmental protection (now interpreted more as a necessity, Miller, 
1995). However, the practical results in Brazil are still modest (Gladwin, in Pearson, 
1987, has made a similar argument regarding developing countries). Furthermore, the 
Brazilian environmental movement is relevant but not fundamental in explaining the 
changes in the business community towards environmental protection in that NGOs 
and consumers exert little pressure on companies’ practices.
With regard to the Brazilian context, it must be said that its “chaotic reality” in 
face of a well-organized literature has provided some insightful findings. According to 
Da Matta (1987, p. 26) “the secret of a correct interpretation of Brazil lies in the 
possibility of studying what is ‘between’ things”. Consequently many of the
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explanations that go beyond the home-host countries and industry subject-areas owe 
much to local conditions. The research design’s focus in one host country may be 
questioned by the limits it poses on the generalization from the cases, and how 
representative it could be of other developing countries. A similar investigation in 
other developing country will generate distinct results. However, a major contribution 
from the empirical work in Brazil is derived from the indication of the most relevant 
variables which explain the implementation of corporate environmental policies in 
TNCs’ subsidiaries.
Overall, one can identify the scarce attention in the literature concerning 
Brazilian attempts to manage external pressure vis-a-vis internal needs. For example, 
the institutionalization of environmental concern at the governmental level includes 
advanced programmes such as the ‘Proalcool’, the recovery of Cubatao, Ibama’s 
restrictions on new concessions for the timber industry, the first private-owned natural 
reserve in Parana, and the demarcation of the ‘Legal Amazon’ area, which is subject to 
special attention from the government for any development plan. This area is much 
broader than the tropical forest including distinct ecosystems at the border of the 
native forest. Nevertheless, there are aspects of the government’s commitments that 
are exclusively rhetorical responding to international pressure79.
Public environmental concern (through NGOs and consumers) may be a major 
explanation for the definition of environmental policies in home countries. But it is not 
a source of pressure in the Brazilian context. Besides, there is no evidence that 
companies are incorporating environmental concern because of consumers’ pressure 
and/or preferences80. At least in the Brazilian context these pressures were not
79 The Brazilian media has identified that Fernando Henrique Cardoso has followed this approach in the 
opening discourse at the UN summit (held in New York in June 1997) to evaluate the progress achieved 
since the UNCED. The President affirmed that the ‘Alcohol Programme’ will be re-started as part of 
Brazilian programme to curb carbon dioxide emissions already anticipating the agreement in the Kyoto 
Conference on climate change. However, there was no evidence of such commitment in the domestic 
context. In reality, this programme has been criticized by the subsidies granted to cane plantation (Jomal do 
Brasil, 11 July 1997).
80 In reality, there is a huge gap between consumers’ willingness expressed at opinion polls and changes in 
their buying behaviour. For example, Brazilian consumers would change traditional products for 
environmentally friendly substitutes in some categories (such as detergents, soup, cleaning products, soft 
drinks, drugs and cars) according to a marketing research made by Rhodia in 1990. In this survey 79% of 
the sample confirmed that they would change products when informed that they were pollution intensive 
(Jomal do Brasil, 5 June 1991, p. 14).
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apparent81. Business’s concern with consumers are present in the pharmaceutical cases 
(where the final consumers are clearly identified), but it does not mean that consumers 
criticize these companies’ operations and/or products. It is relevant to mention that the 
chemical sector has no final, but ‘intermediate industrial’ consumers.
The assumption that liberalization (which became a governmental policy from 
1990) and globalisation have exposed Brazilian companies to international 
competition, thus the business community was faced with the new challenge to 
incorporate environmental concerns, was refuted by all cases. The six TNCs’ 
subsidiaries are located in Brazil (i.e., their exports accounts for a maximum of 10 
percent of total sales) basically to supply the domestic market.
The main argument here is that ‘market forces’ (like any other source of 
environmental pressure), have limitations in the Brazilian context. However, it does 
not mean that voluntary business initiatives should be ignored as levers. The issue is 
more complex because it deals with contradictory forces. Therefore, it is not a case of 
substitution; regulation for self-regulation (in both research and governmental policy), 
because better environmental performance is a consequence of multiple and 
simultaneous factors.
Nevertheless, this new ‘liberal approach’ has many followers at the 
environmental agency. It may be interpreted as the novelty of market mechanisms 
whilst the state government is bankrupted. But, most importantly the domestic market 
has not suddenly incorporated environmental concerns; there are no green consumers 
in Brazil. Thus, changes based on international pressures will be restricted to 
companies that export to industrialized countries. Those are the companies willing to 
have environmental certification to secure their markets.
The ISO certification (similarly to other managerial tools, such as “just-in- 
time” and “quality control” in the past), prompted a real “fever pitch” among the 
business community and public servants in Brazil. It is really supposed to be the 
instrument that will increase environmental awareness within the industry. At the same 
time, it will solve compliance problems for the environmental agency (given that legal 
compliance was included as one of the requirements for certification). However, there
81 The findings from a pilot case study shows that Reckitt & Colman withdrew its range of environmentally 
friendly products from the market. The site is now producing traditional products (at a low price) due to an 
increase in the local demand (interview conducted in the Brazilian site, on 09/10/96).
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is evidence that the use of the best practices in Brazil “which originated in 
technologically more advanced cultures and in the context of capitalist economies, has 
proven that such transpositions are doomed to failure, or take much longer to become 
functional than is tolerable” (Amado and Brasil, 1991, pp. 48-49). This is because 
cultural diversity is not taken into consideration.
In addition, there is widespread belief that American centralized management 
is more efficient than its European counterpart. Such an assumption is translated into 
the incorporation of American standards, which will overshadow other EMS 
approaches and technologies (e.g., from Scandinavian countries and Germany). 
Nevertheless, the authorities have claimed to take into account environmental 
management which combines different cultures. This aspect could be further 
developed assisting the understanding why some practices are implemented faster than 
others or concerning which are the issues the local managers will struggle to accept. 
These may be intrinsically related to the local culture and preferences. Besides this, 
Brazil is a recipient of FDI from a diversity of countries of origin, which should be 
managed as an asset in the search for better managerial approaches.
Considering that the lack of resources is an endemic aspect of Brazilian 
environmental agencies, it is necessary to disseminate distinct voluntary schemes. 
However, there is one mechanism that could produce a demonstrative effect in the 
business community, that is, to improve the transparency of the environmental agency. 
In such a case the media and/or NGOs could be the ideal partner to make public the 
polluters as well as the best environmental practices.
Overall, Brazilian environmental regulatory policy is a(^key element driving 
business behaviour towards cleaner technology and pollution prevention. Despite the 
expectation of further liberalization (in both the international and regional - by the 
Mercosur - levels) it is necessary to regulate companies regarding issues such as waste 
management and environmental disclosure. Accordingly, as a result of the local 
difficulties to enforce the law some state governments have regulated what was 
traditionally a voluntary instrument of self-assessment. Moreover, there is an attempt 
to make obligatory environmental auditing (project of law 3160 from 1992 in the 
Brazilian Federal Congress) valid in the country. This initiative suggests that 
environmental agencies are aware that the current regulation alone is not able to
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produce good environmental practice in Brazil (though the penalty for misuse or 
failure to accomplish the self-assessment is exclusion from register).
On the other hand, the assumption that self-regulation will make companies 
more environmentally responsible is dubious because of the traditional rationality of 
short-termism and profits. The findings presented throughout chapter four and five 
demonstrate that such a mentality is still detrimental to the environment (which 
confirms Thomas, Thomas and Wilkin, 1996). There are therefore limits for what 
could be expected from self-regulation regarding environmental issues82. However, 
these attempts should be understood as bargain instruments to be used in negotiations 
with the government regarding the expectation of more and/or stricter environmental 
regulations (Turner and Hodges, 1992).
Moreover, TNCs are still imposing their standards (which have been 
hypothetically imposed on them by governments, shareholders and other stakeholders 
in their core markets) in host countries. However, their attempts at more global 
standards aim to facilitate their operations worldwide, at the same time that they 
impose similar standards on their competitors. In sum, this is not a case of “business 
ethics”, but an attempt to control their institutional environments. Consequently, they 
remain closed and unaccountable on a worldwide basis, although they disclose 
information in those countries where shareholders and regulations obligate them. So 
far there is no sign that TNCs have changed their “financial rationality”. In broad 
terms, there is the arrogant assumption that the management of global issues should be 
made accordingly to norms from Western industrialized societies (Thomas, in Thomas 
and Wilkin, 1996).
Overall, this thesis has also contributed to the literature by illustrating some 
environmental consequences of the industrial development in Brazil. Those findings 
reporting environmental degradation should be understood as a result of the 
“modernist project” (Robertson, 1992), which took place in the name of progress 
and/or generation of wealth in the postwar period, in conjunction with the 
multinational corporations phenomenon.
82 For example, there is no representation of the ICC in Brazil. Such lack of representation in developing 
countries was confirmed by ICC in the UK because their concern is concentrated on the major markets (that 
is, specifically the Triad markets) of TNCs’ operations. However, a temporary office was created in Rio 
during the UNCED in 1992 (in cooperation with the Brazilian National Committee of ICC) confirming ICC 
interests on international environmental issues (Eden, 1994; Gleckman, 1995).
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In addition to this, globalisation has been weakening the regulatory capacity of 
the state and has been strengthening the influence of other actors such as the TNCs. 
However, the empirical findings suggested that some practices already taken for 
granted at the TNCs’ home countries are not present in subsidiaries located in Brazil. 
Therefore, the burden of pressuring TNCs’ subsidiaries towards environmental issues 
should not be left to NGOs, environmentalists and/or the community at a local level, 
because they might not be available (as in the Brazilian context).
On the contrary, pressure should be also placed on the TNCs’ headquarters by 
their home countries’ governments, international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations. The WRI (1984, p. 6) states that industrialized countries should not try 
to extend their environmental norms to the foreign operations of their MNCs. This 
argument represents the short-term interests of the business community since they 
benefit from distinct regulatory contexts. Moreover, multinationals have been 
extending other aspects of their home-based operations founded on competitive 
advantage.
Nevertheless, the Brazilian government could assume a more active role 
towards environmental performance of business. It seems that there are opportunities 
(based on a bargaining approach) to require a more proactive role from TNCs’ 
subsidiaries. It is specifically by technical assistance and pressure over local suppliers 
that these companies may contribute to enhance environmental concern. However, it is 
clear the lack of social responsibility among the selected cases (though BASF’s case 
may be an exception).
It is relevant to note that the disposal of hazardous waste may became a critical 
environmental issue in Brazil. This finding suggests the urgent need for launching a 
scheme to clean up sites because there is a large amount of environmental burden to be 
recovered. In addition, there is no reliable evaluation of wastes disposed during the 70s 
and early 80s. Finally, Brazilian economic and political stability since the mid-90s, and 
the (rhetorical) environmental commitments from TNCs’ headquarters and 
international business associations (such as ICC) have made redundant the 
subsidiaries’ excuses for their poor performances.
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6.3.1 - Summary of findings
The findings from this thesis will be summarized according to the four levels 
of analysis followed in the investigation of the implementation of corporate 
environmental policies in Brazilian subsidiaries.
First, at the international level the most relevant aspect is the lack of pressures 
on the selected subsidiaries in Brazil. Evidence was not found in particular from 
international environmental NGOs, consumer and business associations. However, 
these pressures have been found by other studies in the context of industrialized 
countries. Therefore, if both aspects are combined it leads to the argument that the 
context of the country of origin may exert more influence on the corporate 
environmental policies and practices than the context of subsidiaries. This is mainly 
because the environmental movement in Brazil has been concentrated on the 
preservation of natural resources (reflecting much of the international NGOs interests 
in Brazil), which usually does not directly affect the business community.
Nevertheless, the analysis of the industrial sectors shows that globalisation has 
exerted an influence on the TNCs’ operations in Brazil. However, it has had a distinct 
pace and consequences for each industrial sector. More specifically, the changes and 
trends in the world chemical industry have been incorporated by the Brazilian industry. 
For example, technological innovation, market demands and competition are much 
more a consequence of calculation from the corporation than from their positions in 
the Brazilian market. As such, local managers either lack knowledge of the causality of 
improvements or attribute much importance to the fact that their production is 
basically directed to the domestic market.
Furthermore, the high environmental impact and risks of accidents in the 
chemical industry means that improvements represent a cost. On the other hand, the 
technological expertise (in operational and managerial terms) has become a new 
business for chemical companies. Most importantly, these services are basically sold 
to other TNCs’ subsidiaries, which shows an integration among TNCs either as 
suppliers or consumers. Moreover, the importing of technology and standards in this 
sector has maintained the current dependence of domestic firms on foreign companies.
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The pharmaceutical industry has benefited from unique momentum; that is, 
deregulation of imports and pricing control, new patent laws and the creation of a 
regional trade bloc in South America. Combined with the historical profitability of this 
sector, it results in high investments in expansion and modernization. Such 
investments will probably result in environmental improvements in a industry with 
minor impacts.
At the national level there are some qualifications to be made between the 
home country and the host country contexts. That is, there is evidence that the 
nationality of the firm is a relevant variable explaining the implementation of 
corporate environmental policies; therefore pressure should be exerted at the home 
country level (i.e., the headquarters context). This is mainly because it is there that 
decisions over investments are made as well as where powerful shareholders and 
consumers are located.
In short, the legislation from the host country was mentioned as the minimum 
requirement followed by the selected TNCs’ subsidiaries. However, these claims were 
more rhetorical than practical in some cases (i.e., Zeneca and Glaxo). The few 
practices recognized as examples of overcompliance are based on headquarters 
guidelines (such as in BASF and HMR) and/or home country regulatory requirements 
that have been incorporated by the companies (such as in DuPont and Lilly).
In regulatory terms, there is evidence that more legislation is expected in the 
Brazilian context. Nevertheless, self-regulation will remain useful instrument of 
leverage in the business community to respond to external pressures. Brazil has been 
quite innovative by turning a traditionally voluntary instrument - environmental self- 
assessment - obligatory. This instrument includes different elements (such as 
disclosure and assessment) together, which may be a realistic option in the face of the 
state’s weakness in enforcing the current legislation. An increase in the use of market 
instruments to improve environmental performance, such as the recent water taxation, 
is also expected.
At the company level the most striking aspect is the evidence that 
decentralization is not the best approach to environmental issues. This is a 
controversial issue because of the evidence that environmental impacts are site- 
specific; consequently it calls for decentralization in the management of subsidiaries’
305
operations. However, such decentralized management must include some type of 
control and/or assessment of the subsidiaries’ environmental practices. Additionally, 
there is evidence that the environmental management of TNCs’ subsidiaries reflects 
corporate management. The latter has specifically incorporated elements from their 
country of origin.
6.3.2 - Directions for further research
First of all, future research should be focused on the agency of NGOs as actors 
(which has been already suggested by Halliday, 1994, p. 242), such as TNCs, in the 
national and/or international context regarding environmental issues. More 
specifically, it is necessary to explain why subsidiaries use the local legal requirements 
as excuses for non-compliance with headquarters standards. Furthermore, the lack of 
representation of international business associations (e.g., ICC and BCSD) in 
developing countries deserves further investigation, because it may confirm the 
rhetorical aspect of their environmental commitments.
Moreover, there is evidence that TNCs (at both headquarters and subsidiaries 
levels) have been exaggerating their environmental improvements in developing 
countries (through aggregated data in environmental reports). There are many potential 
explanations for such behaviour (including economic, cultural and/or historical 
explanations). However, the use of critical theory could be a more useful basis to 
understand and explore this phenomenon.
This thesis has presented evidence that the TNCs’ nationality is a relevant 
factor in explaining corporate environmental policies. However, it is recognized that 
the national character requires further development, because it permeates the 
environmental regulatory policies, the corporate environmental policy, management, 
technology and environmental disclosure. Consequently, it should not be assumed that 
TNCs are dispersed networks of power; indeed, they still have a core of power where 
strategic decisions are made (this locus is in the industrialized countries). 
Nevertheless, there is a vast literature that reports TNCs as powerless agents.
This thesis has not covered all aspects of TNCs’ activities, however in terms of 
environmental issues it shows that the subsidiaries’ discretion is exercised resulting in
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both good and poor performance. Moreover, there is a strong indication that the 
corporate management is constrained by its institutional embeddedness in the home 
country. Consequently, cultural differences should be taken into account in the future 
because they are at th^corp o f  the explanations of corporate environmental policies in 
TNCs’ subsidiaries.
In addition to this, the contradiction between rhetorical commitment (without 
top management commitment) and short-term (mainly financial) pressure over 
subsidiaries is an area that deserves further research. There is some evidence that a 
distinct epistemological approach would refute some aspects of the mainstream 
international business literature. There are some issues, such as lack of shared values 
and management philosophy towards environmental issues, that could be addressed in 
an attempt to understand the effectiveness of corporate environmental policies in 
developing countries. That is, management is not culture and value-free; therefore, it is 
necessary to take them into consideration. The reality’s complexity (with its social, 
political and environmental demands) is voluntarily incorporated by the business 
community in rare cases. These case are basically found in industrialized countries, but 
rarely in developing countries.
The variation in the environmental performance of the selected TNCs’ 
subsidiaries leads to the conclusion that industry is a relevant (basically economic- 
specific) variable, but it is simplistic to believe that this is the most important aspect 
explaining corporate environmental policies. However, data aggregation by industry is 
quite useful as a control variable given that the task context has similarities. Thus, it is 
recommended that further research is undertaken in developing countries in other 
industrial sectors. Nevertheless, the main concern should be focused on potential 
impacts rather than on volume of pollution (that is, pollution-intensiveness); because 
some sectors have high risks of fire and contamination but low rates of pollution 
emissions (e.g., the pharmaceutical).
Finally, the nationalistic view expressed by the Brazilian government on 
environmental issues (from early 70s until late 80s) reflects a historical vulnerability 
towards external influences. However, it is very rare in the literature to find such 
historical explanations and the explicit recognition that they deserve to be taken into 
account when analysing environmental management in the developing world.
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In epistemological terms, there are two relevant points to be questioned in the 
future in the field of international relations, as follows: (a) the authority of the 
researcher to analyse and drawn conclusions from the data when doing comparative 
studies regarding that the final report usually exclude the description of the case 
studies (according to Stake, in Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, such description could allow 
the reader to learn directly from the case), and (b) the extent to which the developed 
versus developing countries (or North-South) discussion is still central to any 
investigation following a similar research design.
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Appendices
A.1 - Further Methodological Aspects
A.1.1 - Criteria forjudging the quality of research design
The internal validity test was performed during the data analysis (presented in 
chapters four, five and six) through the use of a “pattern-matching” approach. Yin 
(1994, p. 33) suggests other tactics (e.g., explanation-building and time series analysis), 
however, the “pattern-matching” type seemed to be more suitable for this thesis because 
of the complementary propositions. External validity was ensured by the use of multiple 
case studies, with the intention of producing “replication logic”. That is, the method of 
generalization is “analytic generalization”, in which the empirical results from the cases 
were compared to the theoretical framework (Ibid., p. 31).
The reliability test was provided by the access, reported as an appendix, to the 
data collection model1. According to Yin “the goal of reliability is to minimize the errors 
and biases in a study” (Ibid., p.36). Thus it was demonstrated that the same procedures 
(i.e., the data collection methods adopted and followed) might be repeated in the same 
case, and that the investigator could arrive at the same results and conclusions. However, 
there is not a high probability that this procedure will obtain the same result by 
consecutive testing. In contrast, according to Popper (1992), empirical generalizations 
are falsifiable instead of verifiable. This means that theoretical assumptions can be 
tested by systematic attempts to refute them.
A.1.2 - Data collection and case studies description procedures
The data collection was organized in three phases: the first in the home 
countries, and the subsequent phases in the host country (see Appendix 2 - section A.2.2 
- for a summary of the data sources). The first phase was focused on the collection of 
documents interpreted as the ones that support the environmental commitment from the 
corporate level. This means a corporate policy to be implemented worldwide as well as
1 This database called “case study protocol” was developed during the research data collection, see 
Appendix 2 for further details.
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the disclosure of major achievements. In sum, only secondary data was collected at this 
phase from the headquarters.
Attempts to collect data through interviews at the headquarters (in the UK, the 
US and Germany) were difficult and unproductive. It must be said that the lack of 
institutional support is one of the explanations for the difficulties in the US. Due to high 
concerns about environmental liabilities, some American companies systematically 
refused access. The reasons for problems of access in the UK and Germany were not 
given. Nevertheless, access was obtained in two British TNCs in the tobacco and 
household sectors2. These two cases were used as pilot cases, consequently they are not 
reported here.
In the second phase (in the host country context) the data collection was 
achieved through semi-structured and direct interviews at the corporate and operational 
levels of the companies3. Interviewees were members of the staff responsible for 
environmental management in the Brazilian subsidiary. Accordingly, the semi-structured 
guideline has ensured that all issues were properly and equally discussed in each case, 
which improved the quality of intra-case and cross-case analysis. The research 
propositions were covered in the guidelines and an effort was made to avoid asking 
questions that induced biased responses.
Aiming to acquaint interviewees with the areas of questioning and also to 
prepare secondary data as evidence, the guideline for interviews was sent long before the 
meetings. Here, one very peculiar situation emerged. That is, the interviewees read the 
guidelines only at the beginning of the meetings, which turned out to be a common 
characteristic of Brazilian managers. In addition, the most reliable way to contact them 
was in person and/or by phone, because written information was not given due attention.
In the third phase, faithful to the intention to use other sources of evidence4, the 
environmental agencies, local environmental pressure groups and industry associations 
were interviewed in Brazil (partially addressed in chapter three). The basis for these
2 The semi-structured guideline for interviews at the headquarters is available in section A.2.3.
3 The semi-structured guideline for interviews at the subsidiaries is available in section A.2.3.
4 The research was particularly concentrated on triangulation by data source and by method (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, p. 266). Briefly, several sources were contacted during the fieldwork activities in Brazil, 
such as: Foreign Relations Ministry; Ministry of the Environment; IBAMA; WWF; research agencies; 
Central Bank; BNDES; FIESP; business associations; scholars from ‘Funda?ao Getulio Vargas, 
Universidade de Brasilia, Pontiffcia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro, Universidade Federal de 
Santa Catarina, UNICAMP, and Universidade de Sao Paulo’.
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(open-ended and focused) interviews were both the literature reviewed (in chapters one 
and two), and the cases’ findings (reported in chapters four, five and six).
Finally, another important element in the data collection process was that all 
interviews were tape-recorded. After the transcription and translation, a brief report was 
sent to the companies to be approved by the interviewees, in order to fill the gaps in the 
respective case studies. It must be said that the responses to this latter request were 
mixed; consequently the utility of such approach is questionable (though it was 
suggested by Yin, 1994, in order to construct validity).
A.1.3 - Data analysis
It is generally acknowledged that analyzing data is one of the most difficult tasks 
in case studies, because the process requires a constant effort to keep strict logic (Yin, 
1994, p.25). Information unrelated to the research propositions, though frequently 
interesting, was left aside. A conscious effort was made to analyze and write down the 
data early in the process; furthermore the data was analyzed individually in each case. 
However, it required several versions of the cases before the categories of data were 
really defined.
One helpful approach in explanatory studies is the establishment of causal 
relationships, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions (it will 
also test the internal validity). This “pattern-matching” approach was adopted in order to 
link information collected from each case to the theoretical propositions. The main pre­
condition for this tactic is to have, at least, two rival propositions that can be 
complementary or contradictory. Therefore, it will result in two unlike patterns to be 
used to interpret the findings (Ibid., pp. 25-26). The most common rival theory has been 
the “null hypothesis”, which is simply the absence of the target hypothesis. However, 
Yin (1993, p. 60) suggests that for case studies “the best rival is a true rival - one that is 
mutually exclusive from the target theory. ... a poor rival would be one that is 
substantively different from the target theory but that also can coexist with the target 
theory”. In principle, this thesis assumed a “null hypothesis” based on the home-host 
dilemma. But after data collection the industry- and home-specific propositions became 
“poor rivals”.
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The logic underlying the use of multiple-cases is that each case must be carefully 
selected to predict similar results (a literal replication) or to produce contrasting results 
but for predictable reasons (theoretical replication). Another relevant step in the 
replication procedure is the development of a rich theoretical framework (Yin, 1994, p. 
46). In this thesis the theoretical framework was based on complementary propositions 
(that is, home-, host-, industry- and company-specific), which resulted in sets of 
explanations (organized from chapters three to six) for the implementation of corporate 
environmental policies.
One important question in doing case studies concerns generalization, because 
cases are not “sampling units” (Ibid., p. 31). In this thesis the method of generalization is 
the analytic (in contrast to the statistical generalization obtained from the use of 
statistical sampling), compatible with the research design. The diagram below illustrates 
the process of analytical generalization:
Case study 
findings
Theoretical framework Rival theory
If two or more findings Findings are more
support the same theory potent if they do not
the result is replication support the rival theory
Source: Adapted from Yin, 1994, p. 31.
According to Yin, each individual case will “indicate how and why a particular 
proposition was demonstrated (or not demonstrated)”. On the other hand, the cross-case 
analysis will “indicate the extent of the replication logic and why certain cases were 
predicted to have certain results, whereas other cases - if any - were predicted to have 
contrasting results” (Ibid., pp. 49-50).
The data analysis was accomplished in three phases, each of the phases was 
subsequent to the phases followed for data collection. The first occurred with the 
analysis of headquarters’ secondary data, in which written documents were the main 
source of evidence on the contents of corporate environmental policies. Other sources of 
secondary data (such as newspapers, reports, etc.) were also used to avoid 
overdependence solely on environmental disclosure from TNCs. At the same time, with 
the aim of understanding the home countries’ contexts, the analysis of selected variables
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were included in the literature review. It included the environmental regulatory policies, 
NGOs and consumers’ environmental pressures. Finally, the industry association’s 
commitment to environmental issues were also included.
The second phase of data analysis happened after the data collection in Brazil. 
This phase included the investigation of the implementation of corporate environmental 
policy in six subsidiaries. The fieldwork in Brazil was accomplished in four months 
(including the investigation of two pilot cases). The data accumulated (from documents, 
newspapers, interviews and observation) was first organized according to source and 
later summarized following the research propositions. Such repetitive description and 
analysis of the cases was a helpful process of data reduction, as suggested by Miles and 
Huberman (1994, pp. 10-11). Furthermore, the authors advocate the use of more 
‘inventive and systematic’ data display which permits conclusion drawing (table 1 
below is an example of such data display).
Table 1 - Summary of evidence from the Brazilian subsidiaries
(International level+ - - - - -
Home country level:
1- Environmental No* Yes No No Yes No*
regulatory policy
|Host country level:
2- Environmental Yes* Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes
regulatory policy
[industry level:
3- Industry structure Yes Yes Yes No No* No*
and commitment
jCompany level:
4- Headquarters’ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
strategic decisions
Notes: * means that this case has some exceptional explanation regarding the proposition, which was 
discussed in chapter six (section 6.2.1); + there was no evidence of international pressures from NGOs, 
consumers and business associations in the selected cases, thus no proposition was included in the final 
report.
The final phase of analysis was based on data from the previous stages. The data 
was finally organized into a matrix of countries of origin and industrial sectors, with the 
purpose of producing replication or theoretical explanations of the research propositions 
(as suggested by Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 207). The cross-case analysis was based
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upon similarities and then differences within the similarities. At the same time, the 
opposite process was undertaken to avoid biases. This tactic facilitated the search for 
more sophisticated explanations and new questions for further research.
The first step was to compare cases 1, 2, 3 and 4, 5, 6, looking for similarities 
determined by the same industrial sector, which produced literal replication to the host- 
and industry-related propositions. The second step was to compare case 1 with 4, case 2 
with 5, and 3 with 6, to produce similarities as a result of a shared country of origin. 
These steps produced literal replication with some degree of variance. The similarities 
discovered were compared again, and differences that were expected confirmed both 
industry-based and country-based explanations. In such a case the theoretical replication 
was achieved (this phase is illustrated in the table 2 below).
Table 2 - Comparative analysis
Country of origin 1st result: 2nd result: Final result:
Industrial
Sector
UK US Germany Literal
Replication
Theoretical
Replication
Chemical
Case 1 
(Zeneca)
Case 2 
(DuPont)
Case 3 
(BASF)
Similarities 
due to 
same 
sector
Comparison
of
similarities
between
IF...
Differences
are
Pharma­
ceutical
Case 4 
(Glaxo 
Wellcome)
Case 5 
(Eli Lilly)
Case 6 
(Hoechst 
Marion 
Roussel)
Similarities 
due to 
same 
sector
two
different
industrial
sectors
industry-
based
1st result: Similarities 
due to same 
country
Similarities 
due to same 
country
Similarities 
due to same 
country
2nd result:
Literal
Replication
Comparison
three
of similarities 
different
between
countries
Final result:
Theoretical
Replication
IF....
Differences are country- based
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A.2 - Case study protocol
A.2.1 - Summary of attempts to collect data
This is a brief report of the attempts made to gain access to selected sources of 
evidence. It includes requests for primary and/or secondary data made to companies, 
business and industry associations, environmental pressure groups, and international 
organizations.
List of companies per industrial sector
Company Positive Secondary Negative No answer
answer data answer
Chemical:
Zeneca X X
DuPont X X
Dow X
Union Carbide X
BASF X X
Monsanto X
Household:
Reckitt & Colman X X
Unilever X X
Colgate X X
Johnson & X
Johnson
Procter & Gamble X
Lubricants:
Castrol X
Texaco X
Shell X X
Exxon X
Mobil X
Pharmaceutical:
Glaxo Wellcome X X
Merck X
Eli Lilly X X
Hoechst Marion X X
Pfizer X
Tobacco:
B.A.T. Industries X X
Philip Morris X
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List of business and industry associations
Association Primarv Secondary No
data data answer
International Chamber of Commerce (UK) X X
US Council for International Business X
Confederation of British Industries X
Chemical Industries Association (UK) X X
Chemical Manufacturers Association (US) X
Verband der Chemischen Industrie X
Brazilian chemical industry association X X
Brazilian pharmaceutical industry X X
association
Soap and Detergent Association (US) X
Soap and Detergent Industry (UK) X
British Lubricants Federation (UK) X
Independent Lubricant Manufacturer (US) X
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturer
of America (US) X
Assn. of the British Pharmaceutical X X
Industry
Tobacco Assn. of United States X
Tobacco Advisory Council (UK) X
List of international governmental and non-governmental organizations
Organization Primary Secondary No
data data answer
UNCTAD - Programme on TNCs X X
UNEP - Industry and Environment X
Friends of the Earth (UK) X
Greenpeace (UK) X
WWF (UK) X
Greenpeace (US) X
Environmental Defense Fund (US) X
WWF (US) X
Greenpeace Brazil X
WWF Brazil X X
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A.2.2 - Summary of the data sources
I - Main source of evidence
The data collected at headquarters and Brazilian subsidiaries are summarized as 
follows:
1) Headquarters
(a) secondary data: formal environmental statements, public relations brochures, 
corporate environmental, health and safety manuals, environmental annual reports.
(b) primary data: interview with the manager responsible for the corporate 
environmental policy.
2) Brazilian subsidiary
(a) secondary data: formal environmental statements, corporate EH&S manuals and 
guidelines, environmental and annual reports.
(b) primary data: interviews with the manager responsible for the adaptation and 
implementation of the environmental policy (at the corporate and operational levels).
The data analysis (based on documents, interviews and direct observation) has 
generated a set of case reports regarding the implementation of the corporate 
environmental policy. These reports were sent to the subsidiaries for their evaluation 
prior to the cross-case analysis. This tactic (as suggested by Yin, 1994) aimed to enhance 
the reliability of this thesis.
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II - Other sources of evidence
The data collected at other sources is summarized below:
1) Non-governmental organizations
(a) environmental pressure groups:
The data collection was concentrated on documents (reports, leaflets, 
campaigning material, and newspaper articles) and interviews with representatives of 
international and local pressure groups (located in Brazil). The main purpose was to 
identify the existence of specific relationships between environmental practices of 
TNCs’ subsidiaries and those groups' actions in Brazil.
(b) industry associations:
The data collection included the gathering of documents (reports, manual, and 
newspaper articles) and interviews with those responsible for environmental issues in 
the industry associations. The main purpose was to investigate the dissemination of 
guidelines for environmental management. It was also relevant to address the role of the 
associations in the companies’ compliance with environmental regulatory policy.
2) Environmental agency
The data collection was focused on the laws and regulations regarding industrial 
pollution control, at the federal and state levels. In addition, interviews (specifically 
regarding TNCs’ subsidiaries) were held at the federal and state environmental agencies.
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A.2.3 - Guideline for interviews
These are the guidelines used during the interviews at the selected companies.
A) Guideline of interview - headquarters
1- What are the main aims and goals of the corporation’s environmental policy (CEP)?
2- Which programmes and/or procedures have been created to implement such a policy?
3- When were those programmes and/or procedures adopted?
a) Are all of them formal procedures?
b) Are there any informal procedures? Why?
4- Which of the following provoked a change in your overall, company-wide 
environmental policy?
a) change of legislation in your home country,
b) change of legislation in a host country,
c) environmental accidents at your premises,
d) environmental accidents at other companies,
e) environmentally related legal action involving your company,
f) environmentally related legal action involving other companies,
g) consumer related events (e.g. boycotts),
h) worker related events,
i) other.
5- What are the main lines of action so that the CEP might produce results of short and 
long term?
6- Which strategic choice is made by the corporation on issues of environmental 
protection?
a) standardization
b) local adaptation
7- Does the corporation have specific company-wide environmental policies and 
standards, beyond those required by national law or regulations?
a) Which environmental issues are covered?
8- How many subsidiaries adhere to such an environmental policy?
a) How was the CEP adapted to fulfill the environmental legislation of the host 
countries?
9- Is the aim of “zero emissions” a realistic goal for your company?
If Yes, a) How does the company manage action with resources to achieve such a goal?
10- What is the organizational area of the corporation responsible for the CEP’s 
definition?
11- What is the political-administrative unit responsible for its implementation?
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a) Is the decision-making process centralized or decentralized?
b) Are these activities linked and/or integrated to health and safety?
c) How many employees are directly involved in activities of data collection, training 
and communication of such a policy?
12- What does public opinion, on a global basis, see as the corporation’s most serious 
environmental problem(s)?
13- What does the corporation itself see as its most serious environmental problem(s) on 
a global basis?
14- What does the company see as its major international environmental problem(s)?
15- Does the corporation have any special concern about its operations in developing 
countries? Especially regarding the following:
a) use of CFCs,
b) control of air emissions,
c) protection of drinking water supplies,
d) protection of seawater,
e) maintenance of land for safety zones,
f) protection of wetland and rainforest,
g) trade of genetically-engineered products,
h) the disposal of hazardous waste,
i) education programmes for workers and surrounding community.
16- What are the most innovative environmental management practices currently in use 
in your company’s main sectors of operation?
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B) Guideline for interview - Brazilian subsidiaries
Departamento de RelagSes Internacionais 
Pesquisadora: Ana Lucia Guedes 
Orientador: Dr. Ian Rowlands
Tftulo da tese: “Polfticas ambientais5de empresas multinacionais no Brasil”
I- Visao geral da Corporagao6
a) Quais sao os principals segmentos de negocios (setor industrial/produtos) no Brasil?
b) Quantas sao e onde estao localizadas as unidades de fabricagao no Brasil?
c) Quais sao os produtos fabricados e comercializados por sua unidade?
II- Adogao e implementagao da polftica ambiental
1- Aspectos gerais
a) Seria possfvel identificar historicamente a preocupagao da empresa7 com questoes 
ambientais?
b) Ha alguma polftica especificamente voltada para questoes ambientais?
c) Como a polftica ambiental tern sido implementada?
d) Quais sao os principals objetivos e metas definidos pela polftica ambiental?
e) Quais sao os principals programas e procedimentos para a implementagao da polftica 
ambiental?
2- Aspectos tecnologicos
a) Houve alguma mudanga nos processos e/ou produtos com o objetivo de minimizar 
impactos ambientais?
b) Como ocorre a transferencia de tecnologia dentro da corporagao? Considerando 
especificamente o princfpio de 'BestAvailable Technology’.
c) Existe alguma atividade de Pesquisa & Desenvolvimento de processos e/ou produtos 
na empresa?
3- Aspectos operacionais
a) Quais sao as principais fontes de impactos ambientais da empresa?
b) Existe algum tipo de comunicagao para o publico extemo quanto a evolugao das 
praticas ambientais da empresa?
c) Houve a definigao de indicadores de performance ambiental? Quais sao?
III- Influencia de princfpios externos na polftica ambiental da empresa
1- Instituigoes internacionais
5 Polftica ambiental 6 definida nesta pesquisa como princfpios gerais relacionados &S decisoes estrategicas 
da empresa, especificamente em termos de gerenciamento dos seus impactos ambientais, seguidos e 
implementados pelas unidades da corporagao.
6 O termo corporagao 6 definido nesta pesquisa como o conjunto de todas as subsidi&rias e o headquarters 
no pafs de origem.
7 O termo empresa sera sempre usado com referenda a subsidiaria no Brasil.
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a) Existe alguma referenda na polftica da empresa a princfpios e/ou carta de inten9 oes 
internacionais? (como por exemplo, International Chamber o f Commerce, CERES - 
Valdez principles, Business Council fo r Sustainable Development)
b) A empresa tern conhecimento das crfticas feitas nos relatorios das Nagoes Unidas? 
(especificamente os estudos da Transnational Corporations and Investment Division)
c) Existe algum aspecto da polftica ambiental voltada para promo9 ao de 
“desenvolvimento sustentavel”?
2- Aspectos legais
a) Quais sao as leis e/ou regulamentos que afetam as atividades produtivas e de 
comercializagao da empresa?
b) Como e o relaciomento da empresa com o orgao de fiscaliza9 ao?
c) Existe algum aspecto da polftica ambiental que seja relacionado com a legislagao 
ambiental no pafs de origem da empresa?
3- Aspectos relacionados ao setor industrial
a) Existe algum aspecto da polftica ambiental que seja resultado de princfpios definidos 
pela associagao industrial?
b) De que forma as caracterfsticas estruturais do setor industrial constrangem as praticas 
ambientais da empresa?
c) Seria possfvel identificar alguma lideranga setorial (considerando os principals 
competidores nacionais e internacionais) em termos de praticas ambientais?
d) A empresa exerce e/ou sofre alguma pressao sobre/de fomecedores para minimizar 
impactos ambientais?
4- Relacionamento com a sociedade
a) Quern sao os principals consumidores dos produtos da empresa? Existe algum tipo de 
demanda por produtos e/ou processos ambientalmente seguros?
b) A empresa tern sido pressionada por organizagoes nao-govemamentais dedicadas a 
proteQao ambiental?
c) Houve alguma demanda da comunidade local por praticas de prote9 ao ambiental?
5- Rela95es com o Headquarters
a) Existe padroniza9 ao e/ou adapta9 ao local de praticas ambientais?
b) A defini9 ao e implementa9 ao da polftica ambiental e feita de forma centralizada e/ou 
descentralizada?
c) Existe alguma demanda especial do headquarters para com sua subsidiaria devido a 
sua localiza9 ao em um pafs em desenvolvimento?
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